In the light of the dramatic events in political society in Serbia the author examines the most basic question of political theory of constitutionalism, i.e. how is it possible for a revolution to culminate in a viable form of constitutional government.

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

This paper lays out the background and main features of Rawls’s new theory of justice. This is a theory that he began adumbrating about 1980 and that is given its fullest statement in his recent book Political Liberalism. I identify the main patterns of justification Rawls attempts to provide for his new theory and suggest a problem with one of these patterns in particular. The main lines of my analysis engage Rawls’s idea of constitutional consensus and his account of political (...) stability. (shrink)

The main goal of this essay is to provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of the Colourful Revolution in North Macedonia as a social movement. From a more general perspective, the paper engages with the growing interest in the literature that explores the correlation between social movements and democratisation processes, especially in societies that fall into the category of hybrid regimes. The Colourful Revolution is a good example of a protest movement that has created effective regime change. (...) It presented a complex social movement encompassing many fragmented social and political groups gathered around the idea of a common adversary. Additionally, the Colourful Revolution has one particularity: it is a social movement that has undergone a full developmental circle - formation through utilization of political opportunity frameworks, a period of activity and success and dissolution. Drawing on literature of the political process, opportunity frameworks and cycles of social movements, the paper argues that social movements such as the Colourful Revolution are not just temporary and unstable structures but are also highly dependent on the existence of a common target of the social activism in question. The removal from power of political actors that have been the reason for mobilisation of a complex and diverse network of social and political activism resulted in an absence of an adhesive factor holding together all the parts of this complex system. The absence initiated gradual discord and dissolution of different factions within the social movement and reveals its true nature - temporary, ideologically diverse, conflictual, and even undemocratic in some respects. (shrink)

In "Constitutional Goods" Alan Brudner presents novel conception of justice that will inform the content of the ideal liberal constitution. The content of this novel conception of justice is constituted by what Brudner describes as an inclusive conception of liberalism, and its justification is grounded on an account of public reason that is presented in opposition to that of John Rawls. I argue that we should reject both the content and justification of Brudner's conception ofjustice. Brudner is unable to construct (...) an inclusive conception of liberalism from elements of libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism, and his account of public reason lacks the properties of fairness and reciprocity that differentiate a reasonable agreement from a modus vivendi. This paper therefore defends a Rawlsian political conception ofjustice and justification from Brudner's criticisms and proposed alternatives. (shrink)

Few terms in political theory are as overused, and yet as under-theorized, as constitutional revolution. In this book, Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai argue that the most widely accepted accounts of constitutional transformation, such as those found in the work of Hans Kelsen, Hannah Arendt, and Bruce Ackerman, fail adequately to explain radical change. For example, a "constitutional moment" may or may not accompany the onset of a constitutional revolution. The consolidation of revolutionary aspirations may take place over (...) an extended period. The "moment" may have been under way for decades-or there may be no such moment at all. On the other hand, seemingly radical breaks in a constitutional regime actually may bring very little change in constitutional practice and identity. Constructing a clarifying lens for comprehending the many ways in which constitutional revolutions occur, the authors seek to capture the essence of what happens when constitutional paradigms change. (shrink)

After the emergence of a popular resistance movement to direct rule by an absolutist monarchy, and several years of civil war, King Gyanendra of Nepal yielded power to an elected Congress in 2006. Within one year, Nepali citizens saw the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly, the declaration of the Nepali state, and the declaration of the Nepali Republic a year after that. An Interim Constitution was adopted by 2007, which endowed the Constituent Assembly (...) with the authority to draft Nepal’s permanent Constitution, and established the limitations under which the Assembly must operate — all apparently legitimate steps in establishing a Constitutional order. What initially appeared to adhere to an established model of post-sovereign constitution-making failed in its first attempt. Indeed, the drafting and ratification of a permanent constitution is no easy task. Why did the first Constituent Assembly fail? Where did the constitution-making process divert from the post-sovereign model, and what caused it? I examine the process from the establishment of Nepal’s first Constituent Assembly to the short-lived deliberations of the Assembly, followed by the dissolution of the Assembly for failing to achieve its mandate. I also trace Nepal’s constitution-making process along the post-sovereign model, and assess whether they adhered to or diverted from the model. It is understood that no political models are fixed in the sense that adherence or divergence is necessarily incompatible with success or failure. However, I use Andrew Arato’s post-sovereign model as a guide for identifying the stages in the constitution-making process, and for a background to the discussion on where the first Assembly failed. (shrink)

