O presente artigo pretende analisar a ideia de pessoa entre os yorùbás da África Ocidental, a partir da conceção de orí , i. e., a cabeça, entendida entre eles como portadora de personalidade e destino, ideia amplamente difundida pela literatura sobre a matéria da personalidade humana e sentidos de destino. A partir do orí , adentrar-se-á pela problemática da predestinação entre os yorùbás e o sentido do ritual de alimento à cabeça, o b ọ rí, entre os yorùbás, com referência (...) aos afro-brasileiros do Candomblé. A problematização conduzir-nos-á à constatação da pluralidade interpretativa do objeto, ao mesmo tempo que nos deixará diante da questão linguística da tradução dos conceitos, facto que influi na própria construção teológica. Ao mesmo tempo estaremos diante da construção histórica da religião yorùbá, notoriamente uma religião dinâmica e mutável que se fabrica nos diálogos com o cristianismo e islamismo. Processos de transformação que, aliás, são transponíveis para o Brasil, onde a celebração do orí se apresenta de modo diferenciado face à realidade autóctone africana. Palavras-chave : Yorùbás. Concepção de pessoa. Orí. Predestinação. Bọrí.The present paper aims to analyze the idea of person among the Yorùbá people of Western Africa, taking into account the conception of orí , i.e., the head, which is understood by them as the bowl of human personality and destiny. Those ideas are clearly present in the plural literature concerning the human personality and its destination among the Yorùbá people. Taking the orí as starting point, I shall problematize the predestination idea among the Yorùbá and the meaning of the b ọ rí , the ritual presented as ‘feeding-the-head’. Such process will be extended to Afro-Brazilian religious system named Candomblé. The problematization will guide my observation to the dramatic plurality of interpretations concerning destiny, while it will spell out the linguistic dilemmas around the translation of concepts. Those dilemmas influence, clearly, the theological construction of the object. At the same time, the paper will deliver us to the evidence of the historical construction of Yorùbá religion, which is a mutable and dynamic religious expression, highly crossed with Christianity and Islam (in African contexts). Those processes of transformation are also clear in Brazil, where the celebration of orí has different religious attitudes comparing to African native ones. Keywords: Yorùbá. Idea of person. Orí. Predestination. Bọrí. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendo apresentar a crítica de Michael Sandel à concepção de pessoa na filosofia política de John Rawls. Para tanto, é preciso descrever, em linhas gerais, a descrição rawlsiana das partes na posição original. Esta descrição, segundo Sandel, pressupõe uma concepção metafísica de pessoa na medida em que apresenta o “eu anterior a seus fins”, ou seja, um “eu distinto dos fins que possui”, mas que detém a posse de tais fins. Sandel argumenta que o “eu”, pensado (...) desta forma, constitui-se como um “eu radicalmente desprovido de corpo”, pois não está inserido em sua situação. E, como solução, Sandel sugere que o eu seja um entendido enquanto “eu situado” nas práticas sociais existentes e, por isso, constituído de seus fins e não, simplesmente, distinto deles. Sandel argumenta a favor da noção de “autoconhecimento” como elemento de reconhecimento dos vínculos constitutivos do “eu” dentro da comunidade. Com base nestas criticas, Rawls responde que a sua abordagem está restrita á concepção política de pessoa e, não necessariamente, possui implicação metafísica. Ele sugere que a sua justificação para a concepção política de pessoa encontra-se fundamentada na cultura pública democrática que enfatiza o pluralismo razoável como um fato da vida moderna, mas, ainda assim, Rawls terá que responder aos questionamentos de Sandel quanto à explicação que ele dá como justificação pública para as instituições democráticas, dentro das quais, as concepções políticas de pessoa e de justiça se desenvolvem. Summary: This paper deals with Michael Sandel’s criticism to the conception of person in John Rawls’ political philosophy. I will make a presentation of Rawls’ position initial and then to analyse the reply of Sandel by focusing on the question concerning the metaphysical conception of person. Then I will present Rawls’ answer to the question as a political conception of person and the limits of such proposal concerning the public justification of democratic institutions. Keywords : Michael Sandel. John Rawls. Justiça. Person. Community. (shrink)

The present text constitutes a summary of a talk given by the author at the III Conferência Brasileira de Educação. It is here claimed that there is a need to discuss the roots of the idea of rights of the individual and of its link, in Locke's founding thought, with property and, moreover, with the freedom and autonomy of the human person. Furthermore, a discussion is made of the liberal-rationalist assumption of the optimum allocation of social resources through the (...) clash and combination of private interests. A twofold crisis of our times: crisis of the view of a self-regulated Laplacean universe and the crisis of the belief in the optimum allocation via market. The idea of the intervention of the State in the economy does not mean a destruction of private property nor of the value law and of profit. It only attests to its survival and seeks to ensure its implementation. Can't the idea of education be analogously thought of as a social right guaranteed and allocated by the State; as an investment in "human capital"? What is the meaning of the expression "educational policy"?O presente texto constitui síntese de comunicação do autor à III Conferência Brasileira de Educação. Afirma-se a necessidade de discutir as raízes da idéia de direitos do indivíduo e seu vínculo, no pensamento fundador de Locke, com a propriedade e, mais ainda, a liberdade e autonomia da pessoa humana. Discute-se ainda o suposto liberal-racionalista de alocação ótima dos recursos sociais através do choque e combinação de interesses privados. Uma dupla crise de nossos tempos: crise da concepção de universo auto-regulado laplaceano e a crise da crença na alocação ótima via mercado. A idéia de intervenção do Estado na economia não significa a destruição da propriedade privada, da lei do valor e do lucro. Apenas atesta a sua sobrevivência e procura garantir seu desenvolvimento. Não se pode pensar analogamente a idéia de educação como direito social garantido e alocado pelo Estado, como investimento no "capital humano"? Qual o sentido da expressão - uma "política educacional"? (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivopara responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista dejustificativa epistêmico-moral.The article (...) seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood . A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of self-identity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de justificativa (...) epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood. A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade (Persönlichkeit). Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de (...) justificativa epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood (Persönlichkeit). A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

As fontes da pedagogia trabalhista de António Sérgio Resumo: Porventura o traço mais saliente da proposta educativa de António Sérgio para o Portugal republicano é a de ser uma pedagogia trabalhista, em que a preparação para e pelo trabalho é uma condição para a construção de pessoas autónomas, membros de uma sociedade baseada na cooperação. Para Sérgio, a correcta operacionalização dos novos métodos de ensino, valorizadores dos interesses imanentes das crianças, implicava uma fundamentação filosófica séria, um modelo antropológico coerente no (...) qual uma concepção do trabalho humano é fulcral. O propósito deste artigo é o de articular sinteticamente os fundamentos da sua proposta trabalhista do valor educativo e social de um ideal de trabalho, cuidando das fontes estrangeiras de inspiração da mesma, entre as quais destacaremos Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey e Georg Kerschensteiner. Mostra-se que Sérgio soube encontrar uma fundamentação que junta reflexões daqueles pensadores, estabelecendo uma relação habitualmente ignorada entre os pedagogos seus, e nossos, contemporâneos. Pretende-se assim, recorrendo aos métodos da história das ideias, valorizadores da genealogia e da contextualização intelectual, homenagear, no cinquentenário da sua morte, um dos paladinos da Escola Nova em Portugal, dissipando algumas dúvidas sobre as reais motivações daquele Movimento pedagógico progressista no Portugal Republicano. Palavras Chave: António Sérgio. Pedagogia trabalhista. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. The sources of the labour pedagogy of António Sérgio: Perhaps the most striking feature of the thought of António Sérgio is his proposal of a labour pedagogy, where the preparation for and through work is a condition for the construction of persons that live in a society based on cooperation. For Sérgio the proper implementation of new teaching methods, that respect the true interests of children, implies a serious philosophical reflection, a coherent anthropological model in which a conception of human labour is critical. Our purpose is to articulate his philosophical reflections that justify the educational and social value of human labour, taking care of foreign sources of inspiration, among which are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey and Georg Kerschensteiner. It is shown that Sérgio brought together reflections of those thinkers, establishing a harmonic philosophical communion, usually ignored. By using the methods of the history of ideas that value the search of genealogy and intellectual context, we honour, in the fiftieth anniversary of his death, one of the paladins of the Éducation Nouvelle in Portugal, showing the real motivations of that progressive educational movement during the First Portuguese Republic. Keywords: António Sérgio. Labour pedagogy. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. Les sources de la pédagogie travailliste d’António Sérgio Résumé: Peut-être la caractéristique la plus frappante de la pensée éducationnelle d'António Sérgio est son pari dans une pédagogie du travail, où la préparation pour et par le travail est une condition pour la construction de personnes qui vivent dans une société fondée sur la coopération. Pour Sérgio, la mise en œuvre de nouvelles méthodes d'enseignement, qui respectent les véritables intérêts des enfants, implique une réflexion philosophique sérieuse, un modèle anthropologique cohérent pour lequel une conception du travail humain est essentielle. Notre but est d'articuler ses réflexions philosophiques qui justifient la valeur éducative et sociale du travail humain, en prenant soin des sources étrangères d'inspiration: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, John Dewey et Georg Kerschensteiner. On démontre que Sérgio a rassemblé des réflexions de ces penseurs, en établissant une communion philosophique harmonique, généralement ignorée par les pédagogues et philosophes de son temps et du notre. En utilisant les méthodes de l'histoire des idées qui reconstruisent des généalogies et des contextes intellectuels, nous rendons hommage, dans le cinquantième anniversaire de sa mort, à l'un des paladins de l’Éducation Nouvelle au Portugal, en montrant les motivations réelles de ce mouvement éducatif pendant la Première République portugaise. Mots clés: António Sérgio. Pédagogie du travail. Proudhon. Dewey. Kerschensteiner. Data de registro: 23/10/2019 Data de aceite: 09/12/2019. (shrink)

