In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Il y a and the UngrundLevinas and the Russian Existentialists Berdyaev and ShestovJames McLachlan (bio)Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other than remains other — with an insurmountable allergy. It is for this reason that it is essentially a philosophy of (...) being, that the comprehension of being is its last word, and the fundamental structure of man.... The God of the philosophers... is a god adequate to reason, a comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds itself again in all its adventures, returning home to itself like Ulysses, who through all his peregrinations is only on the way to his native island.— Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other”Levinas is well known for his assault of the history of Western ontology and its allergy to otherness. In seeing all in terms of Being, philosophy subordinates ethics to ontology by reducing the other to an object of knowledge within Being. Recent work by Fiona Steinkamp, Joseph Lawrence, and Drew Dalton has called attention to a possible [End Page 213] dialogue between Schelling (especially the middle Schelling of Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Ages of the World) and Levinas.1 Joseph Lawrence shows both Schelling and Levinas struggle with the difficulty of thinking the Good beyond being. Schelling thought that the very quest for reality forces us to philosophize from the point of view of practical rather than theoretical reason. He thought there is no adequate theoretical refutation of solipsism but there is a perfectly good practical refutation: to the extent that I treat others as real they reveal themselves as real to me. Lawrence points to Schelling’s claim in Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, “This is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other.”2The parallels between Schelling and Levinas are rooted in the latter’s appreciation of Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. In the introduction to Totality and Infinity, Levinas famously notes that Rosenzweig’s masterpiece was “too often present in this book to be cited” (TI 28). Rosenzweig’s debt to Schelling is well documented. He carried The Ages of the World to the front with him in World War One and refers to it in correspondence. He even wrote, “It’s a great book to the last, had it been completed nobody except the Jews would give two hoots for the Star.”3 This is, without doubt, the correct historical stream to follow in connection with the relation between Schelling and Levinas and the proper way to see the connections between such Levinasian notions as the “there is” and hypostasis and the Schellingian conceptions that reflect similar ideas as the Ungrund, the emergence of the personal from the impersonal ground, and, above all, the importance of the practical ethical move beyond ontology.But there were also contemporaries holding such philosophical views in the Paris of the 1930s, and they can be seen to reinforce such positions. What is more striking is they come from Levinas’s fellow émigrés: Lev Shestov, Nicolas Berdyaev, and Alexandre Koyré. In one way or another, each either championed positions that emphasized the emergence of the particular from the general, rejected ontology, [End Page 214] or attacked the entire Western metaphysical tradition stemming from Parmenides for reasons similar to those held by Levinas. Levinas’s appreciation of Dostoevsky is also an important in connection to some of the ideas shared by Levinas, his fellow émigrés, and Schelling.4The Russian émigrés Shestov and Berdyaev were both Dostoevsky disciples; each offered major and influential studies on Dostoevsky and each viewed the novelist in quite different ways through the lens of each one’s philosophical position that had, in part, been formed by each thinker’s reading of Dostoevsky.5 Levinas’s friend, a student of Edmund Husserl, the philosopher of science Alexandre Koyré’s 1929 dissertation later... (shrink)

The human quest for meaning is an attempt to bring experience into conjunction with illuminating concepts. The second law of thermodynamics is of wide human concern, because it touches experience which is existentially charged and therefore which humans must interpret in broad metaphysical terms. Five types of experience have been incorporated into the second law: running down, degeneracy, mixed‐up‐ness, irreversibility of time, and emergence of new possibilities. The dominant Western tradition (Plato) places these experiences within a metaphysical scheme that evaluates (...) them negatively, whereas a minority tradition (Berdyaev) evaluates them positively. The former makes entropy anti‐God; the latter places entropy within God. (shrink)

