The author argues that according to Sextus Empiricus, (a) the "sensual" nature of the phenomenon is a metaphorical notion, since it is indistinguishably extended both to sensuality and thinking; (b) the phenomenon manifest itself with irresistible force of impact, through a wide range of passive states of mind; (c) the impact of phenomena is always mediated by our ego, because all skeptic expressions are strongly correlated with the first person singular. The article proves that Descartes could not refute the “excess” (...) of skeptical doubt and make an immanent critique of skepticism without borrowing the aforementioned statements of Sextus. Such borrowing (1) has created a common ground for discussion between Descartes and skeptics; (2) made it possible for the meditator to give persuasiveness to careful observation of his own internal experience. Descartes' search for certainty in "Meditations" is entirely based on [а] evidence of "phenomena", "states of mind", "passions"; [b] refusal to agree with the "non-evident" proclaimed by Sextus Empiricus. (shrink)

Oral history of philosophy: written format.

An introduction to the new section "Philosophical Handbooks" from the editor-in-chief of Sententiae.

The main point for criticizing the Cartesians for Vico is the notion of method, interpreted as exceptionally discursive procedure, devoid of spontaneity and creative force which are necessary for discovering new truths. These qualities are embodied for Vico in the Latin term ingenium, loan translation of which is found in Italian (ingegno) and is absent in French. The criticism of Cartesianisn suggested by Vico does not consider the fundamental bilingualism of this philosophy and wide use of the term ingenium in (...) the corps of Descartes’ Latin works. The analysis of the latter proves that the early Descartes’ notion intuitus mentis, as well as the concept of natural light of mind are, in the end, based exactly on ingenium, but not on the discursive methodical procedures. Human soul, following Descartes, reveals its content in several hypostastes and each method of revelation corresponds to specific terminology. Soul as mens is not the same as soul as ingenium. But even the early Descartes’ study of soul is marked by peculiar nominalism, proclamation of the real existence of individual soul as a separate entity. Therefore later, stating his ego cogito, Descartes states exactly the individual substance, not thinking in general. The terminological couple ingenium/mens is not translatable already in the French texts of Descartes himself (both merge in the French esprit), however their Ukrainian translations do not consider neither this untranslatability nor obvious references of Descartes’ esprit to other Latin compliances which differ each time. The article also analyses frequency in usage of the terms ingenium and mens in early and late Descartes’ Latin works; it has been proved that the augmentation of the meaning of metaphysical problems gradually turned mens into the main subject of Descartes’ research and deactualised the problem of ingenium. (shrink)

The text fragments that make up Blaise Pascal's “Penséesˮ are traditionally published in different sequences, according to the difference in the conceptual positions of the editors. So, the problem of correlating different editions is very difficult. Translations of “Penséesˮ reflecting several numbering systems are currently available to Ukrainian readers. The author offers two comparative tables for these numberings. In Table 1, the numberings of Louis Lafuma, Jacques Chevalier and Michel Le Guerne are expressed through the numbering of Leon Brunschvicg, which (...) is currently the most common in Ukraine. In Table 2, Brunschvicg's numbering is correlated with the First Copy of the manuscript, the Port-Royal edition of 1670, as well as editions by Bossuet, Lafuma, Chevalier, Le Guerne, Tournier-Anzieu, and Dolgov. (shrink)

The first Ukrainian translation of Elizabeth Badenter's work "Condorcet, Prudhomme, Guyomar... Paroles d’hommes (1790-1793)".

The paper determines the status of the “Oral History of Philosophy” within the history of philosophy as a discipline. The author formulates his theses as answers to the fundamental questions Serhii Yosypenko asked in 2019. The latter subjected the first attempts to comprehend the then-new concept of “Oral History of Philosophy” to fruitful criticism. It is in response to his criticisms that the former gives now his answers which can be summarized in six points: (1) Oral History of Philosophy is (...) fundamentally different from Oral History and is not limited to the application of the interview method; (2) it is a set of dialogical methods of producing new information in the field of the history of philosophy, that is, a new methodology that can be used in any historical-philosophical research; (3) the main difference is the orientation of the Oral History of Philosophy not to personal testimony, but to joint reflection; (4) this focus on reflection determines all the methods of Oral History of Philosophy; (5) the name “Oral History of Philosophy” is due to the specifics of the situation that gave rise to this methodology rather than a conscious conceptual reflection; (6) this methodology can be given a more exact name: “Dialogical forms of historical-philosophical reflection”, while the name “Oral history of philosophy” can be used for those dialogical forms that rely on oral speech. (shrink)

Referential review of the second part of the first chapter of the book "Les femmes et leur histoire" by GenevièveFraisse, dedicated to the issue of gender equality in the philosophy of the 19th century. An overview of the first two paragraphs is provided.

