This collection presents some of the most vital and original recent writings on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, the three greatest rationalists of the early modern period. Their work offered brilliant and distinct integrations of science, morals, metaphysics, and religion, which today remain at the center of philosophical discussion. The essays written especially for this volume explore how these three philosophical systems treated matter, substance, human freedom, natural necessity, knowledge, mind, and consciousness. The contributors include some of the most prominent writers (...) in the field, including Jonathan Bennett, Michael Della Rocca, Jan A. Cover, Catherine Wilson, Stephen Voss, Edwin Curley, Don Garrett, and Margaret D. Wilson. (shrink)

There has been much discussion about the nature and even existence of so-called “pure conscious events” (PCEs). PCEs are often described as mental events which are non-conceptual and lacking all experiential content (Forman 1990). For a variety of reasons, a number of authors have questioned both the accuracy of such a characterization and even the very existence of PCEs (Katz 1978, Bagger 1999). In this chapter, I take a somewhat different, but also critical, approach to the nature and possibility of (...) PCEs. I focus on several overlapping views found in recent analytic philosophy of mind and examine PCEs in light of them. After introducing terminology and some preliminary matters, I examine whether or not the “higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness” rules out the possibility of PCEs, and conversely, whether or not PCEs show that the HOT theory cannot apply to all conscious states. The HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a higher-order thought to the effect that “I am in mental state M now.” A related theme will be to assess PCEs in light of the recent debate between so-called “conceptualists” and those who believe that there are “non-conceptual contents of experience.” Conceptualism, to which I am very sympathetic, is basically the view that all conscious experience is structured by concepts possessed by the subject. I argue that PCEs are indeed conceptual and so no threat to conceptualism. For example, standard criticisms of conceptualism do not apply to PCEs. Finally, I examine the possibility that PCEs are not conscious at all. In the end, my overall conclusion is that we should hold that PCEs are indeed compatible with both HOT theory and conceptualism or seriously question the idea that PCEs are conscious at all. (shrink)

Many actors mobilize the cognitive, legal and technical tool-box of data protection when they discuss and address controversial issues such as digital mass surveillance. Yet, critical approaches to the digital only barely explore the politics of data protection in relation to data-driven governance. Building on governmentality studies and Actor-Network-Theory, this article analyses the potential and limits of using data protection to critique the ‘digital age’. Using the conceptual tool of dispositifs, it sketches an analytics of data protection and the emergence (...) of its configuration as ‘data protection by design and by default’. This exploration reminds us that governing through data implies, first and foremost, governing digital data. (shrink)

A comparative study of Charles S. Peirce’s and Ernst Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories of categories. Both Peirce and Cassirer developed, in a mature stage of their philosophical reflection, phenomenological theories on three fundamental categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are the names of Peirce’s categories,while Cassirer’s ‚basis phenomena‘ are denominated with the personal pronouns Ich, Du and Es. Prompted by John Michael Krois’s suggestion of an indirect similarity between the two phenomenological theories of categories, this essay aims to find a possible (...) justification for this convergence, thereby reconstructing its metaphysical and epistemological grounding. The study is divided into four sections. In the first part, Peirce’s and Cassirer’s theories of knowledge are compared as expressions of a similar symbolic conception of thought. Secondly, I offer a parallel account of the reasons which led the two philosophers toward a more metaphysical grounding of their symbolic theories, focusing in particular on the relevance of the problem of life in both views. In the third section, I concentrate on the content of the two phenomenological theories and argue that they both represent an attempt to conciliate the tension between the transcendental premises of their symbolic theories of knowledge and the living character of experience. Finally, the reflections of Goethe and Schiller are presented as a possible source of Peirce’s and Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories. (shrink)

