Both corruption and subjective wellbeing are of concern to academics and governments. Although some evidence suggests that corruption deteriorates subjective wellbeing, the relationship between perception of official corruption and subjective wellbeing is still unknown. This study aims to examine the link between perceived official corruption and subjective wellbeing in the context of China and whether satisfaction with government performance has a mediating effect in the process. Based on data from China General Social Survey, a (...) structural equation model was used to test the hypotheses. The results of 3,033 Chinese respondents suggest that perception of official corruption is negatively related to subjective wellbeing, and satisfaction with government performance plays a mediating role in the relationship between perception of official corruption and subjective wellbeing. (shrink)

Introduction. The problem of corruption continues to be relevant in Russia. More research is needed to effectively combat corruption. Studying corruption in the context of general issues of contemporary Russian politics is particularly relevant in this regard. Purpose. The article is aimed at disclosing contradictions associated with perceiving corruption by the population of Russia and its representation in the official discourse. Methods. The author uses the following methods: analysis of statistical data, analysis of the results (...) of public opinion polls, and discourse analysis. Scientific novelty of the research. The article demonstrates the discrepancy between citizens’ perceptions of corruption and their attitudes regarding power and the political regime. The author shows the inconsistency of the official discourse on corruption in Russia. Results. The article reveals the peculiarities of perceiving corruption by the population of Russia. Citizens’ perceptions of corruption correlate with their attitudes towards power and political regime. The author shows the key features of depicting corruption in the official discourse. Conclusions. Widespread perceptions of high levels of corruption have little impact on public support for the Russian political regime. In the mass consciousness, there is no understanding of the connection between corruption, an ineffective economy and a low standard of the population’s living. Corruption is not a significant factor in protest moods, although many causes of social discontent are somehow related to corruption. Reflections of corruption in official discourse are incomplete and internally inconsistent. The approaches to combating corruption proclaimed in the official discourse are not fully implemented in the current anti-corruption policy. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, which was signed in 1997 and is due to be implemented by the signatory nation‐states this year. The Convention represents the expansion of legal measures to combat the bribery of foreign public officials by individuals or corporations, and it has been accompanied by the Organisation of American States’ Convention Against Corruption. Previously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , which applied only to United (...) States individuals or corporations, ‘stood alone in the world as a legal barrier to transnational bribery’ . This article proceeds in stages to evaluate implications of the Convention. Firstly the Convention is placed in the context of the increased focus on transnational business bribery in recent years. Second, the main points of the Convention are outlined. Third, the issues and problems posed by the Convention for business are discussed. Finally some themes regarding enforcement by the relevant authorities are outlined. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, which was signed in 1997 and is due to be implemented by the signatory nation‐states this year. The Convention represents the expansion of legal measures to combat the bribery of foreign public officials by individuals or corporations, and it has been accompanied by the Organisation of American States’ Convention Against Corruption. Previously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which applied only to United (...) States individuals or corporations, ‘stood alone in the world as a legal barrier to transnational bribery’ (Low, Bjorklund and Atkinson 1998:245). This article proceeds in stages to evaluate implications of the Convention. Firstly the Convention is placed in the context of the increased focus on transnational business bribery in recent years. Second, the main points of the Convention are outlined. Third, the issues and problems posed by the Convention for business are discussed. Finally some themes regarding enforcement by the relevant authorities are outlined. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to better understand why public officials and business employees engage in corruption. Insight into individual-level explanations for corruption was obtained with the aid of a self-report survey. The results suggest that the most indicative factors of whether or not individuals are corruption-prone are as follows: the moral conviction they have to refrain from corruption; perceptions of whether their colleagues approve of and engage in corruption; and difficulties experienced in complying (...) with the rules on corruption. This result pattern was identical for public officials and business employees alike, and as a consequence, for both sides of corrupt acts. The latter indicates that the same motives may not only underlie corruption in both private and public sectors, but also the act of corruption in its active and passive forms. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for the assumption that economic considerations—expected costs and benefits—are crucial in predicting corruption. Based on the findings that norms and the perceived opportunity to comply are dominant factors in explaining corruption, this article focuses on the practical implications for the development of anti-corruption strategies within both public and private sectors. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is generally regarded as wrong. But in what exactly does this form of corruption consist and what kind of wrong does it imply? This article aims to take stock of the current philosophical discussion of the different senses in which political corruption is wrong in a general sense, beyond the specific negative legal, economic, and social costs it may happen to have in specific circumstances. Political corruption is usually presented (...) as a pathology of the public order. Therefore, the senses in which political corruption has been presented as wrong have varied depending on the normative theory of the public order that is presupposed. In this article, we offer a critical presentation of two major interpretations of the wrongfulness of political corruption that draw respectively on a neo-republican and a liberal account of the public order. Finally, we show how the analytical distinction between these approaches has important normative implications for the identification of relevant cases of political corruption. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is generally regarded as wrong. But in what exactly does this form of corruption consist and what kind of wrong does it imply? Recent proponents of the “institutionalist approach” to political corruption have concentrated on those occasions when incentive structures distract institutions from their essential purpose and weaken public trust. The corruption of individual public officials has been less relevant to their work, except for when it leads to the (...) erosion of the functioning of institutions. From this perspective, a clear emphasis has been put on the consequences of corruption. In contrast, I argue that political corruption, whether individual or institutional, can be more fundamentally understood as a form of political injustice in which someone has violated the logic of mutual accountability that undergirds all relations of justice in rights-based systems. In this sense, political corruption occurs when public officials use their entrusted power of office for the pursuit of an agenda whose rationale may not be vindicated as coherent with the terms of their mandate. By focusing on the inherent qualities of corrupt political relations, I lay out a novel relational and deontological understanding of the inherent wrongness of political corruption as a form of unaccountable action. (shrink)

