We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we (...) exploit to achieve non-omniscience focuses on topic- or subject matter-sensitivity: a feature of belief states which is gaining growing attention in the recent literature. (shrink)

Danto’s interpretation about Plato’s original condemnation of art doesn’t ground in a rigorous and accurate exegesis of the Platonic text. This contributed to making the interpreters doubtful (e.g. Halliwell), since Danto seems to conceive the philosophical genesis of mimesis attributing to it an excessively univocal meaning as compared to Platonic theses. However, interesting topics about the dangers of poetry and the moral and political implications of the “philosophical disenfranchisement of art” arise from the few Danto’s mentions about Plato’s psychological arguments (...) on mimetic art. The article focuses on these psychological aspects suggesting to Danto the ethical reason why art, tragedy in particular, is considered by Plato to be “dangerous”. The analysis will point out that, with regard to a philosophical consideration of the mimesis, dramatic poetry (specifically, Greek theatre) is a perspicuous clue to clarify the control function exerted by art over the sphere of emotions. This will also allow us to recognize Danto’s debt to Nietzsche, with whom he shares the intention to overthrow Platonism. (shrink)

Sentences \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) are _cognitive synonyms_ for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1 ), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2 ), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1 ). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2 ), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3 ). A cognitively adequate individuation (...) of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3 ) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences \(\varphi _1, \ldots, \varphi _n\) where adjacent \(\varphi _i\) and \(\varphi _{i+1}\) are cognitive synonyms while \(\varphi _1\) and \(\varphi _n\) are not (Sect. 3.1 ). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2 ) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3 )._Sed contra_, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4 ). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light. (shrink)

The title of this book is rather misleading. “Birth of neoliberal governmentality,” or something like that, would have been more faithful to its contents. In Foucault's vocabulary, “biopolitics” is the “rationalisation” of “governmentality” : it's the theory, in other words, as opposed to the art of managing people. The mismatch between title and content is easily explained: the general theme of the courses at the Collège de France had to be announced at the beginning of each academic year. It is (...) part of the mandate of every professor at the Collège, however, that his lectures should follow closely his current research. As a consequence it wasn't unusual for Foucault to take new directions while he was lecturing. In 1979, for the first and only time in his career, he took a diversion into contemporary political philosophy. His principal object of investigation became “neoliberal” political economy. More precisely, he got increasingly interested in those strands of contemporary liberalism that use economic science both as a principle of limitation and of inspiration for the management of people. (shrink)

In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in (...) formal metaphysics by Williamson and Hale. There is a contingent Liar that has been taken to be a problem for type theory. But this is because this Liar has been presented without an explicit recourse to a truth predicate. Thus, type theory could avoid this paradox by incorporating such a predicate and accepting an appropriate theory of truth. There is however a contingent paradox of predication that more clearly undermines the viability of type theory. It is then suggested that a type-free property theory is a better option. One can pursue it, by generalizing the revision-theoretic approach to predication, as it has been done by Orilia with his system P*, based on T*. Although Gupta and Belnap do not explicitly declare a preference for T# over T*, they show that the latter has some advantages, such as the recovery of intuitively acceptable principles concerning truth and a better reconstruction of informal arguments involving this notion. A type-free system based on T# rather than T* extends these advantages to predication and thus fares better than P* in the intended applications of property theory. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how emojis are integrated into the text that they occur with. I use the typology of gestural iconic enrichments proposed by Schlenker (2018a, 2018b) to investigate the hypothesis that emojis denoting objects (e.g., ????) and activities (e.g., ????) project (i.e., interact with logical operators) when co-occurring with text in a similar way as gestures do with speech. In particular, I claim that [i.] emojis generate co-suppositions, i.e., assertion-dependent presuppositions, when immediately following text (e.g., the (...) sentence “John didn’t train today ????” gives rise to the inference that “if John had trained today, weightlifting would have been involved”); [ii.] emojis generate supplements (in the sense of Potts, 2005), just like appositive relative clauses, when they are separated from the accompanying text by a pause (e.g., the sentence “John trained today...????” gives rise to the inference that “John trained today, which involved weightlifting”); [iii.] when used as replacements for words (e.g., “Yesterday, John didn’t ???? ”), emojis have an at-issue semantics and can trigger standard presuppositions. (shrink)

