Critiquer Kant? C'est remettre son oeuvre majeure, la Critique de la raison pure, face à son intention initiale, et lui appliquer le projet critique qu'elle expose. C'est en approfondir la compréhension en la resituant dans son contexte philosophique, et en se forçant de pénétrer son argumentation. C'est surtout analyser, avec Kant, la nature et les possibilités de la connaissance humaine, en cherchant, à travers les thèses qu'il développe, ce qui rejoint notre expérience. C'est faire de son oeuvre une lecture proprement (...) philosophique, au service d'une meilleure compréhension des rapports entre notre esprit et ce qu'il cherche à connaître. Ainsi, qu'on arrive ou non aux mêmes conclusions, on aura philosophé avec Kant, et progressé grâce à lui. (shrink)

[1] Doctrines et méthodes -- 2. Les pouvoirs de l'esprit.

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

The earliest Analects yet discovered, this work provides us with a new perspective on the central canonical text that has defined Chinese culture--and clearly illuminates the spirit and values of Confucius.

This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the (...) compatibility of the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them. (shrink)

This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...) of a formal framework on which both theses are true. This is a modified Bayesian framework; I argue that despite making credences context-sensitive, the framework lets Bayesians hold on to their signature explanatory successes. The sort of context-sensitivity claimed for credences here mirrors the sort of context-sensitivity I have elsewhere claimed for outright belief: one's credences depend, in part, on the space of alternative possibilities one takes seriously in a context. (shrink)

Offers an in-depth exposition of the Confucian conception of persons as the starting point of Confucian ethics.

Roger A. Shiner; VII*—Wittgenstein and the Foundations of Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 103–124, ht.