This book addresses how people and organisations sometimes respond to uncertainty in making decisions. Those decisions are rooted in beliefs and behaviours that are not always rational, especially in response to perceived randomness, chaos and unexpected circumstances. The author uses a transdisciplinary approach to the study of superstition in the context of business and management, taking care to acknowledge that what is regarded as superstition to one person may well be constructed as a spiritual belief by another. Respect and sensitivity (...) in explicating individual and social constructions of spirituality is a core value in structuring the narrative of the text. The work also explores the interwoven relationships amongst superstition, religion, spirituality and empiricism and how cultural, political, economic and environmental factors are likely to influence organisations and those who are employed by them. Further, it examines the influence of beliefs related to topics such as feng shui, astrology, phrenology and the I Ching in recruitment. This comprehensive treatment of the role of superstition in business will advance the scholarly conversation on uncertainty in decision making. It points to the power of belief that defies empirical validation and how it can be used in a variety of contexts, such as the marketing of products and images to manipulate unwary consumers or inhibit the implementation of health advice in times of COVID-19. (shrink)

The existence of superstition and religious beliefs in most, if not all, human societies is puzzling for behavioral ecology. These phenomena bring about various fitness costs ranging from burial objects to celibacy, and these costs are not outweighed by any obvious benefits. In an attempt to resolve this problem, we present a verbal model describing how humans and other organisms learn from the observation of coincidence (associative learning). As in statistical analysis, learning organisms need rules to distinguish between real patterns (...) and randomness. These rules, which we argue are equivalent to setting the level of α for rejection of the null hypothesis in statistics, are governed by risk management as well as by comparison to previous experiences. Risk management means that the cost of a possible type I error (superstition) has to be traded off against the cost of a possible type II error (ignorance). This trade-off implies that the occurrence of superstitious beliefs is an inevitable consequence of an organism’s ability to learn from observation of coincidence. Comparison with previous experiences (as in Bayesian statistics) improves the chances of making the right decision. While this Bayesian approach is found in most learning organisms, humans have evolved a unique ability to judge from experiences whether a candidate subject has the power to mechanistically cause the observed effect. Such “strong” causal thinking evolved because it allowed humans to understand and manipulate their environment. Strong causal thinking, however, involves the generation of hypotheses about underlying mechanisms (i.e., beliefs). Assuming that natural selection has favored individuals that learn quicker and more successfully than others owing to (1) active search to detect patterns and (2) the desire to explain these patterns mechanistically, we suggest that superstition has evolved as a by-product of the first, and that belief has evolved as a by-product of the second. (shrink)

Inventing Superstition weaves a powerfully coherent argument that will transform our understanding of religion in Greek and Roman culture and the wider ancient ...

From uttering a prayer before boarding a plane, to exploring past lives through hypnosis, has superstition become pervasive in contemporary culture? Robert Park, the best-selling author of Voodoo Science, argues that it has. In Superstition, Park asks why people persist in superstitious convictions long after science has shown them to be ill-founded. He takes on supernatural beliefs from religion and the afterlife to New Age spiritualism and faith-based medical claims. He examines recent controversies and concludes that science is the only (...) way we have of understanding the world. Park sides with the forces of reason in a world of continuing and, he fears, increasing superstition. Chapter by chapter, he explains how people too easily mistake pseudoscience for science. He discusses parapsychology, homeopathy, and acupuncture; he questions the existence of souls, the foundations of intelligent design, and the power of prayer; he asks for evidence of reincarnation and astral projections; and he challenges the idea of heaven. Throughout, he demonstrates how people's blind faith, and their confidence in suspect phenomena and remedies, are manipulated for political ends. Park shows that science prevails when people stop fooling themselves. Compelling and precise, Superstition takes no hostages in its quest to provoke. In shedding light on some very sensitive--and Park would say scientifically dubious--issues, the book is sure to spark discussion and controversy. (shrink)

Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in (...) the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious. (shrink)

A superstitious reading of the world based on religion may be harmless at a private level, yet employed as a political tool it can have more sinister implications. As this fascinating book by Ali Rahnema, a distinguished Iranian intellectual, relates, superstition and mystical beliefs have endured and influenced ideology and political strategy in Iran from the founding of the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century to the present day. As Rahnema demonstrates through a close reading of the Persian sources and (...) with examples from contemporary Iranian politics, it is this supposed connectedness to the hidden world that has allowed leaders such as Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mahmud Ahmadinejad to present themselves and their entourage as representatives of the divine, and their rivals as the embodiment of evil. (shrink)

