Professor Davidson, you are one of the dominant figures in analytic philosophy, your articles and papers are read worldwide and long gone are the times when only a few American specialists knew about what you were doing. So today, there is no need to ask you to in introduce your philosophy in “ten sentences that everybody can understand”. Rather, I would like to give your readers the chance to get an impression of the person behind the philosophy as well as (...) a somewhat closer look at some of that person's current philosophical attitudes. What I am interested in, to put it in a nutshell, are all sorts of relations and transitions ‐relations between your philosophy and that of others, and transitions your thinking and interests, philosophical and otherwise, underwent over the years.Let me start with a couple of “historical” questions: What were the earliest philosophical problems that you were interested in? In the long run, you have become especially well known as the inventor of Anomalous Monism – have you always a physicalist of some sort? (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Hegel’s concept of recognition and Levinas’ concept of responsibility complement each other and lead to the idea of an asymmetrical reciprocity in which the origin of our social relations is not mutual equality, but rather mutual inequality. I will unfold this argument in three steps. I will first work out a fundamental asymmetry of recognition in Hegel by means of the figure of the bondsman before elucidating in a second step the asymmetry of responsibility (...) in Levinas by means of the figure of the hostage. In the last and third step, I will correlate both asymmetries and show how far the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility constantly develop from and transition into one another in our social relationships. (shrink)

This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and (...) that in some circumstances, at least, these mighthave deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, hisTime-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-DependentPerson-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought todo, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’tapply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that thetwo Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Argumentsare contradictory. I question Horta’s position that there isno point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on thebasis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solvethe predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude mypaper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views aboutnontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatiblewith the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor. (shrink)

I begin by evaluating four theories: mereological essentialism, the occasional identity thesis, four-dimensionalism and the constitution view. I compare the solutions these theories offer to puzzles of material constitution with particular attention being paid to their treatment of Leibniz’s Law, the ontological status of objects and the distinction between objects and their matter. If a lump of clay constitutes a statue, the lump of clay and the statue are metaphysically distinct such that they are distinct kinds, but numerically one thing—the (...) statue as constituted by the lump of clay. I defend this view against criticism that it collapses into identity or substance dualism, exploding reality with unnecessary objects. I amend constitution to better account for cases of composite objects and to better solve puzzle cases involving change in parts over time. Finally, I go on to apply constitution to an unorthodox puzzle for theories of objects—the problem of the individuation of events. Events are things that happen. If we grant that events are in the same or similar ontological category to objects, there is a strong analogy between the problem of material constitution and the problem of events. In signing the US Constitution you may also do your bit to ratify it. However, the signing and the ratifying have different properties. I suggest that the signing and the ratifying are distinct in kind, but are not two separate events. I develop a constitution relation—a contingent, irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive relation—for events. This relation has the potential to be applied to the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue (...) that it does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.

(1) This paper uses the following binary relations: > (is preferred to); ⩽ (is not preferred to); < (is less preferred than); ~ (is indifferent to). (2) Savage used primitive ⩾, postulated to be connected and transitive onA (the set of acts), to define the others: [x ~ y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and y ⩽ x)]; [y < x ⇔ notx ⩽ y]; [x > y ⇔ y < x]. Independently of the axioms, this definition implies that ⩽ (...) and > are complementary relations onA: [x < y ⇔ notx > y]. (3) Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer used primitive ⩽, postulated to be transitive onL (the set of lotteries), to define the others with a different expression for <: [x < y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and noty ⩽ x)]. Thus, ⩽ and > are not necessarily complementary onL; since ⩽ is not postulated to be connected onL, but connected ⩽ is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. Since the restriction of ⩽ to the subsetA ofL is connected, ⩽ and > are complementary onA. (4) Fishburn used primitive < onA to define the others with different expression for ~ and ⩽: [x ~ y ⇔ (notx < y and noty < x)]; [x ⩽ y ⇔ (x < y orx ~ y)]. His version of Savage's theory then assumed that < is asymmetric and negatively transitive onA. Thus, ⩽ and > are complementary, since asymmetric < is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. (5) This analysis provides a new proof that the same list of elementary properties of binary relations onA applies to all three theories: ⩽ is connected, transitive, weakly connected, reflexive, and negatively transitive; while both < and > are asymmetric, negatively transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive; but only ~ is symmetric. (shrink)

