A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness, where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds descriptive uncertainty about the non-moral facts of a situation into the model by treating choice-worthiness as a random variable. When agents face greater descriptive uncertainty, the choice-worthiness random variable will have a greater spread and a larger (...) standard deviation. MEC, as a decision rule, is sensitive only to the expected value of the random variable and not to its standard deviation. For example, MEC is insensitive to cases where an option with a large degree of descriptive uncertainty may have a higher probability of being below some threshold of impermissibility than does an option with less dispersion, even though the latter has a higher expected choice-worthiness. When applied to the same situation, similar moral theories will have statistically correlated choice-worthiness values. This correlation affects the dispersion of the credence-weighted sum of the random variables but not its expected value. Thus, MEC is insensitive to aspects of the normative situation to which a good decision-rule should be sensitive. (shrink)

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments (...) fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the (...) challenge as a threat to recent skepticism about such views. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should (...) exploit the formal analogy between moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for (...) natural language indicative condi- tionals and bets on conditionals. Within our framework the so-called “defective” truth table, in which participants choose a third value when the antecedent of the indicative conditional is false, becomes a coherent response. We show that only de Finetti’s system has a good descriptive fit when uncer- tainty is the third value. (shrink)

The chapter presents Laclau and Mouffe’s theory and then outlines some of the most important criticism of their discourse analysis. After a brief summary of key terms, such as hegemonic articulation and constitutive outside, the chapter positions Laclau and Mouffe within the post-Althusserian moment, arguing that they inherit certain unresolved problems from this origin. The first problem concerns the application of categories derived from the theory of ideology to the entirety of the social field, which leads to what the chapter (...) calls ‘descriptive indeterminacy.’ The second problem concerns the suppression of the normative dimension in the theory of social subjectivity, which leads to an oscillation between neutral description and partisan intervention. In both cases, Laclau and Mouffe’s response to these criticisms is explored and evaluated. (shrink)

We offer a new argument in favour of metanormative contextualism, the thesis that the semantic value of a normative ‘ought’ claim of the form ‘ S ought to Φ’ depends on the value of one or more parameters whose values vary in a way that is determined by the context of utterance. The debate over this contextualist thesis has centred on cases that involve ‘ought’ claims made in the face of uncertainty regarding certain descriptive facts. Contextualists, relativists, and (...) invariantists all have plausible ways of explaining these cases, and one could reasonably judge the debate between these views to be a stalemate. We argue that this stalemate can be broken by shifting focus to a case that involves normative uncertainty rather than descriptive uncertainty. While relativist and invariantist rivals of contextualism can give plausible accounts of the descriptive uncertainty cases, only contextualism can provide a plausible account of the normative uncertainty case. (shrink)

The current study investigates how native speakers of a morphologically complex language handle uncertainty related to linguistic forms that have gaps in their inflectional paradigms. We analyze their strategies of dealing with paradigmatic defectivity and how these strategies are motivated by subjective contemporaneousness, frequency, acceptability, and other lexical and structural characteristics of words. We administered a verb production task with Finnish native speakers using verbs from a small non-productive inflectional type that has many paradigmatic gaps and asked participants to (...) inflect the verbs in a given context. Inflectional uncertainty was measured by the number of different forms the participants produced for each verb. We classified produced forms that were not expected as either synonymous or novel and measured their optimal string alignment distance to expected forms. Our analyses revealed that a usage-based approach to paradigmatic defectivity fits better with the obtained results than a classical approach typically met in dictionaries and descriptive grammars. Thus, we argue, that paradigmatic defectivity can be better described as a dynamic rather than a static system, where gaps represent a continuum of possible inflectional choices rather than a lack of an inflectional variant. (shrink)

We typically have to act under uncertainty. We can be uncertain about the relevant descriptive facts, but also about the relevant normative facts. However, the search for a theory of decision-making under normative uncertainty is doomed to failure. First, the most natural proposal for what to do given normative uncertainty faces two devastating problems. Second, the motivations for wanting a theory of what to do given descriptive uncertainty do not carry over to normative (...) class='Hi'>uncertainty. Descriptive facts may be inaccessible even in principle, and ignorance of them excuses one from blame, but normative facts are in principle accessible, and ignorance of them arguably is no excuse. Normative facts differ from descriptive facts: normative facts affect what we ought to do no matter what, while descriptive facts affect what we ought to do only insofar as we are aware of them. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is generally regarded as the physical theory that is our best candidate for a fundamental and universal description of the physical world. The conceptual framework employed by this theory differs drastically from that of classical physics. Indeed, the transition from classical to quantum physics marks a genuine revolution in our understanding of the physical world.

Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that have (...) tested less cognitively sophisticated species. By using the same uncertainty-monitoring paradigms across species, it should be possible to map the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition and illuminate the emergence of mind. We provide a unifying formal description of animals' performances and examine the optimality of their decisional strategies. Finally, we interpret animals' and humans' nearly identical performances psychologically. Low-level, stimulus-based accounts cannot explain the phenomena. The results suggest granting animals a higher-level decision-making process that involves criterion setting using controlled cognitive processes. This conclusion raises the difficult question of animal consciousness. The results show that animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition. Remaining questions are whether animals also have the phenomenal features that are the feeling/knowing states of human conscious cognition, and whether the present paradigms can be extended to demonstrate that they do. Thus, the comparative study of metacognition potentially grounds the systematic study of animal consciousness. Key Words: cognition; comparative cognition; consciousness; memory monitoring; metacognition; metamemory; self-awareness; uncertainty; uncertainty monitoring. (shrink)

Something is not working in ethics consultation: in certain situations, relationships within families and with careproviders and surrogates have become so emotionally charged and destabilized that attention is dominated by conflict and misunderstanding, foreshadowing a loss of dignity and hope. In a compelling, urgent article, informed by events in the Schiavo case, with examples from the literature on theory, practice, and outcomes, Caplan and Bergman address this situation: redirecting our attention to what they see as “a lack of effective mechanisms” (...) for dealing with a “painful class of disputes in which families disagree with one another, or with doctors, about the care of those who cannot communicate.”1 It is no small matter that many of these cases are situated in the immediate, intense environment of end-of-life decision making. -/- How might we understand these encounters, and their limits? What can we hope? Following the tack of Caplan and Bergman, I will extend the discussion of the complex relationships between patients, families, surrogates, and physicians, and “hope for consensual resolution,” offering a somewhat different account of what is lacking. While Caplan and Bergman foreground an apparent irreconcilability of appeals to competing biomedical principles as what is lacking, I will suggest that a “salient characteristic” among participants, what Caplan and Bergman identify as a common concern for the patient’s best interests, may be far less stable and more complex, and thereby less directive, than first imagined. When Caplan and Bergman sketch their expectations for mediation and for mediators, they are right in noting that abstract principles “articulated as dispositive by designated ‘experts’ fail to capture, and arguably respect, the unique and complex nature of each such individual decision-making process,” and that “patients and families are at the extreme end of a power imbalance.” It is less clear that their descriptions — or their hope for mediation — capture this enormous challenge. (shrink)

The article discusses the theoretical status of the category of uncertainty. Instead of the classical definitions of uncertainty as an ontological or epistemological concept, a composite theoretical construct is proposed. In classical science, the objectivist representation of the subject of research was preferred. With the nonclassical type of rationality, there rises problem of including subjective elements in a theoretical description. Attention to subject-subject-object methodologies is increasing due to the complication of communicative interactions in science and society in the (...) digital era. One of the consequences of active innovative projective activity on a planetary scale and increasing risks is the perception in the public mind of uncertainty as a challenge. The author considers it appropriate to study the uncertainty-certainty as a paired category. The category of uncertainty was considered in philosophy, science, and management. The status of uncertainty as infinity and formlessness was recognized by Greek natural philosophers. Classical science developed the methodology of knowing the “infinite limit” through the construction of theoretical schemes (forms) and types of empirical testing. The paradox served as a means of destroying dogmatic schemes. In the context of increasingly complex communications in science, the importance of cognitive problems in the study of collective thinking and the personal beginning of creativity is increasing. Modern economic positivism is distinguished by its rejection of objective uncertainty, and the installation of the ability to efficiently manage exclusively accurate calculations is brought to extremes. (shrink)

Both existentialists and ethicists have made much of the concept of freedom. While these two camps make very different use of the concept, the relationship between the two is important: the nature and limits of freedom have an important bearing on moral responsibility, while the moral obligations to promote the development of freedom require that we understand just how free thinking is possible. In this paper, I will make some general observations about the prevailing trends in moral thought, both theoretically (...) and culturally. I argue that now as much as in the past, existentialist descriptions of how freedom is experienced are a crucial complement to theoretical work on morality. Specifically, I argue that the uncertainty of our moral horizons and suspicions of the degree to which we are really free makes Nietzsche’s view of freedom a good fit for the ethical work that faces us in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

