Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

The article analyses the problem of using European constitutional heritage in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia when interpreting the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The author analyses several judgments of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, wherein the Court refers to European legal heritage, when interpreting separate norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Such practice is particularly evident in two categories of cases. The influence of European legal heritage is (...) most clearly expressed in cases where the Court ascertains the essence of the continuity doctrine and when interpreting human rights enshrined in the Constitution (the Satversme). The author notes that constitutional courts reveal two tendencies. On the one hand, a constitutional court cannot ignore the international context. European courts are influenced by European Union law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. On the other hand, constitutional court judges in every country have sworn to be loyal to the national constitution and thus have a duty to exercise constitutional control. These tendencies are not necessarily objectionable. On the contrary–knowledge of the international legal context helps the Constitutional Court exercise its mission. (shrink)

The constitution’s standing as a legal act of the highest power not only ensures its exclusive status in the legal system but also determines the hierarchic certainty of all norms within that system. The explicit character of the constitution does not preclude it from ensuring the hierarchical functionality of the legal system. This latter function requires that the limitation “problem” of explicitness be addressed by interpreting the constitution as a systemic document. Applying the constitution, therefore, requires (...) a continuous effort in comprehending it. The official doctrine of constitutional judicial institutions reflects the standard for understanding the constitution. This standard becomes the sole source, not only de jure, but significantly de facto, for determining the legality of legal acts. The constitution, as the prime and foremost law in a country, determines the functionality of the entire system of legal norms. As a legal source, it takes on the role of the material arbiter of final legality. The constant need to ensure the functioning of the system of legal norms hence informs yet another necessity–to apprehend and understand the constitution and the norms and principles established within. A few factors induce this perpetual need for interpretation, those being (a) the abstractness of constitutional norms, (b) “competition” among constitutional norms, (c) the integral and systemic nature of the constitution, and (d) the problem of legislative/regulative omission in the constitution. (shrink)

In this Article, I assess James E. Fleming’s Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution. For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms. For that purpose: in Part II, I reexamine Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading”; in Part III, I reevaluate Fleming’s argument both “for moral readings and against originalisms”, which can be characterized as “fidelity to our imperfect constitution”; in part IV, I explicit three very helpful dichotomies to distinguish between moral readings, originalisms and legal pragmatism aka living constitutionalism: (1) fidelity and (...) anti-fidelity; (2) interpretation and non-interpretation aka (re)construction, (re)invention and (judicial) legislation; and (3) perfectionimperfection. Additionally, I reintroduce Lon L. Fuller’s distinction between “intelligent and unintelligent fidelity”, to point out the kind of fidelity that moral readers and everyone else must adopt: an intelligent fidelity; and, finally, I present my general conclusion. (shrink)

Certain works in the most recent Polish constitutional law literature suggest that there is acceptance of the principle or the concept of autonomous interpretation of a constitution (autonomy of interpretation of constitutional terms). The Constitutional Tribunal also makes reference to this in numerous rulings. Paradoxically, however, that concept is not very popular in legal theory. It might seem that Polish legal theoreticians and philosophers do not appreciate the concept of interpretation of a constitution devised through (...) practice with the support of constitutional law doctrine. It might, however, mean that opinions on autonomous interpretation of Polish Constitution are nothing more than rhetorical arguments formulated ad hoc not a coherent concept or a theory. This text is an attempt to analyse this concept and its potential in discussions surrounding application of the Polish Constitution. (shrink)

Unwritten constitutional conventions also known as lex non scripta, are under permanent scholarly scrutiny. This does not happen only in the Anglo-Saxon scholarly tradition. When analyzing the issues of unwritten law, a considerable number of representatives of this tradition, starting with W. Blackstone and finishing with contemporary British and American scholars, also talk about the existence of constitutional conventions. It should also be noted that issues pertaining to unwritten law and issues of conventions in particular, are often mentioned and analyzed (...) in the works of scholars of the Roman-Germanic legal tradition. Italian, French, German and Czech scholars take account of constitutional conventions, analyze their features and hold discourse on their future. However, in the course of scholarly debate, the issues of constitutional conventions have been dealt with in a fairly controversial manner. Even though individual scholars recognize constitutional conventions, the variety of opinions and conceptions is too large to form a uniform understanding. (shrink)

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and (...) answer affirmatively. I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