[EN] Several conceptions of trope bundles have postulated mutual relations of ontological dependence to explain the unity of the bundle. The idea is that a bundle is a plurality of tropes such that each one of them is dependent on any other. A variant of this idea is that there is a ‘nucleus’ of tropes all of them mutually dependent, and there is also a ‘periphery’ or ‘halo’ of tropes that are dependent on the tropes of the nucleus, but the (...) tropes of the nucleus are not dependent on them. There are several theoretical advantages that trope bundles conceived in this way have. A weakness of the position nevertheless is that it requires an equivalence relation of dependence. But it has been normally supposed that dependence is a strict order, i.e. it is relation irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. Several recent works have put into question this traditional assumption. Those recent criticisms are discussed and it is argued that they are not convincing. Further arguments are presented for the irreflexivity and transitivity of dependence, from which asymmetry follows. Dependence, then, appears to be in fact a strict order. This implies that most forms of nuclear trope bundles are unintelligible. But not all of them, because nuclear tropes with a unique nuclear trope are coherent. [ES] Varias concepciones de cúmulos de tropos han postulado relaciones de dependencia ontológica mutuas para explicar la unidad del cúmulo. La idea es que un cúmulo es una pluralidad de tropos tal que cada uno de ellos es dependiente de cualquier otro. Una variante de esta idea es que hay un ‘núcleo’ de tropos todos ellos mutuamente dependientes y hay también una ‘periferia’ o ‘halo’ de tropos que son dependientes de los tropos del núcleo, pero los tropos del núcleo no son dependientes de ellos. Hay varias ventajas teóricas que tienen los cúmulos de tropos concebidos de este modo. Una debilidad de esta posición, sin embargo, es que requiere una relación de dependencia que sea una relación de equivalencia. Pero se ha supuesto normalmente que la dependencia es un orden estricto, esto es, una relación irreflexiva, asimétrica y transitiva. Varios trabajos recientes han puesto en cuestión este supuesto tradicional. Estas criticas recientes son aquí discutidas y se argumenta que no son convincentes. Se presentan argumentos adicionales para la irreflexividad y la transitividad de la dependencia, de lo que se sigue la asimetría. Entonces, la dependencia resulta ser un orden estricto. Esto implica que la mayoría de las formas de cúmulos nucleares de tropos son ininteligibles. Pero no todos, porque los cúmulos nucleares con un único tropo nuclear son coherentes. (shrink)

Critical social theory has long been marked by a deep, creative, and productive relationship with psychoanalysis. Whereas Freud and Fromm were important cornerstones for the early Frankfurt School, recent thinkers have drawn on the object-relations school of psychoanalysis. Transitional Subjects is the first book-length collection devoted to the engagement of critical theory with the work of Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, and other members of this school. Featuring contributions from some of the leading figures working in both of these fields, including (...) Axel Honneth, Joel Whitebook, Noëlle McAfee, Sara Beardsworth, and C. Fred Alford, it provides a synoptic overview of current research at the intersection of these two theoretical traditions while also opening up space for further innovations. Transitional Subjects offers a range of perspectives on the critical potential of object-relations psychoanalysis, including feminist and Marxist views, to offer valuable insight into such fraught social issues as aggression, narcissism, “progress,” and torture. The productive dialogue that emerges augments our understanding of the self as intersubjectively and socially constituted and of contemporary “social pathologies.” Transitional Subjects shows how critical theory and object-relations psychoanalysis, considered together, have not only enriched critical theory but also invigorated psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Clear guidelines addressing the ethically appropriate use of anti-infectives in the setting of hospice care do not exist. There is lack of understanding about key treatment decisions related to infection treatment for patients who are eligible for hospice care. Ethical concerns about anti-infective use at the end of life include: (1) delaying transition to hospice, (2) prolonging a dying process, (3) prescribing regimens incongruent with a short life expectancy and goals of care, (4) increasing the reservoir of potential resistant pathogens, (...) (5) placing unreasonable costs on a capitated hospice system. Although anti-infectives are thought to be relatively safe, they can place a burden on patients and be inconsistent to particular care plans. The current complex, and at times fragmented, medical care often fails to address these issues in decision-making. In many ways, the ethics governing the end of life decisions related to dialysis, hydration/nutrition, and hypercalcemia parallel those of anti-infectives. In this article we articulate important elements in ethical decision-making in the application of anti-infectives for patients who are eligible for hospice care, and we point to the need for prospective studies to help refine particular guidelines in these cases. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the scope of Heidegger’s dialog with Hölderlin in Contributions to Philosophy is wider than has often been acknowledged. Traditionally, accounts of this relation have focused solely on tracing Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölderlin’s “flight and arrival of the gods.” In addition to this theme, the relation between Heidegger’s Hölderlin and the project of Contributions should also be framed in light of the specific understanding of attunement which Heidegger developed in his 1934-35 Hölderlin lecture (...) courses. From the perspective opened by this reading, I bring into question and offer an alternative to a widely accepted interpretation of Contributions’ structural composition. (shrink)

