Prosthetic devices that replace a lost limb have become increasingly performant in recent years. Recent advances in both software and hardware allow for the decoding of electroencephalogram signals to improve the control of active prostheses with brain-computer interfaces. Most BCI research is focused on the upper body. Although BCI research for the lower extremities has increased in recent years, there are still gaps in our knowledge of the neural patterns associated with lower limb movement. Therefore, the main objective of this (...) study is to show the feasibility of decoding lower limb movements from EEG data recordings. The second aim is to investigate whether well-known neuroplastic adaptations in individuals with an amputation have an influence on decoding performance. To address this, we collected data from multiple individuals with lower limb amputation and a matched able-bodied control group. Using these data, we trained and evaluated common BCI methods that have already been proven effective for upper limb BCI. With an average test decoding accuracy of 84% for both groups, our results show that it is possible to discriminate different lower extremity movements using EEG data with good accuracy. There are no significant differences in the decoding performance of these movements between healthy subjects and subjects with lower extremity amputation. These results show the feasibility of using BCI for lower limb prosthesis control and indicate that decoding performance is not influenced by neuroplasticity-induced differences between the two groups. (shrink)

Prosthetic devices that replace a lost limb have become increasingly performant in recent years. Recent advances in both software and hardware allow for the decoding of electroencephalogram signals to improve the control of active prostheses with brain-computer interfaces. Most BCI research is focused on the upper body. Although BCI research for the lower extremities has increased in recent years, there are still gaps in our knowledge of the neural patterns associated with lower limb movement. Therefore, the main objective of this (...) study is to show the feasibility of decoding lower limb movements from EEG data recordings. The second aim is to investigate whether well-known neuroplastic adaptations in individuals with an amputation have an influence on decoding performance. To address this, we collected data from multiple individuals with lower limb amputation and a matched able-bodied control group. Using these data, we trained and evaluated common BCI methods that have already been proven effective for upper limb BCI. With an average test decoding accuracy of 84% for both groups, our results show that it is possible to discriminate different lower extremity movements using EEG data with good accuracy. There are no significant differences in the decoding performance of these movements between healthy subjects and subjects with lower extremity amputation. These results show the feasibility of using BCI for lower limb prosthesis control and indicate that decoding performance is not influenced by neuroplasticity-induced differences between the two groups. (shrink)

"Monteverdi et Wagner : hiatus, mariage impossible, défiance à l’entendement. Le mélomane proteste. Mais le parallèle n’est pas inédit. Car mettre en relation Monteverdi et Wagner, qu’a priori tout oppose, permet de lever le voile sur l’essentiel. À deux siècles d’intervalle, les changements de paradigme opérés par les deux artistes ont un terreau commun. Au-delà des analogies formelles, les attaques portées aux deux compositeurs et leurs répliques sous forme d’écrits théoriques mettent en évidence un monde d’idées. Nietzsche commença sa carrière (...) philosophique en le soulignant. À travers Ficin et Politien pour Monteverdi – Hölderlin, Schelling et Novalis pour Wagner –, les racines néoplatoniciennes communes aux deux créateurs constituent une autre correspondance révélatrice. On les retrouve au seuil du baroque comme du symbolisme. Venise, Pétrarque et Le Tasse ne laissent pas de réunir Monteverdi et Wagner, tandis qu’Orphée et Tristan offrent au chercheur une série d’analogies frappantes. Alors pourquoi ce rapprochement a-t-il été si peu approfondi? Certes, la dénonciation des frontières interdisciplinaires propres au système académique n’est pas nouvelle. Mais faut-il rester muet devant leur persistance? Il existe aujourd’hui toute une philosophie de la musique, ou précisément de la musique instrumentale. Mais où est la philosophie de l’opéra? Après avoir évoqué les apports lumineux de Romain Rolland et de Jean-Jacques Nattiez à la musicologie, Olivier Lexa établit un bref historique de la philosophie de l’opéra, de Rousseau à Nietzsche en passant par Hegel, Novalis, Schopenhauer et Kierkegaard. Par la suite, l’auteur aborde la portée exemplaire de l’histoire de l’art, de l’histoire culturelle et de l’esthétique analytique, avant de se pencher sur les relations que plusieurs grands penseurs récents et contemporains ont entretenues avec l’art lyrique : Adorno, Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Deleuze, Foucault, Bourdieu, Badiou, Lacoue-Labarthe et Žižek. Sera-t-on surpris de retrouver les noms de Monteverdi et Wagner parmi les récurrences dominantes?" -- Site internet de l'éditeur. (shrink)