No contemporary philosopher has argued more consistenily or more convincingly for a God of becoming than Charles Hartshorne. Boehme looms largein the historical background of his dipolar theology: both classical theism, which sees God as supreme actuality and most strictly absolute, and pantheism, whichsees in God only supreme potentiality and universal relativity, are correlated in his panentheism. The ultimate contraries are united in the divine relativity,where eternal permanence and temporal process are both preserved in a tension that, logically, precedes them.Hartshorne (...) has been reluctant to develop relationships to earlier and "simpler" representatives of his type of philosophical theology. Berdyaev, on the other hand, is ready to acknowledge Boehme as the real founder of his own philosophy of freedom. The affinity between the two stands out sharply when they explore the problem of evil, tragedy within divinity, or the Unground as Nothingness which gives rise to Something and the entire theogonic process. Berdyaev sees Boehme as one of the rare thinkers who broke with the optimistic rationalism of Western thought to construct a more spiritual philosophy of tragedy.Heidegger's revolt against Western ontology and Christian theology has certain affinities to Boehme's thought. We may point to but one aspect here, the central basic question of metaphysics, which is foolishness to Christian theology: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?" This question and Heidegger's "Nothingness" have obvious connections with Boehme's question and his "Nichts." For both. Nothingness is a primordial and fundamental working. It is found in Being itself rather than outside it. It gives rise through primordial discord to Being. To be sure, Heidegger develops his dialectic far beyond anything suggested by Boehme when he interprets his Dasein as suspended in dread over das Nichts. But Heidegger's profoundly dialectical conception of Being has obvious relations to the non-Being of Boehme: Nothingness or nihilation is present in all beings and is the essence of Being itself. It is the dynamic power of Being thai gives rise to Being. Self-negation is always present in the coming-into-presence of Being. For both Boehme and Heidegger Nothingness is required for the "letting-be" of beings, for the un-concealment of Being. (shrink)

No contemporary philosopher has argued more consistenily or more convincingly for a God of becoming than Charles Hartshorne. Boehme looms largein the historical background of his dipolar theology: both classical theism, which sees God as supreme actuality and most strictly absolute, and pantheism, whichsees in God only supreme potentiality and universal relativity, are correlated in his panentheism. The ultimate contraries are united in the divine relativity,where eternal permanence and temporal process are both preserved in a tension that, logically, precedes them.Hartshorne (...) has been reluctant to develop relationships to earlier and "simpler" representatives of his type of philosophical theology. Berdyaev, on the other hand, is ready to acknowledge Boehme as the real founder of his own philosophy of freedom. The affinity between the two stands out sharply when they explore the problem of evil, tragedy within divinity, or the Unground as Nothingness which gives rise to Something and the entire theogonic process. Berdyaev sees Boehme as one of the rare thinkers who broke with the optimistic rationalism of Western thought to construct a more spiritual philosophy of tragedy.Heidegger's revolt against Western ontology and Christian theology has certain affinities to Boehme's thought. We may point to but one aspect here, the central basic question of metaphysics, which is foolishness to Christian theology: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?" This question and Heidegger's "Nothingness" have obvious connections with Boehme's question and his "Nichts." For both. Nothingness is a primordial and fundamental working. It is found in Being itself rather than outside it. It gives rise through primordial discord to Being. To be sure, Heidegger develops his dialectic far beyond anything suggested by Boehme when he interprets his Dasein as suspended in dread over das Nichts. But Heidegger's profoundly dialectical conception of Being has obvious relations to the non-Being of Boehme: Nothingness or nihilation is present in all beings and is the essence of Being itself. It is the dynamic power of Being thai gives rise to Being. Self-negation is always present in the coming-into-presence of Being. For both Boehme and Heidegger Nothingness is required for the "letting-be" of beings, for the un-concealment of Being. (shrink)

In the Freedom Essay, Schelling provides four different accounts of the copula, two of which are largely implicit. In this paper, I focus on the first of these accounts, which I call the "mediated account." I argue that this explanation of the copula articulates a fundamental ontological structure in Schelling's philosophy. In the first half of the paper, I analyze the structural features of the account, drawing on Schelling's more extensive treatment in the Ages of the World. In the second (...) half of the paper, I argue that Schelling's fundamental distinction between that-which-exists and the ground of existence exhibits the same structure as the mediated account of the copula. This has implications for understanding the enigmatic relationship of these two principles to the Ungrund. I conclude by briefly suggesting other applications of this fundamental structure in Schelling's philosophy. (shrink)