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In (...) the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens. (shrink)

Answering one of the main questions of [S.-D. Friedman, T. Hyttinen and V. Kulikov, Generalized descriptive set theory and classification theory, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc. 230 80, Chap. 7], we show that there is a tight connection between the depth of a classifiable shallow theory [Formula: see text] and the Borel rank of the isomorphism relation [Formula: see text] on its models of size [Formula: see text], for [Formula: see text] any cardinal satisfying [Formula: see text]. This is achieved by (...) establishing a link between said rank and the [Formula: see text]-Scott height of the [Formula: see text]-sized models of [Formula: see text], and yields to the following descriptive set-theoretical analog of Shelah’s Main Gap Theorem: Given a countable complete first-order theory [Formula: see text], either [Formula: see text] is Borel with a countable Borel rank, or it is not Borel at all. The dividing line between the two situations is the same as in Shelah’s theorem, namely that of classifiable shallow theories. We also provide a Borel reducibility version of the above theorem, discuss some limitations to the possible complexities of [Formula: see text], and provide a characterization of categoricity of [Formula: see text] in terms of the descriptive set-theoretical complexity of [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

The present work is focused on a specific question: is time permanent or not in Kant’s first Critique? I tried to find out my answer on the papers written by authors from Anglo-American tradition, who don’t seem so interested in this topic. Indeed, the former problem was to find remarks about it. Then I highlighted two different points of view: ones think that time is permanent. They tried to warrant this, using especially what Kant says about it in the second (...) edition section dedicated to first Analogy. Others think that time flows, in particular when it’s considered as medi- ate external sense. Finally, I tried to explain why, on my point of view, it’s possible to find in Kant this two contrary position and how it is possible to get out from this situation. (shrink)

Sometimes mereologists have problems with counting. We often don't want to count the parts of maximally connected objects as full-fledged objects themselves, and we don't want to count discontinuous objects as parts of further, full-fledged objects. But whatever one takes "full-fledged object" to mean, the axioms and theorems of classical, extensional mereology commit us to the existence both of parts and of wholes – all on a par, included in the domain of quantification – and this makes mereology look counterintuitive (...) to various philosophers. In recent years, a proposal has been advanced to solve the tension between mereology and familiar ways of counting objects, under the label of Minimalist View . The Minimalist View may be summarized in the slogan: "Count x as an object iff it does not overlap with any y you have already counted as an object". The motto seems prima facie very promising but, we shall argue, when one looks at it more closely, it is not. On the contrary, the Minimalist View involves an ambiguity that can be solved in quite different directions. We argue that one resolution of the ambiguity makes it incompatible with mereology. This way, the Minimalist View can lend no support to mereology at all. We suggest that the Minimalist View can become compatible with mereology once its ambiguity is solved by interpreting it in what we call an epistemic or conceptual fashion: whereas mereology has full metaphysical import, the Minimalist View may account for our ways of selecting "conceptually salient" entities. But even once it is so disambiguated, it is doubtful that the Minimalist View can help to make mereology more palatable, for it cannot make it any more compatible with commonsensical ways of counting objects. (shrink)

We study the deviations from the exponential decay law, both in quantum field theory (QFT) and quantum mechanics (QM), for an unstable particle which can decay in (at least) two decay channels. After a review of general properties of non-exponential decay in QFT and QM, we evaluate in both cases the decay probability that the unstable particle decays in a given channel in the time interval between t and t+dt. An important quantity is the ratio of the probability of decay (...) into the first and the second channel: this ratio is constant in the Breit-Wigner limit (in which the decay law is exponential) and equals the quantity Γ1/Γ2, where Γ1 and Γ2 are the respective tree-level decay widths. However, in the full treatment (both for QFT and QM) it is an oscillating function around the mean value Γ1/Γ2 and the deviations from this mean value can be sizable. Technically, we study the decay properties in QFT in the context of a superrenormalizable Lagrangian with scalar particles and in QM in the context of Lee Hamiltonians, which deliver formally analogous expressions to the QFT case. (shrink)

Answering one of the main questions of [S.-D. Friedman, T. Hyttinen and V. Kulikov, Generalized descriptive set theory and classification theory, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc. 230 80, Chap. 7]...