Legal scholars generally consider the theorisation and constitutionalisation of constitutional interpretation as a matter for the courts. This article first challenges this tendency on conceptual grounds, showing that no institutional commitment follows from the nature of interpretation in law, constitutional law included. It then provides guidance for thinking about institutional perspectives according to two criteria: the nature and normative strength of the sources interpreted and the capacity of the interpreter to include and consider every possibility affected when her (...) interpretation carries collective effects and is authoritatively final. The application of these criteria places the discussion on the grounds of democratic theory. The article thus reviews competing democratic theories and champions deliberative democracy as the alternative whose constitutive features best allow for the development of institutions capable of exercising constitutional interpretation when the imposition of meaning on the constitution is final and carrieserga omneseffects. (shrink)

In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act. Under the terms of the Act---one of the many pieces of moratory legislation enacted due to the Great Depression---mortgagors who found themselves unable to make their payments could turn to the state courts for an alteration of their payment schedule. It is clear that if there ever was a state of affairs in which one could justify the imposition of debtor (...) relief, the circumstances in Minnesota during the early 1930s would have filled the bill. By most accounts, the Act was justifiable from a policy perspective. ;Nevertheless, the outcome did not please everyone. The question before the Court was whether the proceedings authorized by the Act violated the contracts clause of the Constitution. Article 1, §10 provides that "No State...pass any...law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The Act did impair the obligation of mortgage contracts. Furthermore, the Act was exactly the kind of debtor relief legislation that the contracts clause meant to forbid. The basic premise underlying the majority opinion was that a constitutional provision should be interpreted both in the context of the entire Constitution and in the context of the social situation confronting the Court. According to the dissent, the framing of the Constitution fixed the meaning of a provision for all cases arising across time. The two approaches represent two extremes in constitutional interpretation. However, the basic agreement is over how the Constitution should evolve. The basic disagreement concerns the problem of constitutional change. ;In a recent work, Robert Lipkin radically rethinks modern constitutional jurisprudence, challenging the received view of constitutional change. His theory of "constitutional revolutions" implies that conventionalism, coherentism, pragmatism, and naturalism all fall short as the best theory of constitutional change. In addition to offering a critique of Lipkin's theory, the present work conducts an independent investigation the theories Lipkin rejects. Such an investigation will not only help ascertain the legitimacy of Lipkin's theory of constitutional revolutions in particular, but of radical constitutional change in general. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the possibilities to constitute meaning in the?borderline- situations? of the social sphere, such as the loss of validity of orientation within and experience of reality in the socially shared structures of the lifeworld. On the one hand, I will refer to A. Schutz? and his constitution-analysis of foreign understanding and of shared meaning; on the other hand, I bear onto I. Kert?sz literary project to narrate the biography of an Auschwitz-survivor as close to his experiential (...) perspective as possible. I will focus both on the concept of constitution and of interpretation with respect to their enabling of the transcending of a typologized everyday?s world which suppresses subjective meaning and its individual articulation. The main guideline is the problem how identity? i.e. a life-story? is configured out of subjective meaning without recourse to everyday reality. A. Schutz?s and Th. Luckmann?s note on a range of social transcendences and on biographical categories referring to the constitution of a socially shared meaning offer a theoretical perspective for dealing with constitutive differences within the reach of understanding social meaning; Kert?sz? narrative mode expandes this theoretical stance as it problematizes exemplary subjective experience. nema. (shrink)

This paper explores how the notion of distance works in the practice of interpretation by studying the philosophical underpinnings of the originalism debate in American constitutionalism. Focusing on some of its most important spokespeople, the paper shows that they start from the historicist presupposition that distance can in principle be overcome by a reconstruction of the original intentions of the framers of the Constitution. With the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who explicitly based his philosophical hermeneutics on the notion (...) of distance, this presupposition will be criticized. The paper concludes that the originalist and hermeneuticist positions do not mutually exclude each other, but can be synthesized if they are seen as different questions about the same text. The meaning of the Constitution is therefore not given but is dependent on the direction of the questions asked by the interpreter. From this question-dependency of meaning it follows that interpretation follows the law of acoustics: "Angle of incidence equates angle of reflection.". (shrink)

In this paper I defend constitutional review against the charge that it neces- sarily runs afoul of democratic principle. In so doing, I draw both on Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation as well as Raz’s theory of detached normative statements and reasoning from a point of view. After arguing that constructive interpretation can be undertaken from a point of view other than that of the interpreter, I go on to argue for the following claims: (1) Constitutional interpretation (...) and review can be undertaken from the point of view of the democratic community and its constitutional morality; (2) This process can be undertaken by a judge without the deliberate intrusion of her own personal moral convictions; (3) When undertaken from this point of view, constitutional interpretation and review can be rendered consistent with democracy; and (4) This is so even when these activities require a good deal of substantive moral reasoning and argument on the part of judges. (shrink)

