In this article we focus on note taking as a practice that is fundamental to (higher) education. We argue that note-taking should not primarily be regarded as a method that supports effective learning, but as formative of the student herself (making her attentive and granting possibilities for self-transformation). Hence it is a practice that has educational meaning in and of itself. It is a pedagogical form in its own right. We go on arguing that the practice of lecturing can itself (...) be seen as a form of note taking and that both phenomena are not only closely related, but also that note making and lecturing consist of reciprocal operations. Studying on the basis of one’s notes comes down to the reverse operation the teacher had to perform when preparing her lessons. Moreover, thanks to making notes during a class students have a deeply embodied sense of what it means to generate and to construct new arguments and ideas. (shrink)

This theoretical paper is offered in the spirit of advancing the debate on the socioemotional wealth construct and its impact on how family firms conceptualize and practise corporate social responsibility. The study builds on Kellermanns et al.’s :1175–1182, 2012) claim that the SEW dimensions can be positively and negatively valenced as well as makes a distinction between the selective and instrumental approach to CSR and the holistic and normative one. Drawing on these considerations, it provides a theoretical underpinning in favour (...) of the view that SEW has ambivalent nature and therefore can produce detrimental outcomes for stakeholders of family companies. In this way, the study challenges the implicit assumption prevalent in the literature that SEW is “a prosocial and positive stimulus”. Crucially, it expands on the SEW construct by arguing that, given its ambivalent nature, SEW, as such, is at odds with the “strategic, whole-business view of responsibility”. Consequently, it posits that family firms—because of their concern with SEW—may be more likely to adopt the instrumental and selective rather than strategic and normative approach. Hence, it also makes the case for regarding the latter as a reference point to investigate the family company’s attitude towards social responsibility. It concludes by summarising the argument and offering future research avenues. (shrink)

The present paper is a response, of sorts, to the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID) and lockdown that we all must face. We have an idea of what doctors, nurses, teachers, among many of the other professions, do for the general public, but one may ask whether there is something substantial that philosophers and ethicists can offer in these circumstances. The thesis of this paper is that the stoic attitude towards times of trouble and the pragmatist way of finding (...) out what is possible to elevate the quality of living against all odds, if skilfully interwoven, could be an important tool in keeping mental health in good shape and, additionally, could contribute to the cultural scene at large. If this is the case, stoic pragmatists can indeed offer an interesting example of practical philosophy for many audiences, especially during the pandemic lockdown and, perhaps, for other serious difficulties or problems. To be effective in delivering their message, stoic pragmatists, as most with philosophers today, should enrich their textual and oral modes of traditional transmission of knowledge and become digital-culture public intellectuals that can recognize and reach more general audiences by, among other things, visual modes of digital communication. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea—seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist—of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semiotics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodological level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explanations of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded (...) interpretation are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if someone rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”. (shrink)

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence \(\alpha \) which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be \({{\,\mathrm{I\Delta _{0}+\exp }\,}}\) ) such that for some formula \(\Theta \) and any arithmetical sentence \(\varphi \), \(\Theta (\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner )\equiv \varphi \) is provable in \(\alpha \). We say that a sentence \(\beta \) is definable (...) in a sentence \(\alpha \), if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of \(\beta \) to the language of \(\alpha \) which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of \(\beta \) is provable in \(\alpha \). Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not \(\Sigma _2\) -definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no \(\Sigma _2\) -sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic. (shrink)

We prove that the theory of fields with a derivation of Frobenius has the model companion which is stable and admits elimination of quantifiers up to the level of the λ-functions. Along the way, we give new geometric axioms of DCFp.

Abstract:The term stoic pragmatism was coined by John Lachs for a theory and practice of the good life in individual, social, and cultural contexts. My intention is not only to promote this interesting idea but also to develop it at some points. In the first instance, I propose something that we may call digital-culture public intellectual as a way for stoic pragmatists to be more visible with their teachings nowadays. Indirectly, and at least to some degree, stoic pragmatists may contribute (...) to the task of the humanization of cyberspace despite its massive algorithmizing according to the Big Tech business models. (shrink)

As shown in (Łukowski, Gensler, 2013), the paradox of the stone is a failed attempt to show that “omnipotence” is a contradictory concept. An element of the argument presented there is that God, while unable to lift the stone, can nevertheless annihilate it. This work considers the amplification of the paradox of the stone to the form generated by the question: can God create a stone which He will not be able to lift, nor, once created, will He be able (...) to destroy. (shrink)

Jaquelyn Ann K. Kegley’s book, Josiah Royce in Focus, is well written, competently arranged, and worthy of being recommended to all those who have some interest in the philosophy of one of America’s classic philosophers, Josiah Royce (1855-1916). The present book confirms that she is one of top scholars on Royce. Her book profoundly investigates Royce’s thought and panoramically covers almost all its aspects – I say “almost,” because the practical thought (ethics, psychology, the self, religi...

