My essay discusses the politics of anger from a phenomenological perspective. Philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum have examined the importance of emotions for achieving social justice. In Anger and Forgiveness, Nussbaum criticizes most forms of anger for including the desire to retaliate, but identifies a species of anger, “Transition-Anger,” which can motivate us to respond to wrongdoing. In a similar vein, I claim that anger can help the oppressed respond to their oppression. To defend this claim, I consider cases in (...) which anger motivates a response to racial prejudice. These cases depict situations in which a black man is confronted with the gaze of a white person. By contrasting the phenomenology of skillful and unskillful activity, I explain why the white gaze can provoke a sense of disorientation and physical incapacitation—what I call “bodily alienation”—in the black man. I argue that anger can wrest a black person from this alienation. This is because anger encourages action and provides blacks with insight into their oppression. My argument implies that anger is instrumentally valuable for resisting racism. As such, it can play a positive role in redressing its harms. Yet the cases of anger I describe are tainted with desires for retaliation, and do not map onto the ideal form of Transition-Anger Nussbaum prizes. Still, anger should not be dismissed altogether: if it can transform the experiences of the oppressed for the better, then there is a place for this emotion in combating injustices. (shrink)

This essay aims to show that implicit biases should not be conceived of as “inside the head” of individuals, but rather as embodied and social. My argument unfolds in three stages. First, I make the case for conceiving of implicit biases as perceptual habits. Second, I argue that we should think of perceptual habits and, by extension, implicit biases, as located in the body. Third, I claim that individual habits are shaped by the social world in which we find ourselves (...) and that the social world is itself shaped by our habitual ways of interacting with and perceiving others. This suggests that implicit biases are part of the fabric of the social world. Thus, I conclude that implicit biases should be understood as embodied and social. (shrink)

"What are you?" This question, whether explicitly raised by another or implied in his gaze, is one with which many persons perceived to be racially ambiguous struggle. This article centers on encounters with this question. Its aim is twofold: first, to describe the phenomenology of a particular type of racializing encounter, one in which one of the parties is perceived to be racially ambiguous; second, to investigate how these often alienating encounters can be better negotiated. In the course of this (...) investigation, this article examines the addressee's point of view and consider possible responses to the other's question. In addition, it discusses the addresser's perspective, both to probe the curiosity underlying the "What are you?" question and to explore alternatives to it. By describing the phenomenology of these encounters, this article hopes to show that racial ambiguity, as distinct from mixed-race, is a category of lived experience that calls for deeper philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

This article explores the ongoing obsession with the thigh gap ideal in certain pockets of Western societies. A thigh gap is the space some women have between their inner thighs when they stand with their feet together. The thigh gap ideal is flaunted on “thinspo” websites, which compile diet and exercise tips and display pictures of fashion models and “real women” in their efforts to inspire women to become thinner. I aim to identify what is wrong with the thigh gap (...) obsession and to suggest a way to overcome it. I begin by describing the genesis of the obsession. I then argue that the relation women in the grip of this preoccupation have to their bodies is an instance of what I call bodily alienation. Next, I consider responses to the thigh gap phenomenon. I claim that a viable response, besides broadening standards of beauty, lies in pursuing bodily activities for their own sake. I call the view I articulate “sensualism.” I conclude by discussing the merits of an individual response of the type I advocate, in light of the structural character of women’s oppression through standards of beauty. (shrink)

"One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human female acquires in society; it is civilization as a whole that develops this product, intermediate between female and eunuch, which one calls feminine. Only the mediation of another can establish an individual as an Other. In so far as he exists for himself, the child would not be able to understand himself as sexually differentiated. In girls as in boys (...) the body is first of all the radiation of a subjectivity, the instrument that accomplishes the comprehension of the world: it is through the eyes, the hands, and not through the sexual parts that children apprehend the universe." -/- My aim is to develop an interpretation of this passage, which starts with one of the most iconic sentences in the history of feminist thought. Beauvoir asserts that only in virtue of the significance others attribute to their sexual parts do children come to understand themselves as sexually differentiated. This is the phenomenon Beauvoir refers to when she speaks of “the mediation of another.” Her claim here, I argue, is that becoming a woman is predicated on developing such a self-understanding. -/- Many readers have argued that this passage epitomizes Beauvoir’s conviction that there is an important difference between sex and gender. On such a reading, Beauvoir might be said to describe the transition between two states: the state of the newborn who has a sex but no gender identity yet (“who is not a woman”) and that of the grown person who has both a sex and a gender identity (“who has become a woman”). I argue that this reading is untenable, and for two reasons. First, there is no evidence in The Second Sex that Beauvoir means to establish a distinction between a person’s biological properties and her social identities. Second, this distinction does not make sense of Beauvoir’s understanding of the body as a situation. Being a woman, I will argue, is an aspect of the body-as-a-situation. The body-as-a-situation is the instrument through which freedom is exercised, and it is shaped by the social significance of bodily features. By contrast, biological properties cannot be predicated of the body-as-a-situation. As such, they are not properly speaking attributes of the self. In other words, Beauvoir does not theorize a nature/culture distinction, but aims to describe the social significance of bodies and constraints on women’s freedom. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