"Judges should interpret the law, not make it." Nearly everyone assents to this proposition , so why is there controversy? In this essay I examine three grounds or sources of disagreement. First, the concept of interpretation is unclear. Second, there is uncertainty about whether legal interpretation raises special interpretive problems. Third, there is an implicit assumption among legal theorists that constitutional interpretation is a specially problematic kind of legal interpretation. My goal is to clarify these and (...) other misconceptions. In Chapter 2 I connect normative theories of adjudication to the concept of interpretation. In Chapters 3 and 4 I develop a conception of interpretation that explains how constitutional interpretation is possible and why it is necessary, thus refuting proponents of the invention and discovery models of adjudication. In Chapters 5 and 6 I develop theories of expression meaning and constitutional interpretation, respectively. Chapters 7 and 8 are critical analyses of the interpretive theories of H. L. A. Hart, Lon L. Fuller, and Ronald Dworkin. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Interpretation According to Law References.

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and (...) answer affirmatively. I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

Debates over the proper theory of, or approach to, constitutional interpretation rage through many Western constitutional democracies. Although the number of distinct theories, if finely individuated, might match the number of theorists who have entered the fray, it has become customary to group the competing accounts into two broad camps, commonly labeled ‘originalism’ and ‘non‐originalism’. This article presents an overview of non‐originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. However, because non‐originalism is defined as the negation of originalism – that is, (...) diverse theories are grouped together as ‘non‐originalist,’ not so much by what they commonly affirm, as by what they commonly deny – the project naturally focuses as well on originalist theories of interpretation. After specifying what originalism maintains, and what objections it encounters, the essay sketches some of the more prominent non‐originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and identifies some of the criticisms they face and worries they provoke. Preliminarily, it explains why ‘theories of constitutional interpretation’ constitute only a subset of ‘theories of judicial review.’. (shrink)

In the science of administrative and constitutional law, administration science and many other sciences, including political science, it is widely accepted that the basic, inherent feature of a municipality, deciding the essence of the territorial self-government unit as an entity of public administration, is the self-reliance it is entitled to. The self-reliance of territorial self-government units is even defined as a constitutional norm.In principle, self-reliance is perceived as a fundamental attribute of a decentralised public authority and constitutes one of the (...) fundamental systemic principles of the Republic of Poland. It was formulated expressis verbis in art. 165 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which states that the self-reliance of territorial self-government units is subject to judicial protection, meaning that TSGUs can defend themselves against illegal attempts, not grounded in the law to interfere in their self-reliance. This protection seems to encompass both the private-law and public-law spheres of territorial self-government activity.The essence and guarantees of territorial self-government units’ self-reliance also arise from other constitutional principles, including the aforementioned decentralisation principle, subsidiarity principle, separation of powers, supremacy of the nation and democratic state under rule of law.The goal of this article is to interpret the principle of municipal self-reliance in the context of constitutional principles of law, in the light of the Polish Constitution. The studies were conducted based on analysis of normative acts, doctrinal views and case law. (shrink)

Constitutional interpretation is problematic because it can be difficult to distinguish legitimate interpretation from illegitimate change. The distinction depends largely on what a constitution is. A constitution, like any other law, necessarily has a meaning, which pre-exists judicial interpretation: it is not a set of meaningless marks on paper. Any plausible constitutional theory must offer an account of the nature of that meaning. In doing so, it must address two main questions. The first is whether (...) the meaning of the constitution is given solely by its words, or also by additional evidence of underlying intentions, purposes or values. The second question is whether, in either case, its meaning is determined by the original meanings, intentions, purposes or values of the founding generation, or by contemporary meanings, intentions, purposes or values. This question divides so-called 'originalists' from 'non-originalists'. This article discusses all these alternatives, and the main arguments for and against them. It is subtitled 'Originalism' because it defends a moderate version of that position; however, it is argued that this is equivalent to a moderate version of non-originalism. (shrink)

