In Dangerous Minds, Ronald Beiner traces the deeper philosophical roots of such far-right ideologues as Richard Spencer, Aleksandr Dugin, and Steve Bannon, to the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger—and specifically to the aspects of their thought that express revulsion for the liberal-democratic view of life.

This article discusses the identity formation process former right wing extremists go through, during and especially after being involved in an exit program for those leaving right wing extremist environments. Based on an ethnographic investigation (and practice theoretical approach), the article argues that participation in culturally defined worlds – such as the extremist right – develops sensitivities and sensibilities that endure. This enables them to engage in social actions, gain a position and develop a (...) correlated identity, but it is also the reason why it can be very demanding for the individual to leave an extremist environment. Perceived from the position of former right wing extremists, the article considers the challenges involved in (re)integrating into society by those stigmatized by a criminal and extremist past. It explores how individuals leaving a right wing extremist group handle themselves in a new world when their embodied knowledge and habitual responding are no longer appropriate, and investigates the many aspects individuals struggle with years after their engagement, when they do not know who to become and how to act. (shrink)

In Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History: Alt/Histories, historians, sociologists, neuroscientists, lawyers, cultural critics, and literary and media scholars come together to offer an interconnected and comparative collection for understanding how contemporary far-right, neo-fascist, Alt-Right, Identitarian, and New Right movements have proposed revisions and counter-narratives to accepted understandings of history, fact and narrative. The innovative essays found here bring forward urgent questions to diverse public, academic, and politically-minded audiences interested in how historical understandings of race, (...) gender, class, nationalism, religion, law, technology and the sciences have been distorted by these far-right movements. If scholars of the last twenty years, like Francis Fukuyama, believed that neoliberalism marked an "end of history," this volume shows how the far right is effectively threatening democracy and its institutions through the dissemination of alt-facts and histories. (shrink)

It is a fact that in the European Union there is a strengthening of right-wing extremism, radical right movement, populism and nationalism. The consequences of the economic crisis, such as a decline in living standards, losing of jobs, rising unemployment especially among young people, undoubtedly goes in favor of strengthening the right-wing extremism. In the research, forms of manifestation will be covered of this dangerous phenomenon and response of the institutions. Western Balkan countries, as a (...) result of right-wing extremism, are especially sensitive region on possible consequences that might occur, since there are several unresolved political problems, which can very easily turn into a new cycle of conflicts, if European integration processes get delayed indefinitely. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the ideological differences between extreme rightwing parties and their voters in the Flemish and Walloon part of Belgium. Extreme right-wing ideology consists of five core elements: racism, extreme ethnic nationalism, the leadership principle, anti-parliamentarianism and an anti-leftist attitude. All these attitudes refer to the basic value of rightwing extremism: the belief in the inequality of individuals and groups. An analysis of the ideology of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders shows that it adheres to (...) these core elements of extreme right-wing ideology. An analysis of the attitudes and motives of the voters of this party, however, shows that they cannot be considered as right-wing extremists. The ideological gap between the Vlaams Blok and its electorate is due to the strategy of this party, since it cultivates 'two faces': a populist, moderate face in order to attract votes, and a radical extreme rightwingface in order to recruit and motivate militants. In Wallonia, less is known about the ideology of right-wing parties and that of their voters. Current research however, suggests that the conclusions from Flemish research may very well be generalized to Wallonia as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.1 (2002) 151-171 [Access article in PDF] Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism Clifford F. Porter Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) is not as well known among historians as he is among political theorists, yet he has had a continuing influence on both German Social Democrat and Christian Democrat political leaders. His early life is very much a reflection of both the intellectual developments and (...) the chaos of Germany and Austria between the wars. Voegelin's analysis of Nazism is worth revisiting by historians because it delineated the Nazi rationale for the Holocaust in the early 1930s, even if the Nazis themselves had yet to move towards mass murder early in the regime. Voegelin was not prescient enough to predict the extent of the Holocaust, but he understood that the ideological rationale of Nazi violence was unlimited. Furthermore, his description of political extremism as Gnosticism in 1952 is valid for explaining why an individual might support the Nazis and then voluntarily commit extraordinarily vicious acts to try to realize the dream-world of the Third Reich.The political, economic, and social chaos in Austria after World War I was the catalyst for the young Eric Voegelin's studies of the essence of ideologies and the ideologists who promoted them from both the left and right wing. As National Socialism grew, so did his experiences with and understanding of extremist political ideologies. Contemporary intellectual debates between neo-Kantian and existentialist methodology, however, did not help penetrate to the essential causes of political extremism. His experiences in America in the mid-1920s were essential for his development away from what he characterized as narrow methodological provincialism to an empiricism open to philosophic questions, including spiritual questions. By 1938 he had theorized that ideologies were political secular religions that substituted the state for divine reality.Because of this interpretation, Voegelin's approach to totalitarianism has been characterized as an outdated ersatz religion model, better suited for the Cold War. 1 The ersatz religion model worked reasonably well to describe similarities [End Page 151] the National Socialist movement had with religions, but Voegelin recognized that it did not penetrate to the essence of ideologies. His understanding of ideologies matured after World War II into his theory that ideologies were Gnostic quests for absolute certainty that caused alienation from reality.Voegelin thought that the search for certainty ultimately required excluding any evidence to the contrary of the ideology; therefore, ideologies limited the individual's view of human reality to the immediate world. Furthermore, although ideologies are founded on a kernel of truth—e.g., proletarians are sometimes oppressed—ideologists become quickly alienated from reality as a consequence of their own quest for certainty about meaning in existence. The consequences of alienation are that ideologists pursue the perceived immanent good and try to eliminate the perceived immanent evil, thereby rationalizing criminality and even murder. Violence is inherent to extremist political ideologies. Background and Influences: Weber, Kraus, University, and America Eric Voegelin was born in 1901 and grew up in Vienna. After the war Austria was convulsed by political and social crises ranging from attempted reactionary and Communist coups to constant food shortages. In the first post-war election Voegelin's political and social inclinations led him to vote for the Social Democratic Party (SDP), but he was aggravated by the uncompromising Marxist rhetoric of the SDP leadership. In this atmosphere Voegelin began his long journey toward understanding ideologies, but first he had to work through many different political and philosophic problems before he arrived at an adequate understanding. The intellectuals that influenced him during this long process were diverse, but they shared a hostility to ideologies.The first important academic influence on Voegelin was Max Weber. 2 Weber encouraged intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit (intellectual honesty) with others and especially with oneself. Weber insisted on following an ethic of responsibility for one's actions (Verantwortungsethik), rather than making apologies for following an ethic of good intentions (Gesinnungsethik). The latter, Weber feared, was often used to justify bad consequences of well-intended actions. 3 These simple... (shrink)