Tel qu’Arrien l’indique dans les Entretiens, le cours d’Épictète comprenait une partie technique, où l’apprentissage de la doctrine et des démonstrations était de mise, et une autre, à laquelle nous avons seulement accès, où le maître discutait plus librement avec des interlocuteurs de tous horizons sur des sujets d’ordre spécifiquement éthiques en interprétant la doctrine stoïcienne selon ses propres catégories conceptuelles. Cette deuxième séquence pédagogique interroge directement l’utilité de la première, et engage une réflexion plus large sur l’école philosophique, reprenant (...) la discussion traditionnellement menée entre stoïciens et académiciens sur la scholè. Épictète apporte ainsi un éclairage original sur le rôle, le sens et la fonction des pratiques scolaires à l’époque romaine, dans la perspective stoïcienne d’une vie philosophiquement authentique, en accord avec la nature. (shrink)

We present a theoretical framework bearing on the evolution of written communication. We analyze writing as a special kind of graphic code. Like languages, graphic codes consist of stable, conventional mappings between symbols and meanings, but (unlike spoken or signed languages) their symbols consist of enduring images. This gives them the unique capacity to transmit information in one go across time and space. Yet this capacity usually remains quite unexploited, because most graphic codes are insufficiently informative. They may only be (...) used for mnemonic purposes or as props for oral communication in real-time encounters. Writing systems, unlike other graphic codes, work by encoding a natural language. This allows them to support asynchronous communication in a more powerful and versatile way than any other graphic code. Yet, writing systems will not automatically unlock the capacity to communicate asynchronously. We argue that this capacity is a rarity in non-literate societies, and not so frequent even in literate ones. Asynchronous communication is intrinsically inefficient because asynchrony constrains the amount of information that the interlocutors share and limits possibilities for repair. This would explain why synchronous, face-to-face communication always fosters the development of sophisticated codes (natural languages), but similar codes for asynchronous communication evolve with more difficulties. It also implies that writing cannot have evolved, at first, for supporting asynchronous communication. (shrink)

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich’s models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our (...) critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions. (shrink)

Cultural forms are constrained by cognitive biases, and writing is thought to have evolved to fit basic visual preferences, but little is known about the history and mechanisms of that evolution. Cognitive constraints have been documented for the topology of script features, but not for their orientation. Orientation anisotropy in human vision, as revealed by the oblique effect, suggests that cardinal orientations, being easier to process, should be overrepresented in letters. As this study of 116 scripts shows, the orientation of (...) strokes inside written characters massively favors cardinal directions, and it is organized in such a way as to make letter recognition easier: Cardinal and oblique strokes tend not to mix, and mirror symmetry is anisotropic, favoring vertical over horizontal symmetry. Phylogenetic analyses and recently invented scripts show that cultural evolution over the last three millennia cannot be the sole cause of these effects. (shrink)

The theory and practice of contemporary comparative biology and phylogeny reconstruction (systematics) emphasizes algorithmic aspects but neglects a concern for the evidence. The character data used in systematics to formulate hypotheses of relationships in many ways constitute a black box, subject to uncritical assessment and social influence. Concerned that such a state of affairs leaves systematics and the phylogenetic theories it generates severely underdetermined, we investigate the nature of the criteria of homology and their application to character conceptualization in the (...) context of transformationist and generative paradigms. Noting the potential for indeterminacy in character conceptualization, we conclude that character congruence (the coherence of character statements) relative to a hierarchy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction. Specifically, it is insufficient due to the lack of causal grounding of character hypotheses. Conceptualizing characters as homeostatic property cluster natural kinds is in accordance with the empirical practice of systematists. It also accounts for the lack of sharpness in character conceptualization, yet requires character identification and re-identification to be tied to causal processes. (shrink)

Cognitive gadgets puts forward an ambitious claim: language, mindreading, and imitation evolved by cultural group selection. Defending this claim requires more than Heyes' spirited and effective critique of nativist claims. The latest human “cognitive gadgets,” such as literacy, did not spread through cultural group selection. Why should social cognition be different? The book leaves this question pending. It also makes strong assumptions regarding cultural evolution: it is moved by selection rather than transformation; it relies on high‐fidelity imitation; it requires specific (...) cognitive adaptations to cultural learning. Each of these assumptions raises crucial yet unaddressed difficulties. (shrink)

