In 1791 Karl Leonhard Reinhold expressed full agreement with Kant’s verdict that appeal to common understanding is not acceptable in philosophy. Only three years later Reinhold presented a philosophical methodology in which common understanding was explicitly assigned an essential function. In my contribution, I shall first reconstruct Reinhold’s account of the relation between common understanding and philosophising reason (Section 2). According to this account, common understanding is supposed to provide a multitude of empirical facts of consciousness. Philosophising (...) reason takes these facts as the starting point of philosophical analysis and establishes their a priori, transcendental grounds. Common understanding and philosophising reason thus fulfil complementary roles: philosophy analyses, explains, and justifies the basic beliefs of common understanding; philosophical claims are, in turn, substantiated through their reference to the facts provided by common understanding. I shall also show that the account of the relation between common understanding and philosophising reason enables Reinhold to deal with some objections against his philosophical system. The appeal to common understanding thus serves the purpose of corroborating the structure and the contents of the Elementarphilosophie. In Section 3, I shall suggest that Reinhold’s introduction of common understanding was not influenced by common-sense philosophy but rather by the Wolffian conception of the relation between common cognition and philosophical cognition. Reinhold accepted the general outline of Wolff’s rationalist conception but adopted it to the framework of critical philosophy. In my concluding remarks (Section 4) I shall briefly indicate that the main characteristics of the account of the relation between common understanding and philosophical reason withstood Reinhold’s later changes of philosophical systems. (shrink)

Karl Leonhard Reinhold publizierte Ende der 1780er-Jahre eine Reihe von Schriften, mit denen er beanspruchte, Immanuel Kants geschmackstheoretische Ausführungen der Kritik der Urteilskraft zu antizipieren. Ziel dieser Studie ist eine bis dato nicht vorgenommene umfassende kontextualisierende Analyse dieser frühen ästhetischen Ansätze, die u. a. auf das Schöne und die Kunst appliziert werden. Reinhold diskutiert die seiner Ansicht nach einseitigen Lustkonzeptionen von Dubos, Pouilly, Wolff, Mendelssohn, Sulzer und Helvétius, welche er mit seiner eigenen Theorie des Vergnügens ergänzt. Die (...) Empfindungstheorie Ernst Platners wird als ein holistischer Zugang gewürdigt. Reinholds Ausführungen nehmen Kants Geschmackskritik zwar nicht vorweg, doch sind sie mit dieser vereinbar und können als ihr vergnügens- und triebtheoretisches Fundament angesehen werden. Platners Einfluss ist dabei nur einer von vielen und verblasst neben dem von Kants Epistemologie und Ethik. Die Originalität von Reinholds Reflexionen liegt v. a. in einer transzendentalphilosophischen Aufwertung der Sinnlichkeit in ästhetischen Belangen und einem Vorläufermodell des freien Spiels der Erkenntniskräfte als einer starken und leichten Beschäftigung der Vorstellungskraft. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played (...) by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

Arina Oriekhova's interview with Professor Serhii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz's concept of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch's interpretation of this concept, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz's philosophy as a whole.

blurb from publisher: "In Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism, Dennis Schulting examines the themes of reflexivity, self-consciousness, representation and apperception in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and German Idealism more widely. Central to Schulting’s argument is the claim that all of human experience is inherently self-referential and that this is part of a self-reflexivity of thought, or what is called transcendental apperception, a Kantian insight that was first apparent in the work of Christian Wolff and came (...) to inform all of German Idealism. In a rigorous text suitable for students of German philosophy and upper-level students of metaphysics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics courses, the author establishes the historical roots of Kant’s thought and traces it through to his immediate successors Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He specifically examines the cognitive role of self-consciousness and its relation to idealism and places it in a clear and coherent history of rationalist philosophy." . (shrink)