In this work we extend results from [4], [3] and [2] about propositional calculi with graded modalities to the predicative level. Our semantic is based on Kripke models with a single domain of interpretation for all the worlds. Therefore the axiomatic system will need a suitable generalization of the Barcan formula. We haven't considered semantics with world-relative domains because they don't present any new difficulties with respect to classical case. Our language will have, as in [1], constant and function symbols, (...) but they will have a rigid interpretation. In this instance the terms will be considered rigid designators, that is, their interpretations will be the same in all possible worlds (cfr. [5]). Nevertheless we will not consider languages with identity: in this way we avoid the problems of identity in modal contexts. On the other hand, we think that in that context would arise essentially the same problems which occur in classical predicative modal logic. Finally we will consider only denumerable languages because the extension to non denumerable ones isn't conceptually problematic. (shrink)

Wie bekannt unterscheidet Kant eine Anthropologie »in physiologischer Hinsicht« und eine »pragmatische« Anthropologie, aber die Anthropologie bleibt doch stets ein empirisches Wissen und besitzteindeutig keine apriorische Universalität. Umso mehr muss man sich über eine Reflexion aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass wundern, wo Kant eine »anthropologia transcendentalis« erwähnt. Bei allen Vorbehaltenwegen der Singularität dieser Formulierung besitzt die Stelle eine wichtige Bedeutung und erfordert eine genauere Analyse. Denn in jener Reflexion erklärt Kant auch, dass der Gelehrte vermeiden müsse,ein »Cyclop« zu werden, das heißt (...) die Phänomene mit nur einem Auge zu betrachten. Dies sei nämlich die Haltung des »Egoisten der Wissenschaft «, der »seinen Kräften zu viel zutraut«. Jeder Arzt, Theologe, Jurist, selbst Geometer hat Kant zufolge »noch ein Auge nötig, welches macht, dass er seinen Gegenstand noch aus dem Gesichtspunkte anderer Menschen ansieht«. Dieser Gesichtspunktsteht hier ausdrücklich mit der »Critik« und der »Selbsterkenntnis« des menschlichen Verstandes und der menschlichen Vernunft in Verbindung: die Anthropologie wird hier also nicht nur als »transzendental« charakterisiert, sondern sie wird auch in direkten Zusammenhang mit dem anderen entscheidenden zentralen Titelwort der reifen kantschen Philosophie gebracht: »Kritik«. (shrink)

Recently, an orthodox Russellian tenet has come under fire from within. In particular, some Russellians now argue that definite descriptions don’t semantically encode uniqueness. Instead, Reformed Russellians, as I call them, hold that definite descriptions are truth-theoretically identical to indefinite ones. On this approach, a definite description’s uniqueness reading becomes a matter of pragmatics, not semantics. These reforms, we’re told, provide both empirical and methodological benefits over and above the prevailing orthodoxy. As I argue, however, the Russellian Reformation contains serious (...) flaws. Indeed, it is Orthodox Russellianism that remains a superior choice, both empirically and conceptually. (shrink)

The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis’ student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is “analytically contained” in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic semantics for DAI, (...) showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense. (shrink)

In our everyday life, we have the genuine feeling that when something we use works very well, we forget that we are doing something that is mediated by something else. It happens when we read through our glasses, or when we drive home, or when we play guitar. In all those cases, it can be said that the device becomes an extension of our body, or that we have incorporated it. In this paper I want to discuss the extension/incorporation dichotomy (...) as presented in contemporary cognitive sciences. I will present the state of the art in the debate in order to promote a methodological shift, namely to adopt two concept borrowed from Material Engagement Theory developed by Lambros Malafouris. By advocating the concepts of temporality and metaplasticity, I will argue for two different but related things: 1) extension and incorporation don’t have to be conceived only spatially, but temporally. This shift leads to two distinctive implications: first, the sooner two entities establish a prosthetic contact, the higher the chances to reach incorporation; second, extension temporally precedes incorporation; the former being an early-staged phenomenon of – a condition of possibility for – the latter. 2) Such a temporal perspective is at the base of metaplasticity, which describes, in the context of MET, the constant, co-constitutive loop between humans and things: metaplasticity deflates the privileged role traditionally attributed to the subject in the making of phenomenal experience. Finally, I will discuss extension and incorporation in media theory, relying on the concept of radical mediation. (shrink)

This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time, dynamic events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be (...) subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, scholarly attention to Enlightenment studies and especially to the roots of Enlightenment ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has increased. Against claims t...

Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F (...) () made true by a and false by b . Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic. (shrink)

Between faith and reason there is no opposition or contradiction, but possible harmony. On the one hand, God don't want that his intelligent creatures walk in the dark. On the other hand, however, he wants to be loved freely by his intelligent creatures, and therefore does not force us to believe in Him.

Vol I. A -- Vol II. B -- Vol. III. C -- Vol. IV. D -- Vol. V. E-F -- Vol VI. G -- Vol VII. H-L -- Vol. VIII. M -- Vol. IX. N-Q -- Vol X. R-S -- Vol XI. T-V -- Vol XII. X-Z.

Sometimes mereologists have problems with counting. We often don't want to count the parts of maximally connected objects as full‐fledged objects themselves, and we don't want to count discontinuous objects as parts of further, full‐fledged objects. But whatever one takes “full‐fledged object” to mean, the axioms and theorems of classical, extensional mereology commit us to the existence both of parts and of wholes – all on a par, included in the domain of quantification – and this makes mereology look counterintuitive (...) to various philosophers.In recent years, a proposal has been advanced to solve the tension between mereology and familiar ways of counting objects, under the label of Minimalist View. The Minimalist View may be summarized in the slogan: “Count x as an object iff it does not overlap with any y you have already counted as an object”. The motto seems prima facie very promising but, we shall argue, when one looks at it more closely, it is not. On the contrary, the Minimalist View involves an ambiguity that can be solved in quite different directions. We argue that one resolution of the ambiguity makes it incompatible with mereology. This way, the Minimalist View can lend no support to mereology at all.We suggest that the Minimalist View can become compatible with mereology once its ambiguity is solved by interpreting it in what we call an epistemic or conceptual fashion: whereas mereology has full metaphysical import, the Minimalist View may account for our ways of selecting “conceptually salient” entities. But even once it is so disambiguated, it is doubtful that the Minimalist View can help to make mereology more palatable, for it cannot make it any more compatible with commonsensical ways of counting objects. (shrink)

On peut, semble-t-il compter parmi les contributions liées au De motu et à ses enjeux, le texte obscur, verbeux et parfois inexact de Raffaello Caverni, l’Histoire de la méthode expérimentale en Italie. L’œuvre monumentale du prêtre toscan fut publiée en six grands volumes et suscita aussitôt autant d’éloges que de critiques. Au-delà des jugements extravagants et des hypothèses audacieuses, les idées de Caverni sur le De motu peuvent tout à fait s’avérer utiles, non tant comme « revue critique», que comme (...) reconstruction du cadre théorique dans lequel s’inscrivait le travail de Galilée. On en tirera des hypothèses sur la façon dont Galilée a entrepris la construction de la nouvelle physique et d’une « histoire des effets» désormais plus précise. (shrink)

On peut, semble-t-il compter parmi les contributions liées au De motu et à ses enjeux, le texte obscur, verbeux et parfois inexact de Raffaello Caverni (1837-1900), l’Histoire de la méthode expérimentale en Italie. L’œuvre monumentale du prêtre toscan fut publiée en six grands volumes (le dernier à titre posthume) et suscita aussitôt autant d’éloges que de critiques. Au-delà des jugements extravagants et des hypothèses audacieuses, les idées de Caverni sur le De motu peuvent tout à fait s’avérer utiles, non tant (...) comme « revue critique», que comme reconstruction du cadre théorique dans lequel s’inscrivait le travail de Galilée. On en tirera des hypothèses sur la façon dont Galilée a entrepris la construction de la nouvelle physique et d’une « histoire des effets» désormais plus précise. (shrink)

A logic is said to be paraconsistent if it doesn’t license you to infer everything from a contradiction. To be precise, let |= be a relation of logical consequence. We call |= explosive if it validates the inference rule: {A,¬A} |= B for every A and B. Classical logic and most other standard logics, including intuitionist logic, are explosive. Instead of licensing you to infer everything from a contradiction, paraconsistent logic allows you to sensibly deal with the contradiction.