Recent culture wars, as fueled by right-wing extremists and warmongers over an identitarian and biologistic understanding of culture, require philosophy of culture to contradict and articulate its self-understanding. The article is structured along four theses that contest widespread assumptions, unfold their problematics and outline perspectives of cultural philosophy: 1. culture is not a being 2. critique is not enmity 3. technology is not a doom 4. history is not destiny.

In From History to Theory, Kerwin Lee Klein writes a history of the central terms of the discipline of theory of history, such as “historiography,” “philosophy of history,” “theory of history,” and “memory.” Klein tells us when and how these terms were used, how the usage of some declined during the twentieth century, and how other terms became increasingly popular. More important, Klein also shows that the use of these words is not innocent. Using words such as “theory” or “historiography” (...) implies certain specific ideas about what the writing of history should be like, and how theoretical reflection on the nature of history and its writing relates to the practical issues of the discipline.In the second half of his book, Klein focuses more on the concept of memory and the memory boom since the later part of the 1980s. He observes that “memory” came to be seen as a kind of “counterhistory,” a postcolonial, fragmented, and personal alternative to the traditional mainstream discourse of history. Klein does not necessarily disagree with this view, but he does warn us about unwanted side effects. More specifically, he argues that the discourse of memory is surprisingly compatible with that of extremist right-wing groups, and should be treated with suspicion. Although Klein certainly has a point, he presents it in a rather dogmatic fashion. However, a more nuanced version of Klein's criticism of memory can be developed by building on Klein's suggestion that there is an intimate connection between memory and identity. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn February 2019, the film Black Panther was awarded three Oscars in Los Angeles. Some reviewers embraced it for its anti-racist message against the resurgence of racism under U.S. president Donald Trump.1 It tells the story of a black hero who tries to steer the development of an ethnically pure, isolationist hereditary monarchy in Africa. The imaginary state of Wakanda, which presents itself to the rest of the world as a third-world country, has highly developed technologies at its disposal–at (...) the same time, one recalls archaic African myths there.2. (shrink)

This volume offers an up-to-date overview of the much-debated issue of how a democracy may defend itself against those who want to subvert it. The justifications, effectiveness and legal implications of militant democracy are discussed by addressing questions as: How can militant democracy measures such as party bans be justified? Why is it that some democracies ban antidemocratic parties? Does militant democracy succeed in combatting right-wing extremism? And is militant democracy evolving into an internationalized legal and political concept? (...) Bringing together experts and perspectives from political science, law and philosophy, this volume advances our understanding of the current threats to democracy, a political system once thought almost invincible. It is especially timely in the light of the rise of illiberal democracy in the EU, the increasingly authoritarian rule in Turkey, the steady shift to autocracy in Russia and the remarkable election of Trump in the US. (shrink)

Migration is a recurrent phenomenon of human history because it is a successful adaptive strategy of human beings. Although migration today is not of a greater magnitude than in the past, it attracts a great deal of media and academia attention. The present wave of non-Western immigrants into the United States and Europe caused, apart from myriad economic, social and political problems, an ideological dispute between globalism and right-wing populism. Both ideological approaches attract many zealots who spread extreme (...) opinions and poison the whole political life. Using the scholastic method, I examined some opposing points of view of globalists and right-wing populists on several topics regarding non-Western immigration: border control, illegal immigration, limitations of legal immigration, refugee relocation quotas and cultural integration of immigrants. The globalists’ and right-wing populists’ theses and arguments were checked in regard with established authorities, available factual data and human reason. Highlighting some important topics relating to immigration problem and weighing the main arguments used by globalists and right-wing populists, I also indicate several points of compromise that could help people to moderate their political opinions. (shrink)