The “species-as-individuals” thesis takes species, or taxa, to be individuals. On grounds of spatiotemporal boundedness, any biological entity at any level of complexity subject to evolutionary processes is an individual. From evolutionary theory flows an ontology that does not countenance universal properties shared by evolving entities. If austere nominalism were applied to evolving entities, however, nature would be reduced to a mere flow of passing events, each one a blob in space–time and hence of passing interest only. Yet if there (...) is genuine biodiversity in nature, if nature is genuinely carved into species, and taxa, then these evolutionary entities will be genuinely differentiated into specific kinds, each species being one of its kind. Given the fact that evolving entities have un-sharp boundaries, an appropriately weak, “non-essentialist” concept of natural kind has to be invoked that does not allow for strong identity conditions. The thesis of this paper is that species are not either individuals, or natural kinds. Instead, species are complex wholes (particulars, individuals) that instantiate a specific natural kind. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis and a normative assessment of rationing through inconvenience as a form of rationing. By “rationing through inconvenience” in the health sphere, we refer to a nonfinancial burden that is either intended to cause or has the effect of causing patients or clinicians to choose an option for health-related consumption that is preferred by the health system for its fairness, efficiency, or other distributive desiderata beyond assisting the immediate patient. We argue that under (...) certain conditions, rationing through inconvenience may turn out to serve as a legitimate and, compared to direct rationing, even a preferable tool for rationing; we propose a research agenda to identify more precisely when that might be the case and when, alternatively, rationing through inconvenience remains ethically undesirable. After defining and illustrating rationing through inconvenience, we turn to its moral advantages and disadvantages over other rationing methods. We take it as a starting assumption that rationing, understood as scarce-resource prioritization, is inevitable and, in a society that has goals beyond optimizing health care for individual patients—such as improving societal health care, education, or overall welfare—prudent and fair. (shrink)

The history of biological systematics documents a continuing tension between classifications in terms of nested hierarchies congruent with branching diagrams (the ‘Tree of Life’) versus reticulated relations. The recognition of conflicting character distribution led to the dissolution of the scala naturae into reticulated systems, which were then transformed into phylogenetic trees by the addition of a vertical axis. The cladistic revolution in systematics resulted in a representation of phylogeny as a strictly bifurcating pattern (cladogram). Due to the ubiquity of character (...) conflict—at the genetic or morphological level, or at any level in between—some characters will necessarily have to be discarded ( qua noise) in favor of others in support of a strictly bifurcating phylogenetic tree. Pattern analysts will seek maximal congruence in the distribution of characters (ultimately of any kind) relative to a branching tree-topology; process explainers will call such tree-topologies into question by reference to incompatible evolutionary processes. Pattern analysts will argue that process explanations must not be brought to bear on pattern reconstruction; process explainers will insist that the reconstructed pattern requires a process explanation to become scientifically relevant, i.e., relevant to evolutionary theory. The core question driving the current debate about the adequacy of the ‘Tree of Life’ metaphor seems to be whether the systematic dichotomization of the living world is an adequate representation of the complex evolutionary history of global biodiversity. In ‘Questioning the Tree of Life’, it seems beneficial to draw at least four conceptual distinctions: pattern reconstruction versus process explanation as different epistemological approaches to the study of phylogeny; open versus closed systems as expressions of different kinds of population (species) structures; phylogenetic trees versus cladograms as representations of evolutionary processes versus patterns of relationships; and genes versus species as expressions of different levels of causal integration and evolutionary transformation. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. At (...) the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

The definition of taxon names as formalized by the PhyloCode is based on Kripke's thesis of “rigid designation” that applies to Millian proper names. Accepting the thesis of “rigid designation” into systematics in turn is based on the thesis that species, and taxa, are individuals. These largely semantic and metaphysical issues are here contrasted with an epistemological approach to taxonomy. It is shown that the thesis of “rigid designation” if deployed in taxonomy introduces a new essentialism into systematics, which is (...) exactly what the PhyloCode was designed to avoid. Rigidly designating names are not supposed to change their meaning, but if the shifting constitution of a clade is thought to cause a shift of meaning of the taxon name, then the taxon name is not a “rigid designator”. Phylogenetic nomenclature either fails to preserve the stability of meaning of taxon names that it propagates, or it is rendered inconsistent with its own philosophical background. The alternative explored here is to conceptualize taxa as natural kinds, and to replace the analytic definition of taxon names by their explanatory definition. Such conceptualization of taxa allows taxon names to better track the results of ongoing empirical research. The semantic as well as epistemic gain is that if taxon names are associated with natural kind terms instead of being proper names, the composition of the taxon will naturally determine the meaning of its name. (shrink)