This work was carried out with the objective of presenting an integral vision of the person necessary for a healthy experience of objectivity/subjectivity in Emmanuel Mounier and rationality in José Saramago. Such approaches will be initiated by the corporeality that shows the body as an essential part of the person, that is, through it she expresses herself as such and exposes herself to the world and to others. However, this same person is beyond the body, the exteriority, he is interiority (...) and there he finds the strength that favors the leap of his own personal reality, that is, he favors the interior-exterior dynamic. In this dynamic, the great gift of freedom emerges, which, although interior, manifests itself in human acts. For the elaboration of the research, a bibliographic exploratory methodology was used in the main works of the authors. Finally, we conclude that Mounier and Saramago's proposal about freedom are really near on there principles, which ideas are sorely needed in today's world. Knowing that freedom is not pure objectivity, that we should live it instead of seeing it, nor pure subjectivity, because the world does not suit only my will; therefore, the human experience is lived under conditions, what surely puts us down to earth. We are free as we make others free, this is the great challenge! (shrink)

A ênfase na liberdade individual e nai gual dade de todos os ci dadãos vi stanos dois princípios de justiça rawlsianosfaz com que a j ustiça como eqüidadeefetue uma articulação entre a liberdadeindividual e a coletiva explicitamente vistanas duas faculdades morais contidas naconcepção de pessoa da teoria rawlsiana,isto é, na idéia de racionalidade e naconcepção de razoabilidade. Portanto,de s t a ma n e i r a , Ra wl s e l a b o r a u maarticulação entre (...) o público e o privadoinserindo, assim, na justiça como eqüidadet ant o a t r adi ção ant i ga de l i ber dadequant o a moder na. Na j us t i ç a c omoeqüi dade, a ut i l i zação do mét odo doe qui l í br i o r e f l e xi vo, a a ut onomi a , al i be r da de , o c onc e i t o nor ma t i vo depessoa, o procedi ment al i smo puro, aordem lexicográfica atribuída ao primeiroprincípio, à concepção política de justiçae a base públ i ca de j ust i f i cação, i st otudo mostra que Rawls considera tantoa liberdade dos antigos quanto à dosmodernos e, com base neste argumento,constata-se um forte suporte conceitualque aponta para o modelo rawlsiano dejustificação: o coerentista.The emphasis in the individual freedomand the equality of all citizens as it appearsin the two Rawlsian principles of justicecauses that justice as fairness be part ofan articulation between the individualfreedom and the collective one as explicitlyseen in the two moral faculties containedin the conception of person of the Rawlsiantheory, that is, in the idea of rationalityand in the conception of reasonableness.Therefore, Rawls elaborates an articulationbe t we e n t he publ i c a nd t he pr i va t einserting justice as fairness in such a waythat he is able to integrate the old traditionof freedom as well as the modern one. Injustice as fairness, the use of the methodof r ef l ect i ve equi l i br i um, aut onomy,f r e e do m, t h e n o r ma t i v e c o n c e p t o fpe r s on, pur e pr oc e di me nt a l i s m, t helexicographical order attributed to thefirst principle, the political conception ofjustice and the public base of justification,show that Rawls considers the freedomof the ancients in the view of the freedomof the moderns and, on the basis of thisargument, provides strong conceptualsupport for his model of justification: acoherentist one. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade (Persönlichkeit). Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivo para responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista de (...) justificativa epistêmico-moral. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Construtivismo. Equilíbrio reflexivo. Liberalismo político. Personalidade. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood (Persönlichkeit). A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of selfidentity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. KEY WORDS – Constructivism. Personhood. Political liberalism. Reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a concepção de liberdade encontrada em "Discourses concerning government" de Algernon Sidney. Mantendo a perspectiva republicana, a liberdade é definida pela ausência de dominação, ou seja, pela não submissão, sujeição ou exposição à vontade arbitrária de outra pessoa; e assumindo a perspectiva jusnaturalista, a liberdade é considerada um direito natural, inerente à condição humana, que deve ser preservado e assegurado pela autoridade política. Pretende-se discutir como Sidney articula essas duas perspectivas em sua (...) teoria política, projetando a concepção republicana de liberdade na modernidade.ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to analyze the concept of freedom found in Algernon Sidney’s "Discourses Concerning government". Keeping the republican thought, freedom is defined by the absence of domination, i.e., the denial of submission, bondage or exposure to the arbitrary will of another person; and taking the jusnaturalist thought, freedom is considered a natural right inherent to the human condition, which must be preserved and guaranteed by the political authority. I intend to discuss how Sidney articulates these two perspectives in his political theory, outlining the republican conception of freedom in modernity. (shrink)

This article attempts to recover the arguments of Spanish philosopher María Zambrano, particularly from works expounding her thoughts regarding the notion of person, and to demonstrate how such a reflection engenders the constitution of the idea of history for westernman, characterized by anethi..

The De praedestinatione of John Scottus Eriugena was intended as a contribution to a controversy sparked off by Gottschalk of Orbais concerning predestination. This work met with trenchant criticism and condemnation even though it firmly rejected Gottschalk’s views on double predestination. One of the reasons for this hostile reception was undoubtedly Eriugena’s singular conception of the freedom of will, a subject I intend to discuss elsewhere. In the present text, however, I would like to focus on another important cause of (...) the rejection of Eriugena’s treatise. In my opinion, this second reason was a pre-scholastic project of rationalization of the faith in the spirit of St. Augustine and using the method of Boethius and Martianus Capella. It would appear that Eriugena’s contemporaries were not ready for the favorable reception of his idea of the vera philosophia that was the same as the vera religio. Yet, as Goulven Madec once rightly observed, the vera ratio of Scotus was closely bound up with the lux mentium which is nothing else than God revealing himself in the human language of the Scriptures. Eriugena’s masters and models were the Church Fathers and his intention was to continue their efforts to achieve an understanding of the faith in his own, personal way. (shrink)

Modern epistemology adopted the idea of historicism, of the historicity of knowledge and the self-consciousness of the cognizer. The research, undertaken within cultural–historical epistemology, also spread in the context of the prevailing tendencies in the sphere of modern epistemology. The specificity of this type of epistemology is related to a special interpretation of the history of cognition. On this interpretation knowledge represents a cultural phenomenon that has an existentially-symbolical meaning for the cognizer. Therefore this type of epistemology returns us (...) to the dimension of knowledge, which has in fact been lost today. It returns us to the original antique notion of knowledge as “good,” as something that changes the person who acquires it. And here in this context comes forth such a feature of knowledge as its integrity. At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, Russian philosophers turned to the problem field of “integral knowledge,” the core of which lies in the unity of the integral and cognitive, which is reflected in the concreteness of knowledge. Such an understanding of knowledge enabled the articulation of a number of ideas that enriched European traditions of socio-humanitarian research and influenced the development of semiotics and structuralism both in Europe and in Russia. The ideas of R. Jakobson that stimulated the structure-semiotic research in the first half of the twentieth century are very well-known to world humanity science. Yet their epistemological potential is related to the idea of the integral knowledge. The epistemological turn towards historicism in semiotics in Russia was accomplished by G. Shpet. Jakobson communicated with Shpet at the Moscow linguistic circle in the 1920s. They both referred to the ideas of Husserl, and, as Jakobson acknowledged himself, he borrowed many ideas from Shpet—in particular, the idea of semiotics. Shpet’s helped implement the idea of “integral knowledge” that opened a perspective of the analysis of knowledge as an open symbolic sign system. This methodological approach appears to be especially topical nowadays in the sphere of humanities, which scientific character does not exclude historicism. The ideas of Russian philosophers, then, provide a productive context immediately as well as long-term prospects for developing the methodology of the humanities. The concepts that prevail in modern methodology accentuate the historical relativity and the outer social determinacy of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile the problem of the cultural–historical status of the humanities and the problem of addressing the idea of “integral knowledge” become increasingly topical and allow the transfer of the epistemological search for the conditions and the landmarks of scientificity. (shrink)

Understanding ownership rights is necessary for socially appropriate behavior. We provide evidence that preschoolers' and adults' judgments of ownership rights are related to their judgments of bodily rights. Four-year-olds and adults evaluated the acceptability of harmless actions targeting owned property and body parts. At both ages, evaluations did not vary for owned property or body parts. Instead, evaluations were influenced by two other manipulations—whether the target belonged to the agent or another person, and whether that other person approved of the (...) action. Moreover, these manipulations influenced judgments for owned objects and body parts in the same way: When the other person approved of the action, participants' judgments were positive regardless of who the target belonged to. In contrast, when that person disapproved, judgments depended on who the target belonged to. These findings show that young children grasp the importance of approval or consent for ownership rights and bodily rights, and likewise suggest that people's notions of ownership rights are related to their appreciation of bodily rights. (shrink)