This paper explicates the philosophical and epistemological background of the MIRRORS project, which is the starting point of the various contributions in this issue. Developments in the philosophy of science will be discussed, especially the watershed work of Kuhn, in order to analyze further developments in the sociology of science, particularly starting from the Strong Programme. Finally, it will be shown how a multidisciplinary approach in Science & Technology (S&T) studies, as opposed to an interdisciplinary one, is to be preferred. (...) Specifically, the connection between this approach and the modelling and idealizational approaches to science is stressed and defended as the best available approach for the formation of a conscientious democratic knowledge-based society. (shrink)

We generalise the properties $\mathsf {OP}$, $\mathsf {IP}$, k- $\mathsf {TP}$, $\mathsf {TP}_{1}$, k- $\mathsf {TP}_{2}$, $\mathsf {SOP}_{1}$, $\mathsf {SOP}_{2}$, and $\mathsf {SOP}_{3}$ to positive logic, and prove various implications and equivalences between them. We also provide a characterisation of stability in positive logic in analogy with the one in full first-order logic, both on the level of formulas and on the level of theories. For simple theories there are the classically equivalent definitions of not having $\mathsf {TP}$ and dividing (...) having local character, which we prove to be equivalent in positive logic as well. Finally, we show that a thick theory T has $\mathsf {OP}$ iff it has $\mathsf {IP}$ or $\mathsf {SOP}_{1}$ and that T has $\mathsf {TP}$ iff it has $\mathsf {SOP}_{1}$ or $\mathsf {TP}_{2}$, analogous to the well-known results in full first-order logic where $\mathsf {SOP}_{1}$ is replaced by $\mathsf {SOP}$ in the former and by $\mathsf {TP}_{1}$ in the latter. Our proofs of these final two theorems are new and make use of Kim-independence. (shrink)

In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment (...) to inconsistent entities. Colyvan's argument could be interpreted, and in part is presented, as a reductio of Quinean scientific realism; yet, Colyvan in the end manifests some willingness to bite the bullet, and provides some reasons why we shouldn't feel too uncomfortable with those entities. In this paper we wish to indicate a way out to the scientific realist, by arguing that no indispensability argument of the kind suggested by Colyvan is actually available. To begin with, in order to run such an indispensability argument we should be justified in believing that an inconsistent theory is true; yet, in so far as the logic we accept is a consistent one it is arguable that our epistemic predicament could not be possibly one in which we are justified in so believing. Moreover, also if our logic admitted true contradictions, as Dialetheism does, it is arguable that Colyvan's indispensability argument could not rest on a true premise. As we will try to show, dialetheists do not admit true contradictions for cheap: they do so just as a way out of paradox, namely whenever we are second-level ignorant as to the metaphysical possibility of evidence breaking the parity among two or more inconsistent claims; Colyvan's examples, however, are not of this nature. So, even under the generous assumption that Dialetheism is true, we will conclude that Colyvan's argument doesn't achieve its surprising conclusion. (shrink)

t. 1. Scripta in editione Basilensi anno 1573 collecta. 2 v.

We introduce a generalization of MV algebras motivated by the investigations into the structure of quantum logical gates. After laying down the foundations of the structure theory for such quasi-MV algebras, we show that every quasi-MV algebra is embeddable into the direct product of an MV algebra and a “flat” quasi-MV algebra, and prove a completeness result w.r.t. a standard quasi-MV algebra over the complex numbers.

