The article comments upon the report written by the French captain Aubert about the Romanian space during the XIXth century. It analyses the richness of documentation data contained by the report, through the lenses of the historical anthropological categories of “the other’s image”. The author concludes that the report was elaborated in a period when French interests for the Romanian space was rising.

At the beginning of the xxth century the high rate of analphabetism and the recent unification of the country, achieved only in 1870, had required a vast program of school and university reforms which were accompanied by a debate on two fundamental questions: whether the university should depend on public funds or become autonomous, and whether the curriculum should be specialized or remain general as in the modern era. The 1859 Casati reform had separated the faculty for literature and (...) philosophy from the faculty for mathematical, physical and natural sciences, thus introducing for the first time specialized curricula. (shrink)

Au cours du xixe siècle, porter l’uniforme est devenu un élément constitutif de l’identité militaire, particulièrement en France où le service militaire s’est progressivement universalisé à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale. Objet matériel doté de fonctions symboliques, l’uniforme introduit l’historien au cœur du fonctionnement d’un milieu social qui est alors l’un des laboratoires de la masculinité. Décrit, critiqué, modifié par les médecins militaires soucieux de fonctionnalité et de bien-être, il donne à voir un corps qui demeure cependant largement (...) façonné, redressé par une armature de tissu dissimulant une réalité beaucoup moins idéale. Son port est le fruit d’un long apprentissage qui agrège le jeune soldat à la communauté masculine qui l’entoure. Offert au regard d’autrui, à celui des femmes tout particulièrement, il construit une identité masculine en quête de reconnaissance et se trouve situé, par conséquent, au cœur des processus de construction de la différence sexuée. (shrink)

La couture et la broderie sont deux activités qui ont marqué, pendant des siècles, la présence féminine à l’intérieur de la famille. Parfois geste technique et nécessaire, parfois moment de formation et/ou d’évasion, la broderie a d’ailleurs constitué l’un des savoir-faire nécessaires pour la jeune fille bourgeoise vouée au mariage, nécessitant, pour l’affirmation de sa présence sociale, un trousseau. Par ailleurs, pendant ces derniers siècles, les femmes se sont emparées de l’écriture pour en faire à la fois un moment de (...) réflexion, de gestion, de mémoire de soi et de la famille : en quoi ces pratiques se ressemblent-elles? En quoi la solitude, le repli sur soi, le silence, la lenteur, la précision du geste, le marquage (du papier, du tissu) deviennent, tout le long du xixe siècle, les éléments communs de savoir-faire qui contribuent de façon analogue à forger, dans l’espace et dans le temps, l’identité individuelle féminine et son insertion sociale? En quoi l’écriture de soi a accompagné, puis remplacé, le travail de l’aiguille? (shrink)

Review of the book Fraisse, G. (1998). Les femmes et leur histoire. Paris: Gallimard.

La couture et la broderie sont deux activités qui ont marqué, pendant des siècles, la présence féminine à l’intérieur de la famille. Parfois geste technique et nécessaire, parfois moment de formation et/ou d’évasion, la broderie a d’ailleurs constitué l’un des savoir-faire nécessaires pour la jeune fille bourgeoise vouée au mariage, nécessitant, pour l’affirmation de sa présence sociale, un trousseau. Par ailleurs, pendant ces derniers siècles, les femmes se sont emparées de l’écriture pour en faire à la fois un moment de (...) réflexion, de gestion, de mémoire de soi et de la famille : en quoi ces pratiques se ressemblent-elles? En quoi la solitude, le repli sur soi, le silence, la lenteur, la précision du geste, le marquage deviennent, tout le long du xixe siècle, les éléments communs de savoir-faire qui contribuent de façon analogue à forger, dans l’espace et dans le temps, l’identité individuelle féminine et son insertion sociale? En quoi l’écriture de soi a accompagné, puis remplacé, le travail de l’aiguille? (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo quiere ofrecer un análisis de la evolución de la pintura chilena del siglo XIX, indagada a partir de la interpretación del tema hídrico en la producción pictórica de tres de los artistas más representativos en los ámbitos de la pintura de paisaje, del marinismo y de la pintura de glorias navales. En particular nos referiremos a las creaciones de Antonio Smith, Charles Wood y Thomas Somerscales, cuyas representaciones de ríos, lagos y sobre todo del Océano Pacífico (...) son una prueba de la fecunda etapa decimonónica que esta disciplina vivía en Chile. Nos fijaremos en el estudio de las tres claves de composición, luz y color en un conjunto de obras guardadas en prestigiosas colecciones públicas y privadas, seleccionadas atendiendo a los juicios sobre las relevantes cualidades técnicas y estéticas reconocidas en ellas por la crítica y la historiografía artísticas actuales.: The present article has the purpose to offer an analysis of the evolution of chilean painting during the 19th century, investigated from the interpretation of the water in the pictorial production of three of the most representative artists in the field of landscape, sea and naval glory painting. In particular, we will refere to the creations of Antonio Smith, Charles Wood and Thomas Somerscales, whose representations of rivers, lakes and especially Pacific Ocean are a proof of the productive phase that in 19th century painting had in Chile. We will focus on the study of the three keys of composition, light and color in a combination of works kept in precious public and private collections, selected due to the judgment about the relevant technical and esthetic qualities by the actual artistic critics and historiography. (shrink)

