The notion of épochè, ‘suspension’, as developed by the Greek Skeptics, refers to the suspension of judgment that makes one neither affirm nor deny anything. In The Neutral, Roland Barthes takes this suspension as an ethical principle. Whereas discursive logic fosters the making of clear choices between alternative positions on something formulated as an issue, Barthes' suspension of judgment counteracts this push toward taking up positions. Barthes' term for this refusal to judge is ‘the Neutral’, which manifests itself in an (...) array of techniques and attitudes that defer, frustrate, or subtilize judgment and thus create room for drifting, relaxation, nuance, and tact. Barthes comes to think of the Neutral as a matter of intensity, of gradient degrees, rather than of the ‘zero degree’. Such gradients allow one to minimize one's interface with the world's arrogance. Barthes' ideas, for his time as much as ours, form a utopian desideratum: that of waylaying the assertiveness that language perversely encourages in its users. (shrink)

Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ is often used by philosophers as a synonym for ‘metaphysics’ (literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term which was used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. The term ‘ontology’ (or ontologia) was itself coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, Rudolf Göckel (...) (Goclenius), in his Lexicon philosophicum and Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), in his Theatrum philosophicum. The first occurrence in English recorded by the OED appears in Bailey’s dictionary of 1721, which defines ontology as ‘an Account of being in the Abstract’. (shrink)

Both ‘Sachverhalt’ and ‘state of affairs’ seem to have been derived from the juridical ‘status’ in the sense of 'status rerum' meaning: state or constitution of things. ‘Status’ signifies also in an extended sense ‘the way things stand, the condition or peculiarity of a thing in regard to its circumstances, position, order’. We describe the history of usage of ‘Sachverhalt’ from these beginnings, addressing the role of Goclenius, Lotze, Stumpf, Husserl and Adolf Reinach, whose theory of the relations between (...) judgment and Sachverhalt served as one starting point for the development of Reinach’s theory of speech acts in 1913. (shrink)

Theorien von Gerechtigkeit als einer ethischen Tugend spielen eine große Rolle in der protestantischen Ethik vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Eines der hervorstechenden Merkmale dieser Theorien ist ihr eklektischer Charakter: Sie verbinden Elemente aus verschiedenen Traditionen der antiken Tugendethik, vor allem der platonischen, aristotelischen und stoischen. Die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von protestantischen Philosophen wie Rudolph Goclenius, Clemens Timpler und Bartholomäus Keckermann illustrieren gut dokumentierte Merkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus wie die Rolle der Reinterpretation von ausgewählten Lehrstücken und die konziliatorische Strategie, scheinbare Widersprüche zwischen (...) verschiedenen Traditionen aufzulösen. Darüber hinaus illustrieren sie aber auch ein weniger gut dokumentiertes Merkmal des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus, nämlich seine Funktion als philosophische Problemlösungsstrategie. Dieser Artikel versucht zu zeigen, wie Goclenius, Timpler und Keckermann einerseits Elemente aus den platonischen (und stoischen) Traditionen nutzen, um diagnostizierte Probleme in der aristotelischen Tradition zu beheben und andererseits Elemente aus der aristotelischen Tradition verwenden, um Probleme in der platonischen Tradition zu lösen. (shrink)