This collection focuses on the ontology of space and time. It is centred on the idea that the issues typically encountered in this area must be tackled from a multifarious perspective, paying attention to both a priori and a posteriori considerations. Several experts in this area contribute to this volume: G. Landini discusses how Russell’s conception of time features in his general philosophical perspective;D. Dieks proposes a middle course between substantivalist and relationist accounts of space-time;P. Graziani argues that it is (...) necessary to provide an account of the “synthetic procedures” implicit in the recourse to diagrams in Euclid’s Elements, while E. Mares comes to the conclusion that in Euclid’s Elements we should treat the parallel postulate as empirical and the postulate that space is continuous as a priori. M. Arsenijevi?/M. Adži? present an important formal result concerning two theories of the infinite two-dimensional continua, which sheds new light on the current dispute between gunkologists and pointilists; F. Orilia discusses two problems for presentism, one regarding the duration of the present and the other related to Zeno’s paradoxes. A. Iacona delves deep into logical matters by focusing on the so-called T×W modal frames in order to deal with the deteterminism-indeterminism controversy. D. Mancuso outlines a non-standard temporal model compatible with time travel, andV. Fano/G. Macchia discuss time travels in the light of an important foundational principle of modern cosmology, Weyl’s Principle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 109 makes for much enjoyment in the reading; the historical and linguistic enquiries are often most rewarding; the weakest moments come when his hectoring of modern sceptics betrays an ignorance of relevant modern arguments. Generally the production is excellent, but on page 129, line 19, delete.... ; on page 185, line 17 and page 186, line 14, read ~p,~**for ~pcr Amherst College J O H NKING-FARLOW Greek (...) into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy. By Richard Wa}zer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oriental Studies I, Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. vi + 256. $11.00. English edition: Oxford, Bruno Cassirer. 63s.) Venu ~ l'islamologie des ~tudes classiques, M. Walzer s'est consacr~ depuis de longues annfies ~ ~tudier la tradition philosophique grecque au sein de la culture musulmane. Ses recherches ont vis~ soit ~trecouvrer sous une forme plus ou moins directe des d6bris de l'h6ritage philosophique et culturel grec perdus dans l'original, soit ~t 6clairer la survivance et l'adaptation de cet hfiritage classique chez les penseurs de l'Islam. Le volume en question rassemble quatorze 6tudes de l'auteur, toutes consacr~es ~ ce th~me sfiduisant, et parues au cours d'une trentaine d'ann6es dans diff~rents recueils et revues scientifiques: en commen~ant par un beau chapitre de synthbse (Islamic Philosophy), contribu~ ~ une histoire g~n6rale de la philosophie, et par l'autre figalement d'ensemble On the Legacy of the Classics in the Islamic World tir~ de la Festschrift pour Bruno Snell, suivis par un nombreux groupe de recherches particuli~res, pour la plus part r6dig~es en anglais, mais aussi en allemand et en italien. Six chapitres traitent de l'Aristote "arabe" (un fragment probablement de l'Eud~me recouvr~ dans al-Kindi, un ficho de dialogue aristot~lique ~p,~T~6~ retrouv~ dans un ouvrage d'adDailami, des comptes-rendus critiques sur tes 6ditions r6centes des versions arabes de l'Organon et de la Metaphysique, une fitude sur la place de la Rh6torique et de la Po~tique dans le m~me Organon, une autre encore sur les versions arabes d'Aristote dans les biblioth~ques d'Istanbul). Deux autres chapitres, fitroitement li~s entre eux, traitent de la philosophie morale de Galien, en puisant h un abr6g6 arabe de son perdu,~p~~0~u, qui trahit une influence platonique pass6e par Posidonius, et contient entre autre une diatrib~ qui rappelle une fable bien connue de Babrius. Les quatre derniers chapitres se rattachent par contre au second des deux courants d'~tudes que nous avons indiqu~s: ils 6tudient ~ la lumi~re de textes r~cemment publi6s la pens~e d'al-Kindi, le philosophe arabe mu'tazilite pour lequel la revelation et la philosophie aboutissaient au m~me but, ou la pens6e d'al-Farabi sur le proph~tisme et la divination, consid~r~es avec Platon comme res- 110 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY sortantes de l"'imagination," et partant subordonn&s toutes les deux ~ la sp&ulation rationnelle. Une autre &ude sur l'&hique de Miskawaih nous montre ce philosophe du X si&le parvenu ~ des positions harmonistiques entre la foi et la pens& rationnelle, qui se rapprochent de celles d'al-Kindi, et se d&achent de celles d'al-Farabi, Avicenne et Averro~s. Une lecture enfin sur Platonism in Islamic Philosophy nous montre chez ce m~me al-Farabi et d'autres penseurs musulmans la survivance et l'adaptation de la pens~e platonique dans ce qui a trait aux quatre vertus fondamentales, ~ l'Rtat idfial, ~ la valeur du proph&isme, et ~ la pri~re philosophique. I1 suffit de cette simple table des mati6res pour faire ressortir la vari&~ et l'importance des th~mes abord~s par l'auteur darts la vaste domaine de la philosophie gr&o-islamique, &helonn& ici dans une succession chronologique et id~ale. M. Walzer connak en maitre la technique philologique dans les deux champs, classique et arabe; mais il salt s'~lever de la philologie fi des probl~mes fondamentaux d'histoire de la pens& et de la culture. I1 r~ussit ~ d~gager tr~s adroitement la pens& des auteurs arabes de leur forme souvent obscure et compliqu&, ~ reconnaltre ce qui est essentiel dans la foule des d&ails, ~ caract~riser la physionomie intellectuelle des individus et ~ la replacer en mSme temps dans le... (shrink)