The essays which Bentham collected together for publication in 1830 under the title of Official Aptitude Maximized; Expense Minimized, written at various times between 1810 and 1830, deal with the means of achieving efficient and economical government. In considering a wide range of themes in the fields of constitutional law, public finance, and legal reform, Bentham places the problem of official corruption at the centre of his analysis. He contrasts his own recommendations for good administration, which he (...) had fully developed in his magisterial Constitutional Code, with the severe deficiencies he saw in English practice. The core of the volume consists of four major essays directed against the principles and policies of four leading statesmen: Edmund Burke, George Rose, Robert Peel, and Lord Chancellor Eldon. Of particular concern to Bentham were the abuses sanctioned by the judges and their officials in the Westminster Hall courts, which, he argues, resulted in the denial of justice to the majority of the population. In this volume, Bentham not only displays the precise logical reasoning for which he is well known, but also his considerable skills as a rhetorician of reform. (shrink)

Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted (...) with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience. (shrink)

Making use of facilitating payments is a very widespread form of corruption. These consist of small payments or gifts made to a person – generally a public official or an employee of a private company – to obtain a favour, such as expediting an administrative process; obtaining a permit, licence or service; or avoiding an abuse of power. Unlike the worst forms of corruption, facilitating payments do not usually involve an outright injustice on the part of the (...) payer as they are entitled to what they request. This may be why public opinion tends to condone such payments; often they are assumed to be unavoidable and are excused on the grounds of low wages and lack of professionalism among public officials and disorganisation in government offices. Many companies that take the fight against “grand” corruption very seriously are inclined to overlook these “petty” transgressions, which are seen as the grease that makes the wheels of the bureaucratic machine turn more smoothly. Despite this, facilitating payments have a pernicious effect on the working of public and private administrations: all too often they are the slippery slope to more serious forms of corruption; they impose additional costs on companies and citizens; and in the long run they sap the ethical foundations of organisations. Although many articles on corruption mention facilitating payments, there have been no systematic studies from a company’s point of view. This article thus focuses on facilitating payments from the point of view of the company that makes the payment, either as the active partner (when it is the company that takes the initiative) or as the passive partner (when the official or employee is the instigator). (shrink)

Corruption is a major problem in many of the world’s developing economies today. World Bank studies put bribery at over $1 trillion per year accounting for up to 12 of the GDP of nations like Nigeria, Kenya and Venezuela. Though largely ignored for many years, interest in world wide corruption has been rekindled by recent corporate scandals in the US and Europe. Corruption in the developing nations is said to result from a number of factors. Mass poverty (...) has been cited as a facilitating condition for corruption just as an inability to manage a sudden upsurge in mineral revenues has been credited with breeding corruption and adventurous government procurement among public officials in countries like Nigeria and Venezuela. Virtually all developing nations that have serious corruption problems also have very limited economic freedom and a very weak enforcement of the rule of law. In such nations, corruption represents a regressive taxation that bears hard on the poor. It has a dampening effect on development and it could result in the production of inferior goods as companies find ways to accommodate under-the-table payments. Finally, corruption is a dangerous threat to the legitimacy of the governments of some of the developing nations themselves. It is suggested that new urgent initiatives are needed to deal with the dangers posed by corruption in the developing economies. They include making the economies of these nations more open by the withdrawal of the government from the productive sector and by the abolition of unnecessarily stringent restrictions on business conduct. The rule of law needs to be strengthened in these nations and those countries like Nigeria and Venezuela should ignore scruples over sovereignty and seek foreign assistance in the management of their oil wealth. Finally, multinationals should be made to disclose all the payments they make in developing nations to such organizations like International Chamber of Commerce or Transparency International where they can be reviewed by anyone interested. (shrink)