In 1966 the Brazilian physicist Klaus Tausk (b. 1927) circulated a preprint from the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, criticizing Adriana Daneri, Angelo Loinger, and Giovanni Maria Prosperi`s theory of 1962 on the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. A heated controversy ensued between two opposing camps within the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory, represented by Leon Rosenfeld and Eugene P. Wigner. The controversy went well beyond the strictly scientific issues, however, reflecting philosophical and political commitments within the (...) context of the Cold War, the relationship between science in developed and Third World countries, the importance of social skills, and personal idiosyncrasies. (shrink)

The article focuses on presenting three arguments that range from less to more in terms of their radical stance on the current legal definition of person. The contribution of the first argument to this discussion lies mainly with a clarification of terminology. In the second argument, Roberto Esposito, despite considering replacing "someone" with "something" and saving humanity as a result, does not surpass his teacher Simone Weil. She is far more important, thanks to the impact of her personality, her qualities (...) as a writer and her radicalism. In the third argument, Simone Weil provides a demonstration of intellectual power that makes one shudder. Her writing reflects a consistent mind, at times out of reach, but her idea of a "philosophy of the impersonal" is unacceptable. Every human being has impersonal elements, such as language, and personal elements, including their manner of speaking and writing. A world without these two elements is simply inconceivable. (shrink)

RESUMO O pensamento de Bakhtin, dos primeiros e dos últimos textos, se concentrou nas imagens do corpo humano. Entende-se o corpo ao contemplá-lo: ver é saber. Esse “contemplar” não tem nenhuma das qualidades objetivantes do que hoje é conhecido como “olhar”. A filosofia inicial de Bakhtin é baseada em um compromisso compassivo pelo qual uma pessoa ajuda a outra a ver e a se conhecer como um todo e, além disso, como um todo amado. Por mais limitante que seja, argumentarei (...) que sua concepção inicial de corpo ainda tem muito valor. O argumento então se volta para as imagens posteriores e muito mais familiares de Bakhtin sobre o corpo grotesco. Enquanto, inicialmente, suas ideias voltam-se para um corpo estático, agora vemos o corpo envolvido em uma interação tumultuada e interminável com seu ambiente social e natural. Seria essa uma alegoria antissoviética ou uma visão alternativa do corpo humano que remonta à pré-história? Ofereço duas ilustrações em defesa da ideia de que esta era, na verdade, uma filosofia do corpo. ABSTRACT Bakhtin's thinking, early and late focused upon images of the human body. A body is a thing understood by looking at it: to see is to know. This 'looking' has nothing of the objectivising qualities of what is known today as the 'gaze'. Bakhtin's early philosophy is based on a compassionate engagement whereby one person helps another see and know themselves as a whole, and moreover, as a loved whole. As limiting as it is, I shall argue his early conception of the body still has much value. The argument then turns to Bakhtin's later and much more familiar images of the grotesque body. While his early body is static, now we see the body engaged in a tumultuous and unending interaction with its social and natural environment. Was this an anti-Soviet allegory, or an alternative vision of the human body that reaches back into pre-history? I offer two illustrations in defence of the idea that this was indeed a philosophy of the body. (shrink)

Resumo A natureza humana é fundamento e não meramente projeto regulador das ações. Ao se considerar Kant o divisor de águas para uma nova concepção do homem, na medida em que ele distingue o homem numênico do homem fenomênico, reconhece-se que a tradição filosófica pós-kantiana passou a considerar a natureza humana não como fundamento mas projeto do ser humano. Por outro lado, pretende-se mostrar aqui que a distinção kantiana é devedora não somente do seu princípio transcendental, mas também de (...) certas fontes históricas do seu pensamento, especialmente a escolástica. As filosofias posteriores ao kantismo desenvolveram esse ideal da natureza humana como projeto, neste caso, individual. A partir da retomada do conceito original de natureza humana fundada no ato de ser descoberto por São Tomás de Aquino, pretende-se demonstrar que a dicotomia kantiana, não obstante toda sua influência histórica, pode ser revertida em favor da unidade dinâmica do ser e do agir na pessoa humana. Palavras-chave : Natureza humana, ato de ser, homem numênico, homem fenomênico, projeto humano, TomismoHuman nature is the foundation and not merely a project regulatory of human actions. When we consider Kant the turning point to a new conception of man, insofar as it distinguishes noumenal man from phenomenal man, it is recognized that the post-Kantian philosophical tradition began to consider human nature not as the foundation of human actions but as a project of humanity. Moreover, we intend to show here that the Kantian distinction is indebted not only to its transcendental principle, but also to certain historical sources of his thought, especially scholasticism. The post-Kantian philosophies developed this ideal of human nature as a project, in this case, individual project. From the resumption of the original concept of human nature founded on the act of being discovered by St. Thomas Aquinas, we intend to demonstrate that the Kantian dichotomy, despite all its historical influence, can be reversed in favor of the dynamic unity of being and acting in the human person. Keywords : Human nature, act of being, noumenal man, phenomenal man, puman project, Thomism. (shrink)

"Qu'est-ce que le droit?" est peut-être la plus essentielle des problématiques auxquelles les juristes doivent répondre. Or peu de questions touchant à l'homme et aux sociétés ont suscité des réponses aussi diverses et parfois antagonistes que "Qu'est-ce que le droit?". Dans le vaste paysage des théories juridiques, il est difficile de savoir avec précision ce qu'est le droit. Faut-il dès lors se résigner à ne jamais disposer d'un objet-droit homogène et stable, dont l'identité serait finement établie et les frontières nettement (...) tracées? Pour étudier le droit, il importe pourtant de connaître ses spécificités parmi les différents modes de régulation sociale, cela afin de délimiter le champ des normes juridiques et donc circonscrire et borner l'objet d'étude. La définition du droit exposée dans la première partie de ce livre est une définition lexicographique, une définition scientifique. Il s'agit de constater ce qu'est le droit, quelles sont ses propriétés, au terme d'une enquête objective et empirique, excluant tout jugement subjectif et toute proposition personnelle. Comme la religion romaine qui accueillait dans son Panthéon tous les dieux grecs et étrusques, la théorie syncrétique réunit toutes les définitions du droit actuellement en vigueur dans la pensée juridique. Dans ce cadre, les diverses théories du droit ne sont plus des concurrentes, mais des associées. Elles ne s'opposent plus, mais se complètent. Ensuite, en appliquant les critères de juridicité ainsi recensés à une norme donnée, on peut mesurer son niveau de force juridique sur l'échelle de juridicité. Cette échelle, expliquée et expérimentée dans la seconde partie du livre, permet d'interroger les dimensions du droit. Or son application à de multiples formes de normativité indique que, dans le monde des normes sociales, les normes fortement juridiques côtoieraient les normes moyennement juridiques et les normes faiblement juridiques. En revanche, il ne semble guère exister de normes sociales non juridiques - les différences entre normes seraient de degré et non de nature. Ainsi l'échelle de juridicité invite-t-elle à retenir une conception graduelle du droit et un panjuridisme modéré. L'intérêt de cette nouvelle forme de rationalité de la pensée juridique est d'autoriser le juriste à s'ouvrir à tout type de normes sociales tout en sauvegardant l'autonomie conceptuelle du droit. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo fazer uma breve aproximação acerca da investigação empreendida por David Hume sobre a ideia de “eu” ou de “pessoa” e de sua inerente identidade e simplicidade. Essa discussão é posta especificamente na seção “Da identidade pessoal”, no primeiro livro do seu Tratado da natureza humana. Entrementes, para acompanhá-la, é necessário considerar alguns dos pontos desenvolvidos nas seções iniciais, nas quais Hume se dedicou a mapear as principais características de sua teoria a respeito da atividade (...) da mente. Com efeito, buscaremos não apenas mostrar o lado cético de sua crítica à ideia de eu, mas também sua recolocação do problema com a seguinte questão: por que, afinal, ainda que se tenha provado que essa ideia é fictícia, continuamos mentalmente propensos a acreditar nela? (shrink)

Resumo No Manifesto surrealista, de 1924, Breton explicita o produto da atividade surrealista como uma “luz de imagem”, gerado pela aproximação involuntária de duas realidades distantes. Essa estrutura dupla da imagem surrealista tem um caráter disruptivo, que rompe com a nossa percepção da realidade cotidiana. Com isso, abre-se a possibilidade de um espaço para a crítica social e histórica, bem como para uma intervenção estético-política justamente em uma sociedade na qual as formas tradicionais de crítica parecem estar neutralizadas. Essa experiência (...) surrealista e esse espaço aberto por ela Walter Benjamin caracteriza respectivamente com a fórmula “iluminação profana” e “espaço de imagem”. Ambos apresentam uma grande semelhança com alguns pontos e consequências, em seus conceitos, tanto de “imagem do pensamento”, como de “imagem dialética”, sobretudo na medida em que esses conceitos também são formulados em meio à crise cultural da sociedade europeia, nos 1920, e buscam uma saída revolucionária para a mesma. Trata-se de investigar aqui, por meio de uma análise comparativa dessas concepções de imagem, até onde vai a influência e a relevância do surrealismo para o pensamento figurativo-dialético de Benjamin e para sua compreensão da história.In the Surrealistic manifest from 1924, Andre Breton explains the product of surrealistic action as a “light of image” resulting from an arbitrary approach of two distant realities. This double structure of surrealistic image has a disrupting character that breaks our common perception of reality. Thus can open a space for social and historical criticism as well as for an aesthetical-political intervention in a society where traditional forms of criticism seem to be neutralized. Walter Benjamin defines this surrealistic experience and its opened space respectively with the expressions “profane illumination” and “image space”. Both have similarities with Benjamin’s ideas of “thought image” and “dialectical image”, especially because they were elaborated amidst the cultural european crisis in the 1920ies looking to find a revolutionary way out of it. Through a comparative analysis of these notions of image, this paper proposes to investigate the influence and the relevance of surrealism for Benjamin’s dialectical-figural way of thinking and his comprehension of history. (shrink)