This article explores current right-wing populism as an ethical position from the perspective of many, though not all, White American evangelicals. The relevant ethics concern not only abortion or gay marriage (which, research finds, are not top vote-motivators) but views of society (who’s in, who’s not) and government (size and role). Building on ideational approaches to studying populism and incorporating historical and religio-cultural material, this article asks: What in White evangelical religious and political history and in present circumstances (...) makes right-wing populism look to be the most ethical stance? In answer, the article explores populism as proposed solutions to the complex intersectionality of economic, way-of-life, and status-loss duress. It investigates how evangelicals, drawing in mediated ways from their religio-political history and beliefs, understand right-populist views of society and government as an ethical solution to these duresses. (shrink)

This essay introduces four articles that form a special issue of Politics & Society titled “Right-Wing Activism in Asia: Cold War Legacies, Geopolitics, and Democratic Erosion.” The articles focus on Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. These three Asian countries present important cases to generate critical comparative insights about the patterns of Far Right mobilization, for their geopolitical histories provide common ground while institutional variations set distinctive conditions. Most importantly, all of them were shaped by the particularly sharp (...) conflicts of the Cold War in the region, and the articles in this issue demonstrate how this legacy has generated illiberal conditions in these countries today. (shrink)

This article is a cross-disciplinary investigation into the role of political violence, in the present era, from a progressive’s viewpoint. Starting from the view that explanations of the rapidly changing politics in the West must take account of an often unconscious, emotional landscape, it invokes Lacanian concepts and artistic representations, including references to Anthony Burgess’s classic novel of dystopian ultra-violence, A Clockwork Orange. Here, I review a long history of the enjoyment of violent performance in politics, from the arenas of (...) Ancient Rome to extremist right-wing websites. Along the way, we hear from neo-Nazis, political activists, stand-up comedians, satirists and philosophers. My aim to prevent an increasingly polarised society descending further into authoritarianism and eventually outright warfare, provokes a surprising final reversal: resistance, sometimes violent (both to self and others) must be protected, in order to lead progressives to those “excluded” from our demos and towards what Connolly (2017) refers to as “multifaceted democracy”. (shrink)

Nae Ionescu is one of the most influential and controversial Romanian thinkers. The present article explores a less used perspective in studying Nae Ionescu’s philosophical, political and journalistic activity: the philosophical roots of his major political ideas. The anti-democratic position of Nae Ionescu was, theoretically explained, by the criticism to Rene Descartes and J.J. Rousseau’s ideas. The individual is supposed to be an instrument of history and nation. Any individualizing tendency is allegedly a betrayal to the nation. Moreover, the leader (...) has mystical prerogatives therefore the universal suffrage is not consistent. On its turn, the nation is not defined on the basis of the social contract. Nation is “a community of love and life”, in Nae Ionescu’s opinion. Nae Ionescu’s beliefs largely influenced the right-wing Romanian ideology during the years between First and Second World Wars. (shrink)

In this article, we trace the histories of discourses supporting ‘jobs for natives’ in the UK and Austria using the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse studies. DHA uses four ‘levels of context’ as heuristic devices in critical analysis. In this article, we focus our attention predominantly on the broadest of these, largely eschewing the text internal analysis typical of CDA, in favour of a wider contextual sweep. In this way, we deconstruct and trace the conceptual history of British and Austrian (...) slogans of the extreme right related to issues of un/employment. We argue that slogans such as ‘British Jobs for British workers’ and ‘Austria First’ have been recontextualised into current political rhetoric while carrying historical context-dependent connotations, stemming from pre-World War II colonialism and antisemitism. Hence, we further claim that – although such rhetoric is currently widespread across EU member states – the ideologies and traditions drawn upon are distinct and create specific subtexts to be exploited for political ends; this is part of the discursive strategy of ‘calculated ambivalence’ employed in such rhetoric. (shrink)

This paper employs Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuaity: Confessions of the Flesh to shed light on the perplexing phenomenon of vaccine (mandate) resistance. It argues that vaccine (mandate) resistance, while seemingly irresponsible and selfish, is entangled with the same modes of ‘truth-telling’ that have been part of the basic structure of modern Western governance for centuries. The paper begins by introducing the problem of vaccinate (mandate) resistance as a pedagogical problem for educators who want to teach social responsibility as informed (...) by sound scientific knowledge and research. It then outlines the triad of knowledge/science, power/governance, and subjectivity/being at the heart of Foucault’s research as a necessary frame for understanding the sociopolitical and historical entanglements of science in modern Western governance. Lastly, the paper traces Foucault’s study of early Christian writers such as St. Augustine in terms of how they help establish basic practices of truth-telling that still impact how subjects relate to power today. The ultimate goal of the paper is to show how exploration of the social, historical, and political realities of science related issues are vital for understanding issues of collective existence today. (shrink)

With right-wing-extremist and -populist parties and movements on the rise throughout the world, the concept of authoritarianism has proven to be particularly valuable to explain the psychological underpinnings of these tendencies. Even though many scales to measure the different dimensions of authoritarianism exist, no short screening instrument has been tested and validated on a large scale so far. The present study examines the psychometric properties of the screening instrument Authoritarianism – Ultrashort in three representative German samples. Using exploratory (...) and confirmatory factor analysis, the A-US demonstrated acceptable internal consistency. Model fit was good and correlations with related constructs indicated convergent validity in both samples. Construct validity was demonstrated using the original version of the scale. The instrument proved to be invariant across sex, employment status, and education, but not across different age groups. Finally, the analyses showed that differences in the A-US are associated with sociodemographic variables. Potential causes and effects of these findings are discussed. Based on these results, the A-US proved to be a valuable and highly efficient tool to screen for authoritarian tendencies. (shrink)