As the creator, God is the source of the abundance for immense variety manifest in creation. The reservoir for this abundance is the primordial chaos, identified as the Pandemonium Tremendum. God manages this inexhaustible “storehouse of the snow” through decisions or “willings,” giving rise to constraints that result in the ordered array of creation. Without this active and decisive vigilance, the Pandemonium Tremendum would scour and ravage the creation. Also, as an omniscient, unobtrusive, and impartial witness, God manages the primordial (...) chaos without compromising its unfettered variety. What is the role of chaos as the Ungrund? All creatures are the consequence of acts of decision. God alone is self‐decisive and, hence, the uniquely sovereign creator. That is, God arises spontaneously through an aboriginal act of in–speaking. Otherwise, and in utter contradiction to its radically unprincipled character, the primordial chaos would provide the arche or sufficient reason for divine causation. This mythic and metaphysical account falls in the tradition of Meister Eckhart and Nicolas Berdyaev and is expressed in the rubric of communication theory. (shrink)

본래 탈자는 신과 인간의 의식연관으로서 육체적 틀을 벗어난 자아의 상태이다. 그 의 미는 신과의 교섭을 통해 현존하는 인간이 자기의 무근거(Ungrund)를 망각하는 주술과도 같다. 하지만 하이데거는 이러한 탈자를 부조리한 죽음을 뒤집어 버리는 불안의 주술로 바 꾼다. 그것은 죽음의 숙고 속에 일상적 세계를 떠나 기투하면서 본래적인 자기로 존재할 것을 결의하는 것이다. 다시 말해 하이데거는 죽음을 인간 존재의 기초조건으로 간주하고 인간을 본래적으로 존재하게 하는 무력한 결의를 산출한다. 이러한 실존의 양식으로 인간 의 본질을 밝히고자 했던 초기 하이데거는 많은 비판에 직면한다. 비판가들은 현존재의 본 (...) 래성에 함의된 유아론적 혐의를 확인하고 신의 이념을 전제하는 다른 유형의 인간주의라 고 말한다. 이러한 비판은 인간의 세속적 이해를 초월해야한다는 본래성 개념이 스콜라철 학의 절대성과 인격성에 손쉽게 연관 지어짐에 따른 결과이다. 이런 맥락에서 이 글은 초 기 하이데거가 어떻게 탈자의 관념을 전유하는지 밝힌다. (shrink)

본 연구는 뵈메와 셸링의 철학에서 자연과 정신을 생명과 자유로 해석하는 신비주의를 고찰하였다. 그들은 자연을 생명현상으로 파악하며, 그 속에서 발산되는 신적 계시를 관조하는 신지학적 신비주의와 자연 신비주의를 정립한다. 생명은 영적인 것이고, 영적 존재의 본질은 자유로 이해된다. 뵈메는 영적 존재를 관조하는 열린 태도로서의 단념이 필요하다고 주장한다. 단념 속에서 이루어지는 관조는 자연과 정신을 숙고하는 누구에게나 가능한 열린 신비이며, 인간의 정신적 삶을 고양하는 체험이다. 이것은 자연과 인간 영혼 속에 계시된 영적 세계, 또는 신적 생명을 향한 시선의 전환이며, 또한 영혼의 자유와 신성(神性)을 회복하려는 시도이다. 관조 (...) 속에서 파악된 자연은 세계영혼으로 또는 대지영혼으로 규정되며, 신의 대응이미지로 이해된다. 이것은 인간의 자유가 신으로부터 위임된 자유이며, 그리고 신적 사랑의 증표로 해명하는 중요한 단서이다. 셸링도 자연을 절대의 자기실현으로 이해하고, 자연을 객관적이고 논리적인 기계론적 체계로 해석하려는 것에 반대한다. 그는 일체의 관행에서 벗어난 정신의 자유로운 지적 활동을 지향한다. 그는 생각과 행동에서의 자유뿐만 아니라 근원적인 의미에서 인간의 자유를 고찰한다. 그는 인간의 자유가 자유자체로부터 나온다는 근대 자유 개념의 근원적인 변혁을 일으킨다. 이러한 자유 개념을 통해서 인간은 개인주의적 자유가 아니라 근원적으로 신적이며 공동체적인 자유 개념에 도달한다. (shrink)

