Due to its enormous importance, Grotius’s contract doctrine has been extensively investigated by legal historians. This paper seeks to enhance scholarly understanding of this topic by looking at commentaries on De jure belli ac pacis written by German theologians and jurists in the second half of the seventeenth century. The paper focuses on comments concerning promises: the criteria for promises that are binding under natural law; the foundations of the obligation to keep promises; error and duress; and immoral promises. Grotius’s (...) contract doctrine rested on a mélange of sources, both theological and juridical, which were not always consistent. Commentators sought to harmonise them by looking at them from different perspectives: some comments were mainly based on interpretations of ius commune texts, whereas others reflected a moral theological approach. The results drew distinctions between law and moral theology that contributed to the fragmentation of Grotius’s synthesis. (shrink)

A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics offers a much-needed survey of the entire field of early modern Spanish scholastic thought. The volume introduces main themes and contexts of scholastics inquiry (theology, philosophy, ethics, politics, economics, law, science and the senses) through close examination of a wide range of texts, debates, methods, and authors, as well as in-depth discussion of the relevant literature. Each chapter includes a useful bibliography and serves as point of departure for future research. The volume not only (...) draws the sum of existing research, but also challenges established notions and breaks new ground. (shrink)

Pierre de Fermat is known as the inventor of modern number theory. He invented–improved many methods useful in this discipline. Fermat often claimed to have proved his most difficult theorems thanks to a method of his own invention: the infinite descent. He wrote of numerous applications of this procedure. Unfortunately, he left only one almost complete demonstration and an outline of another demonstration. The outline concerns the theorem that every prime number of the form 4n + 1 is the sum (...) of two squares. In this paper, we analyse a recent proof of this theorem. It is interesting because: it follows all the elements of which Fermat wrote in his outline; it represents a good introduction to all logical nuances and mathematical variants concerning this method of which Fermat spoke. The assertions by Fermat will also be framed inside their historical context. Therefore, the aims of this paper are related to the history of mathematics and to the logic of proof-methods. (shrink)

Aristotle created logic and developed it to a level of great sophistication. There was nothing there before; and it took more than two millennia for something better to come around. The astonishment experienced by readers of the Prior Analytics, the most important of Aristotle's works that present the discipline, is comparable to that of an explorer discovering a cathedral in a desert. This article explains and evaluates some of Aristotle's views about propositions and syllogisms. The most important omission is the (...) difficult subject of syllogisms involving modalities. Aristotle distinguishes two relations of opposition that can obtain between propositions with the same subject- and predicate-expressions: contrariety and contradiction. In every canonical syllogism, one term is common to the two premises: it is called “middle term,” or simply “middle.” The remaining two terms of the premises are the only ones occurring in the conclusion: they are called “extreme terms,” or simply “extremes.”. (shrink)

In the present paper we discuss a recent suggestion of Schroeder-Heister concerning the possibility of defining an intensional notion of harmony using isomorphism in second-order propositional logic. The latter is not an absolute notion, but its definition is relative to the choice of criteria for identity of proofs. In the paper, it is argued that in order to attain a satisfactory account of harmony, one has to consider a notion of identity stronger than the usual one (based on β- and (...) η-conversions) that the authors have investigated in recent work. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to understand an important passage in the history of the sciences of the psyche: starting from the psychiatric problematization — and the consequent emergence — of the concept and the object called ‘sexuality’ in the second half of the 19th century, it attempts to show a series of continuities and discontinuities between this kind of reasoning and the birth of psychoanalysis in the first years of the 20th century. The particular focus is therefore directed (...) on two texts: Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The argument runs along three intertwined axes: (1) an historico-epistemological analysis of the concepts and their transformations in the field of the science of sexuality; (2) an analysis of the power relationships between patients and physicians; and (3) an account of the psychiatric technologies of the self that have as an effect the emergence of new forms of ‘objective’ knowledge of the subject. The broader goal is to trace a map of the simultaneous and correlate coming into being and transformations both of new forms of objects and of new forms of subjects through the mediation of scientific concepts and techniques. (shrink)

_An examination of the philosophical notion of sacrifice from Kant to Nietzsche._.

Christ as symbol in Kant¿s religion -- Hegel's conception of God -- The reality of religion in Hegel's idealist metaphysics -- Hegel's version of the ontological argument for the existence of God -- The trinity and the I -- The death of God and recognition of the self -- Beyond subjectivism -- The relevance of Hegel's philosophy of religion today.