Far-Right Ecologism explains how the ongoing mainstreaming of the far right has prompted greater engagement with a range of topics, including the environment. Behind the façade of vote-winning strategies, the far right has provided a substantive ideological engagement with the natural environment. Building on the nationalist bent of early green thought and the perceived nexus of pristine nature and cultural purity, Far-Right Ecologism has ideologically adopted the green elements of other ideologies, such as conservatism and fascism, (...) but also of those considered to be 'thin-centred', such as nationalism and populism. Through an authentic experience of learning from the Eastern European, post-socialist realms, this book explores the ideology, ecological discourse, and policy proposals behind the increasing impact of far-right actors on environmental politics in Hungary and Poland. Each chapter begins with stories from the interviewees to illustrate how the far right in Hungary and Poland attempts to permeate environmental politics and even forge partnerships with green actors through specific, local-based policy contributions. Drawing on the findings from a range of sources, such as electoral programs, ideological texts and manifestos, social media and public speeches, policy proposals, and more than forty in-depth interviews with far-right representatives, this book also assesses epistemological and methodological challenges in examining the environmental dimension of far-right, post-socialist politics. The book will be valuable reading for researchers with an interest in the far right, environmental politics and Central Eastern Europe. (shrink)

Extremists often aim to paint a biased picture of the world. Radical narratives, for instance, in forms of internet memes or posts, could thus potentially trigger cognitive biases in their users. These cognitive biases, in turn, might shape the users’ formation of extremist attitudes. To test this association, an online experiment (N=392) was conducted with three types of right-wing radical narratives (elite-critique, ingroup-outgroup, violence) in contrast to two control conditions (nonpolitical and neutral political control condition). We then (...) measured the impact of these narratives on the activation of three cognitive biases of relevance in the formation of extremist attitudes: the ingroup-outgroup bias, the negativity bias, and the just-world hypothesis. The results indicate that violence narratives seem to be particularly harmful as they heighten participants’ negativity bias and increase just-world views. Just-world views in turn show a positive relationship to extremist attitudes, which highlights the need of regulating violence invocations on social media. (shrink)

The present study aims to identify contextual and psychological factors of proneness to radicalization and violent extremism operationalized through the Militant Extremist Mindset scale consisting of three distinct aspects: Proviolence, Vile World beliefs, and trust in Divine Power. A community sample of 271 high school students from Belgrade and Sandžak regions in Serbia completed: a 24-item MEM scale; contextual measures including a 6-item scale of family dysfunction and a 4-item composite measure capturing exposure to a harsh school environment and peer (...) abuse ; psychological measures including the 9-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the 5-item Social Dominance Orientation scale, and the 20-item UCLA Loneliness scale. A path analysis was conducted with contextual factors on the first and psychological factors on the second level of the model predicting the three factors of MEM. LON was positively predicted by FDys and HSE, SDO by HSE only, while RWA was positively predicted by FDys only. Contextual and psychological factors accounted for 27% of the variance in PV, 15% of the variance in VW, and 31% of the variance in DP. Obtained findings reveal a complex interplay of contextual and psychological drivers in the prediction of different aspects of RVE and build upon existing knowledge on risk factors associated with RVE. (shrink)

Georg Lukács (1885-1971) was one of the most original Marxist philosophers and literary critics of the twentieth century. His work was a major influence on what we now know as critical theory. Almost fifty years after his death, Lukács's legacy has come under attack by right-wing extremists in his native Hungary. Despite efforts to erase his memory, Lukács remains a philosophical gadfly. In Confronting Reification, an international team of fourteen scholars explicate, reassess, and apply one of Lukács's (...) most significant philosophical contributions, his theory of reification. Based on papers presented at the 2017 Legacy of Georg Lukács conference held in Budapest, the essays in this volume demonstrate the vitality of Lukács's thought and its relevance. Contributors include: Rüdiger Dannemann, Frank Engster, Andrew Feenberg, Joseph Grim Feinberg, Andraž Jež, Christian Lotz, Csaba Olay, Tom Rockmore, Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker, Mariana Teixeira, Michael J. Thompson, Tivadar Vervoort, Richard Westerman, and Sean Winkler. (shrink)

For twenty-five years, Troy Southgate has been a leading figure in radical politics, and he is currently one of the leading exponents of the English New Right. This anthology is a selection of his best essays, interviews, stories and poems. Through an analysis of both historical and contemporary events, he calls for an abandonment of the traditional Left/Right dichotomy and the creation of autonomous communities outside the prevailing order which can uphold and preserve traditional values. Also offered are (...) Troy's practical suggestions for how this might be put into practice, as well as his in-depth analysis of Julius Evola's Men Among the Ruins, which originally appeared in the Russian Pravda Online. This book has much to offer everyone of a revolutionary disposition. 'Troy's ideals are for power to return to local communities and their chosen leaders, firmly rooted in time-tested principles of honour, labour and responsibility. From this vantage point, it is clear that it is the forces of international capitalism which are the true heirs of the totalitarian movements, and not those such as Troy who are merely seeking a secure island upon which to ride out the coming deluge when it all falls apart... Therefore, one who wants to become active in the arena of radical politics owes it to himself to become familiar with Troy's writings. In doing so, he will avoid many of the problems and pitfalls that plague all would-be radical movements.' --John Morgan, from the Introduction. (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist (...) candidates and their voters or supporters. Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)