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private (...) class='Hi'>corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world''s leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is one of the most obvious problems that affects developed and developing countries alike. Because this view is largely shared, most current studies of this phenomenon—‘political corruption’—have been dedicated either to measuring or counteracting the negative political, social, and economic effects that this form of corruption may have in society. Albeit significant and urgent, these studies have distracted the attention of commentators from a somewhat more basic analysis of the nature (...) and wrongness of this phenomenon. This lacuna has resulted in the formulation of a multiplicity of actions that address a very heterogeneous set of issues, including such diverse phenomena as bribery, embezzlement, institutional malfunctioning, the inadequacy of political leaders, and clientelism. This situation is unsatisfactory because it muddles important distinctions between different pathologies that may affect the public order. But it matters also for the design of anti-corruption strategies that risk to either misfire or be too vague by lacking a clear target and an account of the exact kind of wrong these strategies are meant to prevent and/or correct. In our research on this topic, we have addressed this issue by offering a normative analysis of political corruption as surreptitious public action. Our account explains the distinguishing traits of political corruption and makes sense of its inherent wrongness as a contradiction of the logic of publicity that undergirds political interactions in a rights-based system. In this chapter, we draw on this research and expand it with a view to enhancing the identification of relevant instances of political corruption and the design of policies to counteract them. (shrink)

The systemic role of corruption and its link to low human development is explored. The extractive resource industry is presented as anarena where conditions for corruption—monopoly and discretion without accountability—are especially intense. Corruption is maintainedby a self-reinforcing cycle. Multiple stakeholders are involved in the maintenance of and/or opposition to the cycle: investing corporations, host country regimes and officials, inter-governmental bodies like the OECD, industry associations, non-governmental organization watchdogs like Transparency International, and international agencies facilitating global investment like (...) the World Bank. Complementarity of interests between the demand and supply sides provides strong incentives for entrenched players to maintain corruptive relationships, to protect past gains and sustain current ones. Compulsory international regulation, maximum transparency, effective detection, and enforcement are recommended to enhance accountability, thereby reversing the cycle. It is also necessary to create a corporate culture built on integrity, if regulation itself is to succeed. (shrink)

The expansion of international trade and global business competition in recent years has been accompanied by growth in corruption. While many factors may contribute to a person's willingness to participate in a corrupt transaction, the influence of religion may be significant, and leaders of religious organizations have become increasingly vocal in their condemnation of corruption. As honesty and fairness to third parties is universal to many religions, leaders of many faiths are united in their opposition to corruption. (...) To better comprehend the relationship between religion and corruption, a study was conducted employing information related to religion and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks nations according to the perceived degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. The 133 countries that were included in the 2003 CPI were compared across a range of factors related to 1) the dominant religion practiced in each country, 2) perceived corruption, 3) the importance of religion to the citizens of each country, 4) religious freedom, and 5) the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Study results indicate that, when countries are grouped by dominant religion, the groups differ significantly with regard to perceived corruption, value of religion, religious freedom, and GDP per capita. Significant differences in the same factors also occurred when countries were grouped by corruption levels. (shrink)

A theory of political corruption must give a plausible descriptive account of what counts as politically corrupt conduct, and a plausible normative account of the reasons why (if any) such conduct is wrongful, and distinctively so. On Ceva and Ferretti's sophisticated descriptive and normative account of corruption if and only if the act is carried out by a public official acting in her capacity as officeholder, and she knowingly acts to ends which are not congruent with the (...) terms of her mandate. By their own admission, Ceva and Ferretti focus for the most part on just, or nearly just, regimes – which include democratic regimes. In this paper, I probe the strength and implications of their account for political corruption in clearly unjust regimes, in which individuals’ basic civil, political and socio-economic rights are routinely and systematically violated. I argue that their account does not straightforwardly apply to these cases, and that their cursory treatment of all-things-considered justified corruption in those regimes exposes a gap in their account of corruption. (shrink)

Corruption is defined as private individuals or enterprises who misuse public resources for private power and/or political gains. They do so through abusing public officials whose behavior deviates from the formal government rules of conduct. Ethical behavior is defined as individuals or enterprises adhering to a non-corrupt work or business practice. A review of the academic literature is conducted drawing on perspectives from the political, economic, and anthropological sciences. Insights from a Danish research program are reported on. This program (...) identifies five different actions for dealing with corruption: (1) no action; (2) withdrawals from markets; (3) decentralized decision-making process; (4) establishment of an anti-corruption code; and (5) mutual commitment through integrity pact. The following aspects of ethical behavior should be regulated through an anti-corruption code: the company vis-à-vis political parties; gifts and entertainment expenses; political campaign contributions; and policy against small-scale corruption. Directions for future research are considered including the role of international organizations and multinational companies in fighting corruption and fostering ethical behavior; the role of countries and their governments; and the management systems. (shrink)