Par la genèse de la superstition proposée dans l’Émile, Rousseau montre que seul Jésus a pu manifester la religion naturelle à l’état pur. Ses disciples, marqués par la superstition, n’ont pu maintenir cette pureté : ils sont à l’origine de religions historiques nouvelles, mixtes de superstition et de religion naturelle. Pour des raisons politiques, les théologiens auraient renforcé l’élément superstitieux. Cet article montre que Rousseau aspire à un dispositif qui permettrait aux hommes d’apprendre progressivement à voir dans la religion naturelle (...) l’essentiel de leur religion, et dans tout ce que les théologiens ont ajouté, l’accessoire. La diffusion de la « profession de foi » joue un rôle capital dans ce mouvement de purification. En attendant l’érosion complète de la croûte qui entoure le noyau , la tolérance théologique doit occuper une place centrale : grâce à elle, les hommes pourront être peu à peu convaincus que seule la religion naturelle est nécessaire et assurément vraie.Through the genesis of superstition proposed in Emile, Rousseau shows that Jesus alone could manifest natural religion in its pure state. His disciples, marked by superstition, could not uphold this purity ; they are at the origin of religions historically new, a mixture of superstition and natural religion. For political reasons, theologians would have reinforced the superstitious element. This article shows that Rousseau aspires to a plan which allows men to progressively learn to see in natural religion, the essential of their religion, and all that theologians added, of secondary importance. The diffusion of the “profession of faith” plays a major role in this movement of purification. Awaiting a total erosion of the crust that surrounds the kernel , theological tolerance should occupy a central position ; it is thanks to this that men could be gradually convinced that natural religion alone is necessary and most certainly true. (shrink)

The notion of superstition has a long history of being understood in terms of epistemic and psychological features, although many discussions include its problematic political consequences. I argue that Spinoza’s discussion of superstition in Theological-Political Treatise is an exception. Spinoza connects superstition and piety with the problem of political stability via the notion of obedience, and uses the term “superstitious” to label religious attitudes and practices that undermine civil obedience by establishing demands of allegiance, on the part of the religious (...) authority, that compete with those of the government. Contrary to existing interpretations, I will show that, for Spinoza, “superstition” is not intrinsically characterized by features such as intolerance and anti-intellectualism. In Theological-Political Treatise, practices that clearly shows these traits are labeled as pious, rather than superstitious, precisely because, within certain societies, they foster obedience and therefore stability. One of Spinoza’s goals in TTP is to show that what counts as pious among the ancient Jews or in the Ottoman Empire should be considered superstitious in a more modern, diverse society such as the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, and that libertas philosophandi is the best way to inoculate a society against superstition. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza el concepto de superstición de Spinoza como dispositivo político de alteración de la lógica afectiva y, por ende, del deseo, instituyendo determinadas formas de acción y pensamiento. En virtud de lo anterior, se propone una lectura sobre su devenir conceptual, considerando las nociones de fetichismo en Marx, religión capitalista en Benjamin, espectáculo en Debord y discurso moral en Coccia, de esta manera se pone en evidencia la actualidad del funcionamiento de la superstición en la época del capitalismo. (...) ABSTRACT The article analyzes Spinoza's concept of superstition as a political mechanism that alters affective logic and, therefore, that of desire, establishing determined forms of action and thought. In this context, we suggest a reading of the concept's development, taking into account the notions of fetishism in Marx, capitalist religion in Benjamin, spectacle in Debord, and moral discourse in Coccia, in order to show how superstition operates in the age of capitalism. (shrink)

An examination of the various ways human beings make sense and meaning of the world, concluding with a call to personal agency.

Thought under Threat reveals and combats the forces diminishing the power and role of critical thinking, whether in our individual lives or collectively. Thought under Threat is an attempt to understand the tendencies that threaten thinking from within. These tendencies have always existed. But today they are on the rise and frequently encouraged, even in our democracies. People “disagree” with science and distrust experts. Political leaders appeal to the hearts and guts of “the people,” rather than their critical faculties. Stupidity (...) has become a right, if not a badge of honor; superstition is on the rise; and spite is a major political force. Thinking is considered “elitist.” To see those obstacles as vices of thought, Miguel de Beistegui argues, we need to understand stupidity not as a lack of intelligence or judgment, but as the tendency to raise false problems and trivial questions. Similarly, we need to see spite not as a moral vice, but as a poison that blurs and distorts our critical faculties. Finally, superstition is best described not as a set of false beliefs, but as a system that neutralizes one’s ability to think for oneself. For de Beistegui, thinking is intrinsically democratic and a necessary condition for the exercise of freedom. Thought under Threat shows how a training of thought itself can be used to ward off those vices, lead to productive deliberation, and, ultimately, create a thinking community. (shrink)

Fengshui (also called Chinese geomancy) is a pre-modern tradition rooted in Chinese civilization. Chinese civilization is pre-modern and practice-oriented due to the domination of political power in China. In contrast, Western civilization is modernized. It witnessed the development of religion in ancient times, and the growth of science through reason (logic) and experiment in modern times. It is both rational and transcendental. It seems that Fengshui is an intermediate between science and religion. It is not science although its focus is (...) on this world, for it does not seek knowledge and truth. It is not religion although it is mystical, for it does not seek transcendence and good. It is not only superstition (or magic), but also a mystical trade that centers on secular benefits. (shrink)

In this commentary I attempt to extend the argument made by Atran and Norenzayan in two ways. First, I distinguish between the causes and the consequences of religious belief and speculate on the positive and negative consequences of religion. Second, I raise some questions about individual differences in religiosity and suggest that the origins of nonbelief are worth investigating.