The thought of the Cappadocian fathers is linked to the Trinitarian nature of God. They strive for formulating a definition of divine person. The extent of the Cappadocian notion of person covers two other important ideas which refer to being someone: an ability to be in a fraternal relation with others, and a disposition to enter such a relation voluntarily. The Christian idea of divine person also implicates a concept of infinite dignity. The authoress shows that at the grassroots (...) of the Western concept of person, associated with human inalienable rights, there are certain metaphysical intuitions. (shrink)

O trabalho pretende mostrar como a filosofia da idéia de infinito em Levinas se articula com a concepção da temporalidade diacrônica. A referência filosófica mais explícita e recorrente da idéia de infinito em Levinas é o pensamento cartesiano da Terceira Meditação, porém outras influências muito relevantes para este tema provêm dos textos talmúdicos. Procuramos aproximar as duas fontes do pensamento levinasiano, filosofia e judaísmo, pela análise de dois conceitos fundamentais da obra de Levinas, infinito e temporalidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Infinito. (...) Temporalidade. Ética. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show how the philosophy of the idea of infinite in Levinas is articuled with the conception of diachronic temporality. The more explicit and recurrent philosophical reference of the idea of infinity in Levinas’s thinking is the Cartesian proposition of the Third Meditation; however, other very important influences concerning this theme come from the Talmudic Lectures. We try to approximate the two sources of the Levinasian thinking through the analysis of two fundamental concepts of his work, infinity and temporality. KEY WORDS – Infinity. Temporality. Ethics. (shrink)

O trabalho pretende mostrar como a filosofia da idéia de infinito em Levinas se articula com a concepção da temporalidade diacrônica. A referência filosófica mais explícita e recorrente da idéia de infinito em Levinas é o pensamento cartesiano da Terceira Meditação, porém outras influências muito relevantes para este tema provêm dos textos talmúdicos. Procuramos aproximar as duas fontes do pensamento levinasiano, filosofia e judaísmo, pela análise de dois conceitos fundamentais da obra de Levinas, infinito e temporalidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Infinito. (...) Temporalidade. Ética. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show how the philosophy of the idea of infinite in Levinas is articuled with the conception of diachronic temporality. The more explicit and recurrent philosophical reference of the idea of infinity in Levinas’s thinking is the Cartesian proposition of the Third Meditation; however, other very important influences concerning this theme come from the Talmudic Lectures. We try to approximate the two sources of the Levinasian thinking through the analysis of two fundamental concepts of his work, infinity and temporality. KEY WORDS – Infinity. Temporality. Ethics. (shrink)

O presente artigo discute a educação de pessoas jovens e adultas privadas de liberdade como um direito humano. Analisa as principais normas nacional e internacionais que fundamentam esse direito e discute o modo precário como ele vem sendo implantado no Brasil, tomando por base empírica a pesquisa realizada pela organização nãogovernamental Ação Educativa e parceiros em quatro penitenciárias e quatro centros de detenção provisória do Estado de São Paulo. As informações levantadas entre os meses de outubro e novembro de 2012 (...) buscaram traçar um diagnóstico sobre as condições físicas para o funcionamento das atividades educativas, as expectativas da população carcerária acerca dos estudos, além de procurar compreender o envolvimento de funcionários com as práticas educativas. Os dados foram analisados tomando-se as dimensões propostas por Tomasevski, ex-relatora da ONU para o direito à educação, com base na noção de educação como um direito humano: disponibilidade, acessibilidade, adaptabilidade e aceitabilidade. O material empírico e as análises apontam para, por um lado, oreconhecimento legal do direito à educação da população encarcerada, seja ela formal ou não formal, e por outro, a precária condição de oferta desse direito. Baseado no conceito “prisão pós-disciplinar” de Chantraine, o texto conclui que o direito à educação tem sido utilizado muito mais como mecanismo de controle das populações encarceradas, estando distante do seu reconhecimento como um processo de promoção humana e reinserção na sociedade. Palavras-chave: Educação nas prisões. Educação de jovens e adultos. Educação como direito humano. Educação escolar. Educação não formal. (shrink)

Roberto Grosseteste, bispo de Lincoln, constitui uma figura particularmente importante numa época tão decisiva na história da Filosofia Ocidental, como é a primeira metade do século XIII. Receptor de Aristóteles e do corpo científico-filosófico greco-árabe, Grosseteste interessou-se, contudo, nas suas obras metafísico-teológicas, por continuar a tradição sapiencial herdade dos Padres da Igreja. O seu Hexaemeron é um modelo da sua recepção da exegese espiritualista patrística com vistas a uma concepção integrativa do mundo. Assim, comparando o uso dos Padres da (...) Igreja nesta obra e nos seus opúsculos metafísicos, o presente artigo reafirma sobretudo que Grosseteste tomou deles, reelaborando-as com o seu estilo próprio, as seguintes afirmações metafísico-teológicas: 1. A não-eternidade do mundo; 2. O ser humano como imagem de Deus; 3. A ideia do "corpo místico" de Cristo e do "Christus totus". Estas ideias, por sua vez, são solidárias com a espiritualidade que ele mesmo cultivou. /// Roberto Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, is an especially interesting personality from such a decisive time in the history of western philosophy as is the first half of the thirteenth century. Being recipient of Aristotle and the Greek-Arab scientific-philosophic body, he was nevertheless interested in their metaphysic-theological works, and in continuing the sapiential tradition inherited from the Fathers of the Church. His Hexaemeron is a model of reception of the spiritualist patristic exegesis considering an integrative view of the world. Comparing the use of the Fathers in this work and his metaphysic opuscules, the article states that Grosseteste has taken them into account, rewriting, in his own style, the following metaphysic-theological statements: 1. The no-eternity of the world. 2. Man as God's image. 3. The idea of Christ's "Mystical body" and "Christus totus". It is also shown that these ideas are at the same time in solidarity with the spirituality cultivated by him. (shrink)

In our times, when the pace of economic, scientific and technological, social and cultural change calls to mind the relativist velocities of contemporary physics, Einstein's criterion begins to be applicable to the historical process itself; movement can be recorded (and consequently the notion of velocity acquire meaning) provided an adequate reference system is available. Where science is concerned, such systems have always existed: historians have brought out the increase in adequate knowledge in the past by comparing it with present knowledge, (...) which then offered a system of absolute reference. But now, the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, molecular biology and the radical transformation of standards of value in all cultural areas have made like absolutization of contemporary ideas impossible. Today ideas furnish no more than a point of departure for non-classical retrospection which, as Jaurès said, seeks the fire, not. the ashes, in the history of science. But: the fire of science, its dynamics, its movement, is inseparable from its value, its effect, its psychological ‘accompaniment.’ Contemporary science, with unprecedented dynamism, is distinguishable from classical science by its far more emotional coloring. It lays bare not only the logical collisions of knowledge but also the emotional collisions. Einstein called the history of science the ‘drama of ideas.’ A drama which sometimes turns into a tragedy. The tragic sense Lorentz was aware of in the crumbling of old conceptions is easily perceptible in the remark he made when he confessed he would have prefered to be dead before the structure of classical physics collapsed. For Erenfest the tormenting experience of a personal inability to understand the positive bases of non-classical physics was also tragic and, according to Einstein, was what drove him to suicide. Einstein's own dissatisfaction tor thirty years while he strove in the field theory alone to find a stable universal conception possessing more complete ‘internal perfection’ than the then existing solution, was again tragic. The real characteristic of the collisions of non-classical science, however, is their ambivalence: the tragic notes blend with the optimistic perception of irreversible general progress in knowledge. The collisions of knowledge and this optimistic perception together sound a very complex chord, major on the whole, but with minor harmonics. (shrink)