Abstract: The systemic role of corruption and its link to low human development is explored. The extractive resource industry is presented as an arena where conditions for corruption—monopoly and discretion without accountability—are especially intense. Corruption is maintained by a self-reinforcing cycle. Multiple stakeholders are involved in the maintenance of and/or opposition to the cycle: investing corporations, host country regimes and officials, inter-governmental bodies like the OECD, industry associations, non-governmental organization (NGO) watchdogs like Transparency International, and international agencies (...) facilitating global investment like the World Bank. Complementarity of interests between the demand and supply sides provides strong incentives for entrenched players to maintain corruptive relationships, to protect past gains and sustain current ones. Compulsory international regulation, maximum transparency, effective detection, and enforcement are recommended to enhance accountability, thereby reversing the cycle. It is also necessary to create a corporate culture built on integrity, if regulation itself is to succeed. (shrink)

This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping (...) illegal actions of their respective firms. (shrink)

Venezuelan media present corruption as a major problem of the country and a research conducted by the author shows managers perceive it as business ethics' main issue. The corruption type addressed to in this article is the collusion between public officials and private managers for illegal or undue profits. Corruption in this form is related to the long-standing policy of State intervention and overregulation of the economy in order to industrialize the country. The issue analyzed is the (...) perception of corruption as a major political and social problem. Corruption is pervasive in many societies but it is not perceived as a central problem. The explanation for this perception in Venezuela is the increased impoverishment of people as a consequence of present economic crisis (the corrupt person is perceived as taking from my pocket) and the openness and pluralistic character of the political system. Moral indignation and scandal is the result of this new feature of Venezuelan society. Changes in the economic policies and the awareness of corruption seem to establish the basis to overcome the perception of corruption as the paramount problem it is now. (shrink)

Drawing on historical and contemporary evidence from Great Britain and Italy, this article examines actions that fall under official definitions of corruption and actions that are not illegal but are widely regarded as morally corrupt. As a social anthropologist, I argue that when dealing with the complexity of corruption and abuses of power, we need to identify what aspects of the system encourage or generate illicit practices (illegal and legal) and what aspects could instead generate real change. (...) It is imperative to assess the precise identity of the dividing line between the legitimate and the illegitimate and between the legal and the moral, and to address both the exact relationship of the protagonists in public life to formal law and its production and their perceived legitimacy in the broader society. Empirical evidence suggests that the production of the law must take into account the moralities which inform the definition of legitimacy at the grassroots, for legislation that enjoys such legitimacy is authoritative-therefore effective-legislation, and thus is governance that benefits from and abides by such legislation. (shrink)

While public (or government) corruption has attracted a lot of attention, private (or business) corruption has been relatively under-addressed. A specific form of corruption, namely, paying a bribe to a public official, is easily identifiable as unethical and possibly illegal, but this is not clear in a private business context. Yet private bribery also has serious organizational consequences. This exploratory study suggests that individuals have difficulty in recognizing the ethical connotations of potential bribery, and draws attention (...) to the need to build skills in this regard. (shrink)

The book examines corruption control in post-reform China. Contrary to the normal perception that corruption is a type of behavior that violates the law, the author seeks to approach the issue from a social censure perspective, where corruption is regarded as a form of social censure intended to maintain the hegemony of the ruling bloc. Such an approach integrates societal structure, political goals, and agency into a single framework to explain dynamics in corruption control. With both (...) qualitative data from officials in power and officials in jail and quantitative data from university students, the book explores how the censure on corruption was created and has been applied from 1978 to the present. Though primarily intended for academics, the book is also accessible for general audiences, especially given its intriguing perspective and use of firsthand data on corruption that cannot be found anywhere else. (shrink)

Transparency International has consistently maintained two prominent assertions: that corruption remains a global threat because no human society in the world has a clean record, and that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. These assertions raise some fundamental philosophical concerns. The former assertion re-opens the need to ascertain whether corruption is an essence of humans, or an acquired disposition. Howsoever this is resolved forms the fulcrum of concerns on the second assertion. This paper engages these (...) philosophical concerns. The paper takes two paths to achieve this goal. The first draws from Aristotle’s essentialism and Thomas Hobbes’ accounts on human nature to engage the debate on the relationship between human nature and corruption. The second derives and discusses the plausibility and fundamental implications of the claim that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. It was found that neither on the basis of Aristotle’s nor Thomas Hobbes’, nor even a possible African cosmology as discussed, can it be said that official corruption is essential to humans. The paper concludes that what is at issue concerning corruption as measured by Transparency International pertains to different African expectations of recompense in a protective communalism from which relatives in public offices must have drawn care, now termed “corruption” by Transparency International, which is not so regarded in the African social order. (shrink)

This study looks at how the corporate governance of family-owned business groups, the most dominant form of private sector organising in Asia, deals with different forms of corruption during the course of common business transactions. As a part of an ethnographic study conducted in 2007 to look at the impact of corporate governance reforms in the Philippines, one of the emergent themes from the study was the presence of significant corruption in the business environment of the country. A (...) total of 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with board members from business groups and senior public sector officials supplemented by document analysis of media articles and other text and participant observation. Using Rose-Ackerman’s typology of petty and grand corruption, results show the dilemmas faced when trying to operate within the precepts of corporate governance whilst dealing with the practical reality of corruption in public sector institutions. The results of the study provide empirical evidence into corruption’s impact on Asian business groups and contribute to knowledge on the links between strong institutions and the efficacy of corporate governance. (shrink)

