This paper examines the therapeutic implications of Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment and revenge as our signature malady. §I examines the obstacles to a therapeutic reading of Nietzsche's thought, including his anti-teleological tendencies and the value he places on sickness. Then there is the energetic problem of finding resources to tackle ressentiment, given the volitional exhaustion of modern nihilism. Finally, the self-referential implications of Nietzsche's critique of slave values threaten to trap his thought in a futile ressentiment against ressentiment. If the (...) impulse to cure or redeem us from revenge through critical destruction repeats the logic of revenge, then the challenge for a therapeutic reading is to think through the transformation of revenge on the basis of repetition.An agonal reading of Nietzsche's philosophical practice is proposed to tackle these problems in §II. (shrink)

This essay examines Nietzsche’s thought on hatred in the light of the realist and perfectionist impulses of his philosophy. Drawing on remarks scattered across his writings, both unpublished and published, it seeks to reconstruct the “philosophy of hatred‘ that, as he himself observed, “has not yet been written‘. In S1 it is shown that hatred is a necessary ingredient in Nietzsche’s dynamic and pluralist ontology of conflict. Hatred plays an indispensable role in the drive to assimilate or incorporate other life-forms (...) into life’s struggle for expansion and self-overcoming. According to Nietzsche’s philosophical physiology, hatred is greatest where struggle and the resistance to assimilation are greatest; that is, among equal powers. It is also distinguished from revulsion and contempt, since these are attached to the process of excretion, not assimilation. What is more, since genuine hatred serves to assimilate what is more or less equal, it is bound up with love, understood as attraction and the desire to appropriate what we wish to make our own; this is one of several ways in which the opposition between love and hate is overcome. But for Nietzsche, hatred can take a variety of forms, and his distinctive claim is that it need not be a destructive force, but can take creative forms. Two different forms of creative hatred are then examined: an active agonal hatred inter pares that allows for an affirmative pride in one’s enemy ; and the reactive hatred of the “spirit of revenge‘ that gives birth to slave morality. Attending to Nietzsche’s argumentation on the etymological relations between “hatred‘ and “ugliness‘, one can distinguish genuine hatred inter pares, affirmative and creative, from contempt towards what is inferior from a position of strength, and from hatred-as-ressentiment towards what is superior from a position of weakness. Nietzsche’s analysis of the creative hatred that gave birth to slave morality reveals its destructive core in the “imaginary revenge‘ that degrades its noble opponent, raising the problem: How to respond constructively to the necessity of hatred and conflict implied by Nietzsche’s ontology? In the final section, two responses to this problem are considered: on the one hand to seek ways to “improve‘ hatred by drawing on its idealising powers for constructive ends; on the other hand, to use physiological self-knowledge to correct the errors intrinsic to hatred and cultivate an episteme beyond love and hate. These responses can pull in different directions, but they can also be co-ordinated in a way that addresses the realist and perfectionist impulses in Nietzsche’s philosophy. (shrink)