Democracy faces threats from an emerging right-wing movement in democratic governments around the world. This may be even more prevalent in the United States because there is an evil that uses rhetorical tropes to undermine the anchor institutions of democracy: press, courts, universities, and Congress. This evil has a personification--former President Donald Trump. All the rhetorical critiques of Trump, that he is a demagogue, an authoritarian, a serial liar, a populist on steroids, fail to take into account the (...) evil that is fomented by his angry and vengeful rhetoric. Pictures of evil in Scripture, philosophy, and rhetoric bear a striking resemblance to Trump. It is not enough to say that he is dangerous to democracy. Kennedy claims that he is the evil seed in democracy that is even now sprouting new versions of the Trump rhetoric as each acolyte attempts to outrage the next. Good and Evil in the Garden of Democracy screams at the evil, fights against the evil, and then attempts to sing the songs of goodness and democracy from poets, prophets, and rhapsodes. For the health of democracy these words have been written. (shrink)

Polarization and the Insurrection: The relation between identity and ideology in violent right-wing extremism The Capitol Hill Insurrection on January 6, 2021, in Washington has been, to many, a shocking and inconceivable event. On the face of it, far right ideologies, both in their extreme and radical varieties seem to play a crucial role here. Evidence from interviews with insurrectionists, however, suggests otherwise. Research on polarization in the United States and on radicalization into violent extremism also emphasizes (...) identity over ideology as key explanatory factor. We examine this relation and argue that the importance of identity and that of ideology in the insurrection have to be understood in relation to one another. The battle between Democrats and Republicans is about identity, but it is not a blind battle. Ideological issues are at stake. It is precisely the intertwinement of identity and extreme ideology, which drives radical partisanship in American democracy. (shrink)

European civilization largely lost its sense of direction after World War One when its humanist consensus, that promoted human betterment, collapsed into a fruitless political opposition between left and right wing extremism. This collapse is here exemplified by the breakdown in relationship between left winger Bertrand Russell and right winger D.H. Lawrence during WW1. However, the real causes of the loss of the humanist consensus are more deep-rooted, as that consensus has its roots in the Renaissance andn (...) Enlightenment movements when the influence of humanist views was at its height. By the late 19th century imperialism and militarism threatened the consensus, and the senseless slaughter of WW1 brought it to an end. The humanist consensus re-emerged post-WW2, largely through American influence, but it has declined since. To restore the consensus, it is argued here that humanism can be strengthened by dualist theory and by a process of contextualization that brings humanity to the fore. By using ‘connecting contexts’ we can open our minds to larger perspectives. In that way, we are collectively more inclined to be optimistic about our prospects. The future of humanity seems to depend on such developments in our critical thinking about ourselves. (shrink)

This paper argues that the nature of terrorism has remained unchanged despite perceived shifts. Over four decades of data collected in America show that right-wing violence has consistently posed the most pernicious threat. Despite media claims of objectivity and neutrality, we contend that law enforcement and the media targeted the Muslim community while being aware that the real threat emanates from the activities of right-wing groups. Employing Islamophobia as our conceptual framework and critical theory as our (...) philosophical lens, we illuminate the mechanisms of exclusion by highlighting the Eurocentric historical roots of Islamophobia, with particular attention to the United States. Moreover, we expose those who benefit from raising the specter of a 'clash of civilization.' This study examines the disparities between the existing threat of Muslim-based violence and the terror threat of right-wing groups. (shrink)

The surprising case for liberal nationalism Around the world today, nationalism is back—and it’s often deeply troubling. Populist politicians exploit nationalism for authoritarian, chauvinistic, racist, and xenophobic purposes, reinforcing the view that it is fundamentally reactionary and antidemocratic. But Yael Tamir makes a passionate argument for a very different kind of nationalism—one that revives its participatory, creative, and egalitarian virtues, answers many of the problems caused by neoliberalism and hyperglobalism, and is essential to democracy at its best. In Why Nationalism, (...) she explains why it is more important than ever for the Left to recognize these positive qualities of nationalism, to reclaim it from right-wing extremists, and to redirect its power to progressive ends. Provocative and hopeful, Why Nationalism is a timely and essential rethinking of a defining feature of our politics. (shrink)

This paper discusses the surprising resurgence in the fortunes of the British eugenics movement in the 1930s. It is argued that although mass unemployment may in the long run have discredited that version of eugenics in which social dependence and destitution were attributed to genetic defect, in the short run the Depression was often perceived as a vindication of the eugenical creed. In particular, the attempt to reduce the fertility of the unemployed by popularising birth control techniques, and the voluntary (...) sterilization campaign aimed at preventing the propagation of defectives from the so-called Social Problem Group, satisfied the urge felt by many conservative members from the professional classes to respond creatively to the country's crisis, without endangering existing social and economic institutions. It is also shown that not until 1938 did events in Germany cause substantial damage to the cause of eugenics in Britain. In fact, the ‘German experiment’ was actually greeted with approval by certain British eugenists of an authoritarian cast of mind. However, the Society as a whole never identified with these right-wing extremists, thanks in part to the moderating influence exercised by its General Secretary, Dr. C. P. Blacker, whose prime concern was with psycho-medical problems likely to concern people of all party persuasions. (shrink)

Stuart Sim explores how Lyotard's brand of pragmatism can provide a focus for political theory and action in our cultural climate, especially in light of the dramatic resurgence of right-wing extremism.