In the mid XIXth century, an illustrated intellectual minority questioned the colonial mentality of the system of Spanish domination revealing in its writings an attempt at construction of the sign of woman based on liberal, progressive and post independence ideologies. Within this minority we find the Colombian writer Soledad Acosta de Samper, whose concern for the social condition of women is revealed in her work in the image of an educated woman. Using the text La mujer en la (...) sociedad moderna [Woman in Modern Society] and the novel Una holandesa en América [A Dutch Woman in America], this article analyzes two aspects of the image of women in Acosta: that of woman as a moralizer and that of religiosity. The analysis of these two themes shows Acosta’s use of the normative discourses of the period in her project of giving woman a more important social role and they become strategies to tone down the potential for transgression of the new situation for women that she desires. (shrink)

. In the XIXth century there was a persistent opposition to Aristotelian logic. Nicolai A. Vasiliev (1880–1940) noted this opposition and stressed that the way for the novel – non-Aristotelian – logic was already paved. He made an attempt to construct non-Aristotelian logic (1910) within, so to speak, the form (but not in the spirit) of the Aristotelian paradigm (mode of reasoning). What reasons forced him to reassess the status of particular propositions and to replace the square of (...) opposition by the triangle of opposition? What arguments did Vasiliev use for the introduction of new classes of propositions and statement of existence of various levels in logic? What was the meaning and role of the “method of Lobachevsky” which was implemented in construction of imaginary logic? Why did psychologism in the case of Vasiliev happen to be an important factor in the composition of the new ‘imaginary’ logic, as he called it? (shrink)

Tsvetan Todorov, in his book Us and Them. French Thinking on Human Diversity, asked the following question: “How does one, how should one relate to those who do not belong to the same community as we do?” This question has been posed somewhat differently by intellectuals of the Americas anxious to develop paradigms of identity that will contribute to the successful construction of a society whose aim is to integrate heterogeneous ethnic groups: “How does one, how should one relate to (...) those who are members of our new society but who live either on its margins or who are frequently considered as different?” The mixed-race (métissage) approach, applied to the Latin Americas situation, was in part a response to this question. Here the “us” did not designate metropolitan Europeans engaged in thinking about the “others,” that is to say non-Europeans, but Latin Americans thinking about relations among various dominant groups and the varying “others” within their own society, since the “others” were part of “us.” The meaning of “us” is equally problematic when applied to North America. “What happens when words like ‘community’ and ‘us’ cease to have the clear and immediate meaning that Todorov seems to ascribe to them?” Sherry Simon recently asked. Although offering a general critique of the monological conception of culture and identity – a critique based on Bakhtin's work on polyphony and dialogism, on James Snead's investigation of the hybrid nature of several texts belonging to the European canon (such as The Odyssey and The Divine Comedy), and on the studies of Angelo Ara and Claudio Magris in regard to the heterogeneity of Trieste – she nevertheless begins her essay on a personal note, describing life in the multicultural city of Montreal, where “many children come out of mixed or immigrant marriages, some going to French schools, some to English,” and who can not “define themselves as products of a single culture” (pp. 15-16). Although I agree with Sherry Simon that the “us” of culture is never a given (it should be mentioned that Todorov himself writes that we must “give up basing our thinking on such a distinction” [between us and them] p. 421), it is essential here to emphasize the special ambiguity of the conception of “us” in the ex-colonies of the New World, where the “collision of cultures” implied not only, on the one hand, a confrontation among Spanish, Portuguese, British, and French colonists, but also between the colonists and the African slaves as well as with the immigrants who arrived after independence. Todorov's conception of nationhood (p. 422) as “a more or less perfect (although never total) coincidence of a State and a culture” - which he toned down a bit by adding that a culture is often identified with a particular region, a group of countries, or even a stratum of the population (pp. 424-425) - is even less applicable to the new societies of America than it is to Europe. Not only are we talking about hybrid societies (and what society isn't, to some degree?), but of societies conceived as hybrid, either multicultural (Canada) or mixed-race (Latin America). If, as Ernest Renan insisted at the end of the XIXth century, the idea of the modern nation is based on a conscious disregard for our diverse ethnic origins, the concepts of identity of the societies of the New World have often been based on an explicit symbolization of their heterogeneity. (shrink)

