The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristototelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally (...) to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects. (shrink)

All agree that if the Milgram experiments were proposed today they would never receive approval from a research ethics board. However, the results of the Milgram experiments are widely cited across a broad range of academic literature from psychology to moral philosophy. While interpretations of the experiments vary, few commentators, especially philosophers, have expressed doubts about the basic soundness of the results. What I argue in this paper is that this general approach to the (...) class='Hi'>experiments might be in error. I will show that the ethical problems that would prevent the experiments from being approved today actually have an effect on the results such that the experiments might show less than many currently suppose. Making this case demonstrates two conclusions. The first is that there are good reasons to think that the conclusions of many of Milgram’s commentators might be too strong. The second conclusion is a more general one. The ethics procedures commonly used by North American research ethics boards serve not only to protect human participants in research but also can sometimes help secure, to an extent, the integrity of results. In other words, good ethics can sometimes mean better science. (shrink)

Stanley Milgram was the first who tried to apply the results of his experiment on National Socialism. Historical science has hardly picked up on this subject with the exception of the American historian Christopher Browning. Despite of some serious problems which have occured by transferring the Milgram-experiment onto National Socialism we are convinced that the possibilities Milgram has opened up for contemporary history have not been exhausted yet. In this connection we would like to plead for a (...) stronger distinction of types of perpetrators, taking into account the latest results in criminology. The Milgram-experiment refers methodically to local studies of massacres and genocides. Its application on the bureaucracy of destruction seems particularly promising to us. Also, there should be included the rescuers of jews into the research on perpetrators as a controlling body. (shrink)

The Milgram obedience experiments called