The thesis deals with the concept of truth and the paradoxes of truth. Philosophical theories usually consider the concept of truth from a wider perspective. They are concerned with questions such as - Is there any connection between the truth and the world? And, if there is - What is the nature of the connection? Contrary to these theories, this analysis is of a logical nature. It deals with the internal semantic structure of language, the mutual semantic connection of sentences, (...) above all the connection of sentences that speak about the truth of other sentences and sentences whose truth they speak about. Truth paradoxes show that there is a problem in our basic understanding of the language meaning and they are a test for any proposed solution. It is important to make a distinction between the normative and analytical aspect of the solution. The former tries to ensure that paradoxes will not emerge. The latter tries to explain paradoxes. Of course, the practical aspect of the solution is also important. It tries to ensure a good framework for logical foundations of knowledge, for related problems in Artificial Intelligence and for the analysis of the natural language. Tarski’s analysis emphasized the T-scheme as the basic intuitive principle for the concept of truth, but it also showed its inconsistency with the classical logic. Tarski’s solution is to preserve the classical logic and to restrict the scheme: we can talk about the truth of sentences of a language only inside another essentially richer metalanguage. This solution is in harmony with the idea of reflexivity of thinking and it has become very fertile for mathematics and science in general. But it has normative nature | truth paradoxes are avoided in a way that in such frame we cannot even express paradoxical sentences. It is also too restrictive because, for the same reason we cannot express a situation in which there is a circular reference of some sentences to other sentences, no matter how common and harmless such a situation may be. Kripke showed that there is no natural restriction to the T-scheme and we have to accept it. But then we must also accept the riskiness of sentences | the possibility that under some circumstances a sentence does not have the classical truth value but it is undetermined. This leads to languages with three-valued semantics. Kripke did not give any definite model, but he gave a theoretical frame for investigations of various models | each fixed point in each three-valued semantics can be a model for the concept of truth. The solutions also have normative nature | we can express the paradoxical sentences, but we escape a contradiction by declaring them undetermined. Such a solution could become an analytical solution only if we provide the analysis that would show in a substantial way that it is the solution that models the concept of truth. Kripke took some steps in the direction of finding an analytical solution. He preferred the strong Kleene three-valued semantics for which he wrote it was "appropriate" but did not explain why it was appropriate. One reason for such a choice is probably that Kripke finds paradoxical sentences meaningful. This eliminates the weak Kleene three valued semantics which corresponds to the idea that paradoxical sentences are meaningless, and thus indeterminate. Another reason could be that the strong Kleene three valued semantics has the so-called investigative interpretation. According to this interpretation, this semantics corresponds to the classical determination of truth, whereby all sentences that do not have an already determined value are temporarily considered indeterminate. When we determine the truth value of these sentences, then we can also determine the truth value of the sentences that are composed of them. Kripke supplemented this investigative interpretation with an intuition about learning the concept of truth. That intuition deals with how we can teach someone who is a competent user of an initial language (without the predicate of truth T) to use sentences that contain the predicate T. That person knows which sentences of the initial language are true and which are not. We give her the rule to assign the T attribute to the former and deny that attribute to the latter. In that way, some new sentences that contain the predicate of truth, and which were indeterminate until then, become determinate. So the person gets a new set of true and false sentences with which he continues the procedure. This intuition leads directly to the smallest fixed point of strong Kleene semantics as an analytically acceptable model for the logical notion of truth. However, since this process is usually saturated only on some transfinite ordinal, this intuition, by climbing on ordinals, increasingly becomes a metaphor. This thesis is an attempt to give an analytical solution to truth paradoxes. It gives an analysis of why and how some sentences lack the classical truth value. The starting point is basic intuition according to which paradoxical sentences are meaningful (because we understand what they are talking about well, moreover we use it for determining their truth values), but they witness the failure of the classical procedure of determining their truth value in some "extreme" circumstances. Paradoxes emerge because the classical procedure of the truth value determination does not always give a classically supposed (and expected) answer. The analysis shows that such an assumption is an unjustified generalization from common situations to all situations. We can accept the classical procedure of the truth value determination and consequently the internal semantic structure of the language, but we must reject the universality of the exterior assumption of a successful ending of the procedure. The consciousness of this transforms paradoxes to normal situations inherent to the classical procedure. Some sentences, although meaningful, when we evaluate them according to the classical truth conditions, the classical conditions do not assign them a unique value. We can assign to them the third value, \undetermined", as a sign of definitive failure of the classical procedure. An analysis of the propagation of the failure in the structure of sentences gives exactly the strong Kleene three-valued semantics, not as an investigative procedure, as it occurs in Kripke, but as the classical truth determination procedure accompanied by the propagation of its own failure. An analysis of the circularities in the determination of the classical truth value gives the criterion of when the classical procedure succeeds and when it fails, when the sentences will have the classical truth value and when they will not. It turns out that the truth values of sentences thus obtained give exactly the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics. In that way, the argumentation is given for that choice among all fixed points of all monotone three-valued semantics for the model of the logical concept of truth. An immediate mathematical description of the fixed point is given, too. It has also been shown how this language can be semantically completed to the classical language which in many respects appears a natural completion of the process of thinking about the truth values of the sentences of a given language. Thus the final model is a language that has one interpretation and two systems of sentence truth evaluation, primary and final evaluation. The language through the symbol T speaks of its primary truth valuation, which is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics. Its final truth valuation is the semantic completion of the first in such a way that all sentences that are not true in the primary valuation are false in the final valuation. (shrink)

RESUMO O intuito deste artigo é estudar o objetivo principal da estética musical de Boulez, para o início das comemorações de seus 90 anos, desde certas categorias de Deleuze, considerando que elas nos permitem compreender e delinear uma lógica da sensação sonora. Se Deleuze se ocupou em detalhe do trabalho de Francis Bacon, por exemplo, a fim de criar uma "lógica da sensação visual" em que o conceito de "Figura" fosse central, propomos que o trabalho musical de Boulez, analisado a (...) partir do pensamento de Deleuze, possa mostrar os momentos decisivos de uma "lógica da sensação sonora." Por meio de alguns trabalhos de Boulez podemos ver dois elementos muito importantes para nossa pesquisa dados na estrutura instalada pela filosofia de Deleuze. Esses dois elementos que darão forma a este artigo são: as "figuras" da música e as "forças" do som expressivo. ABSTRACT This article aims to study the main objective of musical aesthetics of Boulez, to begin to commemorate 90 years, since certain categories of Deleuze, as they allow us to understand and outline a logic of sound sensation. If Deleuze worked in detail the work of Francis Bacon, for example, to create a "logic of visual sensation" where the concept of "Figure" is central, we propose that the musical work of Boulez, analyzed from Deleuze's thought, be possible to show the decisive moments of a "logic of sound sensation." Along some works by Boulez we can see two very important elements for our research in the framework installed Deleuze's philosophy are given. These two elements will shape this article are: the "figures" of music and the "forces" expressive sound. (shrink)

Under the careful editorship of R. A. Markus, this book appears to be one of the very finest anthologies of critical essays dedicated to the elucidation of the thought of St. Augustine. Those familiar with Markus’ contribution to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy will readily attest to the depth as well as to the breadth of understanding which Markus brings to Augustine scholarship. Three of the essays appear for the first time: "Action and Contemplation," by (...) Robert J. O’Connell; "Si Fallor, Sum," by Gareth B. Matthews; "On Augustine’s Concept of a Person," by A. C. Boyd. The remaining articles have appeared either as separate pieces or as journal articles: "St. Augustine and Christian Platonism," by A. H. Armstrong; "St. Augustine on Signs," by R. A. Markus; "The Theory of Signs of St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana," by B. Darrell Jackson; "Augustine on Speaking from Memory" and "The Inner Man," by Gareth B. Matthews; "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," by William L. Rowe; "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," by John M. Rist; "Time and Contingency in St. Augustine," by Robert Jordan; "Empiricism and Augustine’s Problems about Time," by Hugh M. Lacey; "Political Society," by P. R. L. Brown; "The Development of Augustine’s Ideas on Society before the Donatist Controversy" and "De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine’s Idea of the Christian Society," The essays display scholarly depth as well as concern for contemporary philosophical problems. It is an excellent addition to Augustine scholarship and to contemporary philosophizing. This book is part of the Doubleday Anchor Modern Studies in Philosophy Series, under the general editorship of Amelie O. Rorty.—D. A. C. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction and a critical analysis of Abraham Maslow’s neglected psychological reading of Thomas Kuhn’s famous dichotomy between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ science, which Maslow briefly expounded four years after the first edition of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in his small book The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance, and which relies heavily on his extensive earlier general writing in the motivational and personality psychology. Maslow’s Kuhnian ideas, put forward as part of a larger (...) program for the psychology of science, outlined already in his 1954 magnum opus Motivation and Personality, are analyzed not only in the context of Kuhn’s original ‘psychologizing’ attitude toward understanding the nature and development of science, but also in a broader historical, intellectual and social context. (shrink)

Introduction, by R. A. Markus.--St. Augustine and Christian Platonism, by A. H. Armstrong.--Action and contemplation, by F. R. J. O'Connell.--St. Augustine on signs, by R. A. Markus.--The theory of signs in St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana, by B. D. Jackson.--Si fallor, sum, by G. B. Matthews.--Augustine on speaking from memory, by G. B. Matthews.--The inner man, by G. B. Matthews.--On Augustine's concept of a person, by A. C. Lloyd.--Augustine on foreknowledge and free will, by W. L. Rowe.--Augustine on free will (...) and predestination, by J. M. Rist.--Time and contingency in St. Augustine, by R. Jordan.--Empiricism and Augustine's problems about time, by H. M. Lacey.--Political society, by P. R. L. Brown.--The development of Augustine's ideas on society before the Donatist controversy, by F. E. Cranz.--De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine's idea of the Christian society, by F. E. Cranz.--Chronological table.--Note on further reading (p. [422]-423). (shrink)