Theorists of public reason such as John Rawls often idealize constitutional courts as exemplars of public reason. This paper raises questions about the seduction and limits of analogies between theorists’ account of public reason and actual constitutional jurisprudence. Examining the work product of the United States Supreme Court, the paper argues that while it does engage in reason-giving to support its decisions—as the public reason strategy suggests— those reasons are (largely) legalistic and specifically juristic reasons—not the theorists’ idealized moral-political reasons (...) on matters of fundamental principle. But if constitutional courts do not engage on matters of fundamental principle, then a public reason strategy for assuaging democratic worries about judicial review would no longer be open: prominent liberal and deliberative democratic theorists could no longer point to the alleged superiority of constitutional courts to speak in the name of, and for, the people’s shared political principles. The paper extends beyond the U.S. case study by pointing to three institutional factors explaining the disanalogy between what some constitutional courts do and what public reason theories require them to do. It concludes with considerations about whether the public reason strategy might be more successfully applied to international courts. (shrink)

The distinction between a concept and its different conceptions plays a prominent role in debates about constitutional interpretation. Proponents of a dynamic reading of the Constitution-espousing interpretation of constitutional concepts according to their contemporary understandings typically rely on the idea that the Constitution entrenches only the general concepts it deploys, without authoritatively favoring any particular conception of them-specifically, without favoring the particular conception of the relevant concept that the framers of the Constitution may have had (...) in mind. Originalists argue, to the contrary, that fidelity to the Constitution requires an understanding of its provisions according to the particular conception of the abstract concepts prevalent at the time of enactment, and not those we may now favor. My main purpose in this essay is to put some pressure on the linguistic considerations that are presented in this debate, arguing that they are much more problematic than the proponents of both positions assume. I will try to show that the debate here is actually a moral-political one, mostly about the main rationale of a constitutional regime and the conditions of its legitimacy. It is, primarily, a debate about what constitutions are for, and what makes them legitimate. But I will only get to this moral issue at the end. The main part of the essay will strive to show that the semantic considerations employed in this debate are inconclusive; the way concepts are used in a given context depends on various pragmatic determinants, and those, in turn, depend on the nature of the conversation in question. The moral disagreement is, ultimately, about the kind of conversation that constitutional regimes are taken to establish. (shrink)

Nursing claims a significant history of engaging philosophical inquiry. To better understand the rationale for this engagement, and what nursing understands itself to achieve through philosophical inquiry, we conducted an interpretive synthesis of the recent nursing literature to identify what nurses are doing when they say they are doing philosophy. The overarching finding was that while vanishingly few articles articulated any definition of philosophy, the synthesis showed how nursing considers philosophical engagement a generative mode for asking and answering questions in/for (...) nursing. Whatever aspects of nursing were focused on in these articles, and they were myriad, philosophy was invoked as an appropriate modality to work through that aspect rigorously, critically, and with an expectation that something “knowledgeable” would result from the effort. Based on the synthesis, we conclude that nursing philosophy could be considered a specific modality of nursing practice by which nursing is both done and delineated, a discursive practice in which we continually assess and explore and adapt and advance our understanding of the discipline in service to advancing our unique efficacy. This definition of “nursing philosophy” provides an opening for further inquiry helping to illuminate its functionalities and potentialities for outputs that can facilitate rigorous practice, education, and scholarship. (shrink)

Constitution is an exclusive legal document, and its interpretation is a process – a continuous work of explanation of its content, the end and qualitative perfection of which may only be considered taking into account the limits of intellectual potential of the particular time. The interpretation of constitution is a permanent process, which is influenced and determined by plenty of conceptual factors. Firstly the supreme juridical power of the constitution as well as its integrity determines (...) the opportunities of its interpreter and applier. Integrity of the constitution is considered to be the legal, philosophical, logical integrity of its norms, which determines an obligation of its interpreter to perceive this legal act as an integral unit, i.e. not only as a catalogue of particular values, but also as a balance of these values. All the constitutional expressis verbis provisions are equal in its’ juridical power, that is why they do not negate each other, on the contrary – each of them only complement others’ content. Besides, it is important to mention that exceptional juridical power of the constitution determines its interpretational self-sufficiency. Constitution can not be interpreted invoking the content of the acts of lower juridical power. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to determine how can new interpretations of old institutes change the status of the taxpayers and tax administrators and to suggest what can the Ministry of Finance do to solve the problem – it can try setting a uniform interpretation of tax institutes. It deals with two findings of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic concerning two institutes described in Tax Administration Act: time-limits for tax assessment and tax inspection; and one finding (...) of the Highest Administrative Court concerning local taxes. Court interpretation is only one of several possibilities of interpretation. Continental system of law differs from the Anglo-American system and we should search for information in the acts, and court practice should be used only alternatively. (shrink)

This is an extended, international edition of Justice Breyer's theory of constitutional interpretation, and the role of courts in a modern democracy. For the revised, international edition Breyer includes an examination of topical debates in Europe, including the legitimacy of the EU and religious freedom under the ECHR.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters. At least since Marbury, in which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitution's being a written document, originalism in one form or another has been a major theme in the American constitutional tradition.

