This practical guide for teaching philosophy brings together essays by two dozen distinguished philosophers committed to pedagogy. Addressing primarily practical issues, such as how to motivate students, construct particular courses, and give educational exams, the essays also touch on theoretical issues such as whether moral edification is a proper goal of teaching ethics.

THERE have been several attempts in recent philosophical discussion to present criteria for determining which words have ontological implications. I am going to concern myself with one attempt. The paradigm case argument has been appealed to in philosophical disputes ranging over such wide problem-areas as ‘other minds’, ‘freedom and determinism’ and ‘epistemological scepticism’. Reference has been made to paradigm cases in answering philosophers’ claims that ‘I can never know that another person is in pain’, ‘There are no acts of free-will’ (...) and ‘I can never know anything for certain’. (shrink)

Tziporah Kasachkoff received her doctorate in philosophy from New York University, teaches at The City University of New York, and has been a visiting professor at Ben Gurion University in the Negev, in Israel. Dr. Kasachkoff has published widely in applied philosophy and, since 1986, has been the editor of the American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy.

PHILOSOPHICAL defenses of the intelligibility of religious utterances, and of the tenability of religious beliefs, have come more and more to appeal to the Wittgensteinian claim that concepts must be understood in terms of the forms of life which give rise to them.

PHILOSOPHICAL defenses of the intelligibility of religious utterances, and of the tenability of religious beliefs, have come more and more to appeal to the Wittgensteinian claim that concepts must be understood in terms of the forms of life which give rise to them.

Discussion concerning the meaning and analysis of “punishment” has centered, in large measure, on claims for a logical connection between “punishment” and “guilt.” However, more and more in the literature focus has shifted from guilt as the defining feature of “punishment” to guilt as only one of many constitutive conditions satisfaction of which is necessary for standard cases with allowance made for other correct, though secondary, uses of the term.

Here, two dozen distinguished philosophers share their insights and practical suggestions on a diverse range of pedagogic issues with essays on how to motivate students, constructing syllabi for particular courses, teaching particularly complex concepts, and constructing creative examinations.

Part of the ‘Studies in Philosophical Psychology’ series, Sense and Delusion is a little book which is surprising, enjoyable, interesting and, at times, disappointing. It consists of five brief essays, three by Ilham Dilman and two by D Z Phillips. The theme of the first two essays, a theme usually associated with ‘existential thought’ but not so usually treated by those philosophers of the so-called ‘analytic’ school, is ‘What is the meaning of life?’ along with the attendant issues ‘What is (...) it to question the meaningfulness of a person’s life?’ and ‘What is it to question and/or be mistaken about the meaningfulness of one’s own life?’. The succeeding two chapters ask what is involved in the notion of self-deception as it applies to the worth-whileness of one’s existence. And the last chapter devotes itself to a discussion of what it means to take a moral stance, have moral opinions, and be merely concerned. (shrink)