The article focuses on the relations between passions and cognition in Hume’s philosophy. Although it is widely recognised that Hume attributed a central role to emotions in our natural structure, it is not frequently understood that in Hume’s conceptual framework passions themselves have a gnoseological content. In this paper some arguments are provided in order to show that this is the case.

A short reconstruction of the notion of passion in ancient ethics, its transformation in modern moral and political philosophy and its demise after the end of the eighteenth-century.

Descartes deems wonder the first among the passions. Pride and generosity originate from it. To maintain that generosity originates from wonder, Descartes has to deal with serious and hard theoretical issues. Descartes, I shall argue, tackles these issues to endow generosity with a role in the monitoring passions. I back this conjecture examining Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s theories of passions.

Descartes deems wonder the first among the passions. Pride and generosity originate from it. To maintain that generosity originates from wonder, Descartes has to deal with serious and hard theoretical issues. Descartes, I shall argue, tackles these issues to endow generosity with a role in the monitoring passions. I back this conjecture examining Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s theories of passions.

L'A. esamina la teoria egidiana delle passioni, sviluppata in quattro declarationes in apertura del suo commento al II libro della Retorica. I temi analizzati sono la definizione di passio animae, la distinzione tra la facoltà irascibile e la concupiscibile, le passioni della facoltà concupiscibile e dell'irascibile. Fonte principale e punto costante di riferimento nella trattazione egidiana è la dottrina dell'Aquinate. L'A. mette costantemente a confronto le posizioni dei due filosofi evidenziando i tentativi di Egidio di staccarsi da Tommaso (...) e criticarne la dottrina, in particolare rispetto alla trattazione dell'ira. (shrink)

The chapter reconstructs the eighteenth-century discussion on commerce and virtue in the light of Hirschman's, Pocock's, Polanyi's, and Viner's interpretations of that discussion. The claims put forth are: the history of the emerging of modern market society has been heavily conditioned by a teleological and deterministic interpretation of history; the eighteenth-century discussion cannot be read neither in terms of ideologies nor in terms of the history of economic analysis; a 'strategic' reading is fruitful in so far as it allows two-ways (...) interactions between discourse and social facts. (shrink)

Did Descartes ever develop a political thought of his own? This question, still open in the field of cartesian studies, is maybe doomed to remain without a definitive answer, mainly because of the lack of a specific work dedicated by him to politics. Nevertheless, we have a long letter to Princess Elisabeth in which the French philosopher, starting from his reading of Machiavelli's masterpiece, Il Principe, discusses political matters, and especially the political instruments that a good prince should use in (...) order to guarantee stability to his reign. The present essay deals with it, exploring the possibility that Descartes might have been trying to outline in that text the main features of a political anthropology, founding it on the universal anthropology of passions that he was developing in those years. (shrink)

Preface -/- 1. 'Anima' and 'res cogitans'. The Cartesian idea of nature and mind as a residual concept. The first chapter discusses the genesis of the concept of mind in Cartesian Philosophy; the claim is advanced that 'res cogitans' is a residual concept, defined on the basis of a previous definition of matter as 'res extensa'. As a consequence, a contradictory ontology of the mind is Descartes's poisoned bequest to the following tradition of 'scientific' psychology. -/- 2. The Mathematical method (...) in the theory of the mind and the passions. The second chapter discusses the first ambitious attempt in this direction, namely Spinoza's theory of the mind and the passions in Ethics II and III; the topics treated are Spinoza's program of a mathematical science of the mind and his transformation of the genre 'treatise of the passions' into a would-be mathematical science of the motions of the soul. -/- 3. The definition of affections and the impossibility of reducing inadequate to adequate ideas. The third chapter discusses a tension in Spinoza project of a theory of the passions, namely a need to reduce concepts to pure mathematical definitions and the opposite need to keep inadequate imaginative definitions of the phenomena under scrutiny, namely the passions, in order to avoid a radical reduction of the subject-matter to the only truly existing reality (the world order in itself) that would leave the theory without any subject-matter at all. -/- 4. 'Conatus', 'potentia', 'vis'. Concepts of force in the theory of passions and the impossibility of eliminating occult qualities. The fourth chapter discusses the troubles arising in the original project deriving from difficulties in the treatment of dynamic concepts, such as the notion of conatus, which were an unavoidable consequence of Cartesian assumptions. -/- 5. Overview and discussion. Chapter five tries to draw a general discussion, focusing on the tension between the Cartesian assumptions and the actual practice in the new post-Galilean sciences, including attempts at giving birth to psychology or science of man. -/- Appendices I. The mind-body problem in Spinoza. II. Concepts of force in Newton and Spinoza. III. Materialist readings of Newton and Spinoza. IV. On the opposition of materialism and spiritualism and Geisteswissenschaften and natural science. V. Conatus, the idea of liberation and social theory in Spinoza. (shrink)

The article analyzes the relationship between passions and sensations in Aristotle’s production. We start from Aristotle’s definition of passions as “affections” of the perceptive soul, thereby associating them to pleasures, pains and more generally desires, which are typical of beings equipped with perceptual faculties and sense organs. Starting from a specific treatment of the concepts of pathê and aisthêsis, the article points out possible analogies and irreducible differences, confirming the primacy of perception over passions, due to perception’s discrimination capability that (...) can provide the first material for knowledge. (shrink)