Human rights are a contested concept. One important strand of criticism concerns the charge of their Eurocentrism, formulated in particular by postcolonial theorists and scholars. Although postcolonial perspectives are now increasingly acknowledged, attempts to incorporate non-Western approaches into the discourse on human rights are still rare. This article considers whether Islamic human rights concepts can address the postcolonial critiques and decenter human rights discourse and politics from the West. Working within the methodological framework of comparative political thought, the article regards (...) Islamic approaches not simply as counter-discourses but analyzes their potential to supplement the dominant theory and practice of human rights and correct some of its inherent flaws. Informed by the critical analysis of Makau Mutua and Gayatri C. Spivak, the primary focus is on alternatives to the liberal individualist framework of human rights as evident in the concept of the autonomous individual subject of rights, and the balancing of individual rights with ethics and notions of responsibility in particular. (shrink)

RESUMEN El objetivo de este artículo es proponer una reinterpretación del concepto de comunidad a la luz de las transformaciones tecnológicas y de las formas de comunicación recientes, las cuales ponen la idea de lo social no como precepto teórico, sino como elemento a descubrir en los diferentes estudios planteados. Se busca una transversalización teórica de los tres autores, tomando elementos esenciales de sus obras para proponer una nueva clave interpretativa que permita tomar el concepto de comunidad no como un (...) presupuesto teórico, sino como un producto inmanente, resultado de las conexiones cotidianas que se realizan entre los sujetos de manera espontánea en el campo de lo social. ABSTRACT Taking as a starting point the objective of this article is the reinterpretation of the concept, forced by the technological and communication transformations that place the ideas of social and community, not as theoretical precepts, but as elements to discover on the studies proposed. A theoretical transversalization of the three authors will be sought, taking essential elements from their works to propose a new interpretative key that allows us to take the concept of community, not as a theoretical presupposition, but as an immanent product resulting from the daily connections made between the subjects, spontaneously, on the social field. (shrink)

Sebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften (...) spielt. Am Beispiel des sogenannten Bestätigungsfehlers führt er aus, dass Menschen, die ihre Überzeugungen nicht fortwährend kritisch prüfen, in diesem Verhalten durchaus rational sein können. (shrink)

Can we take the purpose of nurse education for granted, and, more importantly, should we? That is the issue at stake in this paper. The question of purpose is conspicuously absent in the nursing literature; our aim here is to urge that it not be overlooked by demonstrating its importance to the future of nursing. We approach the question of nurse education's purpose in concrete and speculative terms through two distinct yet interrelated questions: what is the purpose of nurse education? (...) and what should it be? Amidst the complexity and uncertainty of our time, we cast doubt on the adequacy of manualised and regulated approaches—ubiquitous in nurse education—to prepare nurses who can meet the challenges of contemporary practice. We also assert that transgressive approaches to education, as the antithesis of manualisation, reach the same impasse by (over)predetermining what the educational ‘output’ will be. To move beyond this impasse, we draw on the theory of Gert Biesta and Ron Barnett to contrast cultivation and existential‐type education. In so doing, we do not seek to provide ‘answers’ to nurse education's purpose but, rather, raise the profile of what we believe is a right and proper question for the discipline to grapple with. (shrink)

It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or could provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just (...) like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention in developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a dialogue between (post-)phenomenological and decolonial approaches to propose a sentipensante ethics. Emancipating from hegemonic approaches to ethics that privilege rationality over feeling bodies, we conceptualise an analogical ethics of virtues that emerge in the framework of an analectic-responsive experience. In this experience, we specify the affective, interoceptive, and inter-bodily aspects as elements of a sentipensante ethics from an enactivist perspective. This exercise allows us to highlight the foundation of the ethical experience as a participatory (...) virtue-making oriented towards solidary well-being. Finally, it invites us to search for pedagogical practices that cultivate this virtue-making. En este artículo introducimos un diálogo entre enfoques (post-)fenomenológicos y decoloniales para proponer una ética sentipensante. Nos emancipamos de perspectivas hegemónicas que privilegian la racionalidad sobre los cuerpos que sienten, y conceptualizamos una ética analógica de virtudes que emergen en el marco de una experiencia responsiva analéctica. De esta experiencia, precisamos los aspectos afectivos, interoceptivos, e inter-corporales, como elementos de una ética sentipensante desde una perspectiva enactivista. Este ejercicio nos permite resaltar el fundamento de la experiencia ética como un hacer-virtud participativo orientado hacia el bienestar solidario. Finalmente, nos invita a buscar prácticas pedagógicas que cultiven este hacer-virtud. (shrink)