The expansion of international trade and global business competition in recent years has been accompanied by growth in corruption. While many factors may contribute to a person's willingness to participate in a corrupt transaction, the influence of religion may be significant, and leaders of religious organizations have become increasingly vocal in their condemnation of corruption. As honesty and fairness to third parties is universal to many religions, leaders of many faiths are united in their opposition to corruption. (...) To better comprehend the relationship between religion and corruption, a study was conducted employing information related to religion and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks nations according to the perceived degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. The 133 countries that were included in the 2003 CPI were compared across a range of factors related to 1) the dominant religion practiced in each country, 2) perceived corruption, 3) the importance of religion to the citizens of each country, 4) religious freedom, and 5) the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Study results indicate that, when countries are grouped by dominant religion, the groups differ significantly with regard to perceived corruption, value of religion, religious freedom, and GDP per capita. Significant differences in the same factors also occurred when countries were grouped by corruption levels. (shrink)

Are federal prosecutions of non-federal officials for corruption likely to improve non-federal government? This essay suggests that such prosecutions can undermine the distinctive style of democracy at the state and local level, an effect that can be harmful to democracy in America overall. This conclusion rests on a larger argument about the different nature of federal and non-federal democracy in the United States. To insure that each official maintains impartial loyalty to values defined by a single, popularly accountable (...) policymaker, the federal system of bureaucratic populism strictly separates the officials’ public and private interests, through various devices such as civil service protection for executive officials, Article III life tenure, and fixed salary for federal judges, specialized training for federal officers, and conflict-of-interest rules that bar federal officers from acting when their judgment could be compromised by private interests. By contrast, participatory populism rejects this separation of the public and private spheres, instead mixing professional and lay decision-making by using thousands of part-time, under-paid executive and legislative officers who are expected to have substantial private interests in the communities that they represent. The essay argues that each style of democracy has mutually exclusive advantages and disadvantages. However, enforcement of federal anticorruption law against non-federal democracies can undermine their system of mingled private and public interests, reducing the degree to which such governments can provide laypersons with opportunities for political activity. As an illustration of the overextension of federal criminal law, I examine the First Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, the federal mail fraud statute in United States v. Sawyer. Sawyer comes dangerously close to declaring that any undisclosed state or local officer’s conflict of interest constitutes a violation of § 1346 when it involves the U.S. mails. I argue that this view of § 1346 is an error. Participatory populism requires that private and public tasks be closely mingled in ways that bureaucratic populism forbids. Undoubtedly, this mixture of public and private creates a risk that public office will be used for private gain. However, it also avoids some of the bureaucratic sclerosis and lack of lay participation that can be endemic to the more centralized federal tradition. In conclusion, I suggest that federal prosecutors ought to content themselves with using § 1346 to enforce already-existing state criminal conflict-of-interest rules, for the sake of preserving a place in our federal regime for participatory populism. (shrink)

The systemic role of corruption and its link to low human development is explored. The extractive resource industry is presented as anarena where conditions for corruption—monopoly and discretion without accountability—are especially intense. Corruption is maintainedby a self-reinforcing cycle. Multiple stakeholders are involved in the maintenance of and/or opposition to the cycle: investing corporations, host country regimes and officials, inter-governmental bodies like the OECD, industry associations, non-governmental organization (NGO) watchdogs like Transparency International, and international agencies facilitating global investment (...) like the World Bank. Complementarity of interests between the demand and supply sides provides strong incentives for entrenched players to maintain corruptive relationships, to protect past gains and sustain current ones. Compulsory international regulation, maximum transparency, effective detection, and enforcement are recommended to enhance accountability, thereby reversing the cycle. It is also necessary to create a corporate culture built on integrity, if regulation itself is to succeed. (shrink)

This work addresses corruption in politics and the public services, arguing that corrupt public officials should be exposed, prosecuted and gaoled, just like their colleagues in the private sector. It covers ethical standards in the public service, both state and federal; the practice of government; the relationships between officials; their advisors and the public; the interplay between politics and personal behaviour, and offering explanations as to what can be done about corruption in public service through asking questions like; (...) how does corruption gain a foothold in public affairs?; how can public trust be rebuilt between bureaucrats, the politicians and the people who vote for them?; and how can we improve accoutability over the cover-ups? (shrink)