Стаття присвячена розгляду однієї зі станових для гайдеґґерового доробку проблем, предметом якої виступає іменування Буття під натиском універсалізованої Гайдеґґером ідеї про безосновність Буття, вкоріненої в феномені Ніщо. Радикалізуючи сказане: у статті розгортається проблема пошуку більш зрозумілого, самоочевидного та прозорого для Буття поняття, аніж самé буття, що обіймала наукові пошуки пізнього Гайдеґґера. Серед значного корпусу його робіт можна зустріти окреслений діапазон понять, якими він послуговувався як альтернативними у веденні мови про Буття. Варто підкреслити, що наразі йдеться не про уособлене в Dasein (...) буття сущого, а Буття з великої літери в сенсі вже узвичаєної в україномовному перекладі Прояви, тобто Ereignis. Проте, у статті затверджується думка, що воно аж ніяк не єдине з імен, нічим не опосередкованого Буття, окрім ототожнень останнього з тотальним Ніщо. Широкоформатність гайдеґґерових імен Буття розглянуто на прикладі найбільш вживаних ним понять, серед яких автор, окрім Ereignis, виокремлює насамперед грецьку істину-ἀλήθεια, а заразом супутні їм поняття ἐνέργεια, es gibt та copula. Побіжно прочиняється негативна проблематика кайрологічного та еонтологічного часів, що вкотре підтверджує закономірність обраного Гайдеґґером феномену часу нарівні з Буттям у своїй magnum opus. Крім того, у статті не полишені увагою такі локальні гайдеґґерові поняття, як Abßgrund, Ungrund, Austrag, Verwüstung та Gründung, завдяки аналітиці яких, поміж інших, нігітологічний погляд Гайдеґґера на Буття набуває остаточної цілісності. Поняття нігітології було обрано автором задля окремої акцентуації на зверненні Гайдеґґера до історико-філософської традиції погляду на феномен Ніщо із усіма похідними від нього поняттями, які мають пряме відношення до негативної інтерпретації Буття. Незважаючи на те, що примітивізація феномену негативності в бік спрощених форм заперечення вже відбулась в історії філософії, як і розтрачування імені буття до Гайдеґґера, у статті особливо підкреслюється ідея про те, що сáме із визначення греками негативних тез у питанні про буття бере початок Західний тип мислення як такий, що перетворив об’єкт власного неспокою у вигляді фігури Ніщо на одне з центральних для онтології понять. Спільною рисою вищезазначених імен Буття є їхня суперлативність, що водночас спричиняє контрінтуїтивність висновків, до яких вони призводять. Власне, завдяки цьому підтверджується актуальність поточного дослідження в рамцях станової для усіх форм онтології проблеми: приведення Буття до поняття, враховуючи негативну тенденційність імен буття до самоприховування та присутності в них семантичних мотивів нестачі й надлишковості водночас. Відтак, аналітика імені буття у масштабах нігітології має супроводжуватись загальним демонтажем позитивно-укласичненого сенсу заявлених понять, і виключно за таких умов перехід до так званого нового початку, ініційованого Гайдеґґером, можна вважати таким, що остаточно відбувся. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nietzsche’s Rhetoric on the Grounds of Philology and HermeneuticsAdrian Del Caro"The philosopher believes the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the structure: posterity finds it in the stone with which he built."Human, All Too Human, 1.201"All science only achieved continuity and constancy when the art of correct reading, that is philology, reached its height."Human, All Too Human, 1.270The complexity of Nietzschean rhetoric demands first a basic (...) working definition of rhetoric. In the etymological sense of Greek rhe¯torike¯, the art of oratory, and extrapolated to include the art of communicating effectively through writing, Nietzsche's rhetoric is a highly stylized, deeply