According to Kant’s Universal Law Formula, maxims that cannot be conceived as universal laws denote duties of perfect obligation. In the recent literature, two versions of the Contradiction in Conception test have received the most attention. When acting on a maxim would violate a perfect duty, according to the Logical Contradiction Interpretation (LCI), universalizing the maxim would make it literally impossible to perform the action as described in the original maxim. According to the Practical Contradiction Interpretation (PCI), the locus of (...) the contradiction is as follows: the agent acts on the maxim in order to achieve some purpose, but were the agent’s maxim universalized, the purpose would be unattainable. Having examined the most widely accepted versions of both interpretations, I argue that i) PCI cannot generate contradictions for the maxims of any actions that violate perfect duties beyond those generated by LCI, ii) despite claims of its proponents, PCI cannot solve the vexing problem of relevant descriptions that Kant’s account faces, and iii) other arguments in favor of PCI are at best inconclusive. I therefore conclude that since LCI better coheres with the text, sympathetic interpreters should focus their efforts on LCI, not PCI. (shrink)

Uncertainty can’t be understood without taking into account both properties of the problem situation and agent’s knowledge about it. The correspondence of knowledge and situation of decision-making is crucial for understanding the onto-epistemological nature of uncertainty. At the same time, this correspondence is the key topic in virtue epistemology, especially in its ‘non-classical’, regulatory, branch, related to works of R. Roberts and W.J. Wood. In this article, genetic consultation is chosen as an example of such a problematic situation (...) since a doctor and a patient explicitly deal with the uncertainty of genetic risks. The problems of communication and joint decision-making in the context of medical-genetic consultation are comprehensively described in bioethics. At the same time, its social dimension is limited to the direct interaction of two individual agents, that allows us to use it as a model for constructing the ethics of uncertainty. In this article, four forms of uncertainty are identified: descriptive, normative and radical uncertainties, and translation uncertainty. Referring to the approaches of virtue epistemology, the author brings each of these forms into conformity with the proposed regulatory principle. The regulations assume that generating or disseminating knowledge under conditions of uncertainty require taking into account the incompleteness of the presented model of reality in its four aspects. A modelled fragment of reality could change in a predictable (descriptive uncertainty) or unexpected (radical uncertainty) way. The goals and values of a model’s user can not be hierarchically ordered, and may also change in the future (normative uncertainty). User’s interpretations of the model may be diverse, and can never be strictly defined by the intentions of the model’s author (indeterminancy of translation, or uncertainty whether success of co-reference is achieved). (shrink)

A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What (...) we call ‘normative epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty in justifying applied principles when our higher-level principles are open-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclear to generate determinate prescriptions. What we call ‘descriptive epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with uncertainty about empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance, that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot go beyond arrangements that we can know with reasonable confidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In both cases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach, which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principles and has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope of justice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach. (shrink)

We argue that in the decision making process required for selecting assertible vague descriptions of an object, it is practical that communicating agents adopt an epistemic stance. This corresponds to the assumption that there exists a set of conventions governing the appropriate use of labels, and about which an agent has only partial knowledge and hence significant uncertainty. It is then proposed that this uncertainty is quantified by a measure corresponding to an agent’s subjective belief that a vague (...) concept label can be appropriately used to describe a particular object. We then apply Bayesian networks to investigate, in the case when knowledge of labelling conventions is represented by an ordering or ranking of the labels according to their appropriateness, how measure values allocated to basic labels can be used to directly infer the appropriateness measure of compound expressions. (shrink)

We argue that in the decision making process required for selecting assertible vague descriptions of an object, it is practical that communicating agents adopt an epistemic stance. This corresponds to the assumption that there exists a set of conventions governing the appropriate use of labels, and about which an agent has only partial knowledge and hence significant uncertainty. It is then proposed that this uncertainty is quantified by a measure corresponding to an agent’s subjective belief that a vague (...) concept label can be appropriately used to describe a particular object. We then apply Bayesian networks to investigate, in the case when knowledge of labelling conventions is represented by an ordering or ranking of the labels according to their appropriateness, how measure values allocated to basic labels can be used to directly infer the appropriateness measure of compound expressions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new (...) reply to the objection to non-cognitivism, immune to the problems afflicting earlier replies. First, we argue that fundamental moral uncertainty is best understood as classificatory uncertainty, since the psychological factors behind fundamental moral uncertainty are analogous to the factors behind fundamental uncertainty regarding descriptive, non-moral, matters, and fundamental descriptive uncertainty is naturally understood as classificatory uncertainty. We call this the classification account... (shrink)