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should (...) the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to shed some light on the early Stoics' practice of managing platonic suggestions to construct their epistemology. Instances of such a practice, which scholars have recently focussed on, are the Stoic reassessment of the account of phantasia Plato offers in the Sophist and the image of the wax block as discussed in the Theaetetus. In this work I put forward a comparison between the simile of the soul-book, as presented by Socrates in (...) the Philebus (39a1-c2), and the Stoic image of the soul as a sheet in which conceptions are inscribed. I try to show that a far-reaching investigation of the relationship between Plato and early Stoic epistemology should take such a comparison into due account. In section one, I go into the details of the comparison and argue that Plato's perceptual judgment (this is how I translate the term doxa as it is used in the relevant section of the Philebus) is compatible with Stoic phantasia. In section two, I try to show that the theorisation of assent enable the Stoics to reply to an objection Aristotle made to Plato's definition of phantasia as a mixture of perception and judgment. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct a hypothetical genealogy of the U.S. national motto “in God we Trust” by comparing the juridical and theological concept of “depositum”. According to Philo of Alexandria, the deposit was the most sacred institutional act of ancient social life, because it had both a religious and a sociological function. According to the Epistulae to Timothy the term ‘deposit’ defined the legacy of the Christian faith of which the disciple of St. Paul was entrusted. (...) His task was to manage this legacy and to spread it among the others. Hence the deposit defined at the same time a contract based upon good faith and a symbolic space of “security”, namely a container that protected an unchangeable content: the oral knowledge transmitted by Christ to the Apostoles and, indirectly, to St. Paul. The depositum was also the procedure through which the word of Christ would acquire all its potential. On the other hand, the contract defined as “depositum” by Roman law was characterized by a centrality of the so-called bona fides and by the distinction between regular and irregular deposit. This means that the principle of good faith should lead the conducts of the manager whose task is exactly to look after an object called Christian faith. How can we interpret the word ‘trust’ according to the juridico-political remarks? The purpose of this chapter is to explain all these related issues. (shrink)

The article aims at describing an alternative way to the Foucaldian escape of sovereignty. According to Foucault the only chance to reach this goal is to “go beyond” this concept as well as of linked concepts such as “law” and “institution”. On the one hand this vision is affected by the erroneous identification of law with the order of the sovereign, while the original private dimension of law is totally neglected. On the other hand, Foucault cannot assume that it is (...) also possible to delegitimize sovereignty with the very tools of law, namely in a trial. The article deals with the case of the «mutilated sovereignty» of the Italian State which has been acknowledged by a court in 2006. The government has been compensated for the damages suffered by the State because of the illegal activity in a region. The sovereignty has been “estimated”. But estimating something unquantifiable like sovereignty is destroying its symbolic force. (shrink)

Biopolitics, as interaction of power and subjectivity, creates new ways of making law. It is no longer the definition of borders. It gives legitimacy to emerging practices.

The institution is always a heteronomous construction which supposes the intervention of a “fiat” establishing a break in the continuum of the natural succession of events. This beginning is a sequence of acts leading to a practical judgment on a reality that exists only because of this qualification. This is the sense of the legal verb instituere. The paper tests this vision of the institution on the case of a widespread practice in the managerial world: the 360-degree feedback. A Jesuit (...) genealogy of this practice illustrates new cultures within the firm and the consequences on the subjectivity level. (shrink)

This paper deals with a case of Virgilian ambiguity, namely the famous hemistich at Aen. 4.298 omnia tuta timens. By highlighting a plausible reading with a causal force (‘fearing everything too calm’, ‘because of the excessive calmness’), it seeks to demonstrate that this hemistich is an ambiguous passage. This view is confirmed through the imitation by Valerius Flaccus, who, in alluding to the Virgilian passage (Argonautica 8.408–12), highlights its ambiguity by including both of the most plausible readings.

The study of the neuroscience and genomics of mental illness are increasingly intertwined. This is mostly due to the translation of medical technologies into psychiatry and to technological convergence. This article focuses on psychosis. I argue that the convergence of neuroscience and genomics in the context of psychosis is morally problematic, and that ethics scholarship should go beyond the identification of a number of ethical, legal, and social issues. My argument is composed of two strands. First, I argue that we (...) should respond to technological convergence by developing an integrated, patient-centred approach focused on the assessment of individual vulnerabilities. Responding to technological convergence requires that we integrate insights from several areas of ethics, translate bioethical principles into the mental health context, and proactively try to anticipate future ethical concerns. Second, I argue that a nuanced understanding of the concept of vulnerability might help us to accomplish this task. I borrow Florencia Luna’s notion of ‘layers of vulnerability’ to show how potential harms or wrongs to individuals who experience psychosis can be conceptualised as stemming from different sources, or layers, of vulnerability. I argue that a layered notion of vulnerability might serve as a common ground to achieve the ethical integration needed to ensure that biomedical innovation can truly benefit, and not harm, individuals who suffer from psychosis. (shrink)