The fluted fragment is a fragment of first-order logic (without equality) in which, roughly speaking, the order of quantification of variables coincides with the order in which those variables appear as arguments of predicates. It is known that this fragment has the finite model property. We consider extensions of the fluted fragment with various numbers of transitive relations, as well as the equality predicate. In the presence of one transitive relation (together with equality), the finite model property (...) is lost; nevertheless, we show that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems for this extension remain decidable. We also show that the corresponding problems in the presence of two transitive relations (with equality) or three transitive relations (without equality) are undecidable, even for the two-variable sub-fragment. (shrink)

The role of foundation with respect to transitive closure in the Zermelo system Z has been investigated by Boffa; our aim is to explore the role of antifoundation. We start by showing the consistency of "Z antifoundation transitive closure" relative to Z (by a technique well known for ZF). Further, we introduce a "weak replacement principle" (deductible from antifoundation and transitive closure) and study the relations among these three statements in Z via interpretations. Finally, we give some (...) adaptations for ZF without infinity. (shrink)

Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains that the relation of ontological dependence is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The goal of this paper is to challenge that orthodoxy by arguing that ontological dependence should be understood as non- symmetric, rather than asymmetric. If we give up the asymmetry of dependence, interesting things follow for what we can say about metaphysical explanation— particularly for the prospects of explanatory holism.

In qualitative decision theory, a very natural way for defining preference relations over policies (acts) -functions from a set S of states to a set X of consequences- is by using the so called Dominance Plausible Rule. In this context we need a relation > over X and a relation ? over P(S) (the subsets of S). Then we define ≥ as follows: f ≥ g, ? [f > g] ? [g > f], where [f > g] denotes (...) the set {s ? S : f(s) > g(s)g}. In many cases > is a modular relation and ? is a total preorder. A quite rational and desirable property for the relation over policies is transitivity. In general, the relation ≥ defined by the Dominance Plausible Rule is not transitive in spite of the transitivity of ?. In this work we characterize the properties of the relation ? forcing the relation ≥ over policies to be transitive. All this under the hypothesis of modularity of the relation >. (shrink)

Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.

Following Kit Fine (2007), we can say that the de jure pair represent the referent as the same while the second one does not do so. There are roughly three ways of capturing this difference. One could say that de jure coreference between two expression occurrences happen because (a) the occurrences have identical meanings, (b) they have identical syntactic properties, or (c) they enter into a semantic relation not grounded in identity of meaning or syntax. In what follows, I (...) give some reason to think that de jure coreference is not a transitive relation. As a consequence, we can rule out (a) and (b) just on these grounds alone (since identity is a transitive relation). (c) then looks promising. I argue that this gives further support for a relationist semantics along the lines of what Kit Fine has proposed. (shrink)

Theories of scientific representation, following Chakrawartty's categorization, are divided into two groups. Whereas cognitive-functional views emphasize agents' intentions, informational theories stress the objective relation between represented and representing. In the first part, a modified structuralist theory is introduced that takes into account agents' intentions. The second part is devoted to dismissing a criticism against the structural account of representation on which similarity as the backbone of representation raises serious problems, since it has definite logical features, i.e. reflexivity, symmetry and (...) transitivity, which representation lacks. Drawing on the representational relation between quantum and statistical field theories, I argue that scientific representation displays these logical features, although depending on the context they may be used or not. (shrink)