We participate in moral debate, instead of taking morality for granted, because of discontent with the moral discourse in vogue. We feel that something is distorted or concealed. One way to expose deficiencies in established discourse is critical argument, but under certain specific historical circumstances, the apparent self-evidence of established moral discourse has gained such a sway, has acquired such an ability to conceal its basic vulnerability, that its validity seems beyond contestation. Then, all of a sudden, its vulnerability is (...) revealed, through the experience of laughter. Moral criticism is preceded by laughter. All crucial transformations in the history of moral thinking were made possible by laughter and moral criticism is originally a comic genre. The moral significance of laughter is recovered with the help of four philosophers of laughter: Bakhtin, Nietzsche, Bataille and Foucault. Laughter allows reality to appear in a certain light. It is a philosophical factor in its own right. This is explained through a thorough analysis of three crucial moral revolutions occurring in the fourth century B.C., the sixteenth century A.D. and the nineteenth century A.D. These transformations involved basic experiences of laughter articulated by three outstanding protagonists, namely Socrates, Luther and Ibsen. (shrink)

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle, la révolution copernicienne, en arrachant l’homme de sa position centrale dans le cosmos, lui a infligé une profonde vexation. Si elle dit bien notre désarroi contemporain face à un univers devenu infini, cette inter­pré­tation ne reflète pas suffisamment la complexité historique du passage du géocentrisme à l’héliocentrisme. Aussi convient-il de la remettre en question. Mais pour ce faire, il faut d’abord bien la connaître. Aussi cet article étudie-t-il la phase de structu­ration de cette interprétation (1835-1925), dans le (...) contexte du positivisme, du darwinisme, du marxisme et enfin du freudisme. ––– Según la interpretación tradicional, la revolución copernicana, al sacar al hombre de su ubicación central en el cosmos, le propinó una profunda incomodidad. Esta interpretación corres­ponde a nuestra desazón actual provocada por un universo infinito pero desconoce la complejidad histórica implícita en el tránsito desde el geocentrismo al heliocentrismo. Por ello es necesario volver a plantear el problema, y para hacerlo hay que abordar correctamente el tema. De ahí que el presente artículo estudie el período de estructuración de esta interpretación (1835-1925) en los contextos del positivismo, del darwinismo, del marxismo y finalmente del freudismo. (shrink)

In the early 1990s Israel underwent a so-called constitutional revolution. According to the champions of this revolution, Israel has essentially become, as a result of this momentous event, a constitutional democracy, upholding individual freedom and liberties and allowing for judicial review of parliamentary legislation. Despite the congratulatory rhetoric, it is generally agreed upon that the constitution is still in need of some essential supplements before Israel can qualify as a fully constitutional democracy. The main question addressed in this (...) paper is the following: is it ‘reasonable’ that Israel take the further necessary steps that qualify it as a fully constitutional democracy? The doubts raised in this regard stem from the very concerns that lead political philosophers (mainly Rawls) to stress the unique value of liberal democracy. As they argue, liberal democracy provides deeply divided societies with the best means to secure their legitimacy and political stability. Israel's political realities, I argue, defy this claim. Moreover, Israel's political realities may also carry a valuable lesson to other states, even to seemingly robust liberal democracies. It is not the purpose of the paper, of course, to argue that Israel's existing rule of government should be embraced by other states – far from that. Israel should undergo some radical changes so that it can protect the rights and interests of all its citizens. Yet, to achieve this purpose, it should transcend, I will argue, liberal democracy. As matters stand, simply strengthening its liberal character, Israel's political system may be exposed to a growing challenge to its legitimacy and stability. It should, therefore, reject liberal democracy and especially the principle of neutrality that is intimately connected with a liberal rule of government and embrace, instead, the ideal of multicultural democracy. This ideal, I argue, is better equipped to answer the need of deeply divided societies to secure their legitimacy and stability. (shrink)