Este artigo examina e compara Kant e Nietzsche enquanto pensadores do conflito. Argumenta-se no § 1 que, para ambos os filósofos, o conflito desempenha um papel essencial e construtivo em vários domínios de seu pensamento, e que ambos nos oferecem um rico conjunto de insights sobre as qualidades produtivas do conflito. Contudo, Kant não é capaz de formular um conceito genuinamente afirmativo do conflito que faça jus aos prodigiosos poderes produtivos por ele descritos. Em vez disso, ele promove uma guerra (...) de extermínio (Vernichtungskrieg) filosófica contra toda guerra, destinada a negá-la em favor de uma reivindicação absoluta pela paz ('paz perpétua'). Como nos mostra a análise de "Zum ewigen Frieden" no § 2, a possibilidade de ação construtiva requer a eliminação da guerra em favor da paz perpétua por meio do Estado de Direito, e o conflito é, na melhor das hipóteses, produtor de sua própria negação. A parte final do artigo se volta para Nietzsche em busca de um modelo conceitual que permita uma compreensão genuinamente afirmativa do conflito e seus potenciais produtivos. A filosofia da vida de Nietzsche é uma ontologia do conflito que culmina em um ideal de maximização da tensão baseado em um equilíbrio de poderes mais ou menos equânimes. Argumenta-se que a noção nietzschiana de afirmação da vida nos compromete com uma posição que se situa entre a guerra kantiana e o direito cosmopolita, focando a nossa atenção nas relações antagônicas que se estabelecem tanto no interior quanto entre uma pluralidade de ordenamentos jurídicos. This article examines and compares Kant and Nietzsche as thinkers of the conflict. It is argued in paragraph one that conflict plays a fundamental and constructive role for both philosophers in several domains of their thought, and that both of them offer us a rich set of insights on the productive qualities of conflict. However, Kant is unable to formulate a genuinely affirmative concept of conflict that does justice to the prodigious productive powers described by him. Instead, he promotes a termination philosophical war (Vernichtungskrieg) against all war intended to negate it in favor of an absolute vindication for peace ('perennial peace'). As evidenced by "Zum ewigen Frieden" analysis in paragraph two, the possibility of a constructive action requires the elimination of war for the perennial peace through the Rule of Law, and conflict is, at its best, producer of its own negation. The closing part of the article turns to Nietzsche in search of a conceptual model to genuinely understand conflict and its productive potential. Nietzsche's life philosophy is an ontology of conflict that culminates in an ideal of maximizing tension based on a balance of more or less equitable powers. It is argued that Nietzsche's notion of affirmation of life commits us to a position that is between Kantian war and the cosmopolitan law, bringing to our attention the antagonistic relations within and among a plurality of legal systems. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Nietzsche's shifting views on democracy in the period 1870–86 with reference to his enduring preoccupation with tyrannical concentrations of power and the conviction that radical pluralism offers the only effective form of resistance. As long as he identifies democracy with pluralism , he sympathizes with it as a site of resistance and emancipation. From around 1880 on, however, Nietzsche increasingly links it with tyranny, in the form of popular sovereignty, and with the promotion of uniformity, to the (...) exclusion of genuine pluralism. Democracy's emancipatory claims are reinterpreted as "misarchism," or hatred of authority, and Nietzsche looks to the "exceptional beings" excluded by democracy for sources of resistance to the "autonomous herd" and "mob rule." Against elitist readings of this move, it is argued that Nietzsche opposes the domination of the herd type under democracy from a standpoint in human diversity and a generic concern with the future of humankind. Exceptional individuals are conceived in pluralistic, agonal terms, as a community of legislators engaged in a process of transvaluation that serves the interests not of one or a few but of all of us: "the self-overcoming of the human.". (shrink)

The concept of Umwertung, central to Ecce Homo, is marked by discrepancies and incongruities that seem to defy philosophical comprehension. This paper focuses on the problem of Yes-saying and No-saying at the core of Umwertung. How can total affirmation be combined with radical critique, as Nietzsche claims? Nietzsche's favoured idiom of warfare exhibits the incommensurability of these positions, but it also points to a deeper problem: in waging war against idealism, Nietzsche risks repeating idealism, conceived as a war to the (...) death against other forms of life and thought. In §2 idealist warfare is analysed more closely, and in §3 it is contrasted with Nietzschean warfare, cinceived as an agonal form of oppositional thinking that avoids repeating idealism. This model of warfare is, however, undermined by the affirmative and destructive excesses of Nietzsche's text, and §4 proposes a different approach to the problem of Yes- and No-saying. On this approach, the affirmation of reality as war or conflictual multiplicity demands 1. the adoption of antagonistic positions with destructive intent against life-negating positions , but also 2. the overcoming of every antagonistic position in favour of an 'impossible' or fictional standpoint in the relation between antagonists; this alone allows all antagonistic positions to be affirmed. This approach is proposed as a general way to make sense of the fictional qualities of Ecce homo, its excesses and incongruities, and in §5 it is applied as a corrective to the account of Umwertung as a comparative practice proposed by Gerd Schank. (shrink)

