De jure coreference and transitivity

Abstract

Following Kit Fine (2007), we can say that the de jure pair represent the referent as the same while the second one does not do so. There are roughly three ways of capturing this difference. One could say that de jure coreference between two expression occurrences happen because (a) the occurrences have identical meanings, (b) they have identical syntactic properties, or (c) they enter into a semantic relation not grounded in identity of meaning or syntax. In what follows, I give some reason to think that de jure coreference is not a transitive relation. As a consequence, we can rule out (a) and (b) just on these grounds alone (since identity is a transitive relation). (c) then looks promising. I argue that this gives further support for a relationist semantics along the lines of what Kit Fine has proposed.

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N. Ángel Pinillos
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework.François Recanati - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185.
Mental Files and Non-Transitive De Jure Coreference.Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):365-388.

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References found in this work

On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Semantic relationism.Kit Fine (ed.) - 2007 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.
De Lingua Belief.Robert Fiengo & Robert May - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.

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