We will examine the revolts, begun in October of 2019, and currently developing in Chile under three conjoined parts. First, we will not try to theoretically ‘tame’ the revolutionary creature, but rather to plug immanently into the energy of the ‘potentia’ of the revolutionary event. To this extent, we will highlight the shortcomings of a theoretical enterprise that intends to explain it in traditional terms or that thrives for a variant of simple ‘reformism’. Second, and consequently, we will describe how (...) the concept of the constitution is the perfect product of coloniality. Hence, the concept of the ‘constitutional trap’ is not something unique to the Chilean experiment, but that the constitutional idea itself is the main pipeline of coloniality and the most sophisticated product in the contention of democracy. Third, and to encompass and give a particular direction to the previous topics, we will deploy the ‘theory of encryption of power’ and the concept of the ‘hidden people’ to explicate the Chilean phenomenon under a new light, where no past is irrevocable, and no future is necessary. (shrink)

This chapter brings overlapping consensus and its relation to constitutional consensus together, center stage. Since constitutional consensus on its own goes a considerable distance toward providing political stability, the chapter explains how overlapping consensus goes beyond constitutional consensus. What overlapping consensus supplies, which freestanding justification and constitutional consensus can't, is a distinctive set of comprehensive moral and religious reasons endorsing and thereby justifying, each for its own reasons, the liberal order. The chapter takes up the difficult question whether traditional utilitarianism (...) could figure in an overlapping consensus that assigns priority to the “rights, liberties, and opportunities” characteristic of liberalism over the “claims of the general good.” It attempts to provide an argument for saying that a well‐known version of utilitarianism (called indirect utilitarianism) could in fact be part of an overlapping consensus so conceived. (shrink)

The Belgian Constitution of 1831 marked a decisive step in the continental evolution from Restoration constitutional monarchy, based on the monarchical principle, towards the establishment of parliamentary constitutional monarchy. At the time, the new balance of power desired by the Belgian revolutionaries was captured by the phrase ‘republican monarchy’. It is remarkable that this concept, despite being so central to the founding fathers’ deliberations, has hardly been commented upon by later historians and public lawyers. This article aims to reconstruct the (...) origin, meaning and uses of this concept in the context of the 1830 revolutionary wave. French revolutionary veteran general Lafayette was responsible for popularizing republican monarchy in the July Revolution, although the term’s origins went back to eighteenth-century debates on the reform of absolute monarchy. Lafayette used it to summarize the institutional demands of the republican movement vis-à-vis king Louis Philippe. Its transnational migration to the Belgian context subsequently entailed a shift in meaning which will be charted through an analysis of the Belgian constituent and public debates. Finally, the reasons for the concept’s sudden disappearance from the political stage will be addressed. (shrink)

Friedrich Engels, in 1895, reissued Marx's 'The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850' , with an Introduction endorsing peaceful political tactics. We review the primary evidence to bring order to a confusing picture that emerges from a range of conflicting interpretations of the document. Our conclusions are as follows: First, the 1895 Introduction does not signify a new position, considering Engels' recognition over several decades of political concessions by the British ruling class. Secondly, since from the 1840s Marx too had applauded (...) the potential of the 'Social Democratic' route, at least under the appropriate conditions, we may be confident that he would have approved of Engels' Introduction. Thirdly, the case for universal suffrage was to set the foundations for a classless communist system; Engels, we show, would have found unacceptable a Parliamentary system generating a working-class majority unwilling to carry out a communist program, or a working-class electorate choosing to replace the party at the polls. (shrink)