The American regulatory model of corporate governance rests on the theory of self-regulation as␣the most effective and efficient means to achieve corporate self-restraint in the marketplace. However, that model fails to achieve regular compliance with baseline ethical and legal behaviors as evidenced by a century of repeated corporate debacles, the most recent being Enron, WorldCom, and Refco. Seemingly impervious to its domestic failure, Congress imprinted the same self-regulation paradigm on legislation restraining global business behavior, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This (...) anti-bribery initiative prohibits unethical and illegal payments made to foreign public officials in an effort to eradicate bribery as a rational-choice global market entry strategy. However, this paper illustrates, using newly complied statistics from 1977 to 2008, that the FCPA has not had a dramatic impact on U.S. global corporate behavior despite its recent high profile coverage and the tough regulatory rhetoric about corporate compliance. The paper also extends the prior Cragg and Woof FCPA efficiency study and provides current empirical evidence to resolve several unanswered questions raised by that earlier study. (shrink)

This article argues that corrupt practices such as bribery and embezzlement, which scholars have previously assumed to be evidence of the breakdown of the state, may reinforce the state's administrative hierarchies under certain conditions. Drawing on a cross-national analysis of 132 countries and a detailed examination of the informal institutions of official graft in Ukraine, the article finds that where graft is systematically tracked, monitored, and granted by state leaders as an informal payment in exchange for compliance, it provides (...) both an added incentive to obey leaders' directives and the potent sanction of criminal prosecution in the event of disobedience. Where graft is informally institutionalized in this way, it provides the basis for state organizations that are effective at collecting taxes, maintaining public order, and repressing political opposition but that may undermine the development of liberal politics. (shrink)

We test the hypothesis that US corporations headquartered in states with greater public corruption are also prone to more unethical behavior when operating abroad. We exploit passage of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that curtailed bribery of foreign officials and find firms in corrupt states, especially those exporting to more corrupt countries, suffer greater performance decline following FCPA, suggesting larger loss from anticipated bribery restrictions. Controlling for industry, firms in corrupt states are more likely to be targets of FCPA enforcement (...) actions. They are also more likely to have paid foreign bribes, as disclosed during pre-FCPA investigations. (shrink)

_Political Corruption_ by Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti (2021) presents a deontological account of political corruption, understood as an interactive injustice. The aim of the present contribution is to contextualize the authors’ arguments in relation to democracies and through the lens of democracy theory. In particular, it proposes to expand on one of the book’s main theses—namely, that public officials have a moral duty of office accountability towards their colleagues that stems from the nature of public institutions as (...) systems of embodied and interrelated rule-governed roles. In a democratic context, however, officeholders should be accountable not only to their colleagues, but also to citizens, since the latter also occupy an embodied and interrelated rule-governed role in democratic institutions. Consequently, the moral burden of ensuring that public authorities and the public administration operate in a way that conforms with public ethics does not lie exclusively with officeholders or oversight agencies, but, at least in part, with the citizenry. Finally, this contribution shows how democratic innovations could contribute to fighting corruption and to realizing the conception of public ethics advanced in the book. (shrink)

In order to shed light on the issue of crony corruption in the context of economic transition, I focus on the puzzle of China's unique experience of economic transition characterized by the duality forms and effects of crony corruption underlying local corporatism in a dual-track (i.e., market and political tracks) transition. I argue that the duality of local corporatism derives from the duality of crony corruption. First, the early form of local corporatism as state-business public alliance is (...) embedded in informal crony corruption as positive for the purpose of wealth growth in the initial phase of economic transition with public and private interests aligned as compatible. Second, the later form of local corporatism as official-manager private collusion is embedded in quasi-formal crony corruption as negative for the purpose of wealth transfer in the later phase with public and private interests in conflict as incompatible. The duality of crony corruption in the two phases of economic transition is caused by the interplay between formal and informal factors and between economic and political factors. My contribution is twofold. First, I explain China's transition in terms of crony corruption underlying local corporatism. Second, I develop an integrated framework of crony corruption concerning its content, process, antecedent and consequence. (shrink)

This study looks at how discourses of corruption in Bangladesh are discursively constructed within the official documents of Transparency International (TI), a non-profit organization that monitors corruption worldwide. It explores how an orientalist notion regarding Bangladesh is appropriated in neoliberal global discourse through TI’s corruption surveillance process. A postcolonial analysis of TI’s publications demonstrates a symbiotic relation between orientalism and neoliberalism. TI sets up a binary of ‘corrupt’ global South vs. ‘clean’ global North, reinforcing the uneven (...) power relations between nation-states that can be seen as a neocolonial move for maintaining Western hegemony and enabling neoliberal ideology over non-Western territories. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#67-68; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2020 P 49-76. (shrink)

Broadly defined, government corruption is the abuse of public power for private gain. It can assume various forms, including bribery, embezzlement, cronyism, and electoral fraud. At root, however, government corruption is a problem of trust. Corrupt politicians abuse the powers entrusted to them by the electorate (the principal-agent problem). Politicians often resort to corruption out of a lack of trust that other politicians will abstain from it (the collective action problem). Corruption breeds greater mistrust in elected (...) officials amongst the public. The problem of trust is compounded where a lack of transparency and asymmetric information impede effective control over the exercise of public powers. (shrink)