Following a workshop on ‘Wildening the public sphere’ with Nancy Fraser at the Berlin Centre for Social Critique in June 2022, we had the chance to continue the discussion via Zoom in November 2022. We start by illuminating the relation between ‘subaltern counterpublics’ and the public-at-large, the rise of right-wing counterpublics and the impact of so-called ‘social media’ on the public sphere. That brings us to the question how publics are situated within capitalism, and how they are able to politicize (...) issues that are traditionally considered private in capitalist societies. This is particularly interesting in regard to the pressing political task of forming an extended and non-essentialist working class identity that is able to mediate different ‘faces of labour’, as Fraser puts it in her recent Benjamin Lecture (2022a). (shrink)

Moral responsibility seems to presuppose personal identity. However, there are problems with this view, raised by Derek Parfit’s arguments for the view that personal identity isn’t what matters for our practical concerns. While Parfit discusses moral responsibility only in passing, the problems that arise for the connection between moral responsibility and personal identity have recently been sharpened by David Shoemaker. This paper defends the claim that moral responsibility presupposes personal identity against these problems. It argues, first, that only reductionist views (...) about personal identity have problems with the connection between responsibility and identity, which suggests that personal identity is a non-reductionist concept. Second, it argues that while non-reductionism is problematic, there is a novel view—non-representationalism about personal identity, according to which we account for personal identity in terms of a distinctive non-representational function—that is equally well-positioned to rescue the connection as non-reductionism, without suffering from non-reductionism’s problems. (shrink)

Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this is and cannot be the case, but also – and perhaps more importantly – offers a diagnosis why philosophers are nevertheless so often led to think otherwise.

Essences play a central role in Spinoza’s philosophy, not only in his metaphysics, but also in his philosophy of mind, his theory of affects, and his political philosophy. Despite their importance, however, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what exactly essences are for Spinoza. On a widespread reading, the essence of X is nothing but the concept of X. This paper argues against this identification of essences and concepts. Spinozistic concepts are maximally inclusive: the concept of X contains everything that (...) is needed to make X conceivable. The essence of X, in contrast, is more limited in scope and does not include everything that is needed to make X conceivable. Thus, Spinoza avoids the ‘overloading’ of essences and the problems that would ensue. The account developed in this paper has a surprising implication, namely that the essences of non-divine, singular things do not suffice to render these things fully conceivable on Spinoza’s view. Thus, Spinoza breaks with a tradition according to which the essence of a thing states ‘what the thing is.’ As a result, his conception of essence is much further removed from traditional Aristotelian accounts, and from other seventeenth-century accounts, than usually acknowledged. (shrink)

This paper presents scientists’ understanding of their roles in society and corresponding responsibilities. It discusses the researchers’ perspective against the background of the contemporary literature on scientific responsibility in the social sciences and philosophy and proposes a heuristic that improves the understanding of the complexity of scientific responsibility. The study is based on qualitative interviews with senior scientists. The presented results show what researchers themselves see as their responsibilities, how they assume them, and what challenges they perceive with respect to (...) their responsibilities. Regarding the latter, the interviewed researchers highlight those aspects of responsibility that go beyond the expertise of their professional role, and thus cannot be carried by scientists alone. For example, scientists alone cannot determine the general direction science takes, or the useful application of their research. The interviewed researchers describe those challenges as responsibilities that must be shared across different societal groups. In the theoretical literature, responsibility has been described as a relation between an actor (who), the action for which someone is responsible (what), and the normative framework against which someone is responsible (why). We will draw on this concept of “relational responsibility” to identify the various actors, normative frameworks, and actions relevant to scientific responsibility. This will serve as a heuristic tool to help identify the entanglement of responsibilities spread across several societal groups. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...) anticipated by Bradley. (shrink)

This article examines a series of events that are generally known in historiography as the “Tatarbunar Uprising” – an armed rebellion that took place over ten days in September 1924 in south-eastern Bessarabia. I am also interested in the aftermath of those events as well as in their legal and memorial afterlife. My attempt is to reason through and to clarify the legal and historio­graphical construction of narratives of sovereign power as they emerge from the archives of the trial as (...) well as that of the preceding and subsequent military and police operations. The reflection I will conduct here is indeed grounded in the historical context of 1923-1925, but the jurisprudential and comparative legal and political analysis I will deploy here has more general reach insofar as it aims to grasp some more general points about the status of legality under the conditions of emergency. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems (...) to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR. (shrink)

Human existence and its temporal limits are central themes of western culture. In addition to discussing fundamental metaphysical questions and ethical questions, this book examines questions surrounding the possibility of radically extending one's life through new a anti-aging therapies. Does adding years to one's life make one happier?