self-aware manner of expression designed to convey meaning and to appeal. In the more limited sense of my essay, Nietzschean rhetoric is furthermore a discourse whose communicative and appealing aspects are aimed at the earth for the purpose of grounding human beings. By "rhetoric" I do not mean the negative connotation associated with "insincere or grandiloquent language" (Webster's), though it is certainly the case that Nietzsche's rhetoric frequently takes flight and requires grounding. It is to be expected that a classical philologist by training, and both a teacher and a writer by profession, would have a close understanding and practiced application of rhetoric; the particular challenge in explicating Nietzsche's rhetoric lies in the task to which his rhetoric is put, as well as in the zeal with which he pursued his task. I am not primarily concerned with what Nietzsche had to say about rhetoric while lecturing at the University of Basle, though I agree that Gilman, Blair, and Parent are right to emphasize the importance of rhetoric for the interpretation of Nietzsche's writings and in its own right as a competitor with philosophy (1989, xii, xvi, xx), rather, I am concerned [End Page 101] with the practice of rhetoric that distinguishes Nietzsche's writings from the early 1870s until the so-called Wahnsinnszettel (postcards and letters of madness) written in early January 1889. I also agree with Moore, who analyzes the specifically biological and medical idiom of Nietzsche and concludes "that new light can be thrown on [Nietzsche's] thought by situating it within the historical context of nineteenth-century theories of evolution and degeneration" (Moore 2002, 1-2).1In an early aphorism entitled "Origin of faith" Nietzsche concluded: "Habituation of spiritual principles [Grundsätze] without grounds [Gründe] is called faith."2 I provide the German to demonstrate that whenever possible, Nietzsche drew on the Germanic Grund in his discussions of grounding, even though he was keenly aware of Greek and Latin alternatives and could have used them. So for example Nietzsche's translator (say Holling-dale) could have chosen to use English "grounds" for German Gründe, but chose instead to use "reasons," which is also correct though not exactly in the spirit of Nietzsche's etymological nuance.3 Grundsätze, literally "grounding propositions," given idiomatically as "principles," has no comparable etymology in English. What one becomes accustomed to or adopts as a habit based on faith versus grounds, cannot by definition be grounded, whether or not it is a principle. Based on this example, living with grounds or reasons is living with foundation, with base and support. Living without grounds is simply acquiring habits, living by faith, living groundlessly. A similar usage is involved in English "grounds for dismissal," whereby "grounds" equals "reasons." Even the words founded and unfounded preserve some of the strength of "grounded" and "ungrounded" as I use them. In German "unfounded" is unbegründet or grundlos, participle and adjective respectively, and Nietzsche availed himself whenever possible of German expressions based on ground.The aphorism immediately following "Origin of faith" relies even more on Grund, and its translation into English deserves close attention. "Aus den Folgen auf Grund und Ungrund zurückgeschlossen" becomes "Reasons judged a posteriori on the basis of consequences,"4 which I would render as "grounds and ungrounds retroactively concluded from consequences." Nietzsche uses Grund twice already in the title, and in the body of this "aphorism" of thirty lines a variation of Grund occurs six more times (Gründe, Gr... (shrink)