My research takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». In this perspective I delineate, first, the consequences of this position for Hegel's epistemology, in particular with reference to the question of skepticism. Then, I show in what sense the recognitive conception of knowledge makes it possible for Hegel to comprehend unitarily, on one hand, cognition as exercise of natural capacities and cognition as exercise of (...) normative capacities socially articulated, and,on the other hand, theoretical self-consciousness and practical self-consciousness. The gnoseological importance of this solution can be comprehended only if we reconstruct the evolution of Hegel's thought in that span of time in which he most directly tackles the issue of skepsis: that is, from 1797 - the beginning of his Frankfurt period - when he began to occupy himself with gnoseological questions, until the end of his stay in Jena,which begins in 1801 and concludes in 1807 with the writing of the Phenomenology. The analysis of the development of the Hegelian theory of knowledge - worked out in the first part of my study - is dealt with in the context of a reconstruction of the historico-argumentative constellation within which it matured. The constellation of importance for our analysis is represented by the skeptical crisis - triggered by authors such as Schulze, Maimonand Platner - that invested the post-Kantian galaxy, within which the idealist solutions to the problem of cognition matured. Through the analysis of journals and authors with whom Hegel came directly or indirectly into contact - from Platner to Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling, to Hölderlin and Sinclair, concluding with Zeender, Krug, Bouterwek and Werneburg, and among the journals Fülleborn's Beiträge and Niethammer's Journal in particular - it is possible to map the various solutions proposed for the skeptical problem andsee how it is in relation to this problem that the conceptions of self-consciousness evolve and the very concept of "interpersonality" - "intersubjectivity" - emerges for the first time. At the same time, pursuing my objective of broadening the investigation of the phenomenon of recognition, which in my view is not reducible to the field of practical philosophy, I proposea fresh reconstruction of the lexical and conceptual evolution of the various terms -Erkennen, Wiedererkennen, Recognition, Anerkennen - through which the various modalities of the phenomenon of recognition were indicated in the philosophical tradition to which Hegel refers: recognition of objects as perceptive reidentification; reminiscence on the level of theory of memory; recognition of subjects as self-recognition (apperception) and attribution to others of intentionality; logical recognition as recognition of the validity of a proposition; moral recognition, where "recognizing" generally means approving, accepting(more specifically, someone may be "recognized" as an autonomous subject and as a unique,genuine individuality). I focus in particular on the theory of memory as «recognitio» in Wolff and in his school, on the conception of «reconnaissance» in Bonnet, on Kantian«Recognition» and on the theory of «Anerkennen» in Ernst Platner. This investigation serves, on the one hand, to show how the phenomenon of recognition is central for a comprehension of the structure both of the lower and of the higher cognitive faculties. This ought to allow us to understand in what sense Hegel, taking intersubjective recognition as hisleading phenomenon, attempts to reunite the various meanings of recognition within a theory of knowledge on the basis of which «cognition is recognition». On the other hand, my conceptual and lexicographic investigation also serves to bring to light - in a new way with respect to the studies on Anerkennung - a hitherto unknown problematic constellation and the input of certain authors, such as Werneburg and Platner, whose conceptions may haveinfluenced Hegel's approach.The second part and the third of my study - a reconstruction of the pre- phenomenological Jena writings dealing with «Anerkennung» - dwells on the theme of the notion of natural recognition, whose centrality for the Hegelian conception of recognition has not yet been adequately grasped. This reconstruction of the theory of natural recognition gives due weight to the influence of Schelling on Hegel's understanding of «Anerkennung» -while the critical literature has generally concentrated on Fichte. Analyzing the conception of the animal organism developed in particular in the lectures on the philosophy of nature of 1803-04 brings to light how Hegel already individuates the recognitive phenomenon at the level of sexual reproduction: it is from here that he posits the natural prerequisites for the development of consciousness of self. The category of natural recognition will present itself anew in Hegel's analysis of the social ontology of the human world in the philosophy of spirit, where it concerns sexual love, reproduction and child raising: natural recognition is, then, that on the basis of which Hegel develops his theory that cognition is recognition.Recognition, as a «middle» of spirit, is a cognitive phenomenon that is primitive with respectto linguistically structured human intersubjectivity; it is, properly, that cognitive structure which is necessarily presupposed by a self-conscious subjectivity that expresses itself linguistically: linguistic intersubjectivity expresses various modes of recognition, but notevery form of recognition is linguistic. The evolutional theory of cognition as recognition is in fact designed to show how increasingly complex recognitive relations emerge from a basic level of natural interactions to take on a linguistically mediated and universal structure. Withthe notion of spiritual recognition Hegel indicates just that ensemble of normative relations that constitute the infrastructure of action and thus mediate the formation of socially articulated self-conscious knowing of self. In the lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 and of 1805-06 Hegel thus reconstructs the recognitive structure of the social institutions of right, of labor, and of exchange, showing that, within a politically structured community,dyadic (I-you) interactions are mediated by the universal viewpoint of the "we" incarnated in institutions that can be recognized by citizens as their own and by which citizens can be recognized. (shrink)