Friedrich Engels, in 1895, reissued Marx's 'The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850', with an Introduction endorsing peaceful political tactics. We review the primary evidence to bring order to a confusing picture that emerges from a range of conflicting interpretations of the document. Our conclusions are as follows: First, the 1895 Introduction does not signify a new position, considering Engels' recognition over several decades of political concessions by the British ruling class. Secondly, since from the 1840s Marx too had applauded the (...) potential of the 'Social Democratic' route, at least under the appropriate conditions, we may be confident that he would have approved of Engels' Introduction. Thirdly, the case for universal suffrage was to set the foundations for a classless communist system; Engels, we show, would have found unacceptable a Parliamentary system generating a working-class majority unwilling to carry out a communist program, or a working-class electorate choosing to replace the party at the polls. (shrink)

There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important case study for (...) both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy. (shrink)

From a Kuhnian perspective, a paradigmatic revolution in management science will significantly improve our understanding of the business world and show practitioners (including managers and consultants) how to become much more effective. Without an objective measure of revolution, however, the door is open for spurious claims of revolutionary advance. Such claims cause confusion among scholars and practitioners and reduce the legitimacy of university management programs. Metatheoretical methods, based on insights from systems theory, provide new tools for analyzing the (...) structure of theory. Propositional analysis is one such method that may be applied to objectively quantify the formal robustness of management theory. In this chapter, I use propositional analysis to analyze different versions of a theory as it evolves across 1,500 years of history. This analysis shows how the increasing robustness of theory anticipates the arrival of revolution and suggests an innovative and effective way for scholars and practitioners to develop and evaluate theories of management. (shrink)

It is difficult to imagine mathematics without its symbolic language. It is especially difficult to imagine doing mathematics without using mathematical notation. Nevertheless, that is how mathematics was done for most of human history. It was only at the end of the sixteenth century that mathematicians began to develop systems of mathematical symbols . It is startling to consider how rapidly mathematical notation evolved. Viète is usually taken to have initiated this development with his Isagoge of 1591, and a recognisably (...) modern symbol system was available by the 1630s . In little more than a generation, mathematicians went from writing mathematics in natural language to manipulating symbols much as we do today. The manipulation of symbols became both a source of new mathematics and a mode of mathematical argument. This required profound conceptual changes in both mathematics and philosophy; antique conceptions of number, proof, language, and mathematics had to be replaced or at least suspended. Thus, the development of mathematical symbolism was sufficiently rapid and profound to justify the word ‘revolution’.Moreover, what began as a technical innovation in mathematics soon took on a wider philosophical significance. The last line of Viète's introduction reads ‘To solve every problem’. Viète presumably meant that his algebra would solve every mathematical problem . However, two generations after Descartes, the teenage Leibniz articulated the characteristically modern dream of a general algebra of thought . In this ‘universal characteristic’, conceptual errors would …. (shrink)

This book constitutes the first treatment of C. S. Peirce’s unique concept of habit. Habit animated the pragmatists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, who picked up the baton from classical scholars, principally Aristotle. Most prominent among the pragmatists thereafter is Charles Sanders Peirce. In our vernacular, habit connotes a pattern of conduct. Nonetheless, Peirce’s concept transcends application to mere regularity or to human conduct; it extends into natural and social phenomena, making cohesive inner and outer worlds. Chapters in (...) this anthology define and amplify Peircean habit; as such, they highlight the dialectic between doubt and belief. Doubt destabilizes habit, leaving open the possibility for new beliefs in the form of habit-change; and without habit-change, the regularity would fall short of habit – conforming to automatic/mechanistic systems. This treatment of habit showcases how, through human agency, innovative regularities of behavior and thought advance the process of making the unconscious conscious. The latter materializes when affordances form the basis for modifications in action schemas and modes of reasoning. Further, the book charts how indexical signs in language and action are pivotal in establishing attentional patterns; and how these habits accommodate novel orientations within event templates. It is intended for those interested in Peirce’s metaphysic or semiotic, including both senior scholars and students of philosophy and religion, psychology, sociology and anthropology, as well as mathematics, and the natural sciences. (shrink)