El presente artículo tiene por objetivo estipular algunas de las implicacionesque, dentro de la obra de Michel Foucault, supone la aparición de laperspectiva gubernamental. Para ello se especificarán algunos predicadosasociados a los conceptos de “gobierno” y “gubernamentalidad” ensu relación con ciertas nociones significativas como las de “poder” y“conducta”. Se señalarán los supuestos metodológicos que Foucault asumeal tomar al Estado como objeto de indagación. Se procurará explicitar porqué, en la reconstrucción propuesta por el autor, la gubernamentalidadestatal constituye un problema específicamente moderno. (...) Por último, seseñalará la vinculación entre el surgimiento de la gubernamentalidad y laaparición de aquella forma de reflexión crítica que implica un compromisocon el tiempo actual y que Foucault identifica con la impronta de laIlustración. (shrink)

One argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without being committed to the view that these disagreements are merely verbal. In this paper, I will take the considerations about disagreement used to motivate conventionalism seriously. However, I will use them to motivate a very different, novel, and as yet unexplored view about personal identity. This is the view that personal identity is a non-representational concept, the (...) nature of which isn’t to be accounted for in terms of what entity it represents, but its non-representational role. I highlight that we find structurally very similar concerns about disagreement in another philosophical debate, namely in meta-ethics. But, in meta-ethics, such sorts of considerations are, traditionally, thought to support one distinctive view: meta-ethical expressivism, a non-representational view about normative thought and discourse. This suggests that we should take a similar view seriously for personal identity. I also develop what such an unfamiliar view might look like, using expressivism as a template. On this view, judgements about personal identity are plans that regulate who to hold accountable. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without being committed to the view that these disagreements are merely verbal. In this paper, I will take the considerations about disagreement used to motivate conventionalism seriously. However, I will use them to motivate a very different, novel, and as yet unexplored view about personal identity. This is the view that personal identity is a non-representational concept, the (...) nature of which isn’t to be accounted for in terms of what entity it represents, but its non-representational role. I highlight that we find structurally very similar concerns about disagreement in another philosophical debate, namely in meta-ethics. But, in meta-ethics, such sorts of considerations are, traditionally, thought to support one distinctive view: meta-ethical expressivism, a non-representational view about normative thought and discourse. This suggests that we should take a similar view seriously for personal identity. I also develop what such an unfamiliar view might look like, using expressivism as a template. On this view, judgements about personal identity are plans that regulate who to hold accountable. (shrink)

Resumen: El espacio dramático de Michel Tremblay, “tesoro nacional” de Quebec, está poblado por personajes que se enfrentan casi siempre a la alienación y al deseo de encontrar, o incluso de crear, su propia identidad. Los héroes tremblayanos, cualquiera que sea su orientación sexual y posición en la sociedad, realizan un paso desde la inactividad hasta la acción para desgajarse del orden preestablecido. A veces incapaces de cambiar su situación, a veces felices al poder, por fin, contestar a la pregunta (...) “¿quién soy yo?”, los personajes del teatro de Tremblay siguen siendo representativos de la sociedad quebequense que, durante el período de la llamada Revolución tranquila, se vio sometida a unos profundos cambios identitarios. A lo largo de la evolución social del Quebec de los años sesenta y setenta del pasado siglo, se fueron estableciendo paralelismos entre la toma de conciencia identitaria de la sociedad y la de los personajes dramáticos de Trembley. Así, estos últimos se convertirían en alegorías de la estructura social en por lo menos dos dimensiones, moral y cultural, en el caso de Belles-Sœurs y À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou, donde se incuban las frustraciones propias de unas heroínas abrumadas por la cultura patriarcal (impotente en todos los ámbitos y ante todo el sexual), representada a su vez por la pieza Hosanna, a la que se la puede considerar como el símbolo de la expresión social de la homosexualidad y de la identidad sexual en general. En consecuencia, la finalidad de este artículo sería la reflexión misma acerca de unas (r)evoluciones teatrales que reflejarían las llevadas a cabo por la Revolución tranquila dentro de toda la sociedad. Abstract: Michel Tremblay's dramatic space, Quebec’s “national treasure”, is populated by characters who are almost always confronted with alienation and the desire to rediscover, and even to create, their own identity. The heroes of Tremblay, whatever their sexual orientation and social positions are, have the story of a passage from inaction till the act of tearing themselves away from the pre-established order. Sometimes incapable of changing their situation, sometimes happy to finally be able to answer the question “Who am I?”, the characters in the Tremblayan theatre are at all times representatives of the Quebec society, which, during the Quiet Revolution, suffered profound changes in identity. Throughout the social evolution in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s, the awareness of the identity of the society and that of the dramatic characters are two matters that coexist in parallel manner. Thus, the latter become allegories of the social structure on at least two levels: moral and cultural, in the case of the Belles-Sœurs and À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou representing several frustrations: of the heroines, overwhelmed by the powerless patriarchal culture; sexual, represented for example by Hosanna being the symbol of the social expression of homosexuality and sexual identity in general; and finally, actional, as in the case of Sainte Carmen de la Main, which constitutes a message to Québécois to take their destiny in their hands. The main objective of the article is to bring some reflections on theatrical (r)evolutions which reflected the changes of the Quiet Revolution within the entire society. (shrink)

