Belief as emotion

Philosophical Issues 32 (1):104-119 (2022)
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Abstract

It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter‐evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as realbeliefs that we pre‐reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.

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Citations of this work

Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.
Delirio como creencia.Guillermo Ruiz-Pérez - 2022 - Culturas Cientificas 3 (2):78-108.

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References found in this work

Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.

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