This article explicates how different approaches to teaching history can enforce diverse strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Descriptions of three types of historical pedagogy are analysed as three kinds of modelling systems derived from Juri Lotman’s theory of semiotics of culture: myth-type modelling, scientific modelling, and play-type modelling. The paper argues that the connection between pedagogical approaches and uncertainty, as an experience that occurs at the limits of knowledge, can be modelled as the relation between a semiotic system (...) and its boundary. The nature of this relation can differ depending on how the division between the internal and external space of the semiotic entity is perceived. Different types of modelling systems establish distinct patterns in order to deal with the indeterminacy of the borderland area. In the process of learning, these patterns can be viewed as semiotic strategies that various pedagogical approaches enforce when arriving at the limits of knowledge and facing the situation of indeterminacy that can cause students to experience uncertainty. Three different strategies are discussed in the context of history education: avoiding uncertainty in the case of the collective memory approach, addressing uncertainty in the case of the disciplinary approach, and accepting uncertainty in the case of the post-modern approach to teaching history. (shrink)

Tomographic approach to describing both the states in classical statistical mechanics and the states in quantum mechanics using the fair probability distributions is reviewed. The entropy associated with the probability distribution (tomographic entropy) for classical and quantum systems is studied. The experimental possibility to check the inequalities like the position–momentum uncertainty relations and entropic uncertainty relations are considered.

Feature logics are the logical basis for so-called unification grammars studied in computational linguistics. We investigate the expressivity of feature terms with negation and the functional uncertainty construct needed for the description of long-distance dependencies and obtain the following results: satisfiability of feature terms is undecidable, sort equations can be internalized, consistency of sort equations is decidable if there is at least one atom, and consistency of sort equations is undecidable if there is no atom.

How do people make difficult decisions in situations involving substantial risk and uncertainty? In this study, we presented a difficult medical decision to three expert physicians in a combined “thinking aloud” and “cross examination” experiment. Verbatim transcripts were analyzed using script analysis to observe the process of constructing and making the decision, and using referring phrase analysis to determine the representation of knowledge of likelihoods. These analyses are compared with a formal decision analysis of the same problem to highlight (...) similarities and differences. The process of making the decision resembles an incremental, sequential‐refinement planning algorithm, where a complex decision is broken into a sequence of choices to be made with a simplified description of the alternatives. This strategy results in certain kinds of relevant information being underweighted in the final decision. Knowledge of likelihood appears to be represented as symbolic descriptions capturing categorical and ordinal relations with “landrhark” likelihoods, only some of which are described numerically. Numerical probabilities, capable of being combined and compared arithmetically, were not observed. These observations suggest an explanation for the heuristics and biases in human decision making under uncertainty in terms of the processes that manipulate symbolic descriptions of likelihoods and construct plans of action for situations involving risk and uncertainty. (shrink)

The epic, page-turning history of how a group of physicists toppled the Newtonian universe in the early decades of the twentieth century. Marie Curie, Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Albert Einstein didn't only revolutionise physics; they redefined our world and the reality we live in. In The Age of Uncertainty, Tobias Hürter brings to life the golden age of physics and its dazzling, flawed, and unforgettable heroes and heroines. He immerses us in a half century (...) of global turmoil against which some of humankind's greatest and strangest scientific discoveries unfolded, expertly guiding us through the brilliant and mind-bending ideas that turned the world on its head. The work of the twentieth century's most important physicists produced scientific breakthroughs that led to an entirely new view of physics -- and a view of the universe that is still not fully understood today, even as evidence for its accuracy is all around us. The men and women who made these discoveries were intellectual adventurers, renegades, dandies, and nerds, some bound together by deep friendship; others, by bitter enmity. But the age of relativity theory and quantum mechanics was also the age of wars and revolutions. The discovery of radioactivity transformed science, but also led to the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Throughout The Age of Uncertainty, Hürter reminds us about the entanglement of science and world events, for we cannot observe the world without changing it"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

We propose a definition of physical objects that aims to clarify some interpretational issues in quantum mechanics. We claim that the transformations generated by the objective properties of a physical system must be strictly interpreted as gauge transformations. We will argue that the uncertainty principle is a consequence of the mutual intertwining between objective properties and gauge-dependant properties. The proposed definition implies that in classical mechanics gauge-dependant properties are wrongly considered objective. We will conclude that, unlike classical mechanics, quantum (...) mechanics provides a complete objective description of physical systems. (shrink)