This article proposes a fresh reading of a difficult and much-debated passage in Clytemnestra’s speech of triumph in the Agamemnon (1372–98). I argue that in lines 1395–6 Clytemnestra does not speak about herself as pouring a libation, as is generally assumed, but envisages instead the dead body of her murdered husband as the performer of this ritual. This reading, which is based on an overlooked syntactical option, avoids several inconsistencies of previous interpretations and neatly fits into the development of thought (...) and imagery in the speech. It shows how Clytemnestra’s exultation over the corpse of her husband forms a series of closely connected cynical re-interpretations of the murderous blood. (shrink)

The comparison by which the Chorus of Satyrs in Euripides’ Cyclops 469–471 illustrates its wish to participate in the blinding of the Cyclops is regarded as difficult in research on the play, due to the ambiguous expression ὥσπερ ἐκ σπονδῆς θεοῦ (469). There is no consensus either on the question of how the reference to libation is to be understood, nor on whether the transmitted phrasing is correct at all. In the present paper I attempt to show that doubts over (...) the transmission are unfounded and that attempts to refer the comparison not to libation but to the ritual use of water for handwashing at sacrifice are not persuasive. Rather, Euripides in this passage is engaging with the theme of libation on several levels of meaning: when we pay close attention to the context, cult-specific associations and literary applications of libation as a motif in Homer and Aristophanes, the words of the satyrs can be read, firstly, as a metaphorical reference to the two main actions in Odysseus’ plan for revenge, and secondly as a subtle allusion to the use of libation and spit-roasting in sacrificial ritual. (shrink)

This article presents an edition with introduction and commentary of two unpublished letters that Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff wrote to the art historian and cultural scholar Aby Warburg in the 1920 s. The edition completes a correspondence that includes a letter from Warburg that has already been published several times. The two letters cast light on the hitherto barely known relation of Wilamowitz to Warburg himself and to his Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek in Hamburg. They centre on the Warburg Library’s special research interest, (...) namely the influence of the ancient world on later cultural periods, especially the Renaissance. (shrink)

Euripides’Bacchaeis one of the most intensively studied Greek tragedies. Generations of scholars have explored the play from different perspectives and offered fascinating insights. But there are still aspects that have not received the attention they deserve. One such aspect is Euripides’ use of libation as a dramatic motif. Even though this motif relates directly to the question of the tragic conflict between Dionysus and Pentheus, it has never been discussed in detail and its dramatic impact has not been fully acknowledged.

Turri describes a case in which a group of experts apparently correctly advise you not to withhold on a proposition P, but where your evidence neither supports believing nor disbelieving P. He claims that this presents a puzzle about withholding: on the one hand, it seems that you should not withhold on P, since the experts say so. On the other hand, we have the intuition that you should neither believe nor disbelieve P, since your evidence doesn't support it. Thus, (...) there is apparently no doxastic attitude you are permitted to adopt to P. Turri considers various solutions to the puzzle, but in the end rejects all of them and concludes that it seems to be unsolvable. I suggest resolving the puzzle by distinguishing between what I call the subjective and the collective ‘should’. In light of your, the subject's, evidence, i.e., in the subjective sense of ‘should’, you should neither believe nor disbelieve P. However, in light of your and the experts' combined evidence, i.e., in the collective sense of ‘should’, you should not withhold on P. It is true that you are not permitted to adopt a doxastic attitude if you should not, in the subjective sense of ‘should’, adopt it; but this is not so if you should not adopt it in the collective sense. Thus, you are actually permitted to withhold on P. The puzzle is nonetheless philosophically interesting since it points something out that deserves more discussion in epistemology: epistemic advice and the collective sense of the doxastic ‘should’, which we use when giving epistemic advice. (shrink)