Author: Paź Bogusław Title: ONTOLOGY VERSUS METAPHYSICS. GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE MODERN THEORY OF BEING (Ontologia versus metafizyka? Geneza, rozwój i różne postaci nowożytnej teorii bytu) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 817-847 Keywords: ONTOLOGY, MODERN METAPHYSICS, ESSENCE, ESSENTIALISM, IDEA, REPRESENTATIONISM, RATIONALISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper presents the process of modern metaphysics transforming into the ontology. The major points of this process became: (...) 1) scholastic sources of Catholic metaphysics represented by Fonseca, Suarez, Śmiglecki on the one side and Protestant metaphysics, represented by Goclenius and Clauberg, on the other; 2) Descartes’ epistemology of representation and 3) Leibniz’s rational and pluralistic metaphysics (monadology). The climax of the transformation process appears to be “Philosophia prima sive ontologia” (1729), a masterpiece being written by Wolff, where the first system of the ontology (science about being as possibility) was presented as a discipline independent from the traditional metaphysics. However starting with the Kant’s works ontology no longer was the discipline of knowledge about the real world but has being turned into a field of aprioristic categories of thinking about an existence and the physical world. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of the translations of the term “ontology” in Chinese language, and argues that its translation as “bentilun”(in Chinese PinYinorthography) can be supported by ample evidence from the history of doctrine and the tradition of Chinese culture. Therefore, It is necessary to keep this translation on condition that one distinguish strictly “ontology” as a branch of philosophy from “bentilun” as a special morphology of philosophical theory. Examining the history of metaphysics, this thesis draws a clear (...) line of demarcation between “traditional ontology” and “modern ontology”, and reveals themain characteristics of traditional ontology. It holds that although the reformation of Marx’s Philosophy was realized through criticizing traditional ontology, his Philosophy did not abolish the concept of ontology as a branch of the discipline. The ontology of Marx’s philosophy is a theory that considers natural being, social being and human being as a unity. This theory emphasizes understanding the meaning of being from the perspective of a pattern. The main idea of ontology of Marx’s philosophy is that of a practical outlook and practical model of thinking. First, the concept of ontology and its translations would be reviewed. As regards itsderivation, we could find that Ontologie in German and in French both came from the word of Ontologia in Latin, which originated from the Greek. In the literal meaning of Greek,this word means the “logos” of “on”. In Greek, “on” corresponds to “being” in English. As to its signification, according to Heidegger, “on” has a twofold meaning that can signify both “being in general” and “the ground of being”. The former is close to essence while the latter to origin. From the angle ofhistory, Goclenius was the first one who used the term “Ontologia” in philosophy in 17th century. Since then this word was used and developed by subsequent philosophers. Although this term appeared in 17th century, yet its correlative questions had been studied from ancient Greece. The sticking point here is to pay attention to the demarcation between subject and theory. As a branch subject or as a universal noun, “Ontology” is counted in the historical tradition of western philosophy. Here all the problems discussed are public, but the concrete solutions and viewpoints are different. The former corresponds to the level of subject and the latter to the level of theory. These two levels must not be confused or substituted from one and other. That is, different ideas, schools and opinions could bebrought under the same problem. So it could be said that traditional ontology and modern ontology are two branches. Of course these two branches are very different in dealing with the problem of Ontology. This difference could be illustrated as following: (1) What to be→beings→substance —traditional ontology; (2) How to be→the mode of being→relation—modern ontology. Obviously both begin with the problem of being and end with Ontology, while their approaches are very different. The essential characteristic of traditional ontology is to seek the eternal substance, pursue the transcendent nature, establish the base of knowledge, and take the absolute truth as the ultimate telos. Traditional ontology ended with the critique of modern philosophy, Marxmade the crucial critique of traditional ontology in his remarks on Hegel’s philosophy. His critique of Hegel’s speculative method is actually the critique of traditional ontology although Marx himself never used the term of ontology explicitly in his new philosophy. Being in Marx’s philosophy is the real world of real beings. Concretely speaking, it is sensible world, objective world or human world that is integrated on the base of human praxis. The keystones here are natural being, social being and human being. There are some important similarities between Marx’s ontological approach and Heidegger’s ontology, that is, to understand the meaning of being through the mode and relation of being. In any case, the standpoint and thinking mode of praxis characterize the ontology of Marx’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper considers philosophical approaches that are relevant to the intertwinement of logic, metaphysics, and psychology proposed by the Aquinas commentator Tommaso de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, the humanist Petrus Ramus, the pure Aristotelian Cornelius Martini, the Semi-Ramist Bartholomaeus Keckermann, and the lexicographer Rudolf Goclenius. Mostly, however, it is about Ramus and his followers, the Ramists, because of the role they played in exacerbating a discussion on the constitution of objectivity during the Renaissance that was to have an impact on (...) Cartesian andpost-Cartesian theories of subjectivity. Finally, keeping in mind that Kant was familiar with the secunda Petri, i.e., with the second part of Ramus's logic, namely the theory of judgment, some common ground is recognizable between Ramus and Kant as well. (shrink)