Even if we know all relevant descriptive facts about an act, we can still be uncertain about its moral acceptability. Most literature on how to act under such normative uncertainty operates on moral realism, the metaethical view that there are objective moral facts. Lay people largely report anti-realist intuitions, which poses the question of how these intuitions affect their interpretation and handling of normative uncertainty. Results from two quasi-experimental studies (total N = 365) revealed that most people (...) did not interpret normative uncertainty as referring to objective moral facts but rather as uncertainty regarding one’s own view, uncertainty regarding the culturally accepted view or as the result of ambivalence. Especially the anti-realist majority of participants interpreted normative uncertainty different to how it is described in the literature on choice under normative uncertainty. Metaethical views were also associated with lay peoples’ choice of uncertainty reduction strategies and with assumptions about the intended aim of such strategies. The current findings suggest that empirical investigations of normative uncertainty might benefit from considering folk metaethical pluralism, as the lay public largely disagrees with the metaethical assumptions underlying the current discourse on choice under normative uncertainty. (shrink)

In an earlier paper written in loving memory of Asher Peres, we gave a critical analysis of the celebrated 1935 paper in which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) challenged the completeness of quantum mechanics. There, we had pointed out logical shortcomings in the EPR paper. Now, we raise additional questions concerning their suggested program to find a theory that would “provide a complete description of the physical reality”. In particular, we investigate the extent to which the EPR argumentation could have (...) lead to the more dramatic conclusion that quantum mechanics is in fact incorrect. With this in mind, we propose a speculation, made necessary by a logical shortcoming in the EPR paper caused by the lack of a necessary condition for “elements of reality”, and surmise that an eventually complete theory would either be inconsistent with quantum mechanics, or would at least violate Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. (shrink)

In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) Hertwig et al. draw a distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description. In a decision from experience an agent does not have a summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. A career choice, deciding whether to back up a computer hard drive, cross a busy street, etc., are typical examples of decisions from experience. In such decisions agents can rely only of their encounters with the corresponding prospects. By contrast, an (...) agent furnished with information sources such as drug-package inserts or mutual-fund brochures—all of which describe risky prospects—will often make decisions from description. In (Hertwig et al. , 2003) it is shown (empirically) that decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. Most of these results (summarized and analyzed in (Hertwig, 2009)) are concerned with the role of risk in decision making. This article presents some preliminary results concerning the role of uncertainty in decision-making. We focus on Ellsberg’s two-color problem and consider a chance setup based on double sampling. We report empirical results which indicate that decisions from description where subjects select between a clear urn, the chance setup based on double sampling and Ellsberg’s vague urn, are such that subjects perceive the chance setup at least as an intermediate option between clear and vague choices (and there is evidence indicating that the double sampling chance setup is seen as operationally indistinguishable from the vague urn). We then suggest how the iterated chance setup can be used in order to study decisions from experience in the case of uncertainty. (shrink)

The storage hypothesis—as described by Norby—is a descriptive thesis (for it yields systematic predictions of human behaviour across a wide range of situations) that has as a core commitment that degrees of belief are stable, persistent states. It is not clear to me that such a view is widely held in philosophy. If the storage hypothesis is not widely held, then arguments against it become less interesting. But is Norby’s argument against the view compelling in any case? I shall (...) argue that it is not. (shrink)

M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by (...) Oaksford and Chater. First, it is shown that their analysis data reported in the recent article of K. N. Kirby is unsound; second, an EIG analysis is presented of the experiments of P. Pollard and J. St. B. T. Evans that provides a strong empirical disconfirmation of the theory. (shrink)

We provide a mathematical description of quantum measurements with a finite exactness. The exactness of a quantum measurement is used as a new metric on the space of quantum states. This metric differs very much from the standard Euclidean metric. This is the so-called ultrametric. We show that a finite exactness of a quantum measurement cannot he described by real numbers. Therefore, we must change the basic number field. There exist nonequivalent ultrametric Hilbert space representations already in the finite-dimensional case (...) (compare with ideas of L. de Broglie). Different preparation procedures could generate nonequivalent representations. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a consequence of properties of a preparation procedure. The uncertainty principle “time-energy” is a consequence of the Schrödinger dynamics. (shrink)