Recent discussions have connected Nietzsche’s philosophy of masculinity to the return of authoritarian politics. Neoconservative debates about masculinity, and right-wing extremism, explicitly refer back to Nietzsche’s philosophy and often present democratization, a feminization of society, and political correctness as responsible for a weakening of masculinity. One example for this reception of Nietzsche’s writings is Jordan Peterson’s psychological diagnosis of a presumed crisis of masculinity. This article undertakes a comparison of Nietzsche’s philosophy of masculinities with Peterson’s neo-Jungian psychology of (...) masculinity in the context of recent conceptualizations of patriarchy, misogyny, and gendered forms of ressentiment. This comparison will highlight that Nietzsche’s conception of masculinity is more complex, and has philosophically more to offer, than neoconservative ideas about masculinity that onesidedly foreground male strength. Finally it will be pointed out how a Jungian analysis discloses aspects of the Dionysian that are of relevance to contemporary gender studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy. (shrink)

On the basis of the research literature, five aspects of the extreme right-wing ideology were distinguished : racism, extreme ethnic nationalism, the preference for a strong leadership, anti-parliamentarianism, and an anti-left attitude. The data of a postal survey in the spring of 1991 of a representative sample of the Flemish population in Belgium show that the items with which these extreme right-wing topics were operationalized show a one dimensional structure. About 10% to 25% of the interviewees (...) agree with the individual items and about 20% of the subjects scored on the extreme right-wing side of the scale. The 'hardcore' of extreme right-wing respondents is, however, much smaller, and does not seem to be higher in Flanders than in most of the surrounding countries. The right-wing extremism scale developed correlates as expected with a previously developed typology that integrates the attitude with respect to autochthons and allochthons. The analysis confirms that the voters for the Vlaams Blok - taken as a whole - may not be considered right-wing extremists, as suggested by previous research. Right-wing extremism correlates with a large number of attitudes and seems to be embedded in the broader opinion dimension of socio-cultural conservatism. This may also explain why it is associated primarily with the age, educational level, and religiosity of the respondents. (shrink)

The social function of violence was described from the early beginnings of social research - not only in studies of in prejudice. But with the study Autorität und Familie, which was published in 1936, and The Authoritarian Personality, which was published in 1950, the strong connection between violence and subjectivation was figured out as a critique of the society. In this article the thesis of a „secondary authoritarian“ dynamic is developed. Firstly, the empirical findings of the „Mitte“-Studies, a longitudinal research (...) project measuring right wing extremist attitudes in Germany, will be presented to underpin in second step the function of a strong economy: as an authority economy is using force to integrate each individual into modern society. In this understanding right-wing extremist attitudes give a deeper insight into a society as well as into an individual’s prejudices. The society itself is highlighted with psychoanalytical social psychology: it is not research in individual behaviour but in the dynamic of a market society. With the concept of the ‚Secondary Authoritarianism‘, the contemporary social dynamic could be understood as failed process of secularisation. (shrink)

White liberals like to claim that they live in a post-racial society. Furthermore, they believe that most people do not sympathize with the far-right. However, it is not racism fueling right-wing extremism in North America and Western Europe but the dominant ideology, liberalism. Consequently, Slavoj Žižek argues that racism is a problem concerning “objective violence,” which he further breaks down into “symbolic violence” and “systemic violence.” These primarily target minority groups. Thus, “objective violence” best explains the West’s (...) problematic views of Muslims and Islam since it supports what Edward Said refers to as “Orientalism” and reproduces racist depictions of racialized communities. These are incredibly harmful since the West still perceives the Orient and its residents as violent, strange, and backward. These Orientalist attitudes ultimately lead to discrimination against Muslims and Arabs. Furthermore, this ideology naturalizes and legitimizes capitalist social relations while concealing racialization processes. (shrink)

This book uncovers the roots of authentic leadership through a detailed analysis of how philosophy and psychology are relevant for understanding leadership. It reinscribes virtue and integrity into leadership studies by way of key concepts which include; identity-formation, the narrative self, the importance of decision-making, and the philosophy of creativity. In an era when leadership integrity has come under serious attack from authoritarian leadership, and left and right- wing extremism, the ‘Philosophy of Authentic Leadership’ opposes all such forms (...) by arguing for the pursuit of the common good, democratic rights, civic freedoms, and cosmopolitanism. This is a work of interest to students of leadership and political scientists alike. (shrink)