This study looks at how the corporate governance of family-owned business groups, the most dominant form of private sector organising in Asia, deals with different forms of corruption during the course of common business transactions. As a part of an ethnographic study conducted in 2007 to look at the impact of corporate governance reforms in the Philippines, one of the emergent themes from the study was the presence of significant corruption in the business environment of the country. A (...) total of 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with board members from business groups and senior public sector officials supplemented by document analysis of media articles and other text and participant observation. Using Rose-Ackerman’s typology of petty and grand corruption, results show the dilemmas faced when trying to operate within the precepts of corporate governance whilst dealing with the practical reality of corruption in public sector institutions. The results of the study provide empirical evidence into corruption’s impact on Asian business groups and contribute to knowledge on the links between strong institutions and the efficacy of corporate governance. (shrink)

The problem of corruption in Indonesia is like an unbroken chain. Since the 1998 reformation until now, many persons with corruption cases involving politicians or officials have been arrested and even imprisoned. Among those entangled in corruption are many Muslim politicians and religious leaders known to the public as having a high level of religiosity and a clean reputation. Ideally, these Muslim politicians will be at the forefront of guarding the nation’s anti-corruption morality. However, the reality (...) is different. This study explains the discrepancy of the relationship between religiosity and anti-corruption attitudes by Muslim politicians. This study relies on a qualitative approach with a descriptive analysis of the online media findings regarding Muslim politicians’ corrupt behaviour. The results of this study indicate that there is no correlation between religiosity and unethical behaviour. Politicians entangled in corruption come from all circles of political parties, socio-economic levels, intellectuals and various religious backgrounds. It means that other factors besides religious morality encourage a person to commit corruption, such as motives for power, high political costs, a hedonistic lifestyle, an incompetent law enforcement system and a deep-rooted culture of corruption.Contribution: Efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia need to be carried out in an integrated and comprehensive manner with various approaches. Thus, the goal to minimise the corruption behaviour in Indonesia can be achieved. (shrink)

The essays which Bentham collected together for publication in 1830 under the title of Official Aptitude Maximized; Expense Minimized, written at various times between 1810 and 1830, deal with the means of achieving efficient and economical government. In considering a wide range of themes in the fields of constitutional law, public finance, and legal reform, Bentham places the problem of official corruption at the centre of his analysis. He contrasts his own recommendations for good administration, which he (...) had fully developed in his magisterial Constitutional Code, with the severe deficiencies he saw in English practice. The core of the volume consists of four major essays directed against the principles and policies of four leading statesmen: Edmund Burke, George Rose, Robert Peel, and Lord Chancellor Eldon. Of particular concern to Bentham were the abuses sanctioned by the judges and their officials in the Westminster Hall courts, which, he argues, resulted in the denial of justice to the majority of the population. In this volume, Bentham not only displays the precise logical reasoning for which he is well known, but also his considerable skills as a rhetorician of reform. (shrink)

In July 1759 the French philosopher Andre´ Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (1716-1764) published in Berlin a diatribe against the excessive and incorrect use of French in the Prussian capital. Far from being a mere guide to linguistic style, the Préservatif contre la corruption de la langue françoise generated a heated debate, attested by an official threat to ban its publication. The personal animosity between Prémontval and the perpetual secretary of the Berlin Academy, Jean Henri Samuel Formey (1711-1797) (...) was amply demonstrated over the pages of the Préservatif, offering a rare insight into the complex web of social and intellectual tensions in mid eighteenth-century Berlin and its Academy of Sciences. At stake were the social status and the philosophical outlook of local Huguenots, compared to that of French philosophers who were granted asylum in Prussia by Frederick II. The debate also concerned the issues of academic freedom in an absolutist regime, the material production and distribution of texts, conduct and etiquette in the Republic of Letters and the formation of group identities in eighteenth-century Germany. Drawing on manuscripts preserved in Berlin, Göttingen and Krakow, this article traces the development of the controversy and the reception of Prémontval’s work by both French- and German- writing authors at the Berlin Academy and beyond its confines. (shrink)

Political corruption is a contested concept. Both terms in the concept are the object of controversies in political theory, and concern what corruption is and how it is a politically relevant phenomenon. Political corruption has been contested across time, space, cultures, and philosophical traditions. Usually, political corruption is assumed to involve an exchange between a private corruptor and a public official who pursues her personal interest by abusing her power of office. While this account may (...) be true with respect to some such instances as bribery, some significant uncertainties affect its plausibility. Practices such as patronage or state capture might escape this account either because they do not involve a corruptor or because the corrupted officer does not pursue her personal interest but, say, that of her party or faction. Interestingly, despite or perhaps in reason of this semantic uncertainty, political corruption is generally perceived as a disease of the public function, something which any sensible political theory of the good state should want to avoid. Why is such a negative intuition about the nature of political corruption so widespread? A growing debate in political theory is now starting to inquire into the exact nature of the wrongness of political corruption. In this timely book, Robert Sparling engages with such an important but still developing debate. (shrink)