O artigo tem por objeto o exame de três registros de gritantes e distintos paradoxos na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. Registros feitos em tempos e contextos históricos diferentes por Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek atribuiu a Kant a mais paradoxal das proposições jamais enunciadas por qualquer autor, a de que a mera ideia de soberania deve obrigar-nos a obedecer como a nosso inquestionável senhor a quem quer que se haja estabelecido como tal, sem que caiba (...) indagar quem lhe deu o direito de comandar-nos. Willaschek aponta a incompatibilidade de duas teses centrais da doutrina kantiana: a do caráter externo dos vínculos jurídicos e a da incondicionalidade obrigacional do direito positivo, pois não é possível entender como é possível termo-nos como obrigados por imperativos jurídicos e, ao mesmo, vermo-nos internamente isentados do dever de obedecê-los. O ponto crítico de Balthazar é alegar que não pode haver na filosofia kantiana uma crítica da razão político e jurídica, simplesmente porque o conceito de imputação, base da normatividade própria dessas esferas, pressupõe uma pluralidade de agentes livres que, justamente, só pode ser uma pressuposição, pois nosso acesso à normatividade prática só pode ter lugar em primeira pessoa. No exame a que o artigo submete essas alegações, o artigo argumenta, em objeção à tese de Balthazar, que o caráter universal e categórico da força que vincula o sujeito quando confrontado com a lei moral em primeira pessoa necessariamente se desvaneceria se, ao mesmo tempo, ele não fosse tomado pela evidência de que a realidade objetiva dos princípios morais é não só instanciável, mas assegurada pela múltipla instanciação. Com relação às dificuldades levantadas por Willaschek e Bouterwek, o artigo argumenta que o princípio exeundum e statu naturali, enquanto norma metapositiva, anterior à divisão do domínio prático entre doutrina do direito e doutrina da virtude, permite ao mesmo tempo compreender a exigência de obediência ao poder constituído e a restrição das obrigações jurídico-políticas exclusivamente ao foro externo.AbstractThe object of the article is to examine three claims about three distinct and allegedly blatant paradoxes in Kant's Doctrine of Right. These three critical points had been made in distinct times and contexts by Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek attributed to Kant the most paradoxical of all paradoxical propositions, the statement that by the mere idea of sovereignty we are obliged to obey as our lord who has imposed himself upon us, without questioning from where he got such right. Willaschek points out the incompatibility of two main theses of Kantian doctrine of right: the claims that the legal bounds are of external character and that they are the source of unconditional obligations, since it seems impossible to understand how it would be possible to be obliged by juridical norms and decisions and at the same time to be exempted of the internal duty of compliance. The radical objection of Professor Balthazar is the claim that in the context of Kantian Philosophy it is impossible to admit a critique of the juridical and political reason because the concept of imputation, ground of the normativity in these domains, requires not only the presupposition of free agents, but a true and secure epistemic access to them, which is, according to him, impossible considering that the moral law and the other practical principles are accessible for us only in the first person. In the course of the appraisal of such claims, the article contest that objection arguing that the universal and categorical force of the normative bound experienced by the subject when confronted with the moral law in the first person would ineluctably vanish if, at the same time, he had not been taken by the evidence that the objective reality of the moral principles is secured by multiple instancing. Regarding the difficulties raised by Willaschek and Bouterwek, the article argues that the principle exeundum e statu naturali, as a norm of meta-positive character, prior to the division of practical domains between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, is the cue both to the understanding of the requirement of unquestioning obedience to the constituted power and to the restriction of the validity of this requirement only in foro externo. (shrink)

The Person and the Inpersonal: confronting Max Scheler’s phenomenological thought with Heidegger’s. This essay starts from a similarity between the thought of Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger in their correspondent approaches to the way the being of the human as non-substantial. Both Scheler’s notion of “Person” and Heidegger’s notion of “Dasein” are conceived of as acts, always already determined by their being-in-the-world, and not as substantial entities with a kind of identity previous to their “actuality”. Nonetheless, Scheler and Heidegger extract (...) from that originally common thought divergent pathways of thinking: whereas the first one addresses the mode of being of the Person, the second derives to the “impersonal” (das Man). This text aims at showing precisely the way of that divergence. (shrink)

About the Book: - Brahman and Person is a collection of essays by the late Richard De Smet (1916-1997) on the topic of person in Indian thought. Overturning the current interpretation, De Smet proposes that the nirguna Brahman can be regarded as properly personal, provided person is understood in the original and classical sense that emerged in the Christian effort to speak abut the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The Rendering of saguna and nirguna Brahman as personal and (...) impersonal, instead originated with the Western translators of Sanskrit works, who were influenced by an individualistic idea of the person and the consequent restriction of its application to the human being. De Smet also dedicated attention to the question of the human person in Indian and Western thought over a number of essays, proposing that a properly holistic and organic notion of the human person can be found especially n the thought of sankara. This collection of essays by an eminent Indologist constitutes and important contribution not only to Indological studies but also to cross cultural and interreligious dialogue. About the Author:- Richard De Smet taught Indian Philosophy at Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune. Born in Belgium in 1916, he joined the Jesuits in 1934 and came to India in 1946. He earned a Ph.D. in 1953 from the Gregorian University, Rome, for his thesis on the theological method of Sankara, proposing both that sankara was srutivanadin, and that he used the method of analogy in his interpretation of the Upanisadic mahavakyas. De Smet was a life member of the Indian Philosophical Congress and the Indian Philosophical Association and Founder-President of the Association of Christian Philosophers of India and in these capacities carried out an ongoing dialogue with Indian philosophers and religious personalities. He died in 1997. Ivo Coelho is Reader in Gnoseology and Metaphysics at Divyadaan: Salesian Institute of Philosophy, Nashik, and editor of Dvyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education Born in 1958 at Mumbai, he studied under De Smet at Pune, and went on to specialize in the hermeneutical thought of the Canadian Philosopher theologian and economist Bernard Lonergan. He is interested in issues of cross-cultural and interreligious understanding, dialogue and collaboration. He is the author of Hermeneutics and Method: The Universal Viewpoint in Bernard Lonergan (Toronto, 2001). (shrink)

Resumo (200 palavras) Podem-se encontrar diferentes conceitos na história da Ética. Esse artigo lida com a ideia que se deve identificar um conceito de Ética para se discutir sobre sua relação com Educação. Moral é um conceito que aparece quando se pensa sobre Ética. Por isso uma discussão sobre o conceito de Moral e sua relação com Ética é apresentado. Discutir Ética significa entender o conceito na sociedade porque Ética não pode acontecer a uma pessoa sozinha. Pessoas se relacionam na (...) sociedade e Ética é o fundamento básico da vida social. Antes que se possa observar Ética na sociedade como um conjunto, é possível descobrir que Ética começa na vida da família. A escola é o lugar específico na sociedade que ajuda a família a construir a relação entre Ética e Educação. Filósofos e educadores concordam sobre a importância de educar crianças para serem cidadãos éticos, mas os conceitos de Ética que eles possam usar são de algum modo diferente. Ética Relativa e Ética Universal são os principais grupos de conceitos encontrados na literatura. Concluímos que para se tornar inteiramente um ser humano, cada pessoa precisa se sentir integrada à humanidade e isto somente é possível por meio de conceitos universais de ética. Palavras chaves – ética – educação – moral – família - escola - sociedade (200 words) We can find different concepts in history of Ethics. This article deals with the idea that it is necessary to identify a concept of Ethics in order to discuss about its relation to Education. Moral is a concept that comes to mind when we think about Ethics. Because of this a discussion about this concept and its relation to Ethics is presented. To discuss Ethics means to understand it in society because it can’t happen to a person alone. People relate themselves in society and Ethics is the basic foundation to social life. Before we can observe Ethics in society as a whole it is possible to discover that Ethics begins in family life. School is the specific place in society that helps family to build the relation between Ethics and Education. Philosophers and educators agree about the importance of educating children to be ethical citizens but concepts of Ethics they may use are somehow different. Relative Ethics and Universal Ethics are the major groups of concepts that we can find in literature. We conclude that to become a whole human being each person needs to feel integrated to humankind and this is only possible through universal concepts of Ethics. Keywords – ethics – education – moral – family – school - society  . (shrink)

RésuméCet article expose et analyse la notion de référentielà laquelle Gonseth avail consacré son dernier livre. II distingue un référentiel personnel qui comporte deux aspects et un référentiel de groupe qui lui aussi présente diverses modalités . Entre les référentiels personnels et les référentiels de groupe s'établit une symbiose existentielle favorisant les interactions. Cette notion de référentiel peut être utilisée avec profit pour décrire et interpréter les relations que ľhomme entretient avec ses semblables, avec les collectivités dont il fait partie (...) et avec le milieu naturel dans lequel il se trouve engagé.SummaryThis article presents and analyses the notion of reference frame, to which Gonseth devoted his last book. A personal reference frame involving two aspects is distinguished from a group reference frame which also takes various forms . Personal and group reference frames are in an existential symbiosis fostering interactions. This notion of reference frame may be used to advantage in describing and interpreting the relations between man and his fellow man, his organizations, and his natural environment. (shrink)

