Catherine Beattie; The Paradigm Case Argument: its use and abuse in education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 77–86.

From time to time philosophers and scientists have made sensational, provocative claims that certain things do not exist or never happen that, in everyday life, we unquestioningly take for granted as existing or happening. These claims have included denying the existence of matter, space, time, the self, free will, and other sturdy and basic elements of our common-sense or naïve world-view. Around the middle of the twentieth century an argument was developed that can be used to challenge many such (...) skeptical claims based on linguistic considerations, which came to be known as the Paradigm Case Argument ... (shrink)

The paradigm case argument is a widely employed, yet controversial, weapon in the armory of contemporary analytical philosophers. It has been hailed as a philosophical panacea, resolving paradoxes from perception to ethics; and it has been scorned as both unsound and useless. I hope in this paper to help determine its proper use: I will try to show that it can be helpful, particularly at the initial stage of clearing up linguistic misunderstandings. But I must conclude that (...) it is unequal to the more grandiose tasks assigned to it. (shrink)

This article is primarily a defense of the Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). It is secondarily a comment on a recent controversy over the validity of its use in philosophy. I argue that the controversy rests on a misinterpretation. By extending the analysis of the objections (and here I invoke Descartes' famous method of possible doubt) I show that the occurrence of a paradigm and the fact that a concept is normally used to describe that paradigm (...) logically entails not that the paradigm is instantiated, but only that it is correct to apply that concept to that paradigm. In this manner the ontological fallacy is avoided, and further, this enforces the important separation between saying something about the correct application of a concept and saying something about its meaning. (shrink)

Antony Flew; The Paradigm Case Argument: abusing and not using the PCA, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, http.

Antony Flew; The Paradigm Case Argument: abusing and not using the PCA, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, http.

Grundgedanke des paradigm case argument ist, Skepsis gegenüber Ansprüchen auf Tatsachenwissen durch Appell an den Sprachgebrauch zu widerlegen. Die naivsten Formen der Argumentation sind nicht schlüssig; in ihrer weiteren Verwendung und Diskussion ist sie daher in drei unterschiedHchen Richtungen modifiziert worden: durch sprachtheoretische Ergänzungen , zu ad hominem-Strategien sowie zu quasi-transzendentalphilosophischen Varianten.

Grundgedanke des paradigm case argument ist, Skepsis gegenüber Ansprüchen auf Tatsachenwissen durch Appell an den Sprachgebrauch zu widerlegen. Die naivsten Formen der Argumentation sind nicht schlüssig; in ihrer weiteren Verwendung und Diskussion ist sie daher in drei unterschiedHchen Richtungen modifiziert worden: durch sprachtheoretische Ergänzungen (zur Rolle von Standards, Lehrbeispielen, Hinweisdefinitionen, Verwendungskriterien, semantischen Beziehungen, Unterscheidungsfunktionen), zu ad hominem-Strategien sowie zu quasi-transzendentalphilosophischen Varianten (Bedeutung impliziert Wahrheit; Sprachbenutzung impliziert Überzeugung; Sprachspielbeherrschung enthält Wissen).

Grundgedanke des paradigm case argument ist, Skepsis gegenüber Ansprüchen auf Tatsachenwissen durch Appell an den Sprachgebrauch zu widerlegen. Die naivsten Formen der Argumentation sind nicht schlüssig; in ihrer weiteren Verwendung und Diskussion ist sie daher in drei unterschiedHchen Richtungen modifiziert worden: durch sprachtheoretische Ergänzungen (zur Rolle von Standards, Lehrbeispielen, Hinweisdefinitionen, Verwendungskriterien, semantischen Beziehungen, Unterscheidungsfunktionen), zu ad hominem-Strategien sowie zu quasi-transzendentalphilosophischen Varianten (Bedeutung impliziert Wahrheit; Sprachbenutzung impliziert Überzeugung; Sprachspielbeherrschung enthält Wissen).

THERE have been several attempts in recent philosophical discussion to present criteria for determining which words have ontological implications. I am going to concern myself with one attempt. The paradigm case argument has been appealed to in philosophical disputes ranging over such wide problem-areas as ‘other minds’, ‘freedom and determinism’ and ‘epistemological scepticism’. Reference has been made to paradigm cases in answering philosophers’ claims that ‘I can never know that another person is in pain’, ‘There are (...) no acts of free-will’ and ‘I can never know anything for certain’. (shrink)

Oswald Hanfling; II*—What is Wrong with the Paradigm Case Argument?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 21–38, http.