“Body positivity” refers to the movement to accept our bodies, regardless of size, shape, skin tone, gender, and physical abilities. The movement is often implicitly understood as the effort to celebrate diversity in bodily aesthetics and to expand our narrow beauty standards beyond their present-day confines. Like other feminists, I question whether the push to broaden beauty norms should occupy as central a role as it does now in the movement’s mainstream incarnations, and I believe that, beyond challenging confining beauty (...) standards, body positivity should teach us that all bodies are worthy—for example, of care and respect. My aim in this paper is to offer a general account of body positivity. I argue that body positivity should be understood as the transition from limiting body shame to proper body pride. I adopt a pluralistic approach to body positivity, incorporating the idea that we should not only expand aesthetic standards, but also celebrate such aspects of embodiment as our capacity for bodily pleasure or our bodily abilities. What is common to these different ways of developing empowering relations to our bodies is the move to resist all forms of body shame that limit our flourishing and to cultivate proper pride in one’s body. I conclude by considering several avenues toward embodying such pride and, thus, embracing body positivity: expanding beauty ideals; promoting equal access to physical activities and celebrating the accomplishments of all athletes, regardless of body size or level of ability; and consciousness-raising. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article makes the case for the continued relevance of former U.S. president Barack Obama's conception of social hope. To present this conception, I compare it with the views of hope developed by two prominent political philosophers: Immanuel Kant and Richard Rorty. Kant, Rorty, and Obama all espouse the idea that progress must be founded on hope since hope motivates action. Yet the three differ on the grounds of hope. Kant believes that social progress depends on our shared humanity. (...) Similarly, Obama regards progress as founded on a set of values shared by all Americans. Given our divisions today, however, Obama's premise appears implausible. Rorty's philosophy of hope provides a way out of this worry: progress need not depend on an essential feature shared by all but can be achieved by “stitching together” coalitions between groups that share interests. Still, this does not imply that we should abandon Obama's conception of hope altogether. The idea of audacious hope implies that we should have the courage to resist the temptation to let divisions quell our efforts toward political progress. Obama's conception of hope, with the Rortian corrective I defend, holds much promise in our current political climate. (shrink)

This article examines the question of life's meaning in the Anthropocene, an era where the biosphere is significantly threatened by human activities. To introduce the existential dilemma posed by the Anthropocene, Leboeuf considers Samuel Scheffler's Death and the Afterlife. According to Scheffler, the existence of others after one's death shapes how one finds life meaningful. Thus, anyone who sees a connection between the meaning of life and the future of humanity should ask, why live in the Anthropocene? Leboeuf answers this (...) question via William James's lecture “Is Life Worth Living?” James, Leboeuf argues, would enjoin us not to waste time deliberating about life's worthwhileness. Instead, we must meet the challenges placed on us. Today we are summoned by our climate crisis to fight for our survival. Even if our collective future will have been shortened by our inaction, life is worth living in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Research on the experience of gendered embodiment, on the one hand, and racialized embodiment, on the other hand, has emerged as an important tradition in phenomenology thanks to the works of Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1949) and Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) respectively. Beauvoir’s work has been prolonged by pioneering feminist phenomenologists, such as Iris Marion Young and Sandra Bartky, who have investigated both the cultural significance of female bodily functions and the alienating effects (...) of feminine standards of beauty for women. And those inspired by Fanon—for example, George Yancy and Alia Al-Saji—have homed in on the experiences of persons of color confronted by the white gaze or entering white spaces. While each of these lineages has contributed to expanding the discipline of phenomenology, specific descriptions of the bodily experiences of women of color have received comparatively little attention in this field. This chapter aims to fill this gap by exploring the bodily experiences of women of color, thereby making a case for expanding phenomenological work at the intersection of gender and race. (shrink)

The concept of bodily alienation is promising for critical phenomenologies of race because it marries description and evaluation. With this concept, we can go beyond mere descriptions of lived experience and provide arguments for challenging the status quo. In fact, we can steer clear of another danger: an overly “objective” form of theorizing about race that is unresponsive to the lived experiences of the subjects whose lives it aims to reimagine. By contrast, phenomenologies founded on the concept of bodily alienation (...) teach us which social interactions and spaces alienate people of color. In turn, this knowledge can help us envision a more hospitable world for all. (shrink)

