This book elucidates the debate between Swami Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi, V.D. Savarkar and Gandhi, and Sri Aurobindo and Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. It also compares and contrasts for the first time, scholars like Sudhir Kakar and Tapan Raychaudhuri. The debates in classical, colonial and contemporary Indian philosophy are specifically reported. A discussion on Indian state, civil society, religion and politics is presented. Moreover, the association between science and spiritualism is explained.

This book publishes, for the first time in decades, and in many cases, for the first time in a readily accessible edition, English language philosophical literature written in India during the period of British rule.

This paper attempts to articulate certain inadequacies that are involved in the traditional way of categorizing Indian philosophy and explores alternative approaches, some of which otherwise are not explicitly seen in the treatises of the history of Indian Philosophies. By categorization, I mean, classifying Indian philosophy into two streams, which are traditionally called as astica and nastica or orthodox and heterodox systems. Further, these different schools in the astica Darsanas and nastica Darsanas are usually numbered (...) into six and three respectively. Nyaya - Vaisesika, Sankhya -Yoga and Purva & Uttara Mimamsa are identified as astica darsanas and Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism are identified as nastica darsanas (6+3). It is my endeavor to critically analyze the usual astica-nastica distinction of 6+3 classification of Indian philosophy so as to find out the meaning of such a rationale in this categorization. This general consensus is contested in this paper. What I am intended to support and strengthen such a critical analysis and exploration is to discuss these systems of India’s philosophy within the general intellectual milieu of Indian cultural traditions, its orientations, presuppositions and preferences. In order to carry out such a task, I shall be taking recourse to the theories of different scholars, both traditional and modern, in approaching and appropriating Indian Philosophy from different perspectives and their critical-creative approaches shall be scrutinized. (shrink)

This book introduces the vast topic of Indian philosophy. It begins with a study of the major Upanishads, and then surveys the philosophical ideas contained in the Bhagavadgita. After a short excursion into Buddhism, it summarizes the salient ideas of the six systems of Indian philosophy: Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Vedanta. It concludes with an introduction to contemporary Indian thought.

In contrast to a stereotypical account of Indian philosophy that are entailments of the interpreter’s beliefs (an approach that violates basic standards of reason), an approach to Indian philosophy grounded on the constraints of formal reason reveals not only a wide spread disagreement on dharma (THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD), but also a pervasive commitment to the practical foundation of life’s challenges. The flip side of this practical orientation is the criticism of ordinary experience as erroneous (...) and reducible to the agent’s mental states. If we ignore the background practical orientation in Indian philosophy, this seems not like an error theory, that I call Ironic Idealism, but as a defense of idealism. I consider salient candidates for Indian Idealism (Advaita Vedānta, Yogācāra Buddhism, Kāśmīra Śaivism and the Yogavāsiṣṭha) and note that these positions continue a theme in Indian philosophy of articulating Ironic Idealism. Ironic Idealism depends upon the very Indian distinction between ultimate and provisional truth, and Ironic Idealism criticizes the mundane, provisional sort of "truth" as psychological and mental --- and ultimately false. Interpretation, the common approach to the study of Indian philosophy, is an example of what Ironic Idealism criticizes. This explains why authors incorrectly find Idealism everywhere in Indian thought. (shrink)

Article lays out the conceptual space for Indian theorizing about literal and non-literal meaning by way of each of these three textual traditions. Since the article’s structure is topical rather than historical, a chronology of major figures is appended to help orient readers. The focus of the article is the period demarcated roughly from 200 CE to 1300 CE, often characterized as the Classical Period of Indian philosophy.

This volume explores the relevance of classical texts and thought-systems alongside contemporary philosophical consciousness. It also evaluates the absences in contemporary thought patterns and the new epistemes relevant to the Indian subcontinent. The book discusses the present lack of original philosophical discourse in the context of South Asia, especially India. Raghuramaraju investigates the reasons for the decline of traditional philosophical schools and Sanskritic studies in the subcontinent.