The author argues that one of the “circles” that constitute Hegel’s philosophical system, as it is displayed in the Encyclopedia, is the circle between the I and the spirit. Specifically, the author focuses on the emergence of spirit as a self and an I, and on the encounter of the I with nature. The author also argues that absolute spirit maintains fundamental intersubjective and perspectival features that are proper to the I, and that grasping the circular movement between the I (...) and the spirit in the context of Hegel’s discussion of absolute Geist is also relevant to appreciating how normative categories of social thought can be challenged and altered through Geist’s ability to achieve critical distance by overcoming subject/object distinctions. (shrink)

One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions called “realism” in metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these (...) three variants with the local/global realism dichotomy. The taxonomy here provided aims at being meta-philosophical; expressive enough for a fine-grained articulation of different philosophical positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial, with no need to be connected to the defense of one form or another of the philosophical positions called “realism.”. (shrink)

In 1959, the Charles Darwin Station and the Galápagos National Park were established, formally inaugurating conservation on the archipelago. In the same year, a utopian colony from the United States arrived. Whereas scholars have dismissed the latter and focused on the former, this essay unveils the science-inspired utopianism common to both enterprises. Investing science with the exclusive role of producing all knowledge and steering politics, leaders of the two initiatives aspired not only to protect nature but also to forge a (...) new humanity. Describing how such ambitions burst along lines of race, class, and nationality, I argue that these enterprises consolidated the current understanding of the Galápagos as “pristine”: a site fit for research and tourism but unhospitable to people. Drawing on archival and historical documents, this essay aims to reinvigorate two conversations: one between science and technology studies and conservation, and the other between STS and utopian studies. If recent attempts at bridging the divide between science and imagination have emphasized how powerful actors shape human society, this essay considers the long-lasting effects of scientific imaginaries on a politics of nature. (shrink)

Since the microbiological revolution, most infectious diseases have been defined and classified according to an etiologic criterion, i.e. the identification of single, external necessary causes (for example, Mycobacterium for tuberculosis). This is not the case with cancer. Not only external necessary causes of cancer have not been identified, but also the morphological classification cannot be based on univocal criteria. Although neoplasia and anaplasia appear to be universal attributes of cancer, these events are only quantitative. Neoplastic growth can be fast or (...) slow (development may take weeks or years), and tissue pathologies are difficult to detect from normal tissue in some cancers but are obvious in others. Common special properties of anaplasia appear to be concealed in the wide range of morphologies. In the absence of a coherent morphological definition, and of external necessary causes (such as bacteria for infectious diseases), a mechanistic definition could be adopted. However, unless molecular biology discovers specific mechanistic steps in carcinogenesis, which indicate the existence of necessary events in carcinogenesis, we cannot adopt a univocal (monothetic) definition of cancer. The alternative is to use a polythetic definition, according to Wittgenstein's model of a long rope twisted together out of many shorter fibres. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to tackle the sociosemiotic strategies through which the relation between power and visibility is articulated in today’s metropolitan São Paulo. Drawing on the theoretical-methodological framework of Greimasian and post-Greimasian semiotics, the following hypotheses are put forth: (1) contemporary São Paulo is characterized by a true visual hypertrophy, which manifests itself, all at once, in both its architectural and mediatic landscapes; (2) in São Paulo, power is hypervisible and apparently transparent; (3) the excess of images, (...) gazes, and perspectives produces, in São Paulo, dense and wide areas of topological, mediatic, and social invisibility; (4) the predominant visibility in São Paulo can be qualified as a “populist” visibility. Based on these assumptions, this article intends to contribute to the consolidation of a critical debate on the visual matrices of power and on social processes of exclusion and inclusion currently in place in global metropolises. Likewise, it is intended to contribute to the elaboration of a theoretical-methodological framework capable of understanding and addressing the complexity of the phenomena that characterize such debate. (shrink)

This article explores Hegel's conception of experience, positing it as the entry point for grasping the implications of the philosophy of nature. The article briefly examines Hegel's view of nature, focusing on its transformative journey from externality to integration with the conscious I. Subsequently, the purpose of Hegel's philosophy of nature is discussed, and recent interpretations are compared. The article unfolds the notion of experience as a bridge between the subjective dimension explored in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the understanding (...) of reality presented in the Encyclopedia. Experience, considered in its threefold meaning of unveiling, actively interpreting, and generating rationality within nature, dynamically shapes both the self‐conscious subject and the natural world across logic, nature, and spirit. Finally, the article highlights experience as mediating both the epistemological and the metaphysical relationship between nature and spirit. The article concludes by arguing that the transformative power of experience plays a central role in overcoming the separation between spirit and nature, fostering a mediated unity between the human subject and the natural world. (shrink)