From the beginning of the seventeenth century it has generally been held that the second Medicean is the parent of all the other extant manuscripts. In two articles C. W. Mendell has demonstrated that Leidensis B.P.L. 16. B is the manuscript once owned by Rudolphus Agricola and later by Th. Ryck, whose edition makes frequent allusion to its readings. Mendell's attempt to show further that L represents a tradition independent of the Medicean has found little support until recently, when (...) E. Koestermann, in the course of preparing the latest Teubner edition of Annals and Histories became convinced from his own study of L that Mendell's view—in spite of some arguments of dubious validity—was essentially correct. In an article in Philologus and in the preface to his edition of Histories Koestermann has marshalled the arguments which he believes prove L's independence of the Medicean line of descent. Since the new valuation that Koestermann puts upon L has produced a drastic revision of both text and apparatus criticus in his new editions, it may be worth while to examine the evidence that Koestermann adduces in support of his belief in L's independence. (shrink)

From the beginning of the seventeenth century it has generally been held that the second Medicean is the parent of all the other extant manuscripts. In two articles C. W. Mendell has demonstrated that Leidensis B.P.L. 16. B is the manuscript once owned by Rudolphus Agricola and later by Th. Ryck, whose edition makes frequent allusion to its readings. Mendell's attempt to show further that L represents a tradition independent of the Medicean has found little support until recently, when (...) E. Koestermann, in the course of preparing the latest Teubner edition of Annals and Histories became convinced from his own study of L that Mendell's view—in spite of some arguments of dubious validity—was essentially correct. In an article in Philologus and in the preface to his edition of Histories Koestermann has marshalled the arguments which he believes prove L's independence of the Medicean line of descent. Since the new valuation that Koestermann puts upon L has produced a drastic revision of both text and apparatus criticus in his new editions, it may be worth while to examine the evidence that Koestermann adduces in support of his belief in L's independence. (shrink)

A história da psicologia, tal como aparece em algumas obras (E.G. Boring 1950; M. Reuchlin 1957; P. Fraisse e J. Piaget 1963) ou em capítulos introdutórios de alguns manuais (M. Reuchlin 1977), reflete uma adesão — raramente discutida — a uma concepção internalista. Segundo essa concepção, a psicologia seria animada por uma dinâmica própria, um processo evolutivo totalmente endógeno, e seria independente de fatores externos tais como os domínios religiosos, sociopolíticos e econômicos. Além do mais, os partidários dessa história aceitam (...) ver a psicologia influenciada por disciplinas situadas em suas fronteiras, como a biologia, a fisiologia e, em menor medida, a física. Esses domínios fronteiriços geralmente dizem respeito a objetos psicológicos habitualmente qualificados de inferiores, como reflexos, sensações e percepções, em oposição à linguagem e ao pensamento, qualificados como processos superiores. Esses mesmos domínios fronteiriços engendraram por sua vez subdomínios relativamente autônomos, tais como a psicofísica ou a psicofisiologia. Correlativamente a essa concepção internalista, o desenvolvimento científico é apresentado como um caminho ao estado de psicologia positiva, tal como A. Comte a definiu em 1837 na 45a lição do Curso de Filosofia Positiva. A caminhada até a positividade foi indicada pelo próprio A. Comte: estudo da anátomo-fisiologia do sistema nervoso (a frenologia de Gall lhe parece a esse respeito uma contribuição decisiva), estudos comparados, análise de casos patológicos, estudo dos comportamentos animais e do desenvolvimento individual. Considerando a evolução da psicologia nos últimos cem anos, seríamos tentados a sustentar que ela realizou o projeto positivista. Psicologia diferencial, psicopatologia, etologia animal e psicologia da criança são vários domínios que concorrem para essa realização. Entretanto, esses domínios estão longe de parecerem homogêneos quanto aos métodos empregados e os modelos epistemológicos aos quais se referem. Um exame atento dessas dimensões metodológicas e epistemológicas mostra que se avança, sobretudo, em ordem dispersa. (shrink)