Human rights, as traditionally understood in the West, are grounded in an anthropocentric theory of personhood. However, as this chapter argues, such a stance is certainly not culturally universal; historically, it is derivable from a cultural orientation that is Greek in origin. Such an orientation conflates thought with language (logos), and identifies humans as uniquely deserving of moral consideration or standing to the exclusion of non-human knowers. The linguistic theory of thought impedes insight and understanding of both Indian and (...) Western contributions to political and moral thought. It is argued that the idea that we have rights by virtue of being human is problematic. In contrast, the chapter argues for an account of personal rights derivable from Patañjali’s philosophy. On a Patañjalian account, the rights necessary for the good of persons transcend species, sex, caste, race, class, age, ability, and sexual orientation. (shrink)

Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidass 2007). Regretfully, it is not an uncommon view in orthodox Indology that Indian philosophers were not interested in ethics. This claim belies the fact that Indian philosophical schools were generally interested in the practical consequences of beliefs and actions. The most popular symptom of this concern is the doctrine of karma, according to which the consequences of actions have an evaluative valence. Ethics and the History of (...) class='Hi'>Indian Philosophy argues that the orthodox view in Indology concerning Indian ethics is false. The first half the book deals with theoretical issues in studying ethics: defining moral terms, understanding the subject matter of ethics so as to transcend culturally specific substantive commitments and touches upon issues of cross-cultural hermeneutics and translation. The second half consists of a systematic explication of the moral philosophical aspects of nine major Indian philosophical schools. I argue that “dharma” in its various uses in Indian philosophy is always rationally treated as a moral term—even in so called “ontological” employments of the term as seen in Buddhism and Jainism. In understanding “dharma” in this manner, the Indian philosophical tradition is replete with different versions of moral realism that fit tidily with other philosophical commitments of Indian philosophers. Pains are taken to show the breath of moral philosophical disagreement in this tradition. On a comparative note, some Indian moral philosophy resembles realist approaches of the Western tradition (such as the Non-natural realism of Neo-Platonism, or the Naturalism of Utilitarianism). Out of the major Indian philosophical schools, a slim minority are shown to be committed to moral irrealism while some are shown to regard their entire philosophical orientation as firmly planted within moral philosophy (such as Jainism, Buddhism, Purva Mimamsa and Yoga). In response to those who would argue that what Indian philosophers meant by “dharma” is very different from what moral philosophers in the West have meant by “ethical” or “good,” I argue that this is as vacuous as noting that Utilitarians have a different conception of the good from Deontologists. If philosophy is concerned with theoretical debate, as I argue it is, philosophical terms function to articulate such disagreements. The various seemingly desperate uses of “dharma” in the Indian tradition are no longer confusing or disorderly when we understand the theoretico-philosophical function of this term in Indian philosophical disputes. -/- The second edition contains an additional chapter that addresses the colonial and political context of the study of Indian Ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Race, Buddhism, and the Formation of Oriental (Tōyō) Philosophy in Meiji JapanYijiang ZhongIntroduction: Why Race for Philosophy?This paper examines the discursive efforts by Inoue Tetsujirō井上哲次郎, the foremost figure in the establishment of philosophical study in Meiji Japan, to de-Westernize Buddhism for the purpose of redefining the Orient (Tōyō 東洋) and constructing Oriental philosophy in contribution to nation-state building in Japan1. Born in 1855 to (...) a doctor’s family in Kyushu, Inoue studied Confucian classics as well as English and Western thought at a young age before being selected to study at the newly established Tokyo University (Tokyo daigaku 東京大学), which was renamed Imperial University (Teikoku daigaku 帝国大学) in 1886 and then Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo teikoku daigaku 東京帝国大学) in 1897. Upon graduation, Inoue taught philosophy at the university and co-published the first dictionary of philosophy, Tetsugaku jii (字彙) in 1881. In 1884, Inoue was sent to study philosophy in Europe, and upon returning to Japan in 1890, he became a professor of philosophy at (Tokyo) Imperial University, a position he held until retirement in 1923. Regarded as “the representative philosopher of the Meiji period,”2 Inoue played a major role in adopting and reconfiguring both Western and indigenous discourses and categories in the formulation of Oriental philosophy (Tōyō tetsugaku 東洋哲学), and shaped this new form of philosophical knowledge in the service of a “national morality” (kokumin dōtoku 国民道徳), i.e., the ideological foundation of modern Japanese nation-state building. Key to Inoue’s philosophical thought was the eclectic idea of “phenomenon as essence” (genshō soku jitsuzai ron), or the unity of appearance and substance, which Inoue developed by integrating the Kantian distinction of noumena (thing-in-itself) [End Page 53] and phenomenon, and the Buddhist distinction of discrimination (sabetsu) and equality (byōdō).3In October 1890, Inoue Tetsujirō returned to Japan after six years of study in Germany and took up a professorship of philosophy in the Department of Literature of Tokyo Imperial University, where he lectured from 1891 to 1898 on Indian philosophy and history of Buddhism under the title of “Comparative Religion and Oriental Philosophy.”4 On June 30, 1897, he published a small (123-page) book entitled On the Race of Shakyamuni (Shaka shuzoku ron 釋迦種族論), which included a lecture “What Race was Buddha Shakyamuni?” (Shaka ha ikanaru shuzoku nanoka 釋迦は如何なる種族なのか) given at the Tokyo Academy (Gakushi kaiin 学士会院) on July 7, 1895, and a much longer essay defending his theory of the Buddha’s race developed from the lecture as an attack on Naka Michiyo 那珂通世, who was a professor at Tokyo Higher Normal School engaged in a public debate with Inoue on the issue. In 1902, Inoue went on to publish a biography of the Buddha, Shakyamuni-den 釈迦牟尼伝, demonstrating his persistent interest in the life and identity of the founder of Buddhism. Curiously, while the title “What Race Was the Buddha” appeared in the table of contents of the biography, the essay itself was not included in the book. Then in April 1911, a new version of the biography was published after Inoue and his student Hori Kentoku 堀謙徳 expanded the content and appended seven annotations and bibliographical essays, including one on the racial identity of the Buddha. The revised biography has 465 pages, greatly expanding the 1902 version of 286 pages. This time, not only was the essay “What Race Was the Buddha” not included, but its title did not appear in the table of contents either.Why did Inoue need to talk about race and determine the racial identity of the Buddha when he was lecturing on Oriental philosophy, religion, and national morality? What do the emergence and disappearance of the issue of the Buddha’s racial origin in Inoue’s lectures and publications mean? How did these changes speak of Buddhism, Oriental philosophy, and Japanese philosophy Inoue was constructing? So far, scholars have not raised the question of race, although a growing amount of literature on Inoue from the perspectives of philosophy, intellectual history, and political ideology is surfacing.5 The only study that touched upon Inoue’s essay on the racial identity of the Buddha is Isomae Junichi 磯前順一’s Kindai Nihon no shūkyō gensetsu to sono keifu 近代日本の宗教言説とその系譜 [End Page 54... (shrink)