An ideography is a general-purpose code made of pictures that do not encode language, which can be used autonomously – not just as a mnemonic prop – to encode information on a broad range of topics. Why are viable ideographies so hard to find? I contend that self-sufficient graphic codes need to be narrowly specialized. Writing systems are only an apparent exception: At their core, they are notations of a spoken language. Even if they also encode nonlinguistic information, they are (...) useless to someone who lacks linguistic competence in the encoded language or a related one. The versatility of writing is thus vicarious: Writing borrows it from spoken language. Why is it so difficult to build a fully generalist graphic code? The most widespread answer points to a learnability problem. We possess specialized cognitive resources for learning spoken language, but lack them for graphic codes. I argue in favor of a different account: What is difficult about graphic codes is not so much learning or teaching them as getting every user to learn and teach the same code. This standardization problem does not affect spoken or signed languages as much. Those are based on cheap and transient signals, allowing for easy online repairing of miscommunication, and require face-to-face interactions where the advantages of common ground are maximized. Graphic codes lack these advantages, which makes them smaller in size and more specialized. (shrink)

Species are generally considered to be the basic units of evolution, and hence to constitute spatio-temporally bounded entities. In addition, it has been argued that species also instantiate a natural kind. Evolution is fundamentally about change. The question then is how species can remain the same through evolutionary change. Proponents of the species qua individuals thesis individuate species through their unique evolutionary origin. Individuals, or spatio-temporally located particulars in general, can be bodies, objects, events, or processes, or a combination of (...) these. It is here argued that species are best understood as open or closed, causally integrated processual systems that also instantiate an historically conditioned homeostatic property cluster natural kind. (shrink)

The German tradition of considering species, and higher taxonomic entities, as individuals begins with the temporalization of natural history, thus pre-dating Darwin’s ‘Origin’ of 1859. In the tradition of German Naturphilosophie as developed by Friedrich Schelling, species came to be seen as parts of a complex whole that encompasses all (living) nature. Species were comprehended as dynamic entities that earn individuality by virtue of their irreversible passage through time. Species individuality was conceived in terms of species taxa forming a spatiotemporally (...) located relational system (complex whole), a conception of species that was easily assimilated to an evolutionary world view. However, the dynamics of an evolutionary process driven by variation and natural selection created a tension between continuity in nature as opposed to the discreteness and relative stasis of species. As a consequence, some authors such as Ernst Haeckel and Karl August Möbius denied the reality of species, while others explicitly linked the reality and individuality of species to their temporal duration. The mature conception of species as individuals, as formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and adopted by Willi Hennig, is one of an historically conditioned, spatiotemporally located, causally integrated, dynamic yet transiently homeostatically stabilized relational system. (shrink)

This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, (...) confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences. (shrink)

Taking its clues from Popperian philosophy of science, cladistics adopted a number of assumptions of the empiricist tradition. These include the identification of a dichotomy between observation reports and theoretical statements and its subsequent abandonment on the basis of the insight that all observation reports are theory-laden. The neglect of the ‘context of discovery’, which is the step of theory (hypothesis) generation. The emphasis on coherentism in the ‘context of justification’, which is the step of evaluation of the relative merits (...) of alternative theories. The appeal to a total evidence approach in phylogenetic inference. And finally, a silence about causation, which results in an instrumentalist approach to phylogeny reconstruction. This paper explores how these empiricist assumptions are embedded in phylogenetic systematics, and why these assumptions are problematic for cladists (or any taxonomists). (shrink)

In a recent contribution, Ereshefsky (2007a) maintained the following points against Nixon and Carpenter (2000), Keller et al. (2003), and Rieppel (2005a, 2006a,b): (1) that species and taxa are individuals, not natural kinds; (2) that “origin essentialism” conflates qualitative essentialism with genealogical connectedness; and (3) that rigid designation theory applies to taxon names. Here I argue that: (1) the conception of species as individuals or natural kinds is not mutually exclusive but rather context sensitive; species are best seen as spatio-temporally (...) located processual systems that instantiate an HPC natural kind; (2) “origin essentialism” is problematic because of the fuzzy boundaries of species and taxa, yet required if rigid designation theory is to apply to taxon names; and (3) the theories of direct reference and rigid designation do not apply to taxon names. (shrink)