As its title suggests, this is a book about constitutional interpretation. More specifically it is an articulation and defense of that particular method of constitutional interpretation, known as originalism, which looks to the original intent of the constitution’s framers as a benchmark against which interpretation is to be made. Professor Whittington believes “that originalism is the method most consistent with the judicial effort to interpret the written constitutional text and that an originalist jurisprudence facilitates the realization (...) of a political system grounded on popular sovereignty”. I think it is fair to say that in the current legal, political, and philosophical climate, originalist theories are pretty much on the defensive, which makes Whittington’s book all the more timely and valuable. (shrink)

In this article the author, in a context in which principles and the principle of proportionality are at the heart not only of jurisprudence but also of constitutional and human rights interpretation, claims that when there were those ready to raise the hand to declare a unanimous winner, some critics and skeptics appeared. In addition, to the traditional objections, they worry that proportionality invites to doing unnecessary balancing between existing rights, inventing new rights out of nothing at all (in (...) detriment of those already well-established ones), and even worse in doing so balancing some rights away. In order to answer to such objections and to reject them, as well as to reinforce the importance of this development, the author: first, revisits the constitution of principles and of the principle of proportionality, which per definitio contradicts each one of this objections; and, then, restates the constitution of the principle of proportionality as a principle of principles not only in constitutional and human rights interpretation but also in legislation, including constitutional reformation, and adjudication.Resumen:En este artículo el autor, en un contexto en el cual los principios y el principio de proporcionalidad están en el corazón no solamente de la filosofía y teoría del derecho sino además de la interpretación en materia constitucional y de derechos humanos, argumenta que cuando había quienes estaban listos para levantar la mano para declarar a un ganador unánime, algunos críticos y escépticos aparecieron. Aunado a las objeciones tradicionales están preocupados por que en su opinión el principio de proporcionalidad invita a hacer un balanceo innecesario entre derechos existentes, a inventar nuevos derechos de la nada (en detrimento de los ya bien establecidos), y que al hacer el balanceo se pierdan derechos. Para responder a tales objeciones y rechazar las mismas, así como reforzar la importancia del desarrollo, el autor: primero, revisita la constitución de los principios y del principio de proporcionalidad, la cual per definitio contradice cada una de las objeciones; y, luego, reestablece la constitución del principio de proporcionalidad como un principio de principios no sólo en la interpretación en material constitucional y de derechos humanos sino también en la legislación, incluida la reforma constitucional, y en la adjudicación. (shrink)

This chapter is an essay in a volume that examines constitutional law in the United States through the lens of H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition" model of a legal system. My chapter focuses on a feature of constitutional practice that has been rarely examined: how jurists and scholars argue about interpretive methods. Although a vast body of scholarship provides arguments for or against various interpretive methods -- such as textualism, originalism, "living constitutionalism," structure-and-relationship reasoning, representation reinforcement, minimalism, and so forth (...) -- very little scholarship shifts to the meta-level and asks: What are the considerations that jurists and scholars bring to bear in arguing that one or another interpretive method is legally favored? And can we "make sense" of this body of argument? Is there a model of legal discourse that both accurately describes how U.S. jurists and scholars actually argue about interpretive methods, and that vindicates this discourse (in the sense of seeing these actors as making valid arguments)? I find that Hart's rule-of-recognition model fails to describe or vindicate how U.S. jurists and scholars argue about interpretive methods. The problem, in a nutshell, is that Hart sees legal argument as asserting or presupposing the social fact of contemporary official acceptance of a rule of recognition. By contrast, jurists and scholars typically point to social facts other than contemporary official acceptance in arguing for the legal status of an interpretive method -- for example, the fact that the method is supported by Framers' intent, or by U.S. culture and tradition, or by precedent. Further, jurists and scholars very often argue that some interpretive method is legally favored even though the method is controversial. On Hart's model, such a claim is problematic -- because, on his model, the content of the rule of recognition is not controversial, but rather a matter of consensus among officials. The upshot may just be that Hart's model is a failure. However, another possibility is to adopt an "error theory" of U.S. constitutional discourse. It may perhaps be the case that U.S. jurists and scholars often make claims for the favorable legal status of some interpretive method that are inconsistent with the best understanding of the nature of law. (shrink)