In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...) one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. -/- Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry. -/- Contributors Alexandre Billon, Andrew Brook, Paula Droege, Rocco J. Gennaro, Philip Gerrans, William Hirstein, Jakob Hohwy, Uriah Kriegel, Timothy Lane, Thomas Metzinger, Erik Myin, Inez Myin-Germeys, Myrto Mylopoulos, Gerard O’Brien, Jon Opie, J. Kevin O’Regan, Iuliia Pliushch, Robert Van Gulick . (shrink)

In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought (or awareness) that one is in that state. I discuss HOT theory with special attention to how Leibnizian theses can help support it and how it can shed light on Leibniz's theory of perception, apperception, and consciousness. It will become clear how treating Leibniz as (...) a HOT theorist can solve some of the problems he faced and some of the puzzles posed by commentators, e.g. animal mentality and the role of reason and memory in self-consciousness. (shrink)

In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...) one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry. (shrink)

To understand Lacan’s thinking process on vision, the entirety of his teaching must be taken into consideration. Until the 60s, the visual field is the imaginary, the constitutive principle of reality in its phenomenal giving to the experience of a subject. This register is the opposite of the field of the word with the L schema and, subsequently, as subordinated to the symbolic system according to the model of the optical schema of the inverted flower vase of Bouasse. It is (...) only with the 1964 seminar that Lacan makes a daring turnaround through which the visual becomes a sign of the emergence of a real that is irreducible to both reality and the mediation of the subject of knowledge. The split that separates reality and the real is reproduced in Lacan within the visual field, which is, on the one hand, the cardinal principle of the consistency of the experience of reality, and on the other, it is an element of irreducibility to reality. This produces a cascade of consequences: first of all, the modification of the presentation of the mirror stage. Unlike the voice, which through prosody, tone, and volume, finds some strips with which anchor itself imaginatively to reality, the gaze, invisible and elusive, escapes the imaginary grasp. Captured in myths, it reveals its power and ability to annihilate—as in the myth of Medusa’s gaze—or to make people fall in love but only with a narcissistic love that leads inexorably to death as in the myth of Narcissus. The gaze is elusive because the subject is dependent on it in the field of desire. Like the voice, it is about the desire on which the subject is supported; it is one of the objects on which the phantom depends. In our opinion, thanks to this characteristic, the gaze object can make remote psychoanalytic treatment possible through easily accessible videoconferencing tools and, at the same time, create new conditions within it that should be carefully evaluated to understand its implications in the session itself. (shrink)

Preterm discharge effects: Relationship between the maternal experience and newborn's psychobiological regulation The purpose of this study is to investigate how the past experiences of mothers and their potentially traumatic events during pregnancy may have influenced the processes of psychobiological self-regulation and cognitive development in a child born preterm. Eighty children who had a gestational age of < 32 weeks were examined at the 9th month of the corrected age. The mothers and children were divided in two groups: multipara mothers (...) and their children and the primipara mothers and their children. These children were examined on the basis of sleep disorders, nutritional problems and mental development. Perinatal data from clinical observations and data from standardized developmental tests were used to describe the differences. The children of primipara mothers who had unexpected preterm delivery presented major incidences of sleep disorders while the children of primipara mothers, who programmed preterm delivery, presented a major incidences of nutrition problems. The predictability of preterm delivery has a major influence on the capacity of newborns for self-regulation in the case of primipara mothers. (shrink)

Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed (...) and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A). (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and (...) animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what he calls the HOT-brain thesis. He defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. Gennaro proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that he calls the "wide intrinsicality view" and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. -/- Thus Gennaro argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. Gennaro’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make his argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers. (shrink)

"[READING ECO is a timely indication] of the fruitfulness of perceiving Eco as the same in his metamorphoses. [It also testifies] to a certain price that Eco and his readers must/may pay for the enormous pleasure and intellectual stimulus of being Eco and being with Eco." —The Comparatist Umberto Eco is, quite simply, a genius. He is a renowned medievalist, philosopher, novelist, a popular journalist, and linguist. He is as warm and witty as he is learned—and quite probably the best-known (...) academic and novelist in the world today. The goal of this anthology is to examine his ideas of literary semiotics and interpretation as evidenced both in his scholarly work and in his fiction. (shrink)