L'idéalisme allemand est une philosophie enracinée dans la problématique religieuse. C'est Kant qui en inaugure la réflexion avec l'exposé de " la religion dans les limites de la raison ". Fichte fléchit le discours en repensant sa Doctrine de la Science à partir de l'Évangile de Saint-Jean. Mais c'est avec Hegel et Schelling que l'idéalisme postkantien se donne la tâche de ressourcer la dogmatique chrétienne à partir d'une ontothéologie spéculative. Hegel laisse d'admirables Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion, Schelling (...) construira sa Philosophie Positive à partir des " données " de la mythologie et de la révélation. Ce recueil, issu des travaux d'un colloque au Centre de Recherches sur Hegel et l'Idéalisme allemand de l'Université de Poitiers, rassemble des textes d'auteurs belges, français, allemands, italiens, libanais, luxembourgeois et américains. Ils traitent aussi bien des grands idéalistes que de leurs prédécesseurs essentiels. P. Valenza étudie Jacobi et Reinhold, J. Lambinet parcourt la voie qui va de Paracelse et de Boehme à Schelling. V. Waibel compare Hôlderlin et le jeune Hegel. Une seule contribution est consacrée à Fichte : celle de V. Kokoszka sur la Wissenschafislehre tardive. Deux études portent sur Kant. R. Schaeffler réfléchit sur le rôle de l'histoire dans le système critique, R. Theis explore les perspectives de la théologie kantienne à partir de la philosophie de Wolff. Deux études sont également consacrées à Schelling. J. Hatem traite de sa vision de l'intuition intellectuelle contre l'arrière-fond de la mystique tandis que A. Ardovino en étudie les travaux bibliques et patristiques. Quant à l'oeuvre de Hegel, elle fait l'objet de trois articles, ceux de Ph. Soual, de B. Mabille et de J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, une oeuvre que M. Westphal approche à partir de la critique de Kierkegaard. Le recueil est conclu par des travaux comparatifs portant sur chacun des grands idéalistes. E. Brito traite de la notion de la foi chez Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling et Schleiermacher quand J.-F. Marquet donne un exposé de l'enseignement des idéalistes sur le mystère de la Trinité. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte by Manfred GawlinaHenry E. AllisonManfred Gawlina. Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 128. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996. Pp. ix + 345.This work is the first full scale study of the controversy between Kant and the Wolffian philosopher Johann August Eberhard. The controversy was launched by Eberhard’s publication in 1788 of the first part of the first volume of the Philosophisches (...) Magazin, a journal which he and a handful of associates created specifically as an organ for attacking the Kantian philosophy from the standpoint of Leibniz and Wolff. The central claim was that whatever is true in the Kantian philosophy is already contained in Leibniz, and where Kant differs from Leibniz (such as in the denial of knowledge of things in themselves or “true things”) he goes astray. Kant reacted strongly to this [End Page 632] critique, first in a pair of letters to Reinhold (May 12 and 19, 1789) and then in his own published response, with the sarcastic title: Über eine Entdeckung. nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll1 From Eberhard’s side the controversy continued through three more volumes of the Philosophisches Magazin (1790–92), and two volumes of its successor, Philosophisches Archiv (1792–95). Although Kant himself did not respond directly to these subsequent attacks, he contributed material to Johann Schulz for his review of the second volume of the Philosophisches Magazin.Gawlina analyzes the controversy at both the pragmatic and philosophical levels. The former includes a consideration of the motivations of the protagonists and the various strategies and tactics adopted in an attempt to convince the philosophical public of the correctness of their respective positions. Eberhard, for his part, was particularly concerned with the threat which the Critique, which Kant himself describes as the “Medusa head” (hence the title), posed to the survival of Leibnizian-style metaphysics, while Kant’s primary concern was with the misrepresentation of his own philosophy that he saw in Eberhard’s attack. At the philosophical level, the controversy is presented as a clash between two conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable philosophical paradigms: the first being the ontological orientation of Leibniz (defended by Eberhard) according to which pure (contradiction-free) thought mirrors being (this entails that logic has ontological significance), and the epistemological-transcendental orientation of Kant, according to which the fundamental questions concern the conditions of human knowledge and the justification of its claims. The author is well aware that there are epistemological elements in Leibniz and ontological ones in Kant (most notably the claims about space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic), but he argues persuasively that these are grounded in the philosopher’s respective ontological and epistemological standpoints.This general thesis serves to illuminate virtually all of the main points of the controversy, including the question of why Eberhard refuses to admit either the significance or novelty of the analytic-synthetic distinction, while Kant insists on both. Of particular interest in this regard is the author’s discussion of the distinction between Schranken (limits) and Grenzen (boundaries), which Kant himself draws in the Prolegomena (§58). This distinction becomes relevant to the controversy because of Eberhard’s frequent appeal to the fact that Leibniz recognizes the Schranken of human knowledge as part of his attempt to show that Leibniz anticipated Kant in providing a “critique of pure reason.” As Gawlina notes, however, the limits of knowledge, as understood by Leibniz, are merely de facto constraints on the extent to which finite minds are capable of grasping things from the eternalistic perspective of God, whereas the boundaries insisted on by Kant are principled restrictions, grounded in the positive conditions of the possibility of cognition for finite knowers. [End Page 633]Although Gawlina thus clearly indicates the ways in which Eberhard misunderstood and misrepresented Kant’s position, he refuses to declare Kant the victor in the controversy. This is partly on historical and partly on philosophical grounds. Historically, the reason is that in spite of all of its limitations, Eberhard’s critique of Kant did succeed in raising questions among Kant’s followers regarding the coherence of the... (shrink)