While ethicists reflect on specific political and biomedical problems such as euthanasia, the international political context is becoming grim. A number of the articles in this issue, such as the one by Vasti Roodt, make implicit reference to this. It is quite naïve to think that ethicists can exert any influence on the prevailing interpretations of political conflicts, but at the same time it would be inappropriate to take that fact as a reason for no longer being concerned. No one (...) should be indifferent to the international context.There can be no doubt that modern industrial societies provide exceptional opportunities. Modernization creates an ideal environment for economic development whereby painful shortcomings can be eliminated and various public services, such as safe water, education and health care, can be financed. Ideally, modernization leads to greater freedom of expression, more democracy and more institutional transparency.Unfortunately, however, this link is not always in evidence, for a fundamental precondition must be fulfilled: the members of a society must be concerned about the general welfare of their state and that of the international community. A state in which the dominant mentality is “everyone for himself” will not evolve into a society where all citizens feel accepted and integrated. Both in rich western countries and in the wider international community, fault lines have emerged between groups that support liberal modernization and groups that are frustrated by it and wonder whether a strong leader, a simplified religious fundamentalism or a collectively imposed morality might offer better prospects. How has this come about?Dissatisfaction with modernization is often put down to material lack: on this view, people in difficult economic circumstances are more likely to endorse extreme political parties or protest movements. This interpretation rests on the assumption that when basic human needs cannot be met, people become frustrated; conversely, material well-being will give rise to optimism and solidarity. There are many obvious analogies to represent this: dangerous animals are docile and approachable after having eaten, and young children cease crying when they are cared for and nourished. Although these and similar analogies lend support to the assumption, they only apply to beings for whom social integration is not relevant. They do not correspond to the observed facts: the frustrations I spoke of above occur among people who lack nothing in a material sense. As an independent factor, a person’s socio-economic position has no influence on extreme voting behaviour. Let us see whether a different paradigm might be of more help.One could make the assumption that everyone lives with the idea that they lead a more or less enviable life, or at least that they are moving steadily towards such a life. This seems fundamental since everyone appears to share this idea, except for two sorts of people: in the first place, those suffering from depression. The problem they have is precisely that they do not feel their life is an enviable one; they consider themselves to be unattractive or arrogant failures, not at all amiable. I usually add that the second sort of people are philosophers, since they sometimes think that their life is a flash in eternity or an absurd mutation in an amorphous physical process. But this is misleading since even the most pessimistic philosophers would find it enviable that they are allowed to think, speak and write such things.This view differs from the model of needs satisfaction on one essential point: it requires a public if frustration is to be avoided. The current paradigm of homo economicus claims that only isolated consumers and products exist. This overlooks the fact that consumption is communication. Except in cases of extremely rudimentary urges or discomforts, it is not the fulfilment of a preference that brings us satisfaction; it is the feeling of appreciation that we experience with a purchase or a successful achievement. Appreciation is what stabilizes our desire: it gives us the feeling that we have what is essential, it liberates us from the compulsive idea that we must always aim for what is higher, more important, more intense or more outrageous. When appreciation is lacking, then people begin to suffer from what Durkheim called le mal de l'infini, the feeling that we need to have and to do more and more, the feeling that we must always climb higher.Modernization is often accompanied by the disappearance of traditional patterns of expectation. Individuals acquire more freedom to carry out their plans. But this does not alter the fact that they still depend on the people that surround them for their feelings of self-esteem. In today's meritocracy, it is primarily people who have been well educated and who have a bright future who appear to lead an enviable life. Many traditional positions and functions have lost their status and become less attractive. For this reason, modernization is experienced by many groups as humiliating and destructive. Those who are unable to succeed according to the official standards of appreciation often feel deceived and tend to move in the direction of enclaves, opting for a sort of subculture with clearly defined boundaries between 'us' and 'them', an idealization of the in group and demonization of the out group. The result of this is all too familiar.It seems obvious to use religious signifiers to draw the enclavistic boundaries between us and those in Islamic countries, which is not to say that the boundary is drawn for religious reasons. Religious psychologists came to the discovery that religion is only accompanied by intolerance when its intrinsic message remains subordinated to the external reasons for adopting a religious attitude, and when people interpret the religious message literally instead of symbolically. This agrees with the observation that, within Islam, there exists an opposition between the fundamental dimension of Islam — which urges us to give up complacency and leave ourselves behind — and the fundamentalistic extremism of political Islam.The consequences of political Islam's enclavistic ideology are terrible and the damage is causes can be compared with the fascist and communist totalitarian regimes in Europe and Russia. In such enclaves, any non-conformist behaviour is mercilessly punished and any critical reflection can be life-threatening. Human rights are trampled on and women are often humiliated and repressed. Strangely enough, the United States remained blind to these offences as long as it was not threatened by them.The construction of peace in a globalized world is impossible as long as the international political agenda remains dominated by the public opinion of groups moving in the direction of an enclave mentality. A politics driven by collective hate, such as the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, only leads to ever more misery. It is irresponsible for a head of state in a crisis situation to be led by the irrational whims of local public opinion, ignoring international commitments.Military action to curb terrorist violence is one option that might prevent even more damaging forms of extremism from developing. But much more is needed to ensure stability, peace and international security. More should be done to offset the culture shock caused in many countries by the collapse of old social structures. The decline of traditional cultures is not only a problem in non-western countries: the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe and extremist groups in the United States are symptoms of the same ill. (shrink)