​Gibt es eine Wahrheit, die es verdient, als objektive Wahrheit bezeichnet zu werden? Heute wird das oft bestritten. Müssen wir uns also mit einem grenzenlosen Zweifel abfinden – ohne Hoffnung, unser Leben an der Wahrheit ausrichten zu können? Andererseits erscheint es uns oft so, dass wir die ganze Wahrheit zu besitzen glauben, und dann mit restloser Gewissheit und uneingeschränktem Anspruch meinen, über sie verfügen zu können. Wir sind im Alltag also entweder Skeptiker – oder Dogmatiker. Dieses Buch versucht, vor dem (...) Hintergrund der Wahrheitsfrage die Lage des Menschen zu schildern: Er strebt nach Wahrheit, berührt sie bisweilen auch, kann sich ihrer aber doch nie endgültig bemächtigen. Wahrheit hat eine objektive und eine subjektive Seite. Sie gewinnt Gestalt im Menschen – als Person. Was bedeutet das für unser Leben, unsere Überzeugungen, unseren Glauben? Und was heißt das für die Politik: Fordert Demokratie die Ausklammerung der Wahrheitsfrage? Der Herausgeber Christoph Böhr ist Professor für Philosophie an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. (shrink)

The management of patients suffering from chronic disorders of consciousness inevitably raises important ethical questions about the end of life decisions. Some ethical positions claim respect of human life sacredness and the use of good medical practices require allowing DOC patients to live as long as possible, since no one can arbitrarily end either his/her or others’ life. On the other hand, some currents of thought claim respect of human life dignity, patients’ wishes, and the right of free choice entail (...) allowing the withdrawal of life sustaining therapy. This could happen when patients believe their own life to be not worth living, or if therapy is not very beneficial, excessively burdensome, or even futile. Indeed, the decision to withdraw therapies in a DOC patient should be guided by reliable information about DOC diagnosis and prognosis and on how the patient would wish to be treated in such a condition. Taking into account such issues, it would be possible to make the decision that more adequately fits a DOC patient’s best interest. This review aims to overview the range of ethical issues referring to end-of-life decisions in DOC patients, with regard to the thorny debate on the sacredness and dignity of human life. (shrink)

“Leibniz on Consciousness and Self‐Consciousness” It is argued that Leibniz held a version of the so‐called “higher‐order thought” theory of consciousness. According to this theory, what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. For example, in elaborating on his theory of monads, Leibniz explains that an unconscious perception becomes conscious when it is accompanied by an apperception of it. Apperception is best understood as a form of self‐consciousness, and (...) reflection is best understood as a sophisticated form of apperception. With these crucial terminological distinctions in place, it is then argued that treating Leibniz as a HOT theorist can help us understand how he did indeed hold that animals apperceive even if most of them are incapable of sophisticated forms of reflection and rationality. (shrink)

This book argues that God can be found within the edifice of the scientific understanding of physics, cosmology, biology and philosophy. It is a rewarding read that asks the Big Questions which humans have pondered since the dawn of the modern human mind, including: Why and how does the universe exist? From where do the laws of physics come? How did life and mind arise from inanimate matter on Earth? Science and religion have a common interest in the answers to (...) such questions, yet many scientists and believers have been at odds for centuries. The author and contributors present a program for moving beyond the vastly different perspectives of reality offered by science and religion. Historical proofs for the existence of God are considered in light of the possibility that the universe may be only one in an eternal multiverse that contains an infinite number of other universes. Readers will find a modification of St. Augustine’s Argument from Truth for the existence of the necessary, self-sufficient being commonly referred to as God. This book is suited to all with an interest in the crossing points of science and religion, providing much food for thought and reflection. If in the end, you cannot accede to philosophy’s proofs, or theism’s invitation to faith, perhaps you will nevertheless say ‘yes’ to the amazing universe in which we live. (shrink)