This article argues that to call Hume a conservative is a shorthand label that is at least insecure and at most a distortion. It is not claimed that the label is fanciful or without justification but the argument does serve to raise questions as to its accuracy once it is subject to further inspection and, consequently, to doubt its aptness or utility in capturing what is a key characteristic of Hume’s sociopolitical thought. This argument is constituted as follows. After some (...) preliminary refinement of the topic, part I, in order to establish that the paper is not attacking a ‘straw-man’, identifies, by using Oakeshott as a benchmark, those aspects of Hume’s thought that most securely underwrite attributing the conservative label. Part II constructs an argument to render the conservative label insecure, by drawing attention to the case for Hume as a liberal. Part III outlines the grounds for the further claim that when Hume’s commitment to ‘science’ and his polemics against superstition, and other ‘chimerical’ practices and principles, are taken on board then the stronger case that the label is a distortion can be judged to have substance. (shrink)

Plutarch, in his work,_ Peri __Deisidaimon_ia_ __,_ presents a striking portrayal of superstition in the First Century. The Philosopher who also served for decades as a priest of Apollo portrays the pernicious effects of some supposed religious practices as worse than the outcome of atheism. His position constitutes a forceful explanation to ostensibly controversial socio-religious behaviours. This article discusses some of the priest’s concerns as well as his rebuff of religious attitudes that are borne out of what he describes as (...) misrepresentation of the gods or superstition. Plutarch’s essay is seen as illustrating a reason for a socio-religious situation in Africa, a continent that shares a similar religious background with the world of the writer. Specifically, with the example of the hard fight against street begging in some parts of Nigeria, the article shows how social reform programmes could fail when effects of traditional African beliefs and cultural practices remain potent. __. (shrink)

Partie 1. Le contexte scientifique et le langage de Spinoza -- I. Bref apercu du corpus spinozien -- II. Le contexte scientifique du XVIIe siecle -- Partie 2. Spinoza, une arme contre la superstition et les charlatans de la foi -- I. Le refus de la superstition -- II. Contre les charlatans de la foi ou l'actualité de la préface du Traité théologico-politique -- III. L'Ethique ou la connaissance comme arme de libération -- Conclusion.

This feminist research explores how superstition is used by in-law's family to subordinate women business-owners in a highly patriarchal developing context. Whereas the exploration of gender subordination regarding women's entrepreneurship is almost exclusively confined to developed nations, little is known regarding the way women are subjugated in managing their small businesses in a patriarchal developing nation. This research generates data by conducting a case study on a woman's business in Bangladesh. This study yields unique insights by unfolding a specific form (...) of superstition that attempts to restrain a woman from continuing her small business. The paper reveals that the male relative caused a severe adverse impact on the personal life and business of the woman by employing superstition. With particular reference to superstition, this feminist study substantially extends the theoretical understanding of gender subordination within the context of small businesses of women in a highly patriarchal developing nation. The research strongly suggests policymakers to consider familial issues of women business-owners in designing programmes to empower them effectively. (shrink)

Most Chinese religious practice and belief in times past, and even throughout much of the Chinese world today, falls into the still current category of superstition. Assessing the ethical notions that tend to obtain within this vast area of religious life is not easy, but it needs to be done for practical reasons, not least because the legal consequences of moral actions arising from the body of beliefs concerned are starting to come before courts outside China itself. Once the assumptions (...) of a very different worldview affirming the existence of an unseen spirit world are taken into account, the deeds of believers in this worldview can be discussed from the point of view of ethics. Philosophers might do well to pay more attention to this topic. (shrink)

Most Chinese religious practice and belief in times past, and even throughout much of the Chinese world today, falls into the still current category of superstition. Assessing the ethical notions that tend to obtain within this vast area of religious life is not easy, but it needs to be done for practical reasons, not least because the legal consequences of moral actions arising from the body of beliefs concerned are starting to come before courts outside China itself. Once the assumptions (...) of a very different worldview affirming the existence of an unseen spirit world are taken into account, the deeds of believers in this worldview can be discussed from the point of view of ethics. Philosophers might do well to pay more attention to this topic. (shrink)