È mettendo in primo piano l’idea di filosofia pratica universale, già presente nella filosofia dell’Aufklärung, che Fichte è riuscito a dare un nuovo volto alla speculazione trascendentale postkantiana. Il saggio tenta innanzitutto di ricostruire la filosofia pratica abbozzata negli anni 1793-1794. Viene proposto un breve confronto con Wolf. In seguito, lo studio rivolge la sua attenzione ad uno dei contributi della filosofia pratica universale fichtiana: aver trattato il sentimento come nozione pratica fondamentale, presente nella conoscenza e nell’azione. Infine, si tratta (...) di mostrare che Fichte propose, nella prima Dottrina della Scienza, di fare della filosofia pratica universale una philosophia prima che fosse chiamata a prendere il posto della ontologia dogmatica e della dottrina degli elementi critica. Un confronto con Descartes, Wolff, Kant e Reinhold pone in risalto l’innovazione di Fichte. (shrink)

Inhalt: Michael Albrecht: Zum Wortgebrauch von 'Aufklarung' bei Johann Joachim Spalding. Mit einer Bibliographie der Schriften und zwei ungedruckten Voten Spaldings - Bruno Bianco: Schulbegriff und Weltbegriff der Philosophie in der Wiener Logik. Ein Beitrag zum Verstandnis von Kants Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsbegriff - Luigi Cataldi Madonna: Theorie und Kritik der Vernunft bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Claudio Cesa: Reformation statt Aufklarung. Hegel uber Friedrich den Grossen - George di Giovanni: Rehberg, Reinhold und C. C. E. Schmid uber Kant und (...) die moralische Freiheit - Jean Ecole: Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik - Gunter Gawlick: Theodizee fur den Alltag. Bemerkungen zur Rezeption von A. A. Sarasas Ars semper gaudendi in der deutschen Aufklarung - Volker Gerhardt: Prolegomena zum Begriff der Individualitat - Hansmichael Hohenegger: Der Weg der Wissenschaft und die Arbeitsteilung in der Philosophie. Zur Rolle der Teleologie in Kants Philosophieauffassung - Gerd Irrlitz: Antinomik bei Kant und was er von deren Aufklarung erwartete - Fumiyasu Ishikawa: Die 'ungesellige Geselligkeit' der Vernunftkritik. Kant als Polemiker - Soo Bae Kim: Ethik als Kasuistik. Kants Antwort auf die Garvesche Kritik - Lothar Kreimendahl: Hat Hume William Kings 'De origine mali' gelesen? Die Notizen zur Theodizee in den 'Early Memoranda' und ihre Quelle - Silvestro Marcucci: Kant, Gustav von Starck und die 'pythagorischen Ternen' - Pietro Pimpinella: 'Cognitio intuitiva' bei Wolff und Baumgarten - Horst Schropfer: Ludwig Martin Trager - ein fruher Anhanger der philosophischen Ideen und Bestrebungen Immanuel Kants - Clemens Schwaiger: Vollkommenheit als Moralprinzip bei Wolff, Baumgarten und Kant - Rainer Specht: John Lockes Lehre vom Allgemeinen - Katrin Tenenbaum: 'Was ist der Mensch?' Mannliche Universalitat und weibliche Partikularitat in der Anthropologie Kants - Robert Theis: Gottes Spur in der Welt? Kant uber den Optimismus um die Mitte der 1750er Jahre - Maria Jesus Vazquez Lobeiras: Kants Logik zwischen Tradition und Innovation - Verzeichnis der Schriften Norbert Hinskes. (shrink)

