A Change in Manner: Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise and the first Enquiry

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):431-447 (1999)
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The year before his death, Hume asked his publisher to affix an advertisement to all existing and future editions of his works. In this advertisement, Hume disavows the Treatise and directs all criticism to his later work. Hume himself is relatively clear as to why he preferred this later work. In his autobiography, when discussing the poor public reception given his Treatise, Hume says, ‘I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of Success in publishing the Treatise of human nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter; and that I had been guilty of a very usual Indiscretion, in going to the Press too early.’ In a letter to Gilbert Elliot, written in 1751, Hume says that ‘The philosophical Principles are the same in both’ the Treatise and the first Enquiry.



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Miriam Schleifer McCormick
University of Richmond

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References found in this work

The High Road to Pyrrhonism.Richard H. Popkin - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1):18 - 32.

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