Dans Les Métamorphoses du cercle, ouvrage incontournable de l'histoire des idées, Georges Poulet propose une analyse lumineuse et pénétrante des variations innombrables de la figure du cercle à travers les penseurs et poètes depuis la Renaissance. Le cercle apparaît alors comme une métaphore fondamentale qui de tout temps servit aux hommes à penser le inonde et la vie tout court. Sa simplicité et sa perfection en font la première de ces formes privilégiées qui se retrouvent au fond de toutes (...) les croyances et qui servent de principe de structure à tous les esprits. (shrink)

La médiation en droit public a, jusqu’à récemment, revêtu un caractère sectoriel, cantonnée à des domaines tout à fait spécifiques de l’action publique. Face à l’accroissement considérable de demande de justice administrative, il a fallu développer des outils de règlement non juridictionnel des litiges administratifs. C’est là qu’est intervenue la loi du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la Justice du xxi e siècle – dite loi Justice 21.

Introduction.--Montaigne.--Le songe de Descartes.--Pascal.--Molière.--Corneille.--Notes sur le temps racinien.--Madame de La Fayette.--Fontenelle.--L'abbé Prévost.--Rousseau.--Diderot.--Benjamin Constant.--Vigny.--Théophile Gautier.--Flaubert.--Baudelaire.--Valéry.--Proust.

Maurice Scève.--Saint-Cyran.--Racine.--Fénelon.--Casanova.--Joubert.--Les romantiques anglais.--Madame de Staël.--Lamartine.--Stendhal.--Michelet.--Amiel.--Marcel Proust.--Julien Green.

A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament, being Grimm's Wilke's Clavis Novi Testamenti. Translated, Revised and Enlarged by Joseph Henry Thayer, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 726. 36s.Biblico Theological Lexicon to New Testament Greek. by Hermann Cremer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald. Third English Edition. With Supplement. Translated from the latest German Edition by William Uewick, M.A. (...) Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 943. 38s. (shrink)

Abstract I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor (...) University, Waco, TX, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893. (shrink)

T. A. Cavanaugh defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. DER plays a role in anti-consequentialist ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realize a good without also causing a foreseen, but not intended, bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when bombing a military target). This study is the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial approach to hard cases. It will be indispensable in theoretical ethics, applied (...) ethics (especially medical and military), and moral theology. It will also interest legal and public policy scholars. (shrink)

Cosmological arguments for the existence of God face a gap problem. This is the problem of convincingly arguing that their intermediate conclusions that some first cause or necessary being exists provide evidence for their main conclusion that God exists. This paper develops a simple and innovative approach to solving this problem, applicable to many cosmological arguments. According to the proposal, the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. (...) Since a perfect being would be God, the intermediate conclusions of the relevant cosmological arguments provide abductive evidence for their main conclusions. (shrink)

Objective: The aim of the study was to identify clinical variables associated with changes in specific domains of self-reported depression during treatment by antidepressant and/or repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in patients with Major Depressive Disorder.Methods: Data from a trial involving 170 patients with MDD receiving either venlafaxine, rTMS or both were re-analyzed. Depressive symptoms were assessed each week during the 2 to 6 weeks of treatment with the 13-item Beck Depression Inventory. Associations between depression changes on BDI13 domains, treatment arm, (...) time, and clinical variables were tested in a mixed linear model.Results: A significant decrease of self-reported depressive symptoms was observed over time. The main characteristics associated with persistent higher depressive symptomatology on Negative Self-Reference domain of the BDI13 were personality disorders, a past history of suicide attempt, age under 65 years old, and female sex.Conclusions: Early cognitive intervention targeting specifically negative self-referencing process could be considered during pharmacological or rTMS treatment for patients with personality disorders and past history of suicide attempt. (shrink)

The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...) not be found in the physical world as characterized in experience or science. Instead, consciousness constitutes a subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and the physical world is a represented objective reality. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behaviour-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness, and suggest that a mature science of representation may help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon. (shrink)

This text is designed to help students construct and evaluate arguments.

The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the considerable challenge of sourcing expertise and determining which experts to trust. Dissonant information fostered controversy in public discourse and encouraged an appeal to a wide range of social indicators of trustworthiness in order to decide whom to trust. We analyze public discourse on expertise by examining how social indicators inform the reputation of Dr. Didier Raoult, the French microbiologist who rose to international prominence as an early advocate for using hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19. To (...) comprehend how these indicators came to inform his reputation, we outline Dr. Raoult's rise to fame based on discourse about hydroxychloroquine. We then discuss why we trust in experts like scientist-practitioners. This is followed by an examination of how social indicators of trust like status, epistemic authority, influence and values have informed Dr. Raoult's reputation. We conclude with recommendations for how to improve the selection and evaluation social indicators of trust and reputations. Our aim here, instead of making a claim about the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine or Dr. Raoult's reputation per se, is to outline through this case study how social indicators of trust inform reputation and the challenge they present to evaluating expertise. (shrink)

In social cognition, knowledge-based validation of information is usually regarded as relying on strategic and resource-demanding processes. Research on language comprehension, in contrast, suggests that validation processes are involved in the construction of a referential representation of the communicated information. This view implies that individuals can use their knowledge to validate incoming information in a routine and efficient manner. Consistent with this idea, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that individuals are able to reject false assertions efficiently when they have validity-relevant (...) beliefs. Validation processes were carried out routinely even when individuals were put under additional cognitive load during comprehension. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the rejection of false information occurs automatically and interferes with affirmative responses in a nonsemantic task. Experiment 4 also revealed complementary interference effects of true information with negative responses in a nonsemantic task. These results suggest the existence of fast and efficient validation processes that protect mental representations from being contaminated by false and inaccurate information. (shrink)

This paper continues a recent exchange in this journal concerning explanationist accounts of epistemic justification. In the first paper in this exchange, Byerly argues that explanationist views judge that certain beliefs about the future are unjustified when in fact they are justified. In the second paper, McCain defends a version of explanationism which he argues escapes Byerly’s criticism. Here we contribute to this exchange in two ways. In the first section, we argue that McCain’s defense of explanationism against Byerly’s objection (...) is unsuccessful. Then, in the second section, we develop an independent objection to explanationism from a different direction. If our arguments in each section are sound, then not only do explanationist accounts of epistemic justification judge beliefs that are justified to be unjustified, but they judge beliefs that are unjustified to be justified. Explanationism faces problems on both sides. (shrink)