Desde sua constituição como domínio do saber no fim do século XVI, a psicologia divide-se rapidamente em duas tendências com orientações diferentes. A primeira, de inspiração naturalista, situa-se no prolongamento do comentário da Física aristotélica e se desenvolve principalmente nas universidades protestantes de Marburgo e Leiden. Nesses estabelecimentos onde reinava então um espírito humanista, racionalista e tolerante, toma lugar a primeira forma de dualismo da alma e do corpo. Mas na mesma época, em círculos místicos e herméticos, desenvolve-se uma outra (...) concepção da psicologia, cujo método interpretativo inspira-se na exegese bíblica e emprega procedimentos terapêuticos, cuidados da alma e cuidados magnéticos, sustentados sobre a influência psicológica. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 101-103 [Access article in PDF] Cees Leijenhorst. The Mechanization of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes' Natural Philosophy. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Pp. xv + 242. Cloth, $97.00. Cees Leijenhorst, the young Dutch scholar and student of the late Karl Schuhmann, has written the most important book on Thomas Hobbes's natural science since Frithiof Brandt's Thomas Hobbes's Mechanical Conception of (...) Nature of 1928. This is true despite the undoubted brilliance and success of Leviathan and the Air Pump, published in 1985 by Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin. Why this is so, it will be the burden of this review to clarify.Writing in the modern historiographical tradition known as contextualism, long associated with John Pocock, Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck, Leijenhorst seeks to locate Hobbes within the horizon of that current of natural thought that began with Aristotle, led through antiquity and then flourished and came to predominate with the West's recovery of the Stagirite in the late Middle Ages. The course of so long a filiation of ideas cannot be the subject of a book whose length is under 250 pages, though a companion collection of essays on Aristotle and his long progeny, edited by Leijenhorst and others, has also appeared [End Page 101] (to be reviewed in the Journal). Instead, Leijenhorst focuses on the last, self-avowed inheritors and developers of that tradition, known as late Aristotelianism, though precisely how to define that tradition is itself problematized.Classically trained, Hobbes was well equipped to study Aristotle directly in Greek, without intermediaries; he early on published a translation of Thucydides. Still, Leijenhorst's concern is less to draw Hobbes closer to Aristotle than to relate him both to his immediate intellectual predecessors and to his own contemporaries, though, in each case, for different reasons. In the former, Leijenhorst convincingly argues that, as Gilson showed for Descartes, Hobbes assumed, drew upon, adopted and modified prevailing Aristotelian doctrines, even as he famously condemned their ancient author. And, Hobbes's sources, as they themselves interpreted, rejected and modified the views of their forebear, were rather various, including such writers of manuals as Bartholomaeus Anglicus and John Case, as well as others whose interests and directions were more varied and less conservative, including Scaliger, Rudolph Goclenius and Otto Casmann.A common source for both these strains of late Aristotelianism was the great stream of commentaries produced largely by members of the Jesuit Order from the middle of the sixteenth century onward, including Franciscus Toletus, Antonio Rubio, Petrus Fonseca, as well as Franciscus Suarez and members of other orders.This stream of thought also fed into the confessional strife of post-Reformation Europe, so that both Lutherans and Calvinists developed their own Aristotelianisms. One of the most striking conclusions of Leijenhorst's work is that, in characterizing both Aristotle's and his own metaphysics (or philosophia prima) as a universal science rather than as a particular theological science, Hobbes is an heir of this "Protestant ontology."Finally, Hobbes looked to the great names of natural-scientific thinking in sixteenth-century Italy, Zabarella, Pomponazzi, Fracastoro, Telesio and Campanella. Like Hobbes, these latter authors, "though vehemently anti-Aristotelian," nonetheless "exploited kinematic, empiricist and materialist tendencies found within the Aristotelian tradition itself, particularly in the School of Padua" (11).Such investigations into sources and lines of argument illuminate relations with predecessors and contemporaries in ways that social-constructivist accounts, like those of Schaeffer and Shapin and of the Edinburgh sociologist of knowledge David Bloor, may not accomplish. The author gives one instance of direct conflict between the results of that school and his own contextualism which illustrates this larger point.In his fight with Boyle, Hobbes is at pains to deny the existence of the void. Though he came to reject it rather late in his scientific thinking, the void, Schaffer and Shapin suggest, served to give space to the "incorporeal substances," similar to the scholastics' "abstract essences," upon which the latter erected the "kingdom of darkness" that... (shrink)