Este artículo estudiará la participación de los personajes femeninos de los videoclips de narcocorridos La dama de la troca colorada (Rossina Silva “La Pa’rribeña”, 2010) y Las plebitas chacalosas (Yasmín Gamboa, 2010), y de la narcopelícula videohome La descarada (Oscar López, 2017) en las dinámicas neoliberales violentas de enriquecimiento salvaje, hiperconsumo, hedonismo y ostentación de lujos a través de las figuras de la jefa narcotraficante y de la buchona. Los estudios de casos abordarán el rol de la jefa y de (...) la buchona en el capitalismo gore (Valencia 2010) a la luz de sus prácticas necropolíticas destructivas del tejido social y del desgaste de su dinero en objetos de consumo, en fiestas y en lujos efímeros que corresponden a una cultura del consumo inmediato de bienes desechables que acelera el proceso de agotamiento de los recursos naturales. Primero, se mostrará cómo algunos de los personajes femeninos del corpus escogido recurren a la hiperviolencia y mercantilizan la muerte para alcanzar sus aspiraciones de acumulación de capital y de ascenso social. Se analizará luego cómo los personajes de buchonas se insertan en relaciones erótico-afectivas transaccionales con narcotraficantes para obtener lujos que contrastan con la precariedad económica generalmente vivida en la frontera. (shrink)

Much phenomenological work on race has focused on the bodily experiences of persons of color in white spaces or in the face of the white gaze. But comparatively little has been written about how to change these bodily experiences. This article fills this gap by discussing the perspective of those who enact bodily habits alienate persons of color, or what this article calls “racializing bodily habits.” It defends a novel path toward reforming these habits: the practice of mindfulness meditation. The (...) key premise in this argument is that reforming racializing bodily habits requires that one transform one’s perception of and affective responses to racialized others. It explains that mindfulness meditation slows our experience of time, thereby opening up the possibility for new affective responses, perceptual habits, and bodily habits. This article bases its argument on qualitative descriptions of mindfulness meditation and on empirical research on its effects. (shrink)

This essay aims to motivate a different way of reading Simone de Beauvoir's feminist philosophy than that which has become dominant in Beauvoir scholarship. I wish to argue that we can read Beauvoir as articulating what I will call a "feminist art of living." To substantiate this thesis, I highlight a crucial feature of her art of living—one that is connected to her reflections on the body—namely, what I refer to as Beauvoir's "sensualism." By "sensualism," I have in mind a (...) subjective experience of the body from an intimate, first-person perspective that is not derived from the body's appearance.Before delving into the idea of sensualism, let me preview the stages of my argument. I first discuss examples of how... (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van de wijsgerige ethiek.

Scientific realists have suggested that changes in our scientific communities over the course of their history have rendered those communities progressively less vulnerable to the problem of unconcieved alternatives over time. I argue in response not only that the most fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have generated steadily mounting obstacles to revolutionary, transformative, or unorthodox scientific theorizing, but also that we have substantial independent evidence that the institutional apparatus of contemporary scientific inquiry fosters an exceedingly and increasingly theoretically (...) conservative form of that inquiry. I conclude that contemporary scientific communities are actually more vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives than their historical predecessors, and I briefly suggest how we might seek to pursue scientific inquiry in a less theoretically conservative way. (shrink)

인간의 이성적 의식과 법의 관계를 밝히고 법의 해석 과 판단에 인간의 의식이 어떻게 작용하는가를 고찰 한 저술. 제1부에서는 법의 형이상학적인 측면에서 법의 실체, 그리스의 법, 데카르트의 법, 로크와 법, 칸트와 법, 헤겔과 법, 아담스미스의 법의 경제, 중국의 도덕과 법사상을 다루었다. 제2부에서는 심리학적 분석으로 헌법의 심리학적 해석, 법의 판결절차, 증거법, 형법과 죄, 청소년과 가족법, 조세법, 플라톤의 법, 칸트의 도덕론의 경험적 확인, 헤겔의 자아와 노동법, 법의 4차원에 대해 다뤘다.

George Berkeley is one of the greatest and most influential modern philosophers. In defending the immaterialism for which he is most famous, he redirected modern thinking about the nature of objectivity and the mind's capacity to come to terms with it. Along the way, he made striking and influential proposals concerning the psychology of the senses, the workings of language, the aims of science, and the scope of mathematics. In this Companion volume a team of distinguished authors not only examines (...) Berkeley's achievements but also his neglected contributions to moral and political philosophy, his writings on economics and development, and his defense of religious commitment and religious life. The volume places Berkeley's achievements in the context of the many social and intellectual traditions - philosophical, scientific, ethical, and religious - to which he fashioned a distinctive response. (shrink)

One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...) like which is the coherent expression of a single idea: knowing what an experience is like is knowing what it would be like to have the phenomenal content of the experience as the content of an experience one is currently having. I explain how my conclusions indicate that the focus of discussion should be on the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts and not on the Knowledge Argument. The latter is a poor expression of the difficulty Physicalists face. (shrink)