Although people own myriad objects, land, and even ideas, it is currently illegal to own other humans. This reluctance to view people as property raises interesting questions about our conceptions of people and about our conceptions of ownership. We suggest that one factor contributing to this reluctance is that humans are normally considered to be autonomous, and autonomy is incompatible with being owned by someone else. To investigate whether autonomy impacts judgments of ownership, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk read (...) vignettes where a person paid for an entity or created it. Participants were less likely to judge that the entity was owned when it was described as autonomous compared with when it was described as non-autonomous, and this pattern held regardless of whether the entity was a human or an alien, a robot, or a human-like biological creation. The effect of autonomy was specific to judgments of whether entities were owned, and it did not influence judgments of the moral acceptability of paying for and keeping entities. These experiments also found that judgments of ownership were separately impacted by ontological type, with participants less likely to judge that humans are owned compared with other kinds of entities. A fourth experiment tested a further prediction of the autonomy account, and showed that participants are more likely to view a person as owned if he willingly sells himself. Together these findings show that attributions of autonomy constrain judgments of what can be owned. 2017 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore a new framework for personality assessment that may function as sanity nosology of personality traits: the Positive Personality Model. The recent publication of DSM-5 created the opportunity to assess personality traits as dimensional constructs (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In Section III, five maladaptive personality traits are proposed as the maladaptive versions of Five Factor Model (FFM) traits (Costa and McCrae, 1985). This approach draws on the existing idea of conceptualizing pathological and (...) typical personality traits as part of a continuum. It places DSM-5’s maladaptive traits in a sickness pole and FFM’s traits in a “typical” pole. This spectrum, however, does not include a positive perspective that represents healthy behavior: a sanity nosology. The Positive Traits Inventory-5 (PTI-5; de la Iglesia and Castro Solano, 2018) is a measure designed to assess the positive reverse of the Personality Inventory for DSM-5-Adult (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson and Skodol, 2013). The 220 positive personality criteria were studied psychometrically using a sample of 1902 Argentinean adults from the general population (Mage = 39.10, SD = 13.81, Min = 18, Max = 83; 50.1% females, 49.9% males). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses resulted in a five-factor solution. The dimensions were labeled Sprightliness, Integrity, Serenity, Moderation, and Humanity and subsumed under the denomination of Positive Personality Model (PPM). Analyses of convergent validity provided some grounds for interpreting the five positive traits as positive versions of the pathological traits and the typical traits. When tested for its predictive capability on mental health, the PPM outperformed the variance explained by the FFM. It is concluded that the PPM may constitute a positive pole in the continuum of personality traits –possibly functioning as a sanity nosology– and that it is somewhat more related to optimal functioning than to typical trait models. The PPM should be confirmed in other populations, its predictive capability ought to be tested with other relevant variables, and longitudinal studies should be done to analyze the stability of the traits over time. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This paper focuses on Max Scheler`s idea of person and its meaning in terms of values organized according categories. The work of Scheler on ethics expands the solidarity of the person as cordis ordo by the (...) construction of a hierarchical system of values. Therefore, the recognition of the realm of universal values, a sector of which forms the ethos of a given age, has to be supplemented by that of the order of the time with its individual values and claims. There are many lectures of values in axiological philosophy, as we explain in this paper according to material-values ethics, and they are very important in the revelation of the Other. (shrink)

What, if anything, is the correlation between the specialized or technical ideas of the philosopher and the rest of his existence? His everyday life outside his philosophical role. In the specialized reality and reality constitution, when employing the discourse and discipline of philosophy, the philosopher subscribe to many things in an explicit manner and he employs a number of implicit things and assumptions that are not stated explicitly. These things concern the different branches, areas and domains of the philosophical discourse, (...) for example metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, ontology, cognition, consciousness, mind, perception, thinking, etc. Is there a relation between these technical 'beliefs' of the philosopher and other, not philosophical areas of his existence? Does and can all of his non-philosophical existence reflect his philosophical beliefs, statements and expressions? Is it possible that the everyday existence or life world of the philosopher can resemble, confirm and express his philosophical ideas? If this is not the case, what are the factors that are involved in such discrepancies? Do they imply a lack of integrity, of wholeness of integration on behalf of the philosopher? What are the causes of such an illogical or surprising lack of compatibility or similarity between these sets of two or more facts? What are the things that we can look for in such a lack of compatibility – things such as the following? - inconsistency, difference, disparity, variance, variation, deviation, divergence, -/- disagreement, dissimilarity, dissimilitude, mismatch, lack of similarity, contrariety, contradictoriness, disaccord, discordance, incongruity, -/- lack of congruence, incompatibility, irreconcilability, conflict, opposition? -/- I illustrate the above by means of four examples. 1 Let us assume that the embodied human person consists of both voluntary and involuntary processes and activities. Do the philosophy of an individual reflect or express these activities or is it completely or partially unrelated to them? Do the voluntary processes and activities or the voluntary aspects of perception, cognition, brain processes and other activities resemble or express the philosophy of a thinker? 2 Some thinkers are seriously concerned about the importance of discourse and dialogue and the equality of all those involved. We find their concern about the ideal discourse and dialogue described in their written work and talks, but to what an extend do their own discursive and dialogical actions and behaviour reflect the ideal situation they preach? 3 Ethics and morality can be find in and are emphasized in all sorts of disciplines, of course they are major subjects in providing ways to live off for philosophers and we even find institutions devoted to their teaching and investigation. Do the lives, the lived morality and ethics of those individuals who preach the ideals of ethics or ethical ideals reflect the ideals they preach and that provides them with ways to earn a living? Or, is it the case that morality and ethics are merely faked by those individuals living off their preaching of ethics? And, that they merely employ the values, norms, customs and attitudes of a culture, sub-culture, community, group or another social grouping? In other words are the preachers of ethics really more ethical than the rest of the community and society? 4 When the philosopher expresses his ideas by means of all sorts of philosophical tools he is aware of the fact that he employs them, or at least aware of some of them being intentionally employed by him while he is unaware of others that he employs. Do the tools the philosopher employs to theorize (identify problems, the nature of the questions he asks, the nature of his ways of questioning, the assumptions he makes, the forming and testing of hypotheses, the making of generalizations, etc) or philosophize (perceive things, think, think about things, reason, argumentation etc) resemble what he beliefs, asserts and says about thinking, perception, cognition, understanding, subjects, objects, relationships between subjects and objects and other features and processes of epistemology? In short – does the lived philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics etc of the philosopher resemble, represent, confirm, substantiate, back, endorse, support, authenticate and corroborate the ideas, assertions and speculations that are expressed by the statements his philosophy or philosophizing consist of? Does he walk the walk of his talk? Are they similar and identical, the same things and merely expressions of the same things in different mediums? (shrink)

This book offers an analysis of the different concepts of person adopted in educational strategies, their effects on learning, and the contributions of the Thomistic approach on the issue.

Traditionally the modern theory of ideas has been discussed primarily in reference to its alleged introduction of a veil of mental items between the mind and the world, which leads, through the empiricists, to radical skepticism about the existence of an external world. Here I propose to emphasize an entirely different aspect of the Cartesian theory of ideas which, in my view, is more fundamental in opening the empiricist path that leads to Hume’s radical skepticism. I argue that what I (...) call the “phenomenological presentation” model of ultimate justification is rooted in a fundamental ambiguity between sensible and intellectual apprehension insinuated by Descartes’s view of “clear and distinct” ideas together with his emphasis on the priority of intuition over logical inference. Sensible apprehension relies on immediate acquaintance with items pheno-menologically and ostensively present before the mind as given particulars. The phenomenological presentation model takes its clues from sensible apprehension, although the items present before the mind might themselves be either ideas of the understanding, images of the imagination, sensory impressions, or material external objects. Intellectual apprehension, by contrast, as I illustrate with Leibniz’s model of our knowledge of concepts and truths of reason, consists in the discursive, non-ostensive grasping of the generality of abstract concepts and of formal structures . For Leibniz, all intellectual apprehension is unambiguously “logical discursive apprehension” as opposed to “direct ostensive apprehension.” Thus, Leibniz unmistakably disambiguates Descartes’s model in favor of a precise intellectual model. The empiricists, by contrast, correspondingly disambiguate Descartes’s conception in favor of an entirely sensible model.Tradicionalmente, a teoria moderna das idéias foi discutida principalmente em conexão com a sua suposta introdução de um véu de itens mentais entre a mente e o mundo que leva, por meio dos empiristas, ao ceticismo radical sobre a existência de um mundo externo. Aqui eu proponho enfatizar um aspecto completamente diferente da teoria Cartesiana das idéias que, na minha visão, é mais fundamental no que diz respeito a abrir o caminho empirista que conduz ao ceticismo radical de Hume. Eu argumento que o que eu chamo de o modelo de “apresentação fenomenológica” de justificação última está baseado em uma ambigüidade fundamental entre apreensão sensível e intelectual insinuada pela visão de Descartes de idéias “claras e distintas” junto com a sua ênfase na prioridade da intuição sobre inferência lógica. A apreensão sensível confia no contato imediato com itens presentes fenomenologicamente e ostensivamente perante a mente como particulares dados. O modelo de apresentação fenomenológica está inspirado na apreensão sensível, embora os itens que se apresentam perante a mente poderiam ser eles mesmos idéias do entendimento, figuras da imaginação, impressões sensórias, ou objetos externos materiais. A apreensão intelectual, por contraste, como eu ilustro com o modelo de Leibniz de nosso conhecimento de conceitos e verdades da razão, consiste na compreensão discursiva e não-ostensiva da generalidade de conceitos abstratos e de estruturas formais . Para Leibniz, toda a apreensão intelectual é claramente “apreensão discursiva lógica” por oposição a “apreensão ostensiva direta”. Assim, Leibniz claramente desfaz a ambigüidade do modelo de Descartes em favor de um modelo intelectual preciso. Os empiristas, por contraste, desfazem a ambigüidade da concepção de Descartes em favor de um modelo completamente sensível. (shrink)