The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. However, certain time-travel cases that have been used to raise worries about the irreflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry of proper part of can also be used to argue that more fundamental than and partially grounds do not have these formal properties. I present this worry and discuss several responses to it, with the aim (...) of showing that the problem is harder to address when applied to fundamentality and partial grounding than it was when merely applied to proper parthood. (shrink)

Adolescents, in many jurisdictions, have the power to consent to life saving treatment but not necessarily the power to refuse it. A recent defence of this asymmetry is Neil Manson's theory of ‘transitional paternalism’. Transitional paternalism holds that such asymmetries are by-products of sharing normative powers. However, sharing normative powers by itself does not entail an asymmetry because transitional paternalism can be implemented in two ways. Manson defends the asymmetry-generating version of transitional paternalism in the clinical context, arguing that it (...) maximizes respect for adolescent autonomy. This article offers an alternative argument in favour of the asymmetry-generating form of transitional paternalism, one that makes appeal to obligations that individuals have to develop self-governance in others. We should share normative powers asymmetrically in the clinical context for three reasons. First, the asymmetric version of transitional paternalism takes seriously duties to support adolescents’ developing autonomy, alongside other duties that adults have to young people. It does so by enabling young people to be involved in important decisions that they would otherwise be excluded from. This is of value because participation of this sort is central to the cultivation of their self-governance. Second, only the asymmetric version gives young people a voice in respect of all clinical actions, and only the asymmetric version leaves open the possibility that the coarse lines of legislation might be ‘fine-tuned’ in individual cases. Third, the asymmetric sharing of normative powers is consistent with the kind of social arrangements that best support autonomy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I freely use the thought of Charles Hartshorne to defend the ethical permissibility of abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. In the later stages of pregnancy the fetus has an ethical status similar to that of a sentient yet non‐rational animal, a status which should generate in us considerable ethical respect. The distinctiveness of this Hartshornian approach lies in the effort to bring metaphysics to bear on a controversial issue in applied ethics. In particular, the (...) metaphysical issue of temporal relations is crucial to consider in the effort to ascertain the ethical status of the fetus. Two symmetrical (immoderate) theories of temporal relations are criticised, one of which provides the basis for opposition to abortion, a theory wherein one is internally related both to one's past and to one's future. An asymmetrical (moderate) theory of temporal relations is defended, a theory wherein one is internally related to one's past yet externally related to the future. This latter theory would permit abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. (shrink)

This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.

The paper traces the development of Russell’s thinking about relations in 1898. Central to the story is what Russell called “the contradiction of relativity” which he thought to be endemic in the mathematical sciences. Through most of the year he tried to deal with it within the constraints of the neo-Hegelian doctrine of internal relations until, towards the end of the year, he abandoned the doctrine and with it neo-Hegelianism. Most importantly, he came to see that the contradiction of relativity (...) showed that it was impossible to treat transitive, asymmetrical relations as internal. The paper also throws new light on Russell’s earliest debts to G. E. Moore. (shrink)

We examine the range of anonymity that is compatible with a Paretian social welfare relation (SWR) on infinite utility streams. Three alternative coherence properties of an SWR are considered, namely, acyclicity, quasi-transitivity, and Suzumura consistency. For each case, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of permutations to be the set of permissible permutations of some Paretian SWR is given by the cyclicity of permutations and a weakening of group structure. Further, for each case of (...) coherence property, we show that the extended Pareto rule is the least element of the class of anonymous Paretian SWRs. (shrink)

This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept normative standpoints that entail a non-transitive better than relation are compelling enough, we ought to revise our decision method rather than the normative standpoints. The paper introduces the most common argument in favor of non-transitive better than relations. It then illustrates that there are different ways to reconceptualize rational choice so (...) that rational choice is possible also when the relevant better than relation is non-transitive. (shrink)

In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that is (...) better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper. (shrink)

In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that is (...) better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper. (shrink)

Machine learning, deep learning and neural networks are extensively applied for the development of many fields. Though their technologies are improved greatly, they are often said to be opaque in terms of explainability. Their explainable neural functions will be essential to realization in the networks. In this paper, it is shown that the bio-inspired networks are useful for the explanation of tracking and classification of features. First, the asymmetric network with nonlinear functions is created based on the bio-inspired retinal (...) network. They have orthogonal properties useful for the tracking of features compared with the conventional symmetric networks, which is also proposed on the biological functions. Next, the analysis for the independence of the subspaces between the Fourier bases and the asymmetric network bases is performed. It was that the asymmetric networks have better performances in the classification compared with the symmetric ones. Further, the layered asymmetric networks generate the higher dimensional orthogonal bases that improve the classification accuracies by the replacements of bases. Finally, we classified Reuters collections data applying the explainable processing steps, which consist of the linear discriminations and the sparse coding with nearest neighbor relation for classification. (shrink)