A recent trend in futures studies has called for strengthening the inclusion of future generations in constitutional law. This is problematic from a practical and a normative viewpoint. This paper introduces a future-oriented theory of democratic constitutionalism that overcomes originalism (which privileges the past) and living constitutionalism (which privileges the present) without resorting to the explicit constitutional protection of the yet unborn. It is divided into five sections. The first challenges the notion that the constitutional entrenchment of the non-overlapping future (...) is the best means of implementing long time horizons in democratic legal systems. The second maintains that constitutions are substantive normative expressions of the ultimate justification of authority. The third demonstrates that the substantive dimension of constitutions is cross-temporal and includes what I call ‘the objective interests in the future’ of all members of the people. The fourth connects such objective interests with rights to political participation. The final section focuses on the cross-temporal role of constitutional adjudication. Because rights to political participation include objective interests in the future and necessarily hold the status of constitutional rights in any legitimate democratic constitution, constitutional adjudication must guarantee their enforcement over government action. (shrink)

Brings together ten of the nation's finest and most provocative legal scholars to present their views on constitutional interpretation. All of these papers are very recent, and four were written especially for this volume.

Originalism is a force to be reckoned with in constitutional interpretation. At one time a monolithic theory of constitutional interpretation, contemporary originalism has developed into a sophisticated family of theories about how to interpret and reason with a constitution. Contemporary originalists harness the resources of linguistic, moral, and political philosophy to propose methodologies for the interpretation of constitutional texts and provide reasons for fidelity to those texts. The essays in this volume, which includes contributions from the (...) flag bearers of several competing schools of constitutional interpretation, provides an introduction to the development of originalist thought, showcases the great range of contemporary originalist constitutional scholarship, and situates competing schools of thought in dialogue with each other. They also make new contributions to the methodological and normative disputes between originalists and non-originalists, and among originalists themselves. (shrink)

I argue that, even supposing substantive principles of distributive justice entail that animals warrant constitutional protection, there are other, potentially weightier forms of injustice that would probably be done by interpreting a Bill of Rights as implicitly applying to animals, namely, formal injustice and compensatory injustice. Formal injustice would result from such a reading of the Constitution in that the state would fail to speak with one voice upon newly according legal rights to animals. Compensatory injustice would likely result (...) from such a reading, at least in a South African context, in that the law would not only suppress facets of culture that many Africans deem important to their self-conception, but also require spending scarce resources on animals that could have gone toward saving African lives and livelihoods. If the state must choose between acting for the sake of the urgent interests of animals and those of humans, humans must take priority, even assuming that animals have a worth that morally forbids harming them in our private lives. (shrink)

I. ONCE, SAID AN AUTHOR, WHERE I NEED NOT SAY . .

This article reinterprets the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the context of social systems theory and rethinks its major concepts as part of legal and political self-reference and systemic differentiation. In Kelsen?s case, it is the exclusion of sovereignty from juridical logic that opens a way to the self-reference of positive law. Similarly, Schmitt constructed his concept of the political as a self-referential system of political operations protected from the social environment by the medium of power. The author argues that the process (...) of legal and political globalisation rules out the possibility of formulating substantive theories of the state associating this particular social organisation with metaphysical values and a self-validating collective identity. Kelsen and Schmitt continue to inspire current theories of non-metaphysical globalised law and politics. However, the constitutional state and sovereignty need to be reformulated as a meeting point of functionally differentiated and globalised legal and political communications and not as their ultimate end. (shrink)

In this chapter, a reprinted article from Southern African Public Law (2010), I argue that, even supposing substantive principles of distributive justice entail that animals warrant constitutional protection, there are other, potentially weightier forms of injustice that would probably be done by interpreting a Bill of Rights as implicitly applying to animals, namely, formal injustice and compensatory injustice. Formal injustice would result from such a reading of the Constitution in that the state would fail to speak with one voice (...) upon newly according legal rights to animals. Compensatory injustice would likely result from such a reading, at least in a South African context, in that the law would not only suppress facets of culture that many Africans deem important to their self-conception, but also require spending scarce resources on animals that could have gone toward saving African lives and livelihoods. If the state must choose between acting for the sake of the urgent interests of animals and those of humans, humans must take priority, even assuming that animals have a worth that morally forbids harming them in our private lives. (shrink)