In the paper I present the Husserl’s idea of philosophy as a strict science which he understood as universal and ultimately justified knowledge, free from any prejudices coming from naturalistic attitude. The prejudice of such an attitude is a thesis of the existence of the world. By complying with this thesis unreflectively, one becomes immersed in the world, which means that in the natural attitude the transcendental character of subjectivity remains unconscious and anonymous. This anonymity might be razed by transcendental (...) reduction, which aims at getting the transcendental ego rid of self-forgetting. The subjectivity revealed this way is still, in its deepest aspects, anonymous as ultimately functioning ego, for being an epistemological absolute, it is a source of reflection and through reflection it cannot become acknowledged. I discuss some difficulties related to the second type of anonymity in relation to Husserl’s demand of phenomenology realising the idea of philosophy as strict a science. (shrink)

The paper deals with Eugen Fink’s interpretation of transcendental I. Fink does not make do with traditional phenomenological distinction between natural I and transcendental I, but within transcendental I he looks for the distinction between constitutive I i phenomenologizing I. Hence, according to Fink, we should distinguish three kinds of I: natural I, transcendental I which constitutes the world and transcendental-phenomenologizing I as theoretical spectator, who meets the conditions of phenomenological reduction but does not contribute to the constitution of the (...) world. Finks interpretation of transcendental I aims at overcoming difficulties related to Husserlian phenomenological reduction, and the distinction of constitutive I and phenomenologizing I was accepted by Husserl himself. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to question the Cartesian interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. In that interpretation Husserl is regarded as a representative of epistemological fundamentalism characterized by searching for the foundations of cognition in the transcendental consciousness given in the absolute and adequate evidence. The thesis of this article states that the essential anonymity which Husserl ascribes to consciousness is the crucial argument for his questioning of the Cartesian myth of the self-transparency of consciousness and thus allows for regarding (...) him as the master of suspicion in a meaning which Paul Ricoeur has endowed this concept with. According to Husserl, consciousness, at the beginning of philosophical thinking, appears to be unknown, hidden, since a human being living in a natural disposition, is immersed in anonymity and forgets about his own subjectivity. Though this anonymity may be overcome by means of phenomenological reduction, the transcendental consciousness, uncovered due to that reduction, in its deepest layers will remain anonymous and will not present itself adequately in self-reflection. (shrink)

In my paper I discuss Husserl’s standpoint on the existence of world. Addressing this issue the philosopher thinks of the kind of being, outer of consciousness, which is realized in the general thesis of natural attitude. The aim of phenomenological research is to reveal correlation of consciousness and the world, which according to Husserl, becomes transcendental constitution. In the course of explaining this correlation Husserl reveals that the existence of world might be recognized as a correlate of the general thesis (...) of natural attitude, which after phenomenological reduction becomes recognised as the constitutive achievement of consciousness. Transcendental idealism is interpreted in the paper as transcendental monism. Husserl not only questions the possibility of non-cognizable things-in-themselves, but also he uses some broad concept of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity is not opposed to the world, but it includes the world as the subjectivity’s correlate. Strictly speaking, the world is conceived as structure transcendental subjectivity, and the natural attitude might be taken as anonymous modus of transcendental life. (shrink)

The paper presents Ch. S. Peirce\'s attack on Cartesian epistemology as it was formulated in 1868 article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Peirce\'s arguments are analyzed in the context of possible Descartes\' responses. One conclusion of the paper is that Peirce uses two different notions of knowledge and science, and that the distance of his ideas from that of Descartes depends, among others, on which notion we take into account. Another conclusion is that although Peirce\'s general project of combining fallibilism (...) and anti-scepticism looks very attractive (especially in the light of what we now know about the development of science) it generates many problems that Descartes could have pointed out if he had a chance to talk to his two and a half century younger debater. Despite, however, the problems Peircean project generates, it may be regarerd as a forerunner of typical tendencies of 20th century philosophy such as e.g. fallibilism or antifoundationalism. (shrink)

Enacting Intersubjectivity. A Cognitive and Social Perspective on the Study of Interactions, Morganti, F., Carassa, A., Riva, G. (red.), Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008.