Both in the pre-war and the post-war period right-wing extremism was not very strong in Britain. Historians, political scientist and politicians have suggested a whole range of elements to explain this failure. In the light of this limited success the victory of the British National Party in an election of the Millwall district in the London Bourough of Tower Hamlets was indeed a surprise. lt raised the question whether this was the beginning of something similar to what happened (...) earlier in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The very specific characteristics of the London East End and ofthe Millwall district in particular make the BNP victory however quite exceptional, and do not enable a generalization of the phenomenon. This is supported by the electoral results for the London Borough and District Council of May 5 1994. Yet one can still argue that the specific danger of the BNP is not its electoral potential, but the impact of its local activities on the relations between the ethnic groups in the neighbourhoods where it is present. (shrink)

Populism is discussed here in terms of the larger global systemic matrix in which it occurs. It is suggested that it is not, as has been claimed so often, recently, somehow related to what is labelled as right-wing extremism. It is an expression of an aspiration to sovereignty, control over one’s conditions of existence and its links to either left or right are based on that aspiration. And, of course, right and left are themselves terms that (...) have shifted or even been inverted over the past 30 years. The core argument is that populism and cosmopolitanism form a complementary opposition that has emerged as a product of the hegemonic decline of the West. (shrink)

This week saw the beginning of an action for libel brought by one historian against another over a question of history. The right-wing historian David Irving says the Holocaust was not as bad as has been claimed; he is suing American historian Deborah Lipstadt for calling him "a dangerous spokesman for Holocaust denial." The case, and its explosive content, remind us that history matters.

The existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers is the father of a discourse on the spiritual consequences of the Holocaust. First addressed as the Schuldfrage (the question of guilt) by Jaspers immediately after the Second World War in his famous Heidelberg lecture, it has reappeared in various forms in German life and letters. Post-unification Germany has witnessed the valorization of the German experience of the Second World War. This ongoing re-evaluation has its antecedents in the generational literature of the 1970s and 1980s. (...) Whereas the Vaterliteratur of the 1970s (by authors such as Christoph Meckel, Uwe Timm, and Peter Henisch) was often embedded in a left-wing critique of the establishment, recent contributions to this growing genre (by Marcel Beyer, Stephan Wackwitz, Wibke Bruhns, and Ulla Hahn among others) speak to the issue of collective identity and transgenerational family trauma outside distinct left- and right-wing interpretations of National Socialism. The current writings on the life during the Third Reich (filtered through the experiences of discrete generations) are a confluence of historical writing, memorial literature, biography, and fiction. They are closely related to the discussions that W. G. Sebald initiated in his 1997 lecture series on the silence of German postwar literature with respect to German suffering. The subsequent debate on how to bring closure to this ?German suffering? was intensified by Günter Grass's widening of the concept of German victimization beyond the air war controversy in his book Crabwalk (2002). As Grass distinguishes clearly between the various post-World War II generations (and their different perspectives on historical events), the question becomes whether these recent writings will bring about a final so-called ?zero hour? in German postwar history. (shrink)

This chapter examines: (1) the Black Notebooks in the context of Heidegger's political engagement on behalf of the National Socialist regime and his ambivalence toward some but not all of its political beliefs and tactics; (2) his limited "critique" of vulgar National Socialism and its biologically based racism for the sake of his own ethnocentric vision of the historical uniqueness of the German people and Germany's central role in Europe as a contested site situated between West and East, technological modernity (...) and the Asiatic. Heidegger did not break with radical right-wing Germanist thought, as some scholars have argued. He at most placed National Socialism within his narrative of the history of being, metaphysics, and technology, and thereby relativized it without addressing either its uniqueness or its totalitarian structures and practices. Heidegger formulated his own metaphysical and ontological version of Antisemitism during the National Socialist period. This vision was deeply connected with his understanding of the "history of being" and was intensified during and immediately after the Second World War. Heidegger could perceive no difference between the Shoah and the Allied bombing, defeat, and occupation of Germany. Heidegger's post-war philosophy (of home, history and technology) is deeply shaped by, and remained complicit with, his thinking during this period. (shrink)

One of the most interesting phenomena in the history of the English language is the remarkable rise of the word right, in its many interrelated senses and uses. This article tries to trace the changes in the meaning and use of this word, as well as the rise of new conversational routines based on right, and raises questions about the cultural underpinnings of these semantic and pragmatic developments. It explores the hypothesis that the `discourse of truth' declined in (...) English over the centuries; that the use of `right' and `wrong' as parallel concepts increased; and it notes that the use of right as an adjective increased enormously in relation to the use of true. Originally, right meant `straight', as in a right line. Figuratively, perhaps, this right in the sense `straight' was also used in an evaluative sense: `good', with an additional component building on the geometrical image: `clearly good'. Spoken of somebody else's words, “right” was linked with `true'. But in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries right appears to have begun to be used more and more with reference to thinking rather than speaking. The association of right with thinking seems to have spread in parallel with a contrastive use of right and wrong — a trend apparently encouraged by the influence of the Reformation, especially within its Calvinist wing. Another interesting development is that over the last two centuries or so the discourse of `right' and `wrong' appears to have found a competitor in a discourse of `cooperation' and mutual concessions. Judging by both the frequency and range of its use, the word right flourished in this atmosphere, whereas wrong was increasingly left behind. This article traces the transition from the Shakespearean response “Right.”, described by the OED as `you are right; you speak well', to the present-day “Right.” of non-committal acknowledgement and it links the developments in semantics and discourse patterns with historical phenomena such as Puritanism, British empiricism, the Enlightenment and the growth of democracy. (shrink)