Is Hume a liberal or a conservative? Hume scholars are divided over this question. This paper rejects the widespread reading of Hume as a conservative and argues that Hume is a liberal, even though his version of liberalism is fundamentally different from Lockean liberalism. Hume differs from Locke in that he attempts to justify a liberal political order without appealing to natural rights or a social contract. Instead, his liberalism is deeply rooted in his empiricist epistemology and in his sentimentalist (...) ethics. Because the starting point of Hume’s political theory is his analysis of the nature of human beings as they actually are, he ends up with a liberal theory that is less idealizing than Lockean liberalism. He thus defends what I call a non-ideal liberalism. The paper also argues that Hume’s non-ideal liberalism does not rule out political ideals altogether. Such ideals, however, must be derived in such a way that they do not violate his empiricist principles. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason —the principle that everything has a reason—plays a central role in Leibniz’s philosophical system. It is rather difficult, however, to determine what Leibniz’s attitude towards the modal status of the PSR is. The prevailing view is that Leibniz takes the PSR to be true necessarily. This paper develops a novel interpretation and argues that Leibniz’s PSR is a contingent principle. It also discusses whether a merely contingent PSR can do the metaphysical heavy lifting that Leibniz (...) aims for. The paper shows that, despite appearance to the contrary, this is possible. In a nutshell, the argument is that the only possible PSR violation Leibniz allows for is God’s creation of a suboptimal world; there is no Leibnizian possible world, though, which intrinsically violates the PSR. Despite its contingency, then, Leibniz’s PSR is modally robust enough to serve as a foundational principle of his metaphysics. (shrink)

The Aristotelian account of change—according to which no individual can survive a change of species because an individual's essence is, at least in part, determined by its species membership—remains popular in the seventeenth century. One important, but often overlooked dissenting voice comes from Anne Conway. Unlike many of her contemporaries, Conway firmly rejects the Aristotelian account of change. She instead endorses the doctrine of Radical Mutability, the view that a creature can belong to different species at different times. A horse, (...) for example, can gradually become a human being and yet remain the same individual. Why, though, is Conway so opposed to the prima facie appealing Aristotelian account of change? This paper claims that she levels two arguments against this account which have been largely neglected so far. First, she argues that there could be no causal interaction between creatures belonging to different species with distinct essences, because cause and effect would be too dissimilar in that case. Second, Conway argues that the Aristotelian model is inconsistent with divine goodness because it allows for the annihilation of creatures and because it imposes arbitrary restrictions on the capacity of creatures to improve. (shrink)

Descartes famously espouses modal voluntarism, the doctrine that God freely creates the eternal truths. God has chosen to make it true that two plus two equals four, for instance, but he could have chosen otherwise. Why, though, does Descartes endorse modal voluntarism? Many commentators have noted that he regularly appeals to divine omnipotence to justify his doctrine. This strategy is usually thought to be unsuccessful, however, because it seems to presuppose—question-beggingly—that the eternal truths are in the scope of God’s power. (...) This paper argues that Descartes’s appeal to divine omnipotence has more going for it than meets the eye. Like many other medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes assumes that God has the power to control everything that remains unfixed by his own essence. At the same time, though, he denies that the eternal truths are fixed by, or grounded in, the divine essence. The combination of these two commitments leads to modal voluntarism. The paper also argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) may play an important role in the reasoning that leads Descartes to endorse modal voluntarism. This is surprising, given that the PSR appears to be deeply at odds with modal voluntarism. (shrink)

Hume is an avowed critic of contractarianism. He opposes the idea that a legitimate government is based on an ‘original contract’ or on the consent of those who are governed. Most scholars assume, though, that his criticisms apply only to a limited range of contractarian theories, namely to theories according to which actual contractors reach an actual agreement. Theories on which the agreement in question is understood in hypothetical or counterfactual terms, however, are oftentimes seen as being compatible with Hume’s (...) views. Against such interpretations, this paper shows that Hume rejects all contractarian theories, including hypothetical ones. It argues, first, that Hume employs a so far unacknowledged empiricist debunking strategy against contractarianism; if successful, this strategy undermines all variants of contractarianism. Second, it shows that the Humean conception of the state of nature (a topic that has received virtually no scholarly attention) is incompatible with hypothetical contractarianism. Finally, it argues that Hume rejects contractarianism in part because he anticipates a line of criticism which nowadays is often leveled against so-called ideal theory. On Hume’s view, the agreements reached by highly idealized contractors are of little relevance to the non-ideal individuals in the actual world. (shrink)