THE GRAMMAR OF RELIGIOUS “TO BELIEVE” IN THE CONTEXT OF LANGUAGES GAMES Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is not very well known in polish philosophical literature. His conception of language-games is sometimes vague. The article presents the problem of faith and religion in the context of Wittgenstein's language-games. The trouble with it is lack of precise definition of language-game. Still, under certain conditions, we can discuss faith and religion from the perspective of languagegames. It becomes possible to indicate a specific religious (...) language which could be treated as a language-game. Three components characteristic for language-games - some set of words (vocabulary), grammar, and form of life (which is inseparably related to language-game) - could be separated also for religious language. In the face of studies, faith appears as inseparably related to activity. That means that the believer is pushed to specified activities, and we can't talk about faith without these activities. Faith is a "picture" which affects the lives of believers and forms them. (shrink)

There is a long-standing dispute among scholars concerning Berkeley’s supposed commitment to an emotivist theory of meaning as the very first (and an early modern) instance of non-cognitivism. According to this position, the domains of religious and moral language do not refer to facts about the world, but rather express the emotional attitudes of religious or moral language users. Some scholars involved in the dispute argue for taking Berkeley to be an emotivist (non-cognitivist), while others hold that we should not (...) do so. This paper puts forward an interpretation that lends support to the non-cognitivist reading of his stance, but in expressivist rather than emotivist terms. It argues that the label “expressivism” does more justice to the textual evidence concerning his understanding of moral language, as what is distinctive where this philosopher is concerned is his interest in explaining the nature of our practice of employing moral language (i.e. how we come to formulate moral statements as expressions of our non-referential attitudes, and the meta-level considerations pertaining to morality associated with this), rather than whether morality is just a matter of our emotions or feelings (i.e. such first-order considerations about morality as whether moral rightness and wrongness correspond merely to our emotional states). (shrink)

The picture of the beginnings of humankind presented by natural science is often contrasted with what is conveyed in Scripture. It has been pointed out that the Edenic state before sin – which we refer to as original justice – was a time of absolute perfection in which there was no room for any deficiency. According to Thomas Aquinas, however, this picture conflicts with what Paradise was as a state on the way to Heaven. For Aquinas, the difference between Paradise (...) and the present situation is not an ontological one but a change of circumstance, because original justice was not a period of salvation. This means that Paradise was a period of development, thanks to the grace received, which is reconcilable with the principled account of natural science. The key is the distinction between Paradise and Heaven, which sets religion–science reflections in their proper context. Contribution: The article drew attention to notions of original justice, emphasising the Paradise time as the development of virtues, including the theological virtue of faith. This helps to build an adequate theological framework for a fruitful dialogue with the natural sciences, as recommended by Buitendag. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to present the possibility of using Diagnosis- Related Groups (DRG) in the hospital management process and to analyse the need for business performance management on the part of hospital management staff. The following research methods were used: literature analysis, case studies, and poll analysis. It is not possible to increase the effectiveness of operation of healthcare entities without increasing the importance of IT systems and using DRG more effectively in the management process. Training users (...) in IT and the use of DRGs is important to achieving hospital effectiveness. The increased importance of analyses and planning in a hospital should be reflected in the organisational structure of service providers. Hospital controllers should have a similar role to those present in most companies in other industries. (shrink)

The Middle English Pearl is known for its mixture of genres, moods and various discourses. The textual journey the readers of the poem embark on is a long and demanding one, leading from elegiac lamentations and the erotic outbursts of courtly love to theological debates and apocalyptic visions. The heterogeneity of the poem has often prompted critics to overlook the continuity of the erotic mode in Pearl which emerges already in the poem’s first stanza. While it is true that throughout (...) the dream vision the language of the text never eroticizes the relationship between the Dreamer and the Pearl Maiden to the extent that it does in the opening lines, the article argues that eroticism actually underlies the entire structure of the vision proper. Taking recourse to Roland Barthes’s distinction between the erotic and the sexual to explain the exact nature of the bond which connects the two characters, the argument posits eroticism as an expression of somatic longing; a careful analysis of Pearl through this prism provides a number of ironic insights into the mutual interactions between the Dreamer and the Maiden and highlights the poignancy of their inability to understand each other. Further conclusions are also drawn from comparing Pearl with a number of Chaucerian dream visions. Tracing the erotic in both its overt and covert forms and following its transformations in the course of the narrative, the article outlines the poet’s creative use of the mechanics of the dream vision, an increasingly popular genre in the period when the poem was written. (shrink)

The article investigates the canonical plays of William Shakespeare—Hamlet, Macbeth, A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest—in an attempt to determine the nature of Shakespeare’s position on the early modern tendency to demonize fairy belief and to view fairies as merely a form of demonic manifestation. Fairy belief left its mark on all four plays, to a greater or lesser extent, and intertwined with the religious concerns of the period, it provides an important perspective on the problem of religion in (...) Shakespeare’s works. The article will attempt to establish whether Shakespeare subscribed to the tendency of viewing fairies as demonic agents, as epitomized by the Daemonologie of King James, or opposed it. Special emphasis will also be put on the conflation of fairies and Catholicism that one finds best exemplified in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. The article draws on a wealth of recent scholarship on early modern fairies, bringing together historical reflection on the changing perception of the fairy figure, research into Shakespeare’s attitude towards Catholicism and analyses of the many facets of anti-Catholic polemic emerging from early modern Protestant discourse. (shrink)