Temporal becoming is usually considered the essence of the concept of time. But in our century most physicists and philosophers have defended the view that becoming is dependent on the existence of conscious beings and that there is no ontological difference between past and future. I evaluate these related claims both in light of their conceptual implications and by bringing to bear our best spacetime theories. ;Since a mind-independent becoming should be grounded in an ontological, non-epistemic asymmetry between past and (...) future, I discuss the philosophical motivations for various "non-full views" of the future in contrast to the view that the future is as real as the past. I present the disagreement between these views both in terms of what is and in terms of possession of a definite truth value, thereby distinguishing an ontological and a semantic formulation. A formal definition of the "tree model" of reality allows a clear distinction of the often conflated notions of 'determinate', 'determined' and 'stable', and helps to formulate the differences between the "non-full" views and the "full view" of reality. ;To settle the issue concerning these views, I bring into the discussion the special theory of relativity . I show that oft-discussed arguments against the openness of the future presuppose a clarification of the properties of the relation 'being determinate for', in particular symmetry and transitivity. Within STR, objective becoming can be defended at the cost of relativizing what is determinate to spacetime points, of making the relation of determinedness time-asymmetric, and of denying determinateness to spacelike-related events. ;I conclude by urging that mind-independent temporal becoming can find a more hospitable environment in some isotropic cosmological models of general relativity, a claim that has been unreasonably neglected. If the universe does not present causal anomalies , the proper time of a co-moving 'fundamental particle' can be made common to every other world line. The existence of such a cosmic time would make current scientific talk of 'cosmic evolution' and 'the future of the universe' non-metaphorical. (shrink)

The healthcare system—the assemblage of hospitals, insurers, professional associations, policymakers, patients, caregivers, and other entities oriented toward health in the United States—does more than cure illness. It is, and in some cases ought to be but falls short, attentive to endpoints other than cure, such as comfort, participation in desired activities, and the creation of families—things that may broadly be understood as promoting well-being. In the United States, health care utilization is prohibitively expensive. As a result, most people can only (...) access care through insurance. While the care available within the broad U.S. healthcare system may be oriented toward a wide variety of endpoints, insurance... (shrink)

The aim of my proposal is to address the following question: “How the experience of interacting with a specific technology mediate our experience of the world?”. I will do this by exploring the ideas of the postphenomenological theorists: Don Ihde, Peter Paul Verbeek and Evan Selinger. Postphenomenological studies tend to focus on understanding the roles that technologies play in the relations between humans and world.I would examine the idea that technologies mediate the world in such a way that perception of (...) the self, world and environment changes. I am going to deepen the phubbing phenomenon, because it reveals the effect of technologies on social interaction. (shrink)

The problem of whether Lambek Calculus is complete with respect to (w.r.t.) relational semantics, has been raised several times, cf. van Benthem (1989a) and van Benthem (1991). In this paper, we show that the answer is in the affirmative. More precisely, we will prove that that version of the Lambek Calculus which does not use the empty sequence is strongly complete w.r.t. those relational Kripke-models where the set of possible worlds,W, is a transitive binary relation, while that version (...) of the Lambek Calculus where we admit the empty sequence as the antecedent of a sequent is strongly complete w.r.t. those relational models whereW=U×U for some setU. We will also look into extendability of this completeness result to various fragments of Girard's Linear Logic as suggested in van Benthem (1991), p. 235, and investigate the connection between the Lambek Calculus and language models. (shrink)

Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. (...) Traditional sorites arguments show that a statement of form (4) can fail to be true even though it has no clear counter-example. Conceptual vagueness allows a finite series not to have any definite first member. I consider the speculative possibilities that there have been only finitely many non-overlapping hours although there has been no first hour and that space and time are only finitely divisible even though there are no smallest spatial or temporal intervals. (shrink)