The article aims at giving an account of and comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary culture by focussing on the category of seriousness. Both thinkers diagnose a general tendency of downplaying, in fact, suppressing or even abolishing consciousness of sin and a concomitant disappearance of seriousness in what they consider „the modern age of reflection.“ First, the concept of seriousness is spelled out within their respective philosophies of religion, and this in relation to the reality of sin as a (...) misguided and distorted relationship to God. Second, the idea of seriousness is analysed with special reference to the different forms and stages of spirit (in Hegel), on the one hand, and „dialectical seriousness“ (in Kierkegaard) on the other hand. Third, major similarities and differences in both accounts are pointed out, in order, finally, to draw some, partly critical, consequences regarding current and future Kierkegaard research. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of (...) identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur ; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to give an account of the thesis according to which composition is identity and of the criticisms that might be formulated against it. According to a weak version of the thesis, composition, in virtue of being analogous in important respects to identity, is as ontologically innocent as identity. According to the strong version of the thesis, composition is literally a species of the generic relation of identity, and is as ontologically innocent as any species of (...) identity. As we will see, the weak version begs the question or incurs in a non sequitur; and the strong version is incoherent and faces a dilemma. Thus, composition is not identity: one thing cannot be identical to many things. (shrink)

La metafísica de la Superveniencia Humeana ha sido atacada por dos alternativas explícitamente anti-Humeanas: el Realismo Nómico y el Esencialismo Disposicional. Cada una de estas alternativas ofrece una explicación ontológica de la actual distribución de instanciaciones de primer orden. Ambas sostienen, contra el Humeano, que esta distribución no es un accidente metafísico. En este artículo argumento que las explicaciones ofrecidas por ellas son ilusorias. -/- The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and (...) Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory. (shrink)

Mi objetivo en este artículo es defender el núcleo esencial de las teorías de la verdad que entienden la verdad como identidad, a saber: que el portador de verdad _es_ el hacedor de verdad. En particular, me interesa defender la versión de Hornsby (1997) y McDowell (1994) en contra de los ataques realizados por Dodd (1995; 1999; 2008). Mi defensa es aplicable a versiones previas pertenecientes a esta familia de teorías, especialmente a la de Moore (1899; 1902).

The ability to anticipate team members' actions enables joint action towards a common goal. Task knowledge and mental simulation allow for anticipating other agents' actions and for making inferences about their underlying mental representations. In human–AI teams, providing AI agents with anticipatory mechanisms can facilitate collaboration and successful execution of joint action. This paper presents a computational cognitive model demonstrating mental simulation of operators' mental models of a situation and anticipation of their behavior. The work proposes two successive steps: (1) (...) A hierarchical cluster algorithm is applied to recognize patterns of behavior among pilots. These behavioral clusters are used to derive commonalities in situation models from empirical data (N = 13 pilots). (2) An ACT-R (adaptive control of thought - rational) cognitive model is implemented to mentally simulate different possible outcomes of action decisions and timing of a pilot. model tracing of ACT-R allows following up on operators' individual actions. Two models are implemented using the symbolic representations of ACT-R: one simulating normative behavior and the other by simulating individual differences and using subsymbolic learning. Model performance is analyzed by a comparison of both models. Results indicate the improved performance of the individual differences over the normative model and are discussed regarding implications for cognitive assistance capable of anticipating operator behavior. (shrink)

Con el objetivo de cuestionar aquellas interpretaciones que identifican la comprensión liberal del Estado con una estructura organizativa reducida a su mínima expresión cuyo desempeño debe quedar supeditado a las dinámicas económico-productivas, el presente artículo se propone revisar críticamente las propuestas de dos figuras destacadas dentro de la tradición del liberalismo: Adam Smith y Friedrich Hayek. Para ello se compara el modo en el que estos autores articulan el concepto de Estado sobre un plano operativo, en particular, en lo referido (...) al principio de “gobierno limitado”. Se identifican las funciones adjudicadas a las instituciones públicas y se caracteriza el modo en el que se presentan las relaciones entre la órbita estatal y la órbita social. Por último, se destacan continuidades y diferencias entre ambas posturas. Sobre esa base, se proponen algunas reflexiones en torno a la eventual distinción entre un liberalismo ético-político y un liberalismo económico. (shrink)