This paper explores the use of Popper's philosophy of science by cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical taxonomy. Three schools of biological systematics fiercely debated each other from the late 1960s: evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics or numerical taxonomy, and phylogenetic systematics or cladistics. The outcome of that debate was the victory of phylogenetic systematics/cladistics over the competing schools of thought. To bring about this "cladistic turn" in systematics, the cladists drew heavily on the philosopher K.R. Popper in order to (...) dress up phylogenetic systematics as a hypothetico-deductivist, indeed falsificationist, research program that would put an end to authoritarianism. As the case of the "cladistic revolution" demonstrates, scientists who turn to philosophy in defense of a research program read philosophers with an agenda in mind. That agenda is likely to distort the philosophical picture, as happened to Popper's philosophy of science at the hands of cladists. (shrink)

A recently published study on the development of the turtle shell(1) highlights the important role that development plays in the origin of evolutionary novelties(1). The evolution of the highly derived adult anatomy of turtles is a prime example of a macroevolutionary event triggered by changes in early embryonic development. Early ontogenetic deviation may cause patterns of morphological change that are not compatible with scenarios of gradualistic, stepwise transformation.

XXIX. Retour à Aphrodisias. Compléments à Documents XXV, BCH 1983. XXX. Ampoules chrétiennes. Ces petites ampoules, contenant un peu d'huile sainte, étaient portées sur le corps comme des objets de protection. Types trouvés en Asie Mineure : Saint André, Jean l'Évangéliste, la fuite en Egypte. XXXI. Pline VI 49, Démodamas de Milet et la reine Apamè. Démodamas de Milet, général de Séleucos I, connu par Pline et par des décrets de Milet en l'honneur d'Antiochos et d'Apamè. Son zèle pour le (...) Didymeion. Les décrets milésiens datant de 299, son expédition en Sogdiane se place vers 306. XXXII. Documents pergaméniens. 1. Un décret de Pergame : le décret OGI 332, trouvé près d'Élaia, à trois heures de Pergame, décrétant des honneurs à Attale III victorieux (érection de deux statues ; célébration régulière de l'anniversaire de son retour à Pergame, fête exceptionnelle pour l'entrée du roi dans «notre ville»), émane bien de Pergame et non d'Élaia comme on a cru pouvoir l'affirmer à cause de l'opposition entre « Pergame » et « notre ville » : en fait au moment du vote du décret Attale est bien arrivé sur le territoire de Pergame, et il se repose à l'Asclépieion avant son entrée solennelle dans la ville. Autres entrées solennelles de rois ou de Romains. 2. Un décret d'Élaia : dans le décret Syllogez 694, décidant de consacrer des stèles de bronze portant le traité d'alliance avec Rome, la prééminence de Déméter et Core dans les cultes de la cité montre que ce décret émane d'Élaia, dont les types monétaires montrent, à côté d'Athéna et de l'olivier, Déméter, le grain de blé, la torche. 3. Fabriques royales : les ergastéria mentionnés dans une lettre d'un roi de Pergame (Welles, Roy. Cor., 23) sur les droits et privilèges d'un prêtre ne sont pas des fabriques royales, mais simplement des ateliers-boutiques, construites par le roi, dans un portique du sanctuaire, et louées chaque année au bénéfice du prêtre. XXXIII. A Gaunos avec Quintus de Smyrne. Justesse de la description de « Gaunos la creuse » par Quintus de Smyrne. Les voyageurs et la description de la petite plaine, du lac, et du cadre de montagnes. Le Tarbélos est à identifier avec le massif Sandras Dag. Richesse du territoire, malgré les fièvres : les figues, l'encens, la forêt, la pêche. La place de Gaunos dans le monde hellénistique : Gauniens à l'étranger, notamment en Egypte, avec Zenon. (shrink)

Cet article examine le traitement donné par Descartes et certains de ses successeurs d’une question classique, quoique peu étudiée, celle de savoir si l’on peut penser plusieurs choses à la fois. Le thème d’une saisie simultanée est central dans la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance, en particulier dans les Regulæ, où il s’appuie sur le recours à une attention divisée. Restreignant ce pouvoir à la seule imagination, Clauberg voit dans le corps vivant le paradigme de la simultanéité. Spinoza offre quant (...) à lui un point de vue synthétique : la simultanéité dans le corps et l’esprit sont des expressions de la puissance individuelle et de son progrès. L’attention n’est plus comme chez Descartes une condition de la simultanéité intellectuelle, mais un obstacle qu’il s’agit de surmonter pour comprendre plus et mieux. (shrink)