Typical discussions of virtual reality (VR) fixate on technology for providing sensory stimulation of a certain kind. They thus fail to understand reality as the place wherein we live and work, misunderstanding it instead as merely a sort of presentation. The first half of the paper examines popular conceptions of VR. The most common conception is a shallow one according to which VR is a matter of simulating appearances. Yet there is, even in popular depictions, a second, more subtle conception (...) according to which VR is a matter of facilitating new kinds of interaction. The latter half of the paper turns to questions about the contemporary technology of Internet chatrooms. The fact that chatrooms can be used in certain ways suggests something about the prospects for VR. The penultimate section asks whether chatrooms may legitimately be thought of as places. (In a sense, they may.) The final section asks whether cybersex may legitimately be thought of as sex. (Again, yes.) Chatroom technology thus provides an argument for the second conception of VR over its much ballyhooed rival. (shrink)

There has been an increase in recent years in the use of empirical methods in healthcare ethics. Appeals to empirical data cannot answer moral questions, but insights into the knowledge, attitudes, experience, preferences and practice of interested parties can play an important part in the development of healthcare ethics. In particular, while we may establish a general ethical principle to provide explanatory and normative guidance for healthcare professionals, the interpretation and application of such general principles to actual practice still requires (...) interpretation and judgement. And many situations in healthcare practice are complex and may involve a variety of principles, each of which may conflict with the others. Simple surveys or interview studies may not be sufficient if we wish to develop a nuanced approach to ethical practice that can be set out in guidelines, codes or directives. We do not resolve moral questions by plebiscite. In this paper, the authors argue for the use of consensus methods to develop shared understanding of ethical practice, and they argue further for the combination of the Delphi method with the use of vignettes to illustrate the kind of situations that may occur in practice. They develop their argument in part by reference to their experience of using this approach in their recent research. (shrink)

As family physicians, general practitioners play a key role in safeguarding children. Should they suspect child abuse or neglect they may experience a conflict between responding to the needs and interests of the child and those of an adult patient. English law insists on the paramountcy of the interests of the child, but in family practice many other interests may be at stake. The authors argue that uncritical adoption of the paramountcy principle is too simplistic and can lead, paradoxically, to (...) greater harm. They argue for a more subtle and nuanced view of interests and of conflicts of interest in safeguarding children. (shrink)

Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, provides a comprehensive and accessible textbook treatment of the way decisions are made both when we have the statistical probabilities associated with uncertain future events and when we lack them. The book presents models, primarily prospect theory, that are both tractable and psychologically realistic. A method of presentation is chosen that makes the empirical meaning of each theoretical model completely transparent. Prospect theory has many applications in a wide variety of disciplines. The material in (...) the book has been carefully organized to allow readers to select pathways through the book relevant to their own interests. With numerous exercises and worked examples, the book is ideally suited to the needs of students taking courses in decision theory in economics, mathematics, finance, psychology, management science, health, computer science, Bayesian statistics, and engineering. (shrink)

On-line, just as off-line, there are ways of assessing the credibility of information sources. The Internet, although it arguably makes for nothing wholly new in this regard, complicates the ordinary task of assessing credibility. In the first section, I consider a specific example and argue that Internet content providers have no clear interest in resolving these comlications. In the second, I consider four general ways that we might assess credibility and explore how they apply to life online. Finally, I argue (...) that even careful information gathering may pose subtle pitfalls but that some of these may be mitigated on-line. (shrink)

Stuart Hameroff opens with an extended and updated exposition of the Penrose/Hameroff Orch-OR model, and subsequently addresses recent criticisms of quantum approaches to the brain. Evan Walker presents his view on consciousness from the perspective of a new approach to the integration of quantum theory and relativity. Friedrich Beck elaborates on the Beck/Eccles quantum approach to consciousness. Karl Pribram puts the holographic view on consciousness in perspective of his life long work. Peter Marcer and Edgar Mitchell explain the relevance of (...) quantum holography for consciousness. Gordon Globus discusses the relation between postmodern philosophical theories and quantum consciousness. Chris Clarke develops a theory in terms of a specific type of formal logic to reconcile the phenomenology of consciousness with the physical world. Ilya Prigogine summarizes his view on complexity, and on the future of quantum theory, which goes beyond the present formalism, and goes on to comment on the problem of consciousness. Matti Pitkanen identifies the place for consciousness in a unifying topological geometro-dynamics theory. Colin McGinn argues against classical materialism. Dick Bierman gives an overview of anomalous phenomena. He identifies a decline effect, and discusses different possible interpretations. Philip Van Loocke closes the volume with a discussion on how deep teleology in cellular systems may relate to consciousness. (shrink)