Einer Welt ohne letzte Gründe bleibt, so scheint es, nur die Alternative zwischen Fundamentalismus und pragmatischer Indifferenz. Beides wird weder der Komplexität noch der ungebrochenen Notwendigkeit der Begründungssuche gerecht. Die Autoren denken Begründung konsequent als ein stets prekäres Unternehmen: Den Ungründen in Philosophie und Kunst nachzugehen meint nicht eine bloße Ablehnung von Gründen oder einen existenziell aufgeladenen Nihilismus. Im Unheimlichen, Unbegrifflichen oder Unbestimmten schwingt der Versuch (wie das Scheitern) der Entbergung, Konzeptionalisierung und Bestimmung immer mit. Genauso zeichnen sich Ungründe dadurch (...) aus, dass das Negierte als Negiertes stets mitgeführt wird und wirksam bleibt. Ungründe sind immer noch Gründe - aber es sind prekäre, prozessuale, endliche Gründe, die den Anspruch, einen "guten Grund" zu liefern, auf je spezifische Weise einlösen. (shrink)

The Archaic takes as its major reference points C.G. Jung's classic essay, 'Archaic Man' (1930), and Ernesto Grassi's paper on 'Archaic theories of history' (1990). Moving beyond the confines of a Jungian framework to include other methodological approaches, this book explores the concept of the archaic. Defined as meaning 'old-fashioned', 'primitive', 'antiquated', the archaic is, in fact, much more than something very, very old: it is timeless, inasmuch as it is before time itself. Arch,̇ Urgrund, Ungrund, 'primordial darkness', 'eternal (...) nothing' are names for something essentially nameless, yet whose presence we nevertheless intuit. This book focuses on the reception of myth in the tradition of German Idealism or Romanticism (Creuzer, Schelling, Nietzsche), which not only looked back to earlier thinkers (such as Jacob Boehme) but also laid down roots for developments in twentieth-century thought (Ludwig Klages, Martin Heidegger). The Archaic also includes: - studies of the Germanic dimension of the archaic (Charles Bambach, Alan Cardew) - a discussion of the mytho-phenomenological approach to the archaic (Robert Josef Kozljani)̈ - a series of articles on Jung's understanding of the archaic (Paul Bishop, Susan Rowland, Robert Segal). This book will be of interest to psychoanalysts, anthropologists and phenomenologists, as well as students of psychology, cultural studies, religious studies, and philosophy, as it seeks to rehabilitate a concept of demonstrable and urgent relevance for our time. (shrink)

The Archaic takes as its major reference points C.G. Jung's classic essay, 'Archaic Man' (1930), and Ernesto Grassi's paper on 'Archaic theories of history' (1990). Moving beyond the confines of a Jungian framework to include other methodological approaches, this book explores the concept of the archaic. Defined as meaning 'old-fashioned', 'primitive', 'antiquated', the archaic is, in fact, much more than something very, very old: it is timeless, inasmuch as it is before time itself. Arch,̇ Urgrund, Ungrund, 'primordial darkness', 'eternal (...) nothing' are names for something essentially nameless, yet whose presence we nevertheless intuit. This book focuses on the reception of myth in the tradition of German Idealism or Romanticism (Creuzer, Schelling, Nietzsche), which not only looked back to earlier thinkers (such as Jacob Boehme) but also laid down roots for developments in twentieth-century thought (Ludwig Klages, Martin Heidegger). The Archaic also includes: - studies of the Germanic dimension of the archaic (Charles Bambach, Alan Cardew) - a discussion of the mytho-phenomenological approach to the archaic (Robert Josef Kozljani)̈ - a series of articles on Jung's understanding of the archaic (Paul Bishop, Susan Rowland, Robert Segal). This book will be of interest to psychoanalysts, anthropologists and phenomenologists, as well as students of psychology, cultural studies, religious studies, and philosophy, as it seeks to rehabilitate a concept of demonstrable and urgent relevance for our time. (shrink)

The article draws from a personal clinical experience of two suicides, not far removed from each other in time. The first patient was a 33-year-old intellectual suffering from depression with narcissistic traits but no psychotic elements, while the second patient was a 21-year-old student with a manifest psychotic episode behind him and with characteristics of post-psychotic depression at the time of suicide. The two suicides had very different impacts on the therapist: the first left open some “space” for reflection, communication, (...) and working-through, while the second closed such a “space,” leaving only a tiny door to the existential roots of human beings and suffering. The therapist was able to find some “shelter” by talking to supervisors, colleagues, and friends in the first case; in the second, the only possible “shelter” was glimpsed in the philosophy of groundlessness (Ungrund) of the Russian existentialist Nicolai Berdyaev. The personal experiences of the therapist, along with some theoretical interpretations of the after-effects of both suicides, are presented using a psychodynamic and existential–phenomenological understanding of the therapeutic relationship with a psychotic and a non-psychotic patient. The main dilemmas exposed by a patient’s suicide, especially if the patient suffers from psychosis, are difficult to deal with in the usual clinical settings and call for resources beyond it. The authors propose that these can be found in philosophical and theological insights. (shrink)