The article draws a conceptual distinction the (French) structuralism of the 50’s–60’s and the post-structuralism of the 70’s, which are discussed as overlapping in their intellectual paths; their mutual dynamics is defined as a reaction of the intelligence to the pressure of depersonalized unified schemes within the logic of structuralism against free improvisation and loose interpretation instead of total explanations in the post-structuralism interpretation. The article establishes a conceptual identity of the paradoxical nature between post-structuralism (and deconstructionism, which is homogeneous (...) and identical thereto in a number of aspects), on the one hand, and constructionism with its specific process of language dismantling – social/ideological languages, social group dialects, on the other hand, which naturally leads the authors to the analysis of the paradoxicality principles, defined by post-structuralism (five principles of paradoxicality of Gilles Deleuze – paradox of regress, paradox of sterile reiteration, paradox of neutrality, paradox of absurd, paradox of Levi-Strauss); poststructuralists’ paralogisms are examined through paradoxical denotation; the late Roland Barthes’ phenomenon of paradoxicality, becoming a plot-forming principle of narration, is analyzed. Poststructuralism is conceptualized in the article as the first decisive step of post-modernism; the affinity of post-structuralist and postmodernist commitment to parody, game and irony is stated; the theory of language games in post-modern interpretation is explored; one of those games – a game of carnival – is explored within the diachronic retrospective; the affinity of parody and carnival tradition of post-structuralism and post-modernism to the romantic irony of the XIXth century and its inconsistency with the popular culture of laugh is established. The genesis of poststructuralism and post-modernism is connected with the ideological restart of the Western society before the “very end” of the Resistance ideas and the disappointment of the left European intellectuals in the “great legends” and illusions of Marxism. The blurred concepts of relativism are connected with the mutual disproportion of different layers of historical experience. (shrink)

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is (...) an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

Los nombres de José Martí, Eugenio María de Hostos, Gregorio Luperón y Ramón Emeterio Betances sintetizan las luchas llevadas adelante, durante el siglo XIX, para conquistar la independencia y las libertades en la región del Caribe colonizada por España. Reconstruimos algunos de los episodios de esa lucha a través de los escritos de Ramón Emeterio Betances, "El Antillano". Tras una breve introducción biográfica y contextual, la exposición se ordena en torno a dos pares de ideas centrales de su pensamiento: las (...) de independencia y confederación antillana, por una parte, y las de defensa de la raza negra y abolición de la esclavitud, por otra. Aunque las presentamos separadamente, ellas resultan inescindibles en el conjunto de su producción.The names of José Martí, Eugenio María Hostos, Gregorio Luperón, and Ramón Emeterio Betances summarize in themselves the XIXth Century struggles for the freedom and the independence of the Caribbean countries colonized by Spain. In this paper we reconstruct some of the episodes of such struggles through the writings of Ramón Emeterio Betances, "El Antillano" . Following a short biographical and contextual introduction, this work is developed around two pairs of central ideas of his thought: those of Antillean independence and confederation, on the one hand, and those of the defense of the black people and the abolition of slavery on the other. Though presented separately, these ideas are inseparable in the bulk of Betances's production. (shrink)