Dependency functions as a keyword in care theory. However, care theorists have spelled out the ontological and moral ramifications of dependency in different and often conflicting ways. In this article, I argue that conceptual disputes about dependency betray a fundamental discordance among authors, rooted in the empirical premises of their arguments. Hence, although authors appear to share a vocabulary of dependency, they are not writing about quite the same phenomenon. I seek to elucidate these differences by teasing out and comparing (...) different conceptions of dependency found in the literature. Borrowing a phrase from Eva Kittay, I trace four “paradigm cases” of dependency: the infant, the physically disabled person, the profoundly intellectually disabled person, and the refugee. These paradigm cases serve as the empirical touchstone from which theorists extract their conceptions of dependency. Each paradigm case, moreover, permits a particular ethical sensibility toward care. How we understand and value dependency thus seems to determine how we understand and value care, and vice versa. In this way, I contend, our normative orientation toward care might influence what sorts of dependency we see—and, by extension, which forms of dependency we fail to notice. (shrink)

My dissertation project addresses the problem of the legitimacy of "transcendental" arguments. This is an old, familiar problem that goes all the way back to Kant and The Critique of Pure Reason. There, for the first time, we have an explicit attempt to define, characterize and develop a distinct kind of argument. This kind of argument was intended to provide a model which could be used to establish the truth of a quite distinctive sort of proposition, the synthetic (...) apriori. ;The task of this dissertation is to articulate a central paradigm for transcendental arguments, that of being a conceivability argument of a rather special kind; and to reconstruct a Davidsonian argument in the philosophy of language that has all the features that are essential to the paradigm and to show that this argument avoids the familiar sorts of problem that have been claimed to attach to transcendental arguments in general. The project, if successful, serves to illuminate the kinds of features that we ought to care about in constructing and evaluating transcendental arguments. This dissertation suggests that we need to think of the nature of the transcendental in a way that is different from how it is normally understood, but which is such that it retains what is and has always been the truly deep and substantive reasons for interest in arguments of this kind. (shrink)

In contemporary Western culture, death has been widely censured because of its conceptual implications; it lies at the boundaries between reductionism and metaphysics. There is not yet an efficacious epistemology able to solve this contraposition and its consequent collision with science and tradition. This article analyzes Near Death Experiences as a prototypical argument in which the two perspectives conflict. Specifically, it analyzes the epistemological antinomies of the ontological representations of death, inhering in passage versus absolute annihilation. Indeed, the NDEs (...) theme permits the examination of the logical contradiction between monistic reductionism and its ontological counterpart to improve the discovery of a new paradigm that integrates the ecological with eternalist views. (shrink)

Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted pluralism maintains that only some are. Unrestricted pluralism, depending on how it (...) is cashed out, is either nihilism about practical reason or else it is subjectivism. Neither view is consistent with normative pluralism; hence, pluralism must be restricted. Restricted pluralism, however, faces two problems. The first stems from the question: “Why is it that some standards are normative domains while others are not?” The question seems to demand an answer, but it is hard to give any answer without appealing to considerations that imply facts about what we ought simpliciter to do. Second, restricted pluralism has difficulty accounting for our intuitions about cases in which one option is optimal in all domains, but not better than each alternative in any one domain. The unique option that is optimal in every domain seems better than its competitors, though it isn’t better within any domain. This is different than the widely discussed argument from notable-nominal comparisons. So I conclude that we have good reason to reject restricted pluralism, the only form of normative pluralism really worthy of that name. (shrink)

This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de‐sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent (...) and its limits. (shrink)

We discuss several aspects of legal arguments, primarily arguments about the meaning of statutes. First, we discuss how the requirements of argument guide the specification and selection of supporting cases and how an existing case base influences argument formation. Second, we present,our evolving taxonomy of patterns of actual legal argument. This taxonomy builds upon our much earlier work on argument moves and also on our more recent analysis of how cases are used to support arguments (...) for the interpretation of legal statutes. Third, we show how the theory of argument used by CABARET, a hybrid case-based/rule-based reasoner, can support many of the argument patterns in our taxonomy. (shrink)

Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence against theism; there’s no relevant difference (...) between horrendous evils and aggregates of small evils; hence horrendous evils must not provide decisive evidence against theism, either. (shrink)

The kalām cosmological argument proceeds from the claims that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence, and that the universe has a beginning. It follows that the universe has a cause of its existence. Presumably, this cause is God. Some defenders of the argument contend that, since we don’t see things randomly coming into existence, we know from experience that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence. Against this, some critics argue that (...) we may not legitimately move from observations of material things within the universe to conclusions about the universe itself. I argue that these critics are mistaken. We can after all draw cosmic conclusions from everyday experiences in support of the kalām argument. (shrink)

Within many animal taxa there is a trend for the species of larger body size to eat food of lower caloric value. For example, most large extant lizards are herbivorous. Reasonable arguments based on energetic considerations are often invoked to explain this trend, yet, while these factors set limits to feasible body size, they do not in themselves mathematically produce optimum body sizes. A simple optimization model is developed here which considers food search, capture, and eating rates and the metabolic (...) cost of these activities for animals of different sizes. The optimization criterion is defined as the net caloric gain a consumer accrues per day. This model does produce an optimum intermediate body size which increases with food quality - not the reverse. This discrepancy is accounted for, however, because the model also predicts that body size should be even more sensitive to increases in food abundance. In nature, many poor quality foods are also relatively abundant foods, hence the consumers eating them may maximize their daily energetic profit by evolving a relatively large body size. Optimum consumer body size also decreases with increases in consumer metabolic rate and prey speed. (shrink)

Modus Darwin is the name given by Elliott Sober to a form of argument that Sober attributes to Darwin in the Origin of Species, and to subsequent evolutionary biologists who have reasoned in the same way. In short, the argument form goes: Similarity, ergo common ancestry. In the present paper I review and critique Sober's analysis of Darwin's reasoning. I argue that modus Darwin has serious limitations that make the argument form unsuited for supporting Darwin's conclusions, and (...) that Darwin did not reason in this way. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective al-lows us to understand argumentation pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than as a method for obtaining the truth—that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.

This article examines argument structures and strategies in pro and con argumentation about the possibility of human-level artificial intelligence (AI) in the near term future. It examines renewed controversy about strong AI that originated in a prominent 1999 book and continued at major conferences and in periodicals, media commentary, and Web-based discussions through 2002. It will be argued that the book made use of implicit, anticipatory refutation to reverse prevailing value hierarchies related to AI. Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (...) (1969) study of refutational argument, this study considers points of contact between opposing arguments that emerged in opposing loci, dissociations, and casuistic reasoning. In particular, it shows how perceptions of AI were reframed and rehabilitated through metaphorical language, reversal of the philosophical pair artificial/natural, appeals to the paradigm case, and use of the loci of quantity and essence. Furthermore, examining responses to the book in subsequent arguments indicates the topoi characteristic of the rhetoric of technology advocacy. (shrink)

We investigate a new paradigm in the context of learning in the limit, namely, learning correction grammars for classes of computably enumerable (c.e.) languages. Knowing a language may feature a representation of it in terms of two grammars. The second grammar is used to make corrections to the first grammar. Such a pair of grammars can be seen as a single description of (or grammar for) the language. We call such grammars correction grammars. Correction grammars capture the observable fact (...) that people do correct their linguistic utterances during their usual linguistic activities. We show that learning correction grammars for classes of c.e. languages in the TxtEx-model (i.e., converging to a single correct correction grammar in the limit) is sometimes more powerful than learning ordinary grammars even in the TxtBe-model (where the learner is allowed to converge to infinitely many syntactically distinct but correct conjectures in the limit). For each n ≥ 0, there is a similar learning advantage, again in learning correction grammars for classes of c.e. languages, but where we compare learning correction grammars that make n + 1 corrections to those that make n corrections. The concept of a correction grammar can be extended into the constructive transfinite, using the idea of counting-down from notations for transfinite constructive ordinals. This transfinite extension can also be conceptualized as being about learning Ershov-descriptions for c.e. languages. For u a notation in Kleene's general system $(O,\, < _o )$ of ordinal notations for constructive ordinals, we introduce the concept of an u-correction grammar, where u is used to bound the number of corrections that the grammar is allowed to make. We prove a general hierarchy result: if u and v are notations for constructive ordinals such that $u\, < _o \,v$ , then there are classes of c.e. languages that can be TxtEx-learned by conjecturing v-correction grammars but not by conjecturing u-correction grammars. Surprisingly, we show that— above "ω-many" corrections—it is not possible to strengthen the hierarchy: TxtEx-learning u-correction grammars of classes of c.e. languages, where u is a notation in O for any ordinal, can be simulated by TxtBe-learning ω-correction grammars, where ω is any notation for the smallest infinite ordinal ω. (shrink)