The main aim of this chapter is to trace the naturalistic traits present in classical Indian philosophical systems, which are well known for their “spiritual” orientation. Having set aside initial doubts regarding the possibility of discovering naturalism in the Indian philosophical scenario, it draws attention to different kinds of naturalism, viz., ontological, methodological, semantic, linguistic, moral, and aesthetic. With reference to ontological naturalism, it discusses in detail the full‐fledged naturalism of the Cārvāka materialists, the mitigated naturalism of the (...) Naiyāyika‐s, the Buddhists, and the Jainas, and the protonaturalism of the Sāmkhya philosophers. It then discusses methodological naturalism mainly with reference to the Nyāya epistemology and moral naturalism, keeping in mind those philosophical systems which uphold that moral values can be understood in terms of moral facts and therefore question the validity of the fact/value distinction. (shrink)

Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy. By Christopher G. Framarin. Routledge Hindu Studies Series. London: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xv + 196. $170 ; $44.95.

Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy. Edited with an introduction by Eli Franco. Vienna: De Nobili, 2013. Pp. viii + 388. € 40.

The commentary engages Hegel’s anxieties as discussed in Robert Pippin’s lead paper on the question of Western ‘modernity’ in early 19th century: how did we get there, to the ‘dissatisfactions of European high culture’, after all the promises of the teleology of world-spirit (ecclesia spiritualis) and hermeneutik that Hegel mapped in the inexorable march of history. More importantly, we ask how does the rest of the world – the non-European, non-modern regions – fare or compare? Where do they belong in (...) the larger scheme of the world historical picture (Weltbild)? Hegel was not blinded by the lure of a modernising West that he had created; rather, he valued the contributions of other civilizations to the growth of the West. At least references to India, China, or Asia at large, from Herder onwards, did not escape him. But this part of the story is left out from modern accounts. While he suggested turning the gaze toward the East could be instructive for the triumphalism of the West, he was not sanguine about the prospect of the East ever catching up with the West; imperializing the aliens might work. But his anxiety about the incomplete determinate subjectivity of the modern West was not assuaged. That Hegel flirted with the Orient in moments of disappear tells us something about how he both drew West’s attention to the hidden philosophies of the East—especially to Indian dialectical logic—and paved the way for the ‘Europeanisation of the Earth’ (in Heidegger’s cautionary adage on Husserl’s dictum). (shrink)