The partial aim of this paper is to suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is prefigured in Schelling’s conception of God as presented in Ages of the World. This will specifically be demonstrated by explicating the parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s paradoxical notion of the flesh and Schelling’s equally complex idea of Ungrund. Understanding the significance of Schelling’s influence on Merleau-Ponty becomes pivotal upon the recognition that the contemporary French political philosopher Claude Lefort’s idea of the political instituting politics is directly linked to (...) Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the invisible and visible. The implication here involves the suggestion that Lefort’s conception of the political parallels Schelling’s conception of God as mediated by Merleau-Ponty. It is then suggested that the political form of modernity should be understood less as the emergence of a novel form and conceived of more as an originary dimension where the theological and the political become indistinguishable. (shrink)

Boehme's concern was to outline a theory of knowledge that overcame the lifeless structure of traditional religion, and also made possible the real significance of individuals. He accomplished this by describing a dialectical system that began with a unique version of non-being, Ungrund, which was chaotic, and which was never negated throughout the entire dialectic. This system was one which provided a significant role for knowledge, in that the driving force of the dialectic was self-knowledge on the part of (...) God. The words he uses for the emergence of the dialectic are knowledge words--Verstand , Vernunft , Weisheit , Erkenntniss, Wissenschaft. This self-knowledge is a free movement that happens through the infusion of one force in the chaos, which Boehme calls Lust, into all the other forces, Begierde. The forces of Begierde have their craving for manifestation satiated, while Lust has its desire for self-knowledge met. The cooperation between these two is the entire story of dialectical creation, which Boehme calls Weisheit. One can either recognize this dialectical creation in the search for knowledge , or one can conceive knowledge as apart from that grounding . The second of these is a legitimate form of knowledge, but it becomes illegitimate if it does not recognize its dependency on Verstand. God has Verstand, in that God has knowledge of the dialectic, but this knowledge is conceptual, but particularized. Humans both gain Verstand and assume it, in their knowledge of the world through signatures. The result of this structure of creative knowledge is that: God is related to creation directly, without resorting to pantheism; Evil, which is simply a competing "Weisheit" or manifestation can be conquered; There is a place for positively conceived, named individuals; and, a third option is created, between static ontotheology in which there is an unquestioned foundation that legitimates all else, and pure perspectivism, in which the divine is simply one story that could be drawn from the world around. (shrink)

뵈메와 셸링은 공통적으로 신을 비근거로 파악한다. 이것을 통해서 그들은 선과 악을 세계 속의 대립된 요소로 해명할 수 있게 된다. 신은 선과 악을 초월하여 존재하기 때문에, 그들은 신이 악의 근원일 수 없다고 해명한다. 뵈메는 악의 문제를 신지학적 관점에서 영적 의지의 타락에서 논의한다. 그는 순수한 영적 의지와 타락된 영적 의지, 즉 욕망의지를 구별하고, 욕망의지에서 죄와 악이 야기된다고 파악한다. 영적 의지는 신적 의지의 계시를 이해하는 능력이고, 욕망의지는 물질에 집착하며, 물질적 형상을 자신의 본성으로 파악하려는 망상을 가진다. 욕망의지의 망상이 신적 의지에서 이탈된 죄이며 악이다. 셸링도 (...) 영혼의 욕망과 오성의 대립적 성향에서 악의 문제를 다룬다. 그는 욕망을 생명의 근거의지로 파악하며, 그 자체로 죄와 악이 되지 않는다고 본다. 욕망은 자유의지이며 개별의지이다. 악은 보편의지를 지배하려는 개별의지의 행위에서 야기된다. 뵈메와 셸링은 공통적으로 이성이 아니라 오성을 인간의 근원적 본성으로 파악한다. 인간의 오성은 신적 의지, 즉 보편의지를 이해하고 순응하려는 내적인 힘이지만 활성화되지 못한 능력이다. 오성은 욕망에 대립적이지만 욕망을 완전히 제어할 수 있는 힘이 아니다. 이 때문에 그들은 오성이 활성화되는 영적 각성과 신적 사랑을 숙고한다. (shrink)