This book builds on recent scholarship highlighted in the edited collections, Philosophie, histoire, biologie: mélanges offerts à Jean Gayon (Merlin & Huneman, 2018) and Knowledge of Life Today (Gayon & Petit 2018/2019). While honoring the career and the thought of Jean Gayon (1949-2018), this book showcases the continued relevance of Gayon’s interdisciplinary work and illustrates his central place in the community of historians and philosophers of the life sciences. Chapters in this book address Jean Gayon’s intellectual trajectory from historical epistemology (...) to the philosophy of biology, the nature and scope of his philosophical approach to the history of science, and his unique contributions to the history and epistemology of biological concepts and theories. Drawing on published and unpublished sources, the book explores some of Gayon’s most significant contributions to the philosophy, history, and social studies of biology. (shrink)

Suspicion of “physics envy” surrounds the standard statistical toolbox used in the empirical sciences, from biology to psychology. Mainstream methods in these fields, various lines of criticism point out, often fall short of the basic requirements of measurement. Quantitative scales are applied to variables that can hardly be treated as measurable magnitudes, like preferences or happiness; hypotheses are tested by comparing data with conventional significance thresholds that hardly mention effect sizes. This article discusses what I call “shmeasurement.” To “shmeasure” is (...) to fail to apply quantitative tools to quantitative questions. We “shmeasure” when we try to measure what cannot be measured, or, conversely, when we ask binary questions of continuous measurements. Following the critics of standard statistical tools, it is argued that our statistical toolbox is indeed less concerned with the measurement of magnitudes than we take it to be. This article adds, however, that measurement is not all there is to scientific activity. Most techniques of proof do not resemble measurement as much as voting—a practice that makes frequent use of numbers, figures, or measurements, yet is not chiefly concerned with assessing quantities. Measurement is only one among three functions of the scientific toolbox, the other two being collating observations and deciding which hypotheses to relinquish. I thus make a plea for “shmeasurement”: the mismeasure of things starts to make more sense once we take into account the nonquantitative side of scientific practice. (shrink)

In biological systematics, as well as in the philosophy of biology, species and higher taxa are individuated through their unique evolutionary origin. This is taken by some authors to mean that monophyly is a (relational) property not only of higher taxa, but also of species. A species is said to originate through speciation, and to go extinct when it splits into two daughter species (or through terminal extinction). Its unique evolutionary origin is said to bestow identity on a species through (...) time and change, and to render species names rigid designators. Species names are thus believed to function just like names of supraspecific taxa. However, large parts of the Web of Life are composed of species that do not have a unique evolutionary origin from a single population, lineage or stem-species. Further, monophyly is an ambiguous concept if it is defined simply in terms of ‘unique evolutionary origin’. Disambiguating the concept by defining a monophyletic taxon as ‘a taxon that includes the ancestor and all, and only, its descendant’ renders monophyly inapplicable to species. At the heart of the problem lies a fundamental distinction between species and monophyletic taxa, where species form mutually exclusive reticulated systems, while higher taxa form inclusive hierarchical systems. Examples are given both at the species level and below to illustrate the problems that result from the application of the monophyly criterion to species. The conclusion is that the concepts of exclusivity and monophyly should be treated as non-overlapping: exclusivity marks out a species synchronistically, i.e. in the present time. Monophyly marks out clades (groups of species) diachronistically, i.e. within an historical dimension. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, Walter D. Mignolo, l’un des membres-fondateurs du groupe modernité/colonialité aux côtés d’Aníbal Quijano, revient sur la définition de la colonialité comme « face sombre de la modernité » et sur les formes non seulement politiques et économiques mais encore épistémiques et esthéSiques que doivent prendre les enquêtes et les luttes décoloniales. Renommant les ancêtres de ces luttes et dénonçant le « management colonial du savoir » qui a tenté de les faire disparaître, le texte de Mignolo célèbre (...) les travaux de Ottobah Cuogano, Felipe Guamán Poma et M. K. Gandhi comme autant d’appuis pour une pensée décoloniale et pluriverselle de la frontière. (shrink)