The article analyzes Wilhelm Windelband’s views on the problem of the relation of philosophy to its history. Windelband’s essay “History of philosophy” (1905) is put as a starting point. The main motive for this research is the idea that the history of philosophy is an organon and a component of philosophy. The article critically examines Windelband’s interpretation of (1) Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy, (2) the question about the grounds of philosophers’ interest in the history of philosophy, (3) (...) the problem of development of the history of philosophy as a science (Wissenschaft). The author assesses Windelband’s role in the development of the history of philosophy as a science is important, despite some accusations of partisanship. The main merit of Windelband, according to the author, is (1) a critique of Psychologism and Historical Relativism and (2) the justification of the history of philosophy’s main role in education as a whole and in the philosophical education in particular. (shrink)

Social inequalities in health in the UK persist despite attempts to reduce them. We argue that work and pensions constitutes an area of intervention where there is potential to make change happen. We propose that workers who are exposed to significant health risks through their occupation should be allowed to draw their state pension earlier, based on a minimum number of years in the workforce. We model this proposal on similar policies in other European countries. In our modification, the pension (...) age and the retirement age would be separated, such that workers can receive a state pension whether or not they choose to continue working. This arrangement may encourage workers either to reduce their working hours or to change to less demanding or harmful work. The health of these workers would thereby benefit from reduced exposure to a harmful work environment, reduced stress and more opportunities for rest and relaxation. However, it has also been suggested that retirement is bad for mental health. In response, our proposal enables workers to phase in full retirement over a period of part-time work, and we believe that this would counter any potential negative effects on health caused by retirement. (shrink)

Metaphor has a double life. It can be described as a directional process in which a stable, familiar base domain provides inferential structure to a less clearly specified target. But metaphor is also described as a process of finding commonalities, an inherently symmetric process. In this second view, both concepts may be altered by the metaphorical comparison. Whereas most theories of metaphor capture one of these aspects, we offer a model based on structure-mapping that captures both sides of metaphor processing. (...) This predicts (a) an initial processing stage of symmetric alignment; and (b) a later directional phase in which inferences are projected to the target. To test these claims, we collected comprehensibility judgments for forward (e.g., “A rumor is a virus”) and reversed (“A virus is a rumor”) metaphors at early and late stages of processing, using a deadline procedure. We found an advantage for the forward direction late in processing, but no directional preference early in processing. Implications for metaphor theory are discussed. (shrink)

The Description for this book, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice, will be forthcoming.