In Paradigms and Barriers Howard Margolis offers an innovative interpretation of Thomas S. Kuhn's landmark idea of "paradigm shifts," applying insights from cognitive psychology to the history and philosophy of science. Building upon the arguments in his acclaimed Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, Margolis suggests that the breaking down of particular habits of mind—of critical "barriers"—is key to understanding the processes through which one model or concept is supplanted by another. Margolis focuses on those revolutionary paradigm shifts— such as (...) the switch from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview—where challenges to entrenched habits of mind are marked by incomprehension or indifference to a new paradigm. Margolis argues that the critical problem for a revolutionary shift in thinking lies in the robustness of the habits of mind that reject the new ideas, relative to the habits of mind that accept the new ideas. Margolis applies his theory to famous cases in the history of science, offering detailed explanations for the transition from Ptolemaic to cosmological astronomy, the emergence of probability, the overthrow of phlogiston, and the emergence of the central role of experiment in the seventeenth century. He in turn uses these historical examples to address larger issues, especially the nature of belief formation and contemporary debates about the nature of science and the evolution of scientific ideas. Howard Margolis is a professor in the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and in the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality and Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, both published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

R.W. Ashby maintained that people and animals do not have to remember as much as one might think since considerable information is stored in the environment. Presented herein is an everyday, quantitative example featuring calculation of the number bits of memory that can be off-loaded to the environment. The example involves one’s storing directions to a friend’s house. It is also argued that the example works with or without acceptance of the extended mind hypothesis. Additionally, a brief supporting argument (...) for at least a form of this hypothesis is presented. (shrink)

Pascal‘s wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the author‘sgeneral approach for developing (...) criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such ’pascal arguments‘is developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4). (shrink)

In their extensive overview of various concepts of presumption Godden and Walton recognise “the heterogeneous picture of presumptions that exists in argumentation theory today”. I argue that this heterogeneity results from an epiphenomenal character of the notion of presumption. To this end, I first distinguish between three main classes of presumptions. Framework presumptions define the basic conditions of linguistic understanding and meaningful conversation. The “presumption of veracity” is their paradigm case. I argue that such presumptions are satisfactorily covered (...) by the Principle of Charity, or else Gricean maxims or satisfaction conditions for speech acts. Formal presumptions are general presumptive rules of argument, theorised as topoi or acceptable inference warrants, including institutional warrants. Material presumptions are acceptable outcomes of nested or outsourced arguments, which entitles arguers to use them as acceptable premises or opinions in further arguments without the typical burden of proof. If this is correct, then the study of presumption always collapses into the study of other, likely more fundamental, concepts. Does it render presumptions, by Occam’s Razor, altogether redundant in argumentation theory? I tentatively answer this question from a consistently conversational perspective on argumentation; I argue that the pragmatic grounds for presumptions are to be found in the conditions for speech act performance in the institutional social world, as developed by Searle. (shrink)

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively (...) easily able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7). (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that much can be gained for the analysis and evaluation of arguing when fallacies are not, or not only, conceived of as flawed premise–conclusion complexes but rather as argumentative moves which distort harmfully an interaction aiming at resolving communication problems argumentatively. Starting from Normative Pragmatics and the pragma-dialectical concept of fallacy, a case study is presented to illustrate a fallacy which is termed the 'revelation argument' because it is characterized by an interactor's (...) revealing her thoughts and/or emotions to the addressees and claiming that these would have justificatory or refutatory potential with respect to the problem discussed. Although the revelation argument may not be a paradigm case of resolution- hindering moves, it is an extreme case of flawed reasoning that illustrates plainly the advantages of a communicational perspective on arguing and fallacies. (shrink)