Grounding is a powerful metaphysical concept; yet there is widespread scepticism about the intelligibility of the notion. In this paper, I propose an account of an entity’s nature or essence, which I then use to provide grounding conditions for that entity. I claim that an understanding of an entity’s nature, together with an account of how logically complex entities are grounded, provides all we need to understand how that entity is grounded. This approach not only allows us to say what (...) grounds what, it also sheds light on the formal features of the grounding relation. It provides a principled argument for the orthodox view that grounding is irreflexive, asymmetrical, and transitive; but it allows that it may not be well-founded. The resulting approach gives us a powerful framework for understanding nature, grounding, and the relationship between them. (shrink)

We prove completeness for some language-theoretic models of the full Lambek calculus and its various fragments. First we consider syntactic concepts and syntactic concepts over regular languages, which provide a complete semantics for the full Lambek calculus \. We present a new semantics we call automata-theoretic, which combines languages and relations via closure operators which are based on automaton transitions. We establish the completeness of this semantics for the full Lambek calculus via an isomorphism theorem for the syntactic concepts lattice (...) of a language and a construction for the universal automaton recognizing the same language. Finally, we use automata-theoretic semantics to prove completeness of relation models of binary relations and finite relation models for the Lambek calculus without and with empty antecedents and \), thus solving a problem left open by Pentus. (shrink)

Western visitors to those parts of the world that before 1991 were politically organized as the Soviet Union have been impressed by the attitudes of persons toward behavior in ordinary exchanges, attitudes that seem to be so different from those in Western economies. The essential elements of an “exchange culture” seem to be missing, and this absence, in itself, may be central to the effective functioning of market economies. Individual participants in ordinary exchange relationships in Western economies act as if (...) they understand the simplest of all economic principles, namely, that there are mutual gains from trade, that the benefits are reciprocal, that exchange is a positive-sum game. This “as if” understanding, which remains perhaps below our level of consciousness in the West, is largely missing from the public attitudes of citizens of the former Soviet Union, who behave as if the gains from trade do not exist, or at least are one-sided rather than mutual. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a central objection against diseases being natural kinds—namely, that diseases are processes or transitions and hence they should not be conceptualized in the ‘substantish’ framework of natural kinds. I indicate that the objection hinges on conceiving disease kinds as phase kinds, in contrast to the non-phase, natural kinds of the exact sciences. I focus on somatic diseases and argue, via a representative comparison, that if disease kinds are phase kinds, then exact science kinds are phase (...) kinds as well. On the other hand, if exact science kinds are non-phase kinds, then disease kinds are non-phase kinds as well. This objection should thus be rejected, under a certain caveat, though. If natural kind membership has an influence over the diachronic identity of kind members, then it is possible, in principle, to draw the phase/non-phase distinction such that an ‘ontological gap’ lies between medical kinds and exact science kinds. I show further that this caveat is unavoidable even in relation to substantive universals and ‘essential’ properties—two controversial, strong features that were traditionally associated to natural kinds. (shrink)

This article describes the relations between academic psychology and psychical research in Britain during the inter-war period, in the context of the fluid boundaries between mainstream psychology and both psychical research and popular psychology. Specifically, the involvement with Harry Price of six senior academic psychologists: William McDougall, William Brown, J. C. Flugel, Cyril Burt, C. Alec Mace and Francis Aveling, is described. Personal, metaphysical and socio-historical factors in their collaboration are discussed. It is suggested that the main reason for their (...) mutual attraction was their common engagement in a delicate balancing act between courting popular appeal on the one hand and the assertion of scientific expertise and authority on the other. Their interaction is typical of the boundary work performed at this transitional stage in the development of psychology as a discipline. (shrink)

I wish to present a codi cation of syntactic approaches to dealing with ergative languages and argue for the correctness of one particular approach, which I will call the Inverse Grammatical Relations hypothesis.1 I presume familiarity with the term `ergativity', but, brie y, many languages have ergative case marking, such as Burushaski in (1), in contrast to the accusative case marking of Latin in (2). More generally, if we follow Dixon (1979) and use A to mark the agent-like argument of (...) a transitive verb, O to mark the patient-like argument of a transitive verb, and S to mark the single argument of an intransitive verb, then we can call ergative any subsystem of a language that groups S and O in contrast to A, as shown in (3). (shrink)