XI ABKÜRZUNGSVERZEICHNIS 1 EINLEITUNG A. aber die Möglichkeit einer Fichte-Interpretation überhaupt 1 B. Die Wirklichkeit der Interpretation 4 C. Die Bedeutung der Wissenschaltslehre 8 D. WL I794 und WL I8IO II E. Zum Gang der Arbeit I. KAPITEL MACHTSPRUCH UND REELLE NEGATION: DRITTER GRUNDSATZ 19 A. Subsumtion des A-ist unter das A =A 20 I. Standpunkt des A-ist 20 2. Standpunkt des A=A 21 B. Subsumtion des A =A unter das A-ist 22 I. Standpunkt des A=A 22 2. Standpunkt des (...) A-ist 24 C. Synthese der Subsumtionen 25 I. Absolute Kausalität 26 2. Absolute Substantialität 27 3. Absolute Relation 28 D. Die Dialektik des 3. Grundsatzes 2 3 VIII INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 11. KAPITEL SPRUNG UND EIGENTLICHE NEGATION: ZWEITER GRUNDSATZ 47 A. Interpretation des 3. Grundsatzes 49 B. Die vier Erfahrungsstufen 51 I. Naturschwärmerei 52 2. Intersubjektivität 53 3. Gewissen 55 4. Gottesliebe 56 C. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit 56 D. Die Reflexionsform und das Dasein 66 III. KAPITEL UNGRUND UND SCHWEBEN: ERSTER GRUNDSATZ 1 7 A. Das Absolute als Aposteriori 73 I. Die fünffache Identität des Aposteriori 74 2. Das Wesen des Daseins als das Aposteriori 80 B. Das Absolute als Apriori 82 I. Indikativ und Imperativ 82 2. Gott oder das Sein 86 3. Die" zweite Methode" 88 C. Das Wesen der Wissenschaftslehre 92 I. Die WL als Wahrheit (Prinzip) 92 2. Die WL als Weg (Methode) 94 3. Die WL als Leben (Resultat) 6 9 100 NACHWORT A. (shrink)

Dr. Fuad Nucho, a native Jordanian and presently a pastor in Yeadon, Pa., provides us with a lucid and illuminating account of the central problem of freedom in the Christian existentialism of Nicolas Berdyaev. Confident that the thought of Berdyaev, while professedly not a "System," suffers no distortion from an organized and systematized explication, Dr. Nucho orders his work around the problem of freedom conceived of as a paradox demanding resolution. He deals in turn with the nature, implications, and solution (...) of the paradox, after a brief, informative discussion of the influences on Berdyaev's thinking. Critical and evaluatory remarks are reserved for a final chapter, so as not to interrupt the progress of his argument. For Berdyaev, man is a citizen of two worlds, divided between an inclination toward material objects which enslave him, and an aspiration toward the transcendent world of divine freedom. Nature, society, and history all tend to enslave man, yet they are also the theater in which his freedom must be exercised. Man himself is conceived of essentially as a free being. Freedom for Berdyaev means creativity, where creativity is taken in the radical sense of production out of nothing. Hence the alliance of freedom with the "nothing," and so with Boehme's Ungrund. The paradox is resolved only when, first, the world of natural necessity is recognized as perfused with symbol and when, finally, the revelation of Christ is taken as the meaning of that symbolization. Such a liberation comes to historical man in metahistorical moments when he grasps the eternal meaning behind the phenomena of nature and history, that is, when he grasps the end of history and nature. Nucho concludes that Berdyaev is a religious thinker in the tradition of the early Christian Fathers—a modern parallel, in particular, to Clement of Alexandria.—J. D. C. (shrink)

The main concern of both Berdjaev's and Bulgakov's philosophical strivings consists in developing a concept of the person as the foundation of human dignity and creativity within a Christian world view. Once attracted by Marxism with its emphasis on human dignity and social justice, they started to struggle against Marxism's atheist materialism because of its lack of a concept of person. However, the same concern will lead both thinkers down very different paths with different consequences. This paper argues that, even (...) though Berdjaev has become famous as a philosopher of the person and a herald of creative ethics, Bulgakov developed a more solid Christian justification of the same claims. Both systems are presented by means of comparing some crucial notions within their concepts of personality—potentiality, trinity and autonomy. (shrink)