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Miriam Mccormick [16]Miriam Schleifer McCormick [8]
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Miriam Schleifer McCormick
University of Richmond
  1. Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - Routledge.
    The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products (...)
     
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  2.  64
    Rational Hope.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):127-141.
    My main aim in this paper is to specify conditions that distinguish rational, or justified, hope from irrational, or unjustified hope. I begin by giving a brief characterization of hope and then turn to offering some criteria of rational hope. On my view both theoretical and practical norms are significant when assessing hope’s rationality. While others have recognized that there are theoretical and practical components to the state itself, when it comes to assessing its rationality, depending on the account, only (...)
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  3. Taking Control of Belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.
    I investigate what we mean when we hold people responsible for beliefs. I begin by outlining a puzzle concerning our ordinary judgments about beliefs and briefly survey and critique some common responses to the puzzle. I then present my response where I argue a sense needs to be articulated in which we do have a kind of control over our beliefs if our practice of attributing responsibility for beliefs is appropriate. In developing this notion of doxastic control, I draw from (...)
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  4. Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.
    My main aim is to argue that most conceptions of doxastic agency do not respond to the skeptic’s challenge. I begin by considering some reasons for thinking that we are not doxastic agents. I then turn to a discussion of those who try to make sense of doxastic agency by appeal to belief’s reasons-responsive nature. What they end up calling agency is not robust enough to satisfy the challenge posed by the skeptics. To satisfy the skeptic, one needs to make (...)
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  5. Why Should We Be Wise?Miriam Mccormick - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (1):3-20.
    There is a tension in Hume’s theory of belief. He tells us that beliefs are ideas that, as a result of certain natural mechanisms of the mind, become particularly lively and vivacious. Such an account seems to allow us little control over which beliefs we acquire, maintain or eschew. It seems I could not avoid feeling the strength of such ideas any more than I could avoid feeling the strength of the sun when exposed to it. Yet much of Hume’s (...)
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  6.  61
    Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles.Miriam Mccormick - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):103-116.
  7.  32
    A Change in Manner: Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise and the First Enquiry.Miriam Mccormick - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):431-447.
    The year before his death, Hume asked his publisher to affix an advertisement to all existing and future editions of his works. In this advertisement, Hume disavows the Treatise and directs all criticism to his later work. Hume himself is relatively clear as to why he preferred this later work. In his autobiography, when discussing the poor public reception given his Treatise, Hume says, ‘I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of Success in publishing the Treatise of human (...)
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  8.  43
    A Change in Manner: Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise and the First Enquiry.Miriam Mccormick - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):431-447.
    The year before his death, Hume asked his publisher to affix an advertisement to all existing and future editions of his works. In this advertisement, Hume disavows the Treatise and directs all criticism to his later work. Hume himself is relatively clear as to why he preferred this later work. In his autobiography, when discussing the poor public reception given his Treatise, Hume says, ‘I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of Success in publishing the Treatise of human (...)
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  9.  48
    Compelled Belief.Miriam McCormick - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):157-169.
  10.  32
    Hume, Wittgenstein and the Impact of Skepticism.Miriam McCormick - 2004 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (4):417-434.
  11.  13
    Are We Responsible for Our Emotions and Moods?Michael Schleifer & Miriam McCormick - 2006 - Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 18 (1):15-21.
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  12.  63
    Value Beyond Truth-Value: A Practical Response to Skepticism.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8601-8619.
    I aim to offer a practical response to skepticism. I begin by surveying a family of responses to skepticism that I term “dogmatic” and argue that they are problematically evasive; they do not address what I take to be a question that is central to many skeptics: Why am I justified in maintaining some beliefs that fail to meet ordinary standards of doxastic evaluation? I then turn to a discussion of these standards of evaluation and to the different kinds of (...)
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  13.  16
    Hume’s Skeptical Politics.Miriam Schleifer Mccormick - 2013 - Hume Studies 39 (1):77-102.
    I argue that there is a unity between Hume’s philosophical reflection and his political views and that many interesting connections can be found that illuminate both aspects of his thought. This paper highlights two of these connections. First, I argue that the conclusions Hume comes to in his political writings are natural outgrowths of his skepticism, a skepticism that recommends limitation of inquiry, modesty, moderation and openness. Most scholars who view Hume’s skepticism as informing his political views see it as (...)
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  14.  18
    Hume’s Skeptical Politics.Miriam Schleifer Mccormick - 2013 - Hume Studies 39 (1):77-102.
    Most twentieth-century discussions of Hume’s politics echo the view expressed by T. H. Grose in his 1889 introduction to Hume’s works where he says that Hume’s philosophical labors came to an end when he started writing essays and history.1 In his foreword to the revised edition of Hume’s Essays, Eugene Miller voices his disagreement with this view, saying, “Hume’s essays do not mark an abandonment of philosophy . . . but rather an attempt to improve it by having it address (...)
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  15.  34
    Judgment and Agency, by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Miriam Schleifer Mccormick - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):309-317.
    Judgment and Agency, by SosaErnest. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 288.
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  16. Anne Jaap Jacobson, Ed., Feminist Interpretations of David Hume. [REVIEW]Miriam McCormick - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (2):125-127.
  17. The Nature and Value of Scepticism.Miriam Mccormick - 1998 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    This work, the Nature and Value of Scepticism, shows that the metaphilosopby arising from what David Hume calls "true scepticism," is of use and value, refuting three standard objections to sceptical philosophy: the charges of unlivability, of idleness and of being dangerous and destructive. ;The unlivability charge is refuted with an examination of the work of a self-proclaimed extreme sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The idleness charge is answered by questioning its assumption that if scepticism does not lead to an extreme conclusion, (...)
     
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  18.  27
    Hume's True Scepticism by Donald C. Ainslie.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):167-168.
    In this rigorous and thorough discussion of David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature 1.4, entitled “Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy,” Donald Ainslie aims both to provide detailed textual exegeses of all seven sections, and to offer a way of understanding them as unified by the recurring theme of the dangers of “false” philosophy and a defense of “true” philosophy or “true scepticism.” To understand the compatibility of Hume’s skeptical conclusions and his philosophical ambitions, and so to (...)
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  19.  27
    The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I of a Treatise of Human Nature.Miriam McCormick - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (1):161-161.
    Oliver Johnson’s book is the first attempt to offer a systematic textual analysis of Book 1 of The Treatise, in which he seeks to fill “an important gap in the literature on Hume” by undertaking “the task of going through Book I fully, systematically, and in detail, following directly in the footsteps of Hume”.
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  20.  19
    Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Written by Annalisa Coliva.Miriam McCormick - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):327-332.
  21.  17
    Book Review: Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Written by Annalisa Coliva. [REVIEW]Miriam McCormick - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4).
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  22.  29
    Comments on Walter Ott’s “What Can Causal Claims Mean?”.Miriam McCormick - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):471-473.
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  23.  3
    Responsibility for Beliefs and Emotions.Miriam McCormick & Michael Schleifer - 2006 - Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 15 (1):75-85.
    This paper maintains that the concept of responsibility must be extended to beliefs and emotions. It argues that beliefs and emotions have their crucial link through the element of judgment. Judgment refers to relationships in contexts of ambiguity and uncertainty; developing good judgment in children involves the question of similarities and differences in varying situations and contexts. Both beliefs and emotions are crucial to this process. Educators interested in helping develop better judgment must look at the relevant beliefs and emotions (...)
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