An introduction to comparative philosophy relates European and Oriental philosophies and brings to light such aspects of Eastern philosophy as intellectuality, reasoning, and logical analysis usually associated with Western thought.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion by Selusi AmbrogioCatherine König-Pralong (bio)Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion. By Selusi Ambrogio. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. How Modern Historians of Philosophy Drew Their World MapsIn his latest book, Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in (...) Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion, Selusi Ambrogio presents an extensive survey of how Indian and Chinese traditions were conceived of and staged in modern European historiography. This study, which surpasses in detail and scope other works devoted to the same topic,1 reconstructs 150 years of philosophical historiography. Otto van Heurn's Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum libri duo (published in 1600) included for the first time contemporary and ancient Indian thinkers in the philosophical doxography; at the other end of the time span considered, Jacob Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1744) sanctioned the exclusion of Chinese and Indian thinkers by means of a detailed criticism of their pseudo-philosophies. Moreover, Ambrogio makes the choice to focus on the history of philosophy, unlike Étiemble, for example,2 who was interested in philosophy in a broad sense—academic and non-academic—as well as in travel accounts, the writings of the Jesuits, and those of their opponents, among other sources. According to Ambrogio, the histories of philosophy were more representative of "the common European understanding of these civilizations," since they "were not openly written for controversialist aims" (p. 2). Even though one may wonder whether defining philosophy ("what philosophy is and its role"—ibid.) and legitimizing its scholarly practice is a less political or less polemical undertaking than pamphlets, letters, and philosophical essays,3 it is probably true that philosophical historiography produced an effect of objectification or an appearance of neutrality.The author's main thesis is that the exclusion of all non-Greeks or non-Europeans from the history of philosophy does not date from the nineteenth century and Hegel, as is generally thought, but precisely from the moment when Indian and Chinese "civilizations" were considered by historians of philosophy and included in the philosophical historiography: from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards (p. 3). Applying a segregationist model, modern historians of philosophy developed a dialectic of [End Page 203] identification—the author speaks of "reception"—and exclusion. They defined the European philosophical mind by demarcating it from other ways of thinking, which they situated in place and time on a civilizational world map. Encompassing the world from Europe produced in return processes of definition and situation. Philosophy was established in a territory and identified with a "culture" or "mind" that began to think itself in relation to the rest of the world under the name of Europe.4I will discuss Ambrogio's remarkable work in three moments. First, I will develop some particularly interesting conclusions drawn from the study; namely, they address periodization, the production of cultural categories, and the valorization of theory. I will then discuss the main thesis as well as some problematic issues, before concluding on the subject of a world absent from Ambrogio's book, the Near and Middle East.I. Logic of Time and Cultural TerritorializationAmbrogio's book is composed of three parts that address three successive historiographical models. First, the "perennialist universalism" (p. 57)—represented by, among others, Otto van Heurn, Thomas Burnet, Isaac Vossius, François Bernier, Georg Horn, and François de la Mothe le Vayer—included ancient India and then China in the "prisca theologia"; on the other hand, it described contemporary Indian and Chinese thinkers as "barbarian" philosophers. In this constellation, Buddhism began to function as the negative part of Oriental thought. According to the Jesuits, it had polluted and corrupted the original Chinese wisdom, often identified with Confucianism.The second model constructed an "Atheistic Asia," which was used either as a positive anthropological image (for example in Pierre Bayle), or as a negative foil for Lutheran philosophy and theology (for example in Johann Franz Buddeus). In the pages he dedicates to these endeavors, Ambrogio often moves away from philosophical doxography, represented by André-Fran... (shrink)

Pandey, V. Introduction.--Kalelkar, K. S. Jainism, a familyhood of all religions.--David, M. D. From Risabha to Mahavira.--Chalil, J. E. Glimpses of Southern Jainism.--Gopani, A. S. Life and culture in Jaina narrative literature, 8th, 9th and 10th century A.D.--Gopani, A. S. Position of women in Jaina literature.--Ranka, R. Evolution of Jaina thought.--Pandey, V. Jaina philosophy and religion.--Shah, C. C. Jainism and modern life.--Sankalia, H. D. The great renunciation.--Shah, U. P. Jaina contribution to Indian art.--Gorakshkar, S. Early metal images of (...) the Jainas.--Bhagwati, U. Bibliographical aids for the study of Jainism. (shrink)