Clarke and Beck's defense of the theoretical construct “approximate number system” is flawed in serious ways – from biological misconceptions to mathematical naïveté. The authors misunderstand behavioral/psychological technical concepts, such as numerosity and quantical cognition, which they disdain as “exotic.” Additionally, their characterization of rational numbers is blind to the essential role of symbolic reference in the emergence of number.

The considerable prominence of internet addiction (IA) in adolescence is at least partly explained by the limited knowledge thus far available on this complex phenomenon. In discussing IA, it is necessary to be aware that this is a construct for which there is still no clear definition in the literature. Nonetheless, its important clinical implications, as emerging in recent years, justify the lively interest of researchers in this new form of behavioral addiction. Over the years, studies have associated IA with (...) numerous clinical problems. However, fewer studies have investigated what factors might mediate the relationship between IA and the different problems associated with it. Ours is one such study. The Italian version of the SCL-90 and the IAT were administered to a sample of almost 800 adolescents aged between 16 and 22 years. We found the presence of a significant association between IA and two variables: somatization (β = 7.80; p < 0.001) and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (β = 2.18; p < 0.05). In line with our hypothesis, the results showed that somatization predicted the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and IA (β = −2.75; t = −3.55; p < 0.001), explaining 24.5% of its variance (ΔR2 = 1.2%; F = 12.78; p < 0.01). In addition, simple slopes analyses revealed that, on reaching clinical significance (+1 SD), somatization showed higher moderation effects in the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and IA (β = 6.13; t = 7.83; p < 0.001). These results appear to be of great interest due to the absence of similar evidence in the literature, and may open the way for further research in the IA field. Although the absence of studies in the literature does not allow us to offer an exhaustive explanation of these results, our study supports current addiction theories which emphasize the important function performed by the enteroceptive system, alongside the more cited reflexive and impulsive systems. (shrink)

Objective: To investigate the differences between patients returning to work and those who did not after brain tumor surgery.Methods: Patients were evaluated before surgery and after 3 months. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment test, Trail-Making Test, 15-word Rey–Osterrieth Word List, F-A-S tests, and Karnosfky Performance Status were used to assess cognitive status, attention, executive functions, memory, word fluency, and functional status. Patient-reported outcome measures used to evaluate emotional distress and disability were the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and World Health Organization (...) Disability Assessment Schedule. Clinical and work-related variables, PROMs, and cognitive tests were compared using chi-squared, t-test or Mann–Whitney U test.Results: Sixty patients were included. Patients returning to work were 61.3 and 31.0% among people with meningioma and glioma, respectively. They reported lower postoperative disability and lesser home-to-work travel time. Patients with meningioma also showed better preoperative and postoperative attention and executive functions, better postoperative functional and cognitive status, and lower frequency of treatments.Conclusions: These variables should be considered in a clinical context to plan interventions for people who need support during return to work and in future research to investigate preoperative and postoperative predictive factors of going back to work. (shrink)

We investigate an expansion of quasi-MV algebras ([10]) by a genuine quantum unary operator. The variety of such quasi-MV algebras has a subquasivariety whose members—called cartesian—can be obtained in an appropriate way out of MV algebras. After showing that cartesian . quasi-MV algebras generate ,we prove a standard completeness theorem for w.r.t. an algebra over the complex numbers.

CONTENTS: -/- SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 -/- SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? -/- Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione (...) mereologica Stefano Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 -/- SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO -/- Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 -/- SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE -/- La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359 . (shrink)