A fuzzy predictive fault-tolerant control scheme is proposed for a wide class of discrete-time nonlinear systems with uncertainties, interval time-varying delays, and partial actuator failures as well as unknown disturbances, in which the main opinions focus on the relevant theory of FPFTC based on Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy model description of these systems. The T-S fuzzy model represents the discrete-time nonlinear system in the form of the discrete uncertain time-varying delay state space, which is firstly constructed by a set of local linear (...) models and the nonlinear membership functions. The novel improved state space model can be further obtained by extending the output tracking error to the constructed model. Then the fuzzy predictive fault-tolerant control law based on this extended model is designed, which can increase more control degrees of freedom. Utilizing Lyapunov-Krasovskill theory, less conservative delay-range-dependent stable conditions in terms of linear matrix inequality constraints are given to ensure the asymptotically robust stability of closed-loop system. Meanwhile, the optimized cost function and H-infinity performance index are introduced to the stable conditions to guarantee the robust performance and antidisturbance capability. The simulation results on the temperature control of a strong nonlinear continuous stirred tank reactor show that the proposed control scheme is feasible and effective. (shrink)

When constrained by limited resources, how do we choose axioms of rationality? The target article relies on Bayesian reasoning that encounter serioustractabilityproblems. We propose another axiomatic foundation: quantum probability theory, which provides for less complex and more comprehensive descriptions. More generally, defining rationality in terms of axiomatic systems misses a key issue: rationality must be defined by humans facing vague information.

I describe how close attention to the process of sculpting clay from the perspective of Material Engagement Theory can create a detailed description of a mutable sense of agency and of self. First, I show that sculpting is associated with a loss of sense of agency and self. Second, that to sense agency as a systemic phenomenon creates anxiety. Third, that meaning in an art encounter develops in association with an anterospective viewpoint. Fourth, that within the logic of the extended (...) mind, emergent meaning becomes openly available for further exploration. Fifth, that artistic creativity is not an opaque process. It proceeds in a similar manner to other forms of human, sense-making activities. Finally, that playing seriously with clay can be used in an investigative manner—as a tool for material conceptualisation. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic is also called a crisis of uncertainty because of so many unforeseeable events like canceled qualification competitions, loss of training facilities, and postponement of the Olympic games. Athletes and their entourage experience this uncertainty as stressful. Sport psychology practitioners are in a key position to support athletes in coping with these unforeseeable stressors. However, SPPs are similarly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and simultaneously have to cope with stress. Salutogenesis, which describes how to manage stress (...) and to stay well, provides a theoretical approach to how to cope with uncertainty. The salutogenetic approach aims at strengthening individuals’ sense of coherence and consists of three components, namely comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness. Although it is known that the SoC can be enhanced via psychological skills training, so far, this approach has not been systematically applied to the elite sport context. Athletes have been advised to see SPPs for help; thus, the question of how SPPs handle the time of uncertainty while supporting others emerges. The aim of this contribution was to outline how the salutogenetic approach can be applied to strengthening SPPs’ SoC via a single-day four-part workshop. Additionally, we applied the workshop to N = 26 volleyball coaches and evaluated the workshop’s effects on participants’ psychological aspects [i.e., the Sense of Coherence—Leipziger short version, resilience : coping with uncertainty, affective response, and stress via semantic differentials] and the workshop’s quality ratings. The evaluation provides results that show a positive impact on a descriptive level of the participants’ SoC, uncertainty, affect, and stress perception; however, the results show no significant main effect of time [F = 1.04, p = 0.467, ηp2 = 0.454]. Workshop quality and skill acquisition were positively evaluated; 82.00% of the participants would use the learned tools in the future. Thus, we outline how this workshop might help strengthen SPPs’ SoC and at the same time empower them to strengthen their athletes’ SoC. Overall, we add a theoretical and a practical perspective on how to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic for SPPS, athletes, and their support network. (shrink)

Tendencies and efforts have shifted from genome description, DNA mapping, and DNA sequencing to active and profound re-programming, repairing life on genetic and molecular levels in some parts of contemporary life science research. Mirroring and materializing this atmosphere, various life engineering technologies have been used and established in many areas of life sciences in the last decades. A contemporary progressive example of one such technology is DNA editing. Novel developments related to reproductive technologies, particularly embryo editing, prenatal human life engineering, (...) and germline engineering need to be analyzed against the broader social and structural background. The crucial analytical scope for this paper is a specific field: the life-editing technologies used in reproductive medicine and performed experimentally on viable human embryos, particularly CRISPR/cas9 technology. This text argues that germline editing technologies, as a representative part of contemporary biomedicine, are merging ideas of treatment and enhancement to avoid future risks. Using this specific life manipulation of embryos and gametes, the text analyzes these processes within the concept of power over life—biopower and the specific governing rationality that imagines, classifies, and governs contemporary societies. The text specifically focuses on the potential to create, define, and manage future risks and uncertainties related to prenatal life. (shrink)