Book Review Alcover, M. (1981). Poulain de la Barre: une aventure philosophique. Paris, Seattle & Tübingen: Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature.

Review of the book Fraisse, G. (1998). Les femmes et leur histoire. Paris: Gallimard.

The paper aims to prove the hypothesis that Sextus Empiricus’ Neo-Pyrrhonism is significantly influenced by the Cartesian meditation as a genre of philosophizing. It refutes theses about (1) the non-predicativity of Sextus’ language and about (2) Sextus’ epochê as an automatic result of the action of opposite things or statements, and it argues that both Sextus and Descartes distinguish between (a) internal (forced) agreement with clarity and (b) the personal acceptance of this agreement which depends on a volitional decision. Sextus’ (...) recognition of the clarity of appearance as appearance gives Descartes the only chance to refute the skepticism of Sextus, which is invulnerable to external criticism. Therefore, Descartes developed meditation as a special model of purely immanent criticism (the very word “skepticism” is never mentioned in the Meditations), focused on dealing with states of clarity and evidence. The author’s hypothesis is that the key elements to which this model appeals are the “history of a skeptic” set out in Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the conception of skeptical expressions. This hypothesis can be tested further by proving or disproving the thesis that the discourse of I, II, and at least partially of III Meditations is based on the pattern of skeptical expressions, focused on the internal states of the speaker, and not on clarifying the “objective” state of affairs (i.e. not on dogmatic inferences). (shrink)

Discourse on the Method” and “Metaphysical Meditations” by René Descartes: Seminar.

Some terms from Outlines of Pyrrhonism are problematic for Ukrainian translation. The commentary justifies the Ukrainian equivalents for those terms, in particular, "uyavlennia" for phantasia, "pidvplyvnyi stan" for pathos, "pomirnopidvplyvnist" for metriopatheia, "neosiagnennist" for akatalepsia.

Commentary on the translation of Revel, J.-F. (1992). Le Regain démocratique. Paris: Fayard.

The first article of the cycle “The role of skeptical evidence in the First and Second ‘Meditations’” compares the Cartesian and Sextus Empiricus’ concepts of doubt in, respectively, “Metaphysical meditations” and “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”. The article starts with the current state of the problem “Descartes and skepticism” and admits the existence of consensus about Cartesian perception of skeptical tradition: Cartesius (1) was influenced by all skeptical movements, known in his time, and (2) created a generalized notion that contains elements of (...) both Academic and Pyrrhonian origin. This consensus is the source of many contemporary studies on how different skeptical doctrines influenced certain parts of Cartesian philosophy. This article attempts to analyze possible Descartes’ use of Sextus Empiricus’ notion of phenomenon. Sextus clearly states in “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” that one cannot doubt phenomenon as something perceived directly. The article proves that (a) Sextus’ thesis about the “sensory” nature of phenomenon is metaphorical, so far as it includes (without distinction) both sensuality and the experience of thinking; (b) the phenomenon is realized through a wide range of passive states of mind that all have irresistible force of influence; (c) the impact of phenomena is always mediated by our self, because all skeptical phrases are strictly correlated with the first person singular. Some researchers distinguish Sextus’ isostenia, as one of such insurmountable states, from Cartesian doubt at the First Meditation, which is allegedly based on a purely volitional decision. The article proved that this argument is artificial, since Descartes’ volitional decision is caused by initial inability to take the dubious as if it were certain. Thus, Cartesian approach can be considered a specific kind of isostenia. Such parallelism is a reason to assume a key role of Sextus’ understanding of insurmountable power of phenomena in Cartesian anti-sceptical argumentation. This assumption will be tested in the following articles of the cycle. (shrink)

Review of Marion, J.-L.. Questions cartésiennes III: Descartes sous le masque du cartésianisme. Paris: PUF.

Review of the book Nadler, S. et al (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Review of Stetter, J., & Ramond, C... Spinoza in 21st-century American and French philosophy: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Review of Dika, T. (2023). Descartes’s Method. The Formation of the Subject of Science. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Review of Jolibert, B. (2020). Descartes en questions: l'urgence d'un retour aux textes. Paris: L'Hrarmattan.