Reasoning from negative evidence takes place where an expected outcome is tested for, and when it is not found, a conclusion is drawn based on the significance of the failure to find it. By using Gricean maxims and implicatures, we show how a set of alternatives, which we call a paradigm, provides the deep inferential structure on which reasoning from lack of evidence is based. We show that the strength of reasoning from negative evidence depends on how the arguer (...) defines his conclusion and what he considers to be in the paradigm of negated alternatives. If we negate only two of the several possible alternatives, even if they are the most probable, the conclusion will be weak. However, if we deny all possible alternatives, the reasoning will be strong, and even in some cases deductively valid. (shrink)

In her paper ‘An Awkward Relationship: the Case of Feminism and Anthropology’, Marilyn Strathern argues that feminist research cannot produce a paradigm shift in social anthropology. I reconstruct her arguments and evaluate them, revealing that they are insufficient for ruling out this possibility.

Many of our concepts are introduced to us via, and seem only to be constrained by, roughand-ready explanations and some sample paradigm positive and negative applications. This happens even in informal logic and mathematics. Yet in some cases, the concepts in question – although only informally and vaguely characterized – in fact have, or appear to have, entirely determinate extensions. Here’s one familiar example. When we start learning computability theory, we are introduced to the idea of an algorithmically computable (...) function (from numbers to numbers) – i.e. one whose value for any given input can be determined by a step-by-step calculating procedure, where each step is fully determined by some antecedently given finite set of calculating rules. We are told that we are to abstract from practical considerations of how many steps will be needed and how much ink will be spilt in the process, so long as everything remains finite. We are also told that each step is to be ‘small’ and the rules governing it must be ‘simple’, available to a cognitively limited calculating agent: for we want an algorithmic procedure, step-by-minimal-step, to be idiot-proof. For a classic elucidation of this kind, see e.g. Rogers (1967, pp. 1–5). Church’s Thesis, in one form, then claims this informally explicated concept in fact has a perfectly precise extension, the set of recursive functions. Church’s Thesis can be supported in a quasi-empirical way, by the failure of our searches for counterexamples. It can be supported too in a more principled way, by the observation that different appealing ways of sharpening up the informal chararacterization of algorithmic computability end up specifying the same set of recursive functions. But such considerations fall short of a demonstration of the Thesis. So is there a different argumentative strategy we could use, one that could lead to a proof? Sometimes it is claimed that there just can’t be, because you can never really prove results involving an informal concept like algorithmic computability.. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously endorse knowledge reliabilism, the view that knowledge must be reliably produced. Leading reliabilists have suggested that reliabilism draws support from patterns in ordinary judgments and intuitions about knowledge, luck, reliability, and counterfactuals. That is, they have suggested a proto-reliabilist hypothesis about “commonsense” or “folk” epistemology. This paper reports nine experimental studies (N = 1262) that test the proto-reliabilist hypothesis by testing four of its principal implications. The main findings are that (a) commonsense fully embraces the possibility (...) of unreliable knowledge, (b) knowledge judgments are surprisingly insensitive to information about reliability, (c) “anti-luck” intuitions about knowledge have nothing to do with reliability specifically, and (d) reliabilists have mischaracterized the intuitive counterfactual properties of knowledge and their relation to reliability. When combined with the weakness of existing arguments for reliabilism and the recent emergence of well supported alternative views that predict the widespread existence of unreliable knowledge, the present findings are the final exhibit in a conclusive case for abandoning reliabilism in epistemology. I introduce an alternative theory of knowledge, abilism, which out-performs reliabilism and well explains all the available evidence. (shrink)

Blair's account, like the intelligence field in general, treats many distinct constructs as if they were practically interchangeable – this is not self-evident. Paradigm integration and rationalization of redundant nomenclature are important for the continued development of understanding. The prior task is to demonstrate where synonymity of constructs across paradigms occurs, and where it fails. We present arguments why this is the case. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non-blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the “inside out”—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this (...) intention is also blameworthy in deterministic worlds. (shrink)