This book places Benjamin’s writing on revolution in the context of his conception of historical knowledge. The fundamental problem that faces any analysis of Benjamin’s approach to revolution is that he deploys notions that belong to the domain of individual experience. His theory of modernity with its emphasis on the disintegration of collective experience further aggravates the problem. Benjamin himself understood the problem of revolution to be primarily that of the conceptualization of collective experience (its possibility and (...) sites) under the conditions of modern bourgeois society. The novelty of his approach to revolution lies in the fact that he directly connects it with historical experience. Benjamin’s conception of revolution thus constitutes an integral part of his distinctive theory of historical knowledge, which is also essentially a theory of experience. Through a detailed study of Benjamin’s writings on the topics of the child and the dream, and an analysis of his ideas of history, the fulfilled wish, similitude and communist society, this book shows how the conceptual analysis of his corpus can get to the heart of Benjamin’s conception of revolutionary experience and distil its difficulties and mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of the strategies and theories of democratic participation in Nigeria that breed institutional marginality and bad governance due to shortfalls in pursuing the values of justice and empowerment as core democratic characteristics. The same democratic principles such as voting, parliament, constitution, judiciary, that are suggestive of gains such as responsible use, and peaceful transfer of power may not have translated fully into sociopolitical empowerment for responsibility and representation in evolving democratic practice in Nigeria due to (...) problems of agency and political ideology. Democratic theorizing and participation in Nigeria has defied orthodox presuppositions seen in the disrespect for basic rights and the disregard for the rule of law in democracy that allow for fair play within and among the elites and political grassroots. Thus this study investigates the Nigerian predicament as a model or case study, raising questions about the reasons for the systematic disempowerment of groups. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with the character of scientific disputes tend to divide into two camps. On the one side there are those who hold that scientists can always settle their differences by appealing to shared assumptions; on the other side there are those who maintain that in many cases scientists must resort to (nonrational ) persuasion to establish their views. The trouble is that for all their strong points both approaches labour under enormous difficulties. Scientific disagreement is often much deeper than (...) the first conception allows while persuasion, propaganda and the like are far less prevalent than the second one requires. On examining scientific practice is becomes clear that philosophers on both sides err in supposing that scientists can resolve their differences in a purely scientific fashion just to the extent that they can single out one of their views on the basis of assumptions that they hold in common. For one thing scientists make progress even though they rarely employ the strategy of reversion to neutral territory. And for another the strategy of reversion to neutral territory is at odds with the important methodological requirement that all relevant information be taken into account. Instead of thinking of scientists as resolving their differences by reviewing their respective positions in the light of their shared assumptions, we should think of them as fashioning positions on which they can agree, as arguing to shared conclusions rather than from shared premises. The relevant picture is one of scientists gradually narrowing the distance that separates them, of their converging on a mutually acceptable viewpoint. Far from being prerequisites for scientists' resolving their disputes, shared assumptions are what result from their managing to resolve them. How scientists who disagree deeply make progress is thus much less of a problem than is usually supposed. What determines whether scientists' conclusions constitute advances is not wether they were obtained by the expedient of reversion to neutral territory but whether each of the available options was fully ventilated. When scientists take into account all the relevant considerations (including those introduced into the discussion by their opponents and those that they can reasonably be expected to know), the question of whether they can be said to have made progress no longer arises. More generally, we misconstrue the manner in which scientists resolve their differences because we allow ourselves to be guided by our philosophical preconceptions about scientific knowledge and we devote insufficient attention to what happens in practice. Instead of exploring how scientists reason to mutually acceptable conclusions, we wrongly assume that they cannot but proceed by reverting to neutral territory. What is needed is not a general account of consensus formation but rather a fresh look at the multitude of ways in which scientists make progress by dint of argument and debate. Considered as a phenomenon in its own right scientific disagreement poses no special problem; it is puzzling only when it is considered within the framework of traditional epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the theory of legitimacy at the core of John Rawls’ political liberalism. Rawls argues that a political system is well grounded when it is stable. This notion of stability embodies both pragmatic and moral elements, each of which constitutes a key desideratum of Rawlsian liberal legitimacy. But those desiderata are in tension with each other. My main claim is that Rawls’ strategy to overcome that tension through his theory of public justification is ultimately unsuccessful, because (...) the account of consensus it envisages is unstably placed between the extremes of moralized redundancy and pragmatic free-for-all. In other words, what counts as consensus is either regulated too tightly, or not enough. -/- . (shrink)