MacIntyre è il grande avversario lottatore contro modernità e post-modernità. Egli scopre, ed argomenta, che all'origine della affermazione "moderna" c'è una grande truffa fondata sulla presunzione di liberarsi dalla soggezione alla storia, intesa sia come Tradizione sia come metodo con una sua epistemologia per comprendere l'uomo e il suo operare. L'epilogo di tale pretesa è sotto gli occhi: un razionalismo autoreferenziale che non ha più contatto con la realtà e che proprio per questo si riduce a delirio di onnipotenza o (...) di potenza decaduta per resistenza indebita di storia e tradizioni "portatrici solo di oscurantismo!". La realtà porta, invece, a scoprire l'identità dell'uomo come «io» contestualizzato, che nasce da una storia, una storia di amore, e si realizza in un contesto di condizioni e condizionamenti, con cui bisogna sempre fare i conti se si desidera essere lealmente attenti a cogliere le notizie che da essa provengono per comprendere chi è questo essere speciale e particolare. Anche altri filosofi hanno risposto alla "pretesa modernista", però spesso o con un atteggiamento di «falso irenismo», teorizzando un dialogo con cui, prendendo a prestito il metodo illuministico, si è cercato di asserirne "dialetticamente" la falsità, cercando di trattenerne, invece, "le cose buone"; oppure ponendosi come pensatori alternativi al pensiero "comunista" distruttore della «comunità» e della «persona». Secondo MacIntyre, l'errore di questi è nel non aver inteso che la falsità "moderna" è proprio nel suo metodo che ha posto come a-priori non negoziabile, in ogni riflessione e ricerca, il rifiuto della storia, della concretezza, del particolare, della tradizione, propugnando che solo la "spersonalizzazione", la "universalizzazione", insomma: solo il regno della "ragion pura" e auto-purificatasi ha ragione e dignità di essere l'a-priori per eccellenza nella ricerca filosofica. Il «personalismo», nella versione europea, non raramente è incorso in questa confusione. (shrink)

This paper is aimed to understand the state of the art and the resulting consequences of the legal framework in Europe, with regard to the protection of children's data. Especially when they interact with networked and robotic toys, like in 'My friend Cayla' case. In order to evaluate the practical implications of the use of IoT devices by children or teenager users, the first part of the paper presents an analysis of the international guiding principles of the protection of minors, (...) a category which enjoys a higher level of protection of their fundamental rights, due to their condition of lack of physical and psychological maturity. Secondly, the focus is moved upon the protection of personal data of children. Only after confronting previous data protection legal instruments and having compared them with the novelties set forth in General Data Protection Regulation, it is reasonable to assume that new provisions such as "privacy by design" principle, adequacy of security measures and codes of conduct, can support data controllers in ensuring compliance in the field of IoT toys. In conclusion, the paper supports a view of Data Protection Authorities as a relevant player in enhancing these renovated tools in order to achieve the protection of children's rights, as to ensure their substantial protection against the threats of the interconnected world. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.

An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is (...) that it is the object of some kind of higher-order mental state directed at M. The primary focus of this entry is on HOR and especially higher-order thought (HOT) theory. The key question that should be answered by any theory of consciousness is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? Section 1 introduces the overall representationalist approach to consciousness and briefly discuss Tye’s FOR. Section 2 presents three major versions of HOR: higher-order thought theory, dispositional higher-order thought theory, and higher-order perception theory. In section 3, a number of common and important objections and replies are presented. Section 4 briefly outlines a close connection between HOT theory and conceptualism, that is, the claim that the representational content of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the conceptual capacities the perceiver brings to bear in her experience. Section 5 examines several hybrid higher-order and “self-representational” theories of consciousness which all hold that conscious states are self-directed in some way. Section 6 addresses the potentially damaging claim that HOT theory requires neural activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in order for one to have conscious states. (shrink)