ObjectivesTo examine the association between illness uncertainty, resourcefulness, and poststroke depression and identifies whether stroke patients’ resourcefulness plays a mediating role in the relationship between illness uncertainty and PSD.MethodsA cross-sectional study was conducted from September 2020 to April 2021. A convenience sample of 355 stroke patients was recruited. A general characteristic questionnaire, the Mishel Uncertainty in Illness Scale, the Resourcefulness Scale, and the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 were used to obtain data. Descriptive analysis, Student’s t-test, Mann–Whitney U-test, (...) chi-squared test, hierarchical regression analyses, Pearson correlation analysis, and mediation analysis with the PROCESS macro were used to analyze the data.ResultsIllness uncertainty, resourcefulness, and PSD were significantly related to each other. Resourcefulness partially mediated the relationship between illness uncertainty and PSD.ConclusionIllness uncertainty and resourcefulness were significantly associated with PSD, and resourcefulness played a mediating role between illness uncertainty and PSD. Interventions designed to reduce illness uncertainty and enhance resourcefulness may contribute to the prevention and improvement of PSD. (shrink)

Our understanding of the decisions made under scenarios where both descriptive and experience-based information are available is very limited. Underweighting of small probabilities was observed in the gain domain when both description and experience were provided. The divergence observed from the prospect theory suggests a need for a separate or modified theory of decision making under risk. Recent studies suggest a possible role of probability weighting in the choice behaviour under risk. We investigated both gain and loss domains with (...) and without feedback for small and large probability conditions. We characterized the shape of the probability weighting function by a two-parameter functional form representing discriminability (concave-convex shape) and attractiveness (level of absolute weights relative to objective probability). We replicated four-fold pattern of risk attitude on non-WEIRD population. We find that feedback leads to underweighting of small probabilities and overweighting of large probabilities in the gain domain and overall underweighting of probabilities in the loss domain. We find that underweighting of small probabilities is driven by changes in discriminability and attractiveness components in the gain domain and changes in the attractiveness component in the loss domain. We have interpreted the results by proposing an updated belief-based account of decisions under uncertainty in which feedback, when available, influences the probability weighting mediating the choice behaviour. (shrink)

Background There is ongoing debate regarding how moral distress should be defined. Some scholars argue that the standard “narrow” definition overlooks morally relevant causes of distress, while others argue that broadening the definition of moral distress risks making measurement impractical. However, without measurement, the true extent of moral distress remains unknown. Research aims To explore the frequency and intensity of five sub-categorizations of moral distress, resources used, intention to leave, and turnover of nurses using a new survey instrument. Research design (...) A mixed methods embedded design included a longitudinal, descriptive investigator-developed electronic survey with open-ended questions sent twice a week for 6 weeks. Analysis included descriptive and comparative statistics and content analysis of narrative data. Participants Registered nurses from four hospitals within one large healthcare system in Midwest United States. Ethical considerations IRB approval was obtained. Results 246 participants completed the baseline survey, 80 participants provided data longitudinally for a minimum of 3 data points. At baseline, moral-conflict distress occurred with the highest frequency, followed by moral-constraint distress and moral-tension distress. By intensity, the most distressing sub-category was moral-tension distress, followed by “other” distress and moral-constraint distress. Longitudinally, when ranked by frequency, nurses experienced moral-conflict distress, moral-constraint distress, and moral-tension distress; by intensity, scores were highest for moral-tension distress, moral-uncertainty distress, and moral-constraint distress. Of available resources, participants spoke with colleagues and senior colleagues more frequently than using consultative services such as ethics consultation. Conclusions Nurses experienced distress related to a number of moral issues extending beyond the traditional understanding of moral distress (as occurring due to a constraint) suggesting that our understanding and measurement of moral distress should be broadened. Nurses frequently used peer support as their primary resource but it was only moderately helpful. Effective peer support for moral distress could be impactful. Future research on moral distress sub-categories is needed. (shrink)