Consensus around what constitutes researcher conflicts of interest (COIs) and awareness of their influence on our research are two critical steps in ensuring the integrity of our science. In this research, data were collected from individual scholars via 2 surveys 5 years apart and from journals and associations to examine the level of social consensus and moral awareness among scholars, journals, and associations regarding researcher COIs. Although we observed increases in level of social consensus and moral awareness between 2012 and (...) 2017, results still revealed limited agreement about what relationships constitute a COI and limited awareness about the presence of and the ethical issues surrounding COIs. Although all journals and associations we examined supported COI disclosure, most did not provide researchers with detailed COI-related information, guidance, or disclosure tools. Limited social consensus and moral awareness regarding COIs is problematic because it inhibits the recognition, disclosure, and management of COIs and limits ethical decision making. We need to continue and enhance discussions about COIs and aim to create consensus and awareness where we do not have it with the goal of reducing potential scientific misconduct related to COIs. (shrink)

As early as 1962, Jürgen Habermas was convinced that Karl Marx’s theoretical attempt to ‘turn Hegel the right side up’ had resulted in a one-sided embrace of revolution and a perilous rejection of legality and rights. Habermas would restate these remarks thirty years later in Between Facts and Norms, noting that the collapse of state socialism, with its characteristic disdain for legality and rights, culminated in the discrediting of revolutionary Marxism. This article revisits Habermas’s theoretical dichotomy between revolution (...) and legality in view of his ambivalent relationship to ‘Marx’s spectre’ and shows its significance for Habermas’s ongoing debate with Wolfgang Streeck concerning the tension between democracy and capitalism. Using textual evidence from Marx’s neglected journalistic writings before, during, and after the 1848 revolutions, the article offers a competing perspective of Marx’s views on legality and rights at a time when their respective fates were critically at stake. A careful reconsideration of Marx’s reflections and a confrontation with his spectre offers Habermas fruitful resources for responding to Streeck’s critique and for reviving the project of ‘radical reformism’ at a time when the liberal constitutional order finds itself under attack. (shrink)

Scientific revolution has been one of the most controversial topics in the history and philosophy of science. Yet it has been no consensus on what is the best unit of analysis in the historiography of scientific revolutions. Nor is there a consensus on what best explains the nature of scientific revolutions. This chapter provides a critical examination of the historiography of scientific revolutions. It begins with a brief introduction to the historical development of the concept of scientific revolution, (...) followed by an overview of the five main philosophical accounts of scientific revolutions. It then challenges two historiographical assumptions of the philosophical analyses of scientific revolutions. (shrink)

Focusing on current efforts to persuade the public to comply with Covid-19 best practices, this essay examines what role appeals to religious reasons should (or should not) play in leaders’ attempts to secure followers’ acceptance of group policies in contexts of religious and moral pluralism. While appeals to followers’ religious commitments can be helpful in promoting desirable public health outcomes, they also raise moral concerns when made in the contexts of secular institutions with religiously diverse participants. In these contexts, leaders (...) who appeal to religious reasons as bases of justification for imposing Covid policies may seem to fail to show respect for the autonomy of those who lack the relevant religious commitments, and—especially when a leader herself rejects the religious commitments she makes reference to to persuade others—her appeals to religious reasons may seem to constitute ethically problematic exercises of manipulation. This essay draws on the resources of contemporary political philosophy to analyze and respond to these concerns and concludes that they are not sufficiently well-founded. To the contrary, it contends that there are good moral grounds for leaders to appeal to religious reasons as (partial) bases of justification for why followers should accept Covid policies. In the course of the argument, this essay also highlights how contemporary political theory can enrich discussions about the distinctions between coercion, manipulation, and leadership, and thereby give insight not only into the ethics of leadership but also—at least by the lights of central theories of leadership like that of James MacGregor Burns (1978)—into whether and how appeals to religious reasons can figure into genuine exercises of leadership, in contrast with mere instances of the wielding of social power. (shrink)