As religiosidades de matriz africana tem um importante papel na condução das práticas de saúde de seus devotos a partir de uma visão integral do corpo da pessoa que considera o ser humano em suas diferentes esferas, a espiritual, a social, a mental e a biológica. No candomblé, a cabeça, denominada de _Orí_, é entendida como a sede da individualidade do sujeito, possui um conteúdo espiritual, tem _status_ de divindade, e guia os filhos e filhas de santo em sua jornada (...) no Ayê. Se enfraquecida, ela pode trazer enfermidades, o que exige uma série de procedimentos rituais para o fortalecimento de _Orí_, como o _bori_, que se traduz no ritual de dar comida e bebida à cabeça, essencial para o restabelecimento da saúde espiritual ou física. A partir desse contexto, a pesquisa buscou compreender a importância de _Orí_ para o processo saúde-doença de pessoas filiadas ao candomblé, entrevistando sujeitos de diferentes terreiros. Os resultados apontam para a capacidade de _Orí_ em fortalecer o caráter das pessoas, seus valores e atitudes positivas diante da vida, como sendo fundamental para se fazer boas escolhas em prol da saúde, e evitar as enfermidades. Ter uma cabeça boa é ter uma saúde boa. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an analysis of the intellectual itinerary of Louis de Broglie, from the discovery of wave mechanics, until today. Essential attention is paid to the fact that this itinerary is far from being linear, since after a first attempt to develop his own views on wave mechanics through the theory of singular waves, Louis de Broglie abandoned it for twenty five years, under the influence of the Copenhagen School (even embracing the conceptions of the latter), until (...) the beginning of the fifties, when he definitively came back to his primary theory. This evolution of the Louis de Broglie's views on wave mechanics is told here and explained through an analysis of the evolution of all of quantum mechanics and, more generally, the dominating conceptions of theoretical physics in our century.This paper is written in a quite personal form, which is not exactly one to which the readers of scientific journals are accustomed, because it reproduces, in fact, the preface of a book (to be published) of Louis de Broglie, which is precisely devoted to the fundamental problems of quantum mechanics and closely linked to the second turnabout of the author. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende, por meio da análise literária e da leitura de Freud , investigar a concepção de progresso em Sade, tomando como objeto de estudo o romance A filosofia na alcova . Defende-se que a ficção sadeana resulta de um conflito entre indivíduo e sociedade, de cujo resultado depende a felicidade humana. Esta seria alcançada com a superação dos obstáculos impostos pela educação, pela cultura e pela abertura da sociedade para a satisfação de todos os prazeres do sentido. (...) The goal of this article is to investigate the concept of progress in Sade's work through the analysis and reading of Freud's work, focusing here on the analysis of the novel Justine. It argues that Sadean fiction is the result of a conflict between each individual and society, and that the happiness of humankind depends on the outcome of this conflict. Happiness would consequently be reached by overcoming the accumulation of obstacles imposed by education and culture, and through the willingness of the society to satisfy every pleasure of the senses. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo examina as considerações de Nietzsche acerca das fontes sociais e históricas do eu como um contra-argumento à concepção liberal de indivíduo. Defendo que Nietzsche oferece não apenas uma crítica contundente à concepção associal e previamente individuada de pessoa, à qual se conecta a noção liberal de liberdade, como ainda um contra-conceito alternativo de pessoa e de soberania. Seus argumentos visam mostrar, em sua dimensão crítica, que o indivíduo ou pessoa é inseparável de seus objetivos ou (...) valores, que são socialmente constituídos, e que nossa capacidade como indivíduos, especialmente para a agência soberana, é o produto de uma longa história e pré-história social. Em sua dimensão construtiva, encontramos em Nietzsche a contra alegação de que a manutenção e o cultivo de nossas capacidades são dependentes de relações de um antagonismo ponderado entre nós mesmos enquanto indivíduos, ou antes: como dividua. Esses argumentos serão desenvolvidos no que se segue em consonância com quatro principais linhas de pensamento: sobre as origens sociais e o caráter da consciência ; sobre a história e a constituição social de nossa capacidade como indivíduos soberanos [sovereign] ; sobre as origens sociais do fenômeno moral ; e sobre a destruição fisiológica do sujeito moral substancial, seguida da reconstrução fisiológica.This essay examines Nietzsche's thought on the social and historical sources of the self as a counter-argument against the liberal concept of the individual. Nietzsche, it is argued, offers a powerful critique of the asocial, antecedently individuated concept of personhood, to which the liberal notion of freedom is attached, but also an alternative counter-concept of personhood and sovereignty. On the critical side are arguments to the effect that the individual or person is inseparable from its ends or values, which in turn are socially constituted, and that our capacities as individuals, especially for sovereign agency, are the product of a long social history and pre-history. On the positive side is the constructive counter-claim that the maintenance and cultivation of our capacities for productive, autonomous agency is dependent on relations of measured antagonism both between and within us as individuals, or rather: as dividua. These arguments are reconstructed along four main lines of thought: on the social origins and character of consciousness ; on the history and social constitution of our capacities as sovereign individuals ; on the social origins of moral phenomena, understood as internalisations of communal norms ; and Nietzsche's physiological destruction of the substantial moral subject, coupled with the physiological reconstruction of the subject as dividuum. (shrink)

Virginia Held nos propõe em seu capítulo “Care and Human Rights”, do livro Philosophical Foudantion of Human Rights, que utilizemos a perspectiva da ética do cuidado para pensar e efetivar as demandas que escolhemos tratar com a linguagem dos direitos humanos, na qual se prioriza tradicionalmente as questões da justiça. Ainda que reconheça a importância que os direitos humanos possuem em mobilizar forças tanto em âmbito internacional como na esfera nacional, no que diz respeito à efetivação de leis e de (...) políticas voltadas para problemas que afetam seriamente as populações dos países, Held frisa que milhares de pessoas ainda escapam a esse alcance, inclusive crianças, que morrem em número alarmante por desnutrição ou por doenças tratáveis. Destaca, ainda, que nossa concepção de direitos humanos é herdeira de uma visão individualista e violenta da tradição liberal, na qual o sujeito solitário vai enfrentar sozinho as forças do mundo, incluindo aí a natureza e as outras pessoas. Uma ética do cuidado, pela sua característica de reconhecer nossa situação necessária de vulnerabilidade e de interdependência, propõe-se como uma alternativa mais eficiente, por focar na relação entre cuidador/a e cuidado/a, buscando-se afastar das abstrações tradicionais como as que ela entende ser as demais abordagens éticas como a kantiana e a utilitarista, ainda tributárias daquela tradição liberal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 369 On Divine Foreknowledge. (Part IV of the Concordia). By Lms DE MOLINA. Trans. Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xii +286. $34.95. The contents of the sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina's famous work are specified in its title: Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia-" The Agreement of Free Choice with the Gifts of Grace, Divine (...) Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation." Part IV, which particularly concerns the Divine Fore· knowledge, is divided into seven " Disputations," 47-53 inclusive. These deal with contingency, the presence of all things to God in eternity, God's knowledge of future contingents (including the role of the Divine Ideas), and especially the reconciliation of freedom and contingency with absolutely certain Divine Foreknowledge and Predeterminations. It is Part IV, especially Disputation 52, which contains Molina's well known teaching about the scientia media, God's "middle knowledge," i.e., eternally between the natural knowledge He has of all things possible and the free or post-volitional (according to our way of conceiving it) knowledge He has of all things actual. More precisely, by middle knowledge God knows, before any exercise of His will, what a created free agent would do in various circumstances, both those which actually will obtain and those which, although possible, will never in fact exist. The objects of such knowledge are situated between what is merely possible and what will simply he at some moment of time. They are possible with a certain hypothetical (ex hypothesi) dependence on both Divine and human free causation. Thus, in comprehending them as they are, God's absolutely necessary and prior knowledge would seem in some way dependent upon what is contingent and even created. Molina's doctrine attempts to overcome the paradox in this. A competent admirer of Molina's position, University of Notre Dame Professor Freddoso is not just a master of the Jesuit's baroque Latin, with its sesquipedalian sentences bristling with spiny technical terms. He also shows himself to be a fine logician (earlier he translated portions of Ockham's Summa Logicae), with an excellent understanding of scholastic theology (in areas such as the Trinity, Christology, and the Eucharist), metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of human nature. To make the translated work even more accessible, he has in his introduction briefly treated prior parts of the Concordia as preparing the stage for Part IV, has related Molina's concerns to those of present day philosophers of religion, and has made clear the agreement as well 370 BOOK REVIEWS as the main difference between Molina and his " Banezian " opponents, whose position he summarizes from the 20th century theologian-philosopher, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. In addition, he has graced the translation with helpful footnotes. At times these identify persons mentioned by Molina, some of whom (e.g. Richard of Middleton, William Durandus, Gregory of Rimini, or Didacus de Deza [Hispalensis]) would be less than household names today for a non·medievalist. At other times, Freddoso's notes clearly and succinctly explain items of Catholic doctrine which Molina presupposes or to which he refers. Still again, they reproduce important texts of St. Thomas connected with points Molina is making. And something which I welcomed, Freddoso uses his notes frequently to recall and clarify premises of earlier arguments to which Molina later simply alludes without restatement. The translation itself is from the modern critical edition of the Concordia by Johannes Rabeneck, S.J. (Oniae et Matriti, 1953), which I would like to have seen reproduced on facing pages. Freddoso's version is accurate to the point of being literal. Despite that, however, it is amazingly readable. He does on occasion have difficulty with terms like complexio (which he specially notes on page 10) and ratio: whether to understand them subjectively or objectively-but then, doesn't everyone have the same problem? Again, while one might wonder about sentences as long as nineteen lines (e.g. page 178), they are in fact the legacy of Molina himself (cf. Disp. 52, n. 19, Rabeneck, p. 346, where the Latin runs 14 lines). Freddoso speaks of Molina's " lumbering " prose. But at the same... (shrink)