BackgroundClinical ethics case consultations (CECCs) provide a structured approach in situations of ethical uncertainty or conflicts. There have been increasing calls in recent years to assess the quality of CECCs by means of empirical research. This study provides detailed data of a descriptive quantitative and qualitative evaluation of a CECC service in a department of cardiology and intensive care at a German university hospital.MethodsSemi-structured document analysis of CECCs was conducted in the period of November 1, 2018, to May (...) 31, 2020. All documents were analysed by two researchers independently.ResultsTwenty-four CECCs were requested within the study period, of which most (n = 22; 92%) had been initiated by physicians of the department. The patients were an average of 79 years old (R: 43–96), and 14 (58%) patients were female. The median length of stay prior to request was 12.5 days (R: 1–65 days). The most frequent diagnoses (several diagnoses possible) were cardiology-related (n = 29), followed by sepsis (n = 11) and cancer (n = 6). Twenty patients lacked decisional capacity. The main reason for a CECC request was uncertainty about the balancing of potential benefit and harm related to the medically indicated treatment (n = 18). Further reasons included differing views regarding the best individual treatment option between health professionals and patients (n = 3) or between different team members (n = 3). Consensus between participants could be reached in 18 (75%) consultations. The implementation of a disease specific treatment intervention was recommended in five cases. Palliative care and limitation of further disease specific interventions was recommended in 12 cases.ConclusionsTo the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth evaluation of a CECC service set up for an academic department of cardiology and intensive medical care. Patient characteristics and the issues deliberated during CECC provide a starting point for the development and testing of more tailored clinical ethics support services and research on CECC outcomes. (shrink)

Many organizations must adjust their supply chains and business environments to remain competitive and retain market share. However, despite the benefits of such developments for organizations, they can lead to supply chain disruptions in many cases. An essential aspect of modern organizations is closed-loop supply chain management, which reduces risk by coordinating processes. This paper presents a mathematical model of a closed-loop green supply chain under uncertain conditions. A detailed description of the model and current assumptions for a specific industry (...) are provided. Consequently, the model is developed with several relevant objectives for the design of the network. Our proposed model has the following characteristics: being multiobjective, multiproduct, and multiperiodic. Our analysis indicates that the applied model can be used both to increase profitability and to reduce environmental damage. The problem was made more uncertain using fuzzy logic. Torabi and Hassini method is combined with Jiménez’s proposed method to solve the problem. (shrink)

A century after the advent of quantum mechanics and general relativity, both theories enjoy incredible empirical success, constituting the cornerstones of modern physics. Yet, paradoxically, they suffer from deep-rooted, so-far intractable, conflicts. Motivations for violations of the notion of relativistic locality include the Bell’s inequalities for hidden variable theories, the cosmological horizon problem, and Lorentz-violating approaches to quantum geometrodynamics, such as Horava–Lifshitz gravity. Here, we explore a recent proposal for a “real ensemble” non-local description of quantum mechanics, in which “particles” (...) can copy each others’ observable values AND phases, independent of their spatial separation. We first specify the exact theory, ensuring that it is consistent and has quantum mechanics as a fixed point, where all particles with the same values for a given observable have the same phases. We then study the stability of this fixed point numerically, and analytically, for simple models. We provide evidence that most systems are locally stable to small deviations from quantum mechanics, and furthermore, the phase variance per value of the observable, as well as systematic deviations from quantum mechanics, decay as \ time)\, where \. Interestingly, this convergence is controlled by the absolute value of energy, suggesting a possible connection to gravitational physics. Finally, we discuss different issues related to this theory, as well as potential novel applications for the spectrum of primordial cosmological perturbations and the cosmological constant problem. (shrink)

EI objetivo de este artículo es presentar los principios de la programación lógica borrosa y de sus principales variantes, ilustrándolas a través de un conjunto de aproximaciones que, a nuestro entender, son representativas de los avances en esta área. También incluimos la descripción de otros sistemas de programación lógica que se sustentan en lógicas de la incertidumbre diferentes de la lógica borrosa. En esta presentación presuponemos que la mayoría de los lectores no son expertos en programación lógica; para seguirla sólo (...) se requiere un conocimiento básico de la lógica de predicados.The purpose of this paper is to present the principles of the fuzzy logic programming, exemplifying them by a couple of proposals that we think are representatives of the advances in this field. We include also the description of another systems of logic programming with uncertain information that are based on other logics of uncertainty which are different from fuzzy logic. This article only presuppose anelementary knowledge of the classical first-order logic. (shrink)