Tim Scanlon’s famous and important paper ‘The Diversity of Objections to Inequality’ sets out five reasons why those sympathetic to equality may object to inequality. This paper shows the origin of this approach to inequality in Scanlon’s earlier work, and its persistence in his later work. It also compares Scanlon’s position to earlier egalitarian writers, such as R.H. Tawney, and anti-egalitarians such as J.R. Lucas. It concludes by suggesting that there are interaction effects between the reasons for objecting to inequality (...) and hence they are more powerful if taken together. (shrink)

in Risk: Philosophical Perspectives ed Tim Lewens, Routledge.

Feenberg’s new book,Technosystem: the social life of reason, makes an important intervention in the study of technological systems by showing that instrumental reason requires value judgement at the moment of its realization in this world. It fosters hope that technological development can be redirected towards the fulfilment of human needs through public interventions of nonexperts. However, Feenberg does not sufficiently engage with the political dilemmas that inevitably accompany these interventions as a result of the formal capitalist bias of the technosystem. (...) The books by Bridle and Bucher underline the importance of confronting these dilemmas as they encounter them in various domains and provide possible ways for dealing with them. (shrink)

Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt -- Christian Freyherrn von Wolf Erinnerung, wie er es künftig mit den Einwürfen halten will, die wider seine Schriften gemacht werden.

The aim of this article is to explain the proofs Aristotle calls proofs "by exposition" and to find out the rules and principles these proofs rest on. The first part shows why previous attempts to explain Aristotle's method of "exposition" have failed. The second part develops a new explanation and reconstructs all of Aristotle's expository proofs on the basis of a few simple rules. The last part shows that the new interpretation of Aristotle's method has very important consequences regarding, firstly, (...) the extent to which Aristotle's logic is valid, secondly, the relationship between syllogistic and geometric exposition and, last but not least, the correct understanding of the principles underlying Aristotle's logical system and the correct understanding of what a "complete" syllogism is. Thus, the article solves a number of fundamental problems concerning the interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic. (shrink)

Afirmar os sacramentos como símbolos da comunhão apresenta a questão sobre como possibilitar que essa comunhão aconteça entre igrejas que atualmente celebram seus sacramentos de forma separada. A comunhão sacramental é uma questão ecumênica. Será possível um consenso na doutrina e na celebração dos sacramentos que possibilite às igrejas um mútuo reconhecimento da vivência sacramental? O objetivo deste artigo é responder a essa questão, apresentando as convergências e os consensos que o diálogo ecumênico sobre os sacramentos nos permite colher. O (...) método que utilizamos é a análise qualitativa da bibliografia que apresenta a teologia sacramental em perspectiva ecumênica. E os resultados atingidos mostram que uma mútua acolhida sacramental exige das igrejas uma recepção estrutural, em suas doutrinas e liturgias, das convergências já alcançadas no diálogo sobre os sacramentos. Como consequência, elas precisam também de um esforço conjunto para ressignificar ritos, gestos e símbolos, bem como refazer o universo semântico da terminologia sacramental. (shrink)

Theorists of global justice confront an apparent dilemma. If citizens in the developed world have duties of (socio-economic) justice to those elsewhere on the globe, then it is supposed that the duties must be very extensive indeed, requiring the same concern to be shown for everyone on earth. Those who deny that global obligations are as extensive as domestic obligations seem therefore to have to concede that any obligations beyond borders must be based on charity, rather than justice. The assumption (...) on which this dilemma is based is that 'justice is uniform'. In this paper I argue that such an assumption should be rejected in favour of the view that justice is relative to norms of cooperation. Consequently it is possible to develop a view of 'justice but not the same justice': the ‘layers of justice’ view. (shrink)

Nöthige Zugabe zu den Anmerckungen über Herrn D. Buddens Bedencken von der Wolffischen Philosophie -- Klarer Beweiss, dass Herr D. Budde die Ihm gemachten Vorwürffe einräumen und gestehen muss.

T. 1. Préface-Einleitung, 1705-1710 -- T. 2. 1711-1718 -- T. 3. 1719-1724 -- T. 4. 1725-1731 -- T. 5. Supplemente Register.