Nietzsche says "good Europeans" must not only cultivate a "supra-national" view, but also "supra-European" perspective to transcend their European biases and see beyond the horizon of Western culture. The volume takes up such conceptual frontier crossings and syntheses. Emphasizing Nietzsche's genealogy of European culture and his reflections upon the constitution of Europe in the broadest sense, its essays examine peoples and nations, values and arts, knowledge and religion. Nietzsche's apprehensions about the crises of nihilism and decadence and their implications for (...) Europe's future are investigated in this context. Concerning the crossing of notional frontiers, contributors examine Nietzsche's hoped-for dismantling of Europe's state borders, the overcoming of national prejudices and rivalries, and the propagation of a revitalizing "supra-European" perspective on the continent, its culture and future. They also illuminate lines of syntheses, notably the syncretism of the ancient Greeks and its possible example for the European culture to-be. Finally certain of Europe's current problems are considered via the critical apparatus furnished by Nietzsche's philosophy and the diagnostic tools it provides. (shrink)

Im Nietzsche-Wörterbuch werden etwa 300 Begriffe aus Nietzsches Vokabular eingehend erläutert, davon 67 imersten Band. Berücksichtigt werden u. a.: Anzahl der Belege, Schwerpunkte im Gebrauch, Synonyme, die verschiedenen Bedeutungen, Bedeutungskomponenten und bedeutungsrelevanten Kontexte, sprachgeschichtliche und philosophiehistorische Lokalsierung von Nietzsches Gebrauch des Wortes, Nietzsche-Forschung und -Rezeption. Das gesamte Wörterbuch umfaßt 4 Bände.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 446-461.

Resumo Este artigo examina as considerações de Nietzsche acerca das fontes sociais e históricas do eu como um contra-argumento à concepção liberal de indivíduo. Defendo que Nietzsche oferece não apenas uma crítica contundente à concepção associal e previamente individuada de pessoa, à qual se conecta a noção liberal de liberdade, como ainda um contra-conceito alternativo de pessoa e de soberania. Seus argumentos visam mostrar, em sua dimensão crítica, que o indivíduo ou pessoa é inseparável de seus objetivos ou valores, que (...) são socialmente constituídos, e que nossa capacidade como indivíduos, especialmente para a agência soberana, é o produto de uma longa história e pré-história social. Em sua dimensão construtiva, encontramos em Nietzsche a contra alegação de que a manutenção e o cultivo de nossas capacidades são dependentes de relações de um antagonismo ponderado entre nós mesmos enquanto indivíduos, ou antes: como dividua. Esses argumentos serão desenvolvidos no que se segue em consonância com quatro principais linhas de pensamento: sobre as origens sociais e o caráter da consciência ; sobre a história e a constituição social de nossa capacidade como indivíduos soberanos [sovereign] ; sobre as origens sociais do fenômeno moral ; e sobre a destruição fisiológica do sujeito moral substancial, seguida da reconstrução fisiológica.This essay examines Nietzsche's thought on the social and historical sources of the self as a counter-argument against the liberal concept of the individual. Nietzsche, it is argued, offers a powerful critique of the asocial, antecedently individuated concept of personhood, to which the liberal notion of freedom is attached, but also an alternative counter-concept of personhood and sovereignty. On the critical side are arguments to the effect that the individual or person is inseparable from its ends or values, which in turn are socially constituted, and that our capacities as individuals, especially for sovereign agency, are the product of a long social history and pre-history. On the positive side is the constructive counter-claim that the maintenance and cultivation of our capacities for productive, autonomous agency is dependent on relations of measured antagonism both between and within us as individuals, or rather: as dividua. These arguments are reconstructed along four main lines of thought: on the social origins and character of consciousness ; on the history and social constitution of our capacities as sovereign individuals ; on the social origins of moral phenomena, understood as internalisations of communal norms ; and Nietzsche's physiological destruction of the substantial moral subject, coupled with the physiological reconstruction of the subject as dividuum. (shrink)

This paper draws on Alexander Baumgarten, the founder of modern aesthetics (1714- 1762), to tackle two fundamental questions: What is an image or representation “of violence”? And what makes an image violent, in the sense that it can provoke acts of political violence? In the mediatized environment we inhabit, I argue, our perception has become damaged by generalized logics of image-exchange and -sharing, so that we have become immunized against perceiving concrete particularity. Baumgarten’s notion of clear and “con-fused” or “fused” (...) (“verworren”) representations describes well how certain images – “violent” images – can break through these mediatized logics and capture the concrete particular in its qualitative singularity. The complexity and plurivocity of such images defeat our cognitive capacity to determine truth/untruth univocally, provoking a fear of ambiguity, which is one of the small beginnings of violent political acts and events. (shrink)