The Story of Oriental Philosophy by Lily Adams Beck offers insights into such Eastern scriptures as the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the teachings of Zen, and Indian sacred writing. Chapters include: The Aryan People of India and the teachings and lore of notable figures as Buddha, Shankara, Confucius, Lao-Tsu, Mencius and many others. The ancient wisdom of Asia awaits those seeking value in thought and knowledge. L. Adam Beck was one of the more well-known and popular (...) novelists and biographers in the 1920s. Beck's fascination with Asian culture and philosophy influenced her to write not only this book but several ""oriental fantasies"" of her era. (shrink)

When one becomes aware of the stated aim of this short text, he is not so prone to view with surprise the territory it claims to cover, for Hackett tells us that he is not attempting a learned treatise but wishes "to spread a feast of insight for the common man who is at the same time deeply thoughtful and profoundly concerned with the cumulative, total human understanding of the meaning of existence". The "feast" includes two main dishes and two (...) lesser ones plus three short desserts. The main course has a substantial chapter on "Buddhism: A Philosophy of Enlightenment" followed by "Hinduism: A Philosophy of Release." The meal opens with two relatively brief chapters: "Confucianism: A Philosophy of Ethical Idealism" and "Taoism: A Philosophy of Mystical Oneness and Self-Transcendence." The dessert is in the form of three brief appendices, one on Jainism, another on Indian materialism and the third on Reincarnation. A helpful glossary clarifies terms, some of which are not even tasted in the earlier portions. The index is careful; the selected bibliography is much too short. Fine-print marginal summaries throughout the book help the digestive processes. (shrink)

This new edition of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy sets forth clearly, for the first time for the English reader, what Hegel actually said. These lectures challenged the antiquarianism of Hegel's contemporaries by boldly contending that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy, not just history. It portrays the journey of reason or spirit through time, as reason or spirit comes in stages to its full development and self-conscious existence, through the successive products of human (...) intellect and activity. These lectures proved to be extremely influential on the intellectual history of the past two centuries. They are crucial to understanding Hegel's own systematic philosophy in its constructive aspect, as well as his views on the centrality of reason in human history and culture. Volume I holds additional importance because, as well as setting out Hegel's discussion of the history of Chinese and Indian philosophy, it presents the interesting and significant changes that Hegel made to the stage-setting introduction to these lectures across the years from 1819 to 1831. This edition adapts the considerable editorial resources of the German edition that it translates, to the needs of the general reader as well as the serious scholar, so as to constitute an unparalleled resource on this topic in the English language. (shrink)

Comparative environmental philosophy is valuable in many ways. Perhaps it is most valuable because it reveals some of the foundational assumptions that run so deep in the poles of comparison that they might otherwise have gone unnoticed. These revelations may invite us to challenge those assumptions that have led to the kind of thinking responsible for much of the environmental degradation that we see today. Japanese Environmental Philosophy gathers papers focused on the environmental problems of the twenty-first century. (...) Drawing from Japanese philosophical traditions they investigate our relationships with other humans, nonhuman animals, and the environment. The heart of the book consists of chapters written by fifteen top scholars from Japan, the United States, Europe, and Australia. The essays cover a broad range of topics drawn from various strains of Japanese thought—including Zen Buddhism, Shintoism, the Kyoto school, and Japanese philosophy of art and aesthetics—as well as from traditional Japanese culture and the contemporary science of planning for natural disasters. These articles demonstrate that Japanese scientific, philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions can provide meaningful insight to address the current global environmental crisis. (shrink)

The ideas, topics, and parameters of Indian Mahāyana Buddhist philosophy are immense and diverse. The soteriological goal of achieving the liberative state of nirvāna provides the basic aim and orientation of all Buddhist philosophy, including the Indian Mahāyana. The Yogācāra school (also known as Cittamātra) of Mahāyana philosophy makes use of the technical term “emptiness” in its descriptions of the essenceless way in which things are said to exist, yet the details of the way this (...) is explained are strikingly different from those of their Madhyamaka counterparts. The chapter presents a basic outline of the structure of Mahāyana path system with the caveat that, for individual thinkers, the devil, so to speak, is in the details. (shrink)

This book is the first English translation of the classic philosophical treatise Kantadarsaner Tatparyya . Bhattacharyya combines the basic tenets of Kant to present it in terms of Indian philosophical traditions. The introduction discusses the need for the translation, the challenges involved, and the context of Bhattacharyya's interpretations and thought. The detailed notes and annotations to the translation guide the reader through a variety of concepts in Western and Indian philosophy, as well as comments on the Bengali (...) text. This book will be of considerable interest to scholars, teachers, and students of Western and Indian philosophy. (shrink)