In 1994, the Argentine Inland Revenue service investigated a case of suspected tax evasion that became more newsworthy when it was discovered that $37 million bribes were paid by IBM Argentina, the subsidiary of Armonk, New York-based International Business Machines Corp. The bribes were paid to Argentine government officials to land a $250 million contract to modernize the state-owned Banco de la Nación Argentina, which was and still is the country’s largest bank. The IBM IN ARGENTINA series introduce the legal (...) and ethical dilemmas that managers face when the moral standards at the host country appear to be lower than at those at home and highlight the consequences that managers may suffer when they perform illegal/immoral activities on behalf of the firm. Intended audience, teaching objectives, research methods, and sample questions are briefly discussed in this summary. (shrink)

Over the past decade, we have witnessed some early signs of progress in the battle against international bribery and corruption, a problem that throughout the history of commerce had previously been ignored. We present a model that we then use to assess progress in reducing bribery. The model components include both hard law and soft law legislation components and enforcement and compliance components. We begin by summarizing the literature that convincingly argues that bribery is an immoral and unethical practice (...) and that the economic harm it causes falls most heavily on those least able to absorb it. The next section summarizes the main provisions of anti-bribery legislation including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the Organization for Eco nomic Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the laws of selected countries. We conclude this section with a discussion of the "moral imperialism" argument for not imposing Western laws and values on other cultures. The next section focuses on the roles played by NGOs including Transparency International (TI), the World Economic Forum (WEF), and the International Chamber of Commerce. We review trends in enforcement and prosecution, including a review of the United States' enforcement processes, mechanisms for cross-border legal assistance, a discussion of the distinctive nature of FCPA cases, and an assessment of what the future holds for enforcement. The final section focuses on compliance processes for corporations aimed at reducing the risk of FCPA and related violations. This section also addresses the ethics of gift giving and "grease" payments. The article concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. Throughout the article, we reference important bribery cases and include comments from several authorities who are on the front lines of the battle against international bribery. (shrink)

My main goal here is to develop a functional analysis of cheating and corruption in sports, and to differentiate cheating within the broader category of corruption. Whereas officials can act corruptly, they cannot cheat. In contrast, sports participants, since they occupy two roles, can do both. I argue that although acts of cheating are acts of corruption, not all corrupt acts by competitors are acts of cheating. I also respond to some skeptical challenges and criticisms of the (...) concept of ‘cheating’ by providing some opposing arguments and a provisional definition. I argue that cheating in sports occurs in the context of a complex institutional practice. It transpires due to some failing in the efforts and/or limitations of sports officials to prohibit it. In central cases it consists in both the functional and ethical violation of the constitutional norms of a sport in the service of obtaining unearned victory for the cheater. (shrink)

The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention) obligates signatory nations to make bribery of foreign public officials a criminal act on an extraterritorial basis. The purposes of this article are to describe the nature and consequences of bribery, outline the major provisions of the OECD Convention, and analyze its role in promoting transparency and accountability in international business. While the OECD Convention is not expected to totally eliminate the seeking or (...) taking of bribes, there are hopes that a uniform set of rules will curtail corrupt behavior, as long as those rules are both enforceable and enforced. (shrink)

Which social arrangements have a history of fostering progress and prosperity? One quick answer, falsely attributed to Adam Smith, holds that we are guided as if by an invisible hand to do what builds the wealth of nations. A more sober answer, closer to what Smith said and believed, is thatifthe right framework of rules—plus decent officiating—steers us away from buying and selling monopoly privilege and steers us toward being valuable to the people around us, we indeed will be part (...) of the engine that drives human progress and the wealth of nations. (shrink)

The essays which Bentham collected together for publication in 1830 under the title of Official Aptitude Maximized; Expense Minimized, written at various times between 1810 and 1830, deal with the means of achieving efficient and economical government. In considering a wide range of themes in the fields of constitutional law, public finance, and legal reform, Bentham places the problem of official corruption at the centre of his analysis. He contrasts his own recommendations for good administration, which he (...) had fully developed in his magisterial Constitutional Code, with the severe deficiencies he saw in English practice. The core of the volume consists of four major essays directed against the principles and policies of four leading statesmen: Edmund Burke, George Rose, Robert Peel, and Lord Chancellor Eldon. Of particular concern to Bentham were the abuses sanctioned by the judges and their officials in the Westminster Hall courts, which, he argues, resulted in the denial of justice to the majority of the population. In this volume, Bentham not only displays the precise logical reasoning for which he is well known, but also his considerable skills as a rhetorician of reform. (shrink)