Maine de Biran a toujours été considéré comme un représentant exemplaire de l'anti-matérialisme dans la philosophie française du début du XIXe siècle. N'a-t-il pas tenté, sur la base de l'expérience du fait primitif, de fonder une doctrine dualiste? Certes, mais des textes récemment publiés montrent que cela n'a pas toujours été le cas: vers 1800, sous l'influence des Idéologues, et particulièrement de Cabanis, il a, pour un temps, épousé les thèses du naturalisme matérialiste. Ce sont ces textes que nous examinons (...) ici, avant d'envisager certaines objections que l'on pourrait faire à notre interprétation. In the french philosophy of the XIXth century's beginning, Maine de Biran has always been regarded as a supporter of anti-materialism. Has he not tried to establish the foundations of a dualistic doctrine, on the basis of the « fait primitif »? Certainly, but some recently published texts show that it has not always been so: about 1800, under the influence of the Ideologists, Cabanis particularly, Biran has for a while endorsed materialistic-naturalistic theses. We examine here these texts and survey some objections against our interpretation. (shrink)

The Paleolithic art interpretation is still a polemical subject. Nearly 300 caves covered with Paleolithic paintings have been discovered and more than 90% are located in Spain and in France. Surprisingly, more than half the painted illustrations are abstract patterns such as dots and lines. The high realism of naturalist figures also stands out. We will present the four groups of theories that have been formulated since the end of the XIXth century in order to interpret the Paleolithic (...) art: the artistic theory from Lartet and Piette; the magical hunting theory from anthropologists such as Tylor and Frazer and archeologists like Breuil; the structuralist theory from Raphael, Leroi- Gourhan and Laming-Emperaire; and lastly the shamanist theory from Lewis-Williams and Clottes. We will also refer to the agglutinative theory gathering all of these from Ucko and Rosefeld. Afterwards I will offer my own thought. Paleolithic paintings are the expression the life led by every generation of the clan. The panels or the set of animals as much as the painted signs are their own History collection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the (...) very project of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the (...) very project of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY most extensive study of this aspect of Schelling's thought, at least until 1806. However, even if Schelling was not, as it is frequently stated, indifferent to the problems and the vicissitudes of politics, his theoretical thinking on this subject never went beyond temporary systematizations, to be given up, or modified, after a while. The author shows how Schelling, especially in this fieM, was influenced either (...) by his environment in general, or by some personalities he happened to contact: first his "republican" and francofile friends of the Ttibingen Stilt, afterwards the romantic circle of Jena, and, between 1801 and 1803, Hegel. The author studies in his first chapter, devoted tO the non-philosophic writings of the TUbingen period (1790-1795), not only Kant's and Herder's influence on Schelling, which are usually taken for granted, but also the impact of C. G. Heine and of other GSttingen scholars. This is a stimulating suggestion, showing the need for a more detailed study on the diffusion of the "historicocritical" method in circles, as the Ttibingen school, dominated rather by philosophical and theological than by philological and historical interests. In the following chapters, Schelling is closely related again to the intellectual history of his time; Schelling's relationship to the Aufkliirer Nicolai produces some surprises, and the same may be said about some new particulars (implementing F. Rosenzweig's and F. Bthm's research) on the close connection between Schelling and Htlderlin in 1795-1796. The fourth chapter is devoted to the correlation between theories on "natural philosophy" and moral political theories. The fifth concerns the philosophy of history and of government. This remarkable study, founded on sound scholarship, and conducted with a sharp historical mind, is to be recommended not only to students of Schelling, but to all those who have some interest in early XIXth Century German political thought. GIORGIO TONELLI State University of New York at Binghamton Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Ed. Hartmut Buehner and Otto Ptggeler. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. Pp. 622. DM 86.00) Despite the high reputation Germany has long enjoyed with regard to its scientifically reliable editions, up to this very moment, a historic-critical edition of the totality of Hegel's works has not existed. There were only provisional texts of single works available whose philological reliability differed in its sometimes doubtful variety. This is a rather strange fact, considering that Hegel died in 1831. It can be explained only by a phenomenon peculiar to this philosopher: at the peak of his fame, numerous students from all countries of the world attended Hegel's lectures, assiduously taking notes and frequently publishing as authentic what they had understood and jotted down. The philosopher was very generotis in authorizing various versions of his lectures and thus, the international market was swamped with quite incongruous editions of some of his writings at the moment of Hegel's death. Despite this rather confused state of affairs, distinguished scholars have tried, for BOOK REVIEWS 489 more than six decades, to bring order into the posthumous manuscripts of the philosopher, and these efforts were successful, but only to a certain extent. Next to the pioneering publications of Wilhelm Dilthey, Herman Nohl and Frans Rosenzweig, lesser known savants, in the first place, Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister have devoted many years of self-denying efforts to make /mportant parts of Hegel's manuscripts available to the public and looked for new possibilities to edit the large body of lectures. But the task proved too difficult for individual scholars. For this reason, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, a government-sponsored organization, has commissioned the publication of an all-encompassing historic-critical edition of Hegel's works and arranged for the appointment of a senatorial commission for advising the editors of such a mammoth undertaking. Members of the commission were the aforementioned scholars (see title) and W. Wieland. The Ministry of Education of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has opened a research center, originally directed by F. Nicolin, since 1968 by O. Ptggeler. Thus the edition can now be published continuously. Before discussing the contents of volume four, the only volume hitherto published, let's take... (shrink)

The actuality of research paper is the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and the achievement of victory over Russia in the "hybrid war" of the XXIst century, the need to unite Ukrainian people around common goals based on national pride. The Ukrainians study two important concepts - the Ukrainian the national idea and the national identity, the means of their evaluation and development. The aim of the research is a critical analysis of common and distinctive concepts of (...) the UNI and national identity. The purpose of the research is to define the main difficulties for spreading the victorious UNI in present conditions; to research the practice of studying and measuring the numerous characteristics of national identification by sociologists and the other Ukrainian scholars. The research methodology has a modern system and multidisciplinary character. The method of dialectical analysis is taken from philosophy, evolutionary approach - from historical sciences, comparative analysis - from linguistics and pedagogics, etc. We will be constantly turning to the latest scientific discoveries in ethology, cognitive science, noohistory and the other “young” sciences, that is necessary for predictions in the topic of "national identification”. Particularly we are going to borrow foreign experience in the protection of the national language and in effective teaching of foreign languages. The main result of the research is the need to create and apply the UNI as a strategic means on consolidation of Ukraine. UNI-21 should rely on a combination of noohistory as the sum of exact dates of archaeological findings and the decoding of the DNA of their organic part. The facts about the Great Trypillya and the other ancestors’ achievements of Ukrainians for over 15,000 years have already raised national pride and created a scientific outlook. The noohistorians have created a new theory on the of the Indo-European languages’ family origin. Besides they confirmed the hypothesis of German linguists of the XIXth century about the extension of Indo-European languages’ family from Ukraine's forest steppes. These and other facts are forming a high national pride, which greatly facilitates the solution of language problems. Conclusion: We have proved that the experience of Ireland on the language issues has special significance for modern Ukraine. It is known that Ireland has been colonized by the United Kingdom for 800 years. The Irish were suffered from a linguistic split and separation of a part of the nation, but they did not lose their native language. And even after the “economic victory” over the colonialists in circumstances of a very high standard living they started to restore the Irish language position of the main state language. (shrink)

A number of writers have attempted, since Mach, Boltzman and the psychologists of the end of the XIXth century, to give an evolutionary account of logical norms. Husserl famously argued that this account fails, for it is circular. I examine here some recent accounts, based on evolutionary psychology and game theory, in particular those of Gibbard, Millikan and Cosmides-Tooby. I argue that they suffer for similar circularities, although an evolutionary account of the cognitive mecanisms which underlie logical norms (...) is feasible. (shrink)

This paper examines the contribution of Gabrio Piola to continuum mechanics.Though he was undoubtably a skilled mathematician and a good mechanician, little is commonly known about his papers within the international scientific community, principally because a large part of the Italian school of mechanics was isolated in the first half of the XIXth century.We examine and comment on Piola’s most important papers, and compare them with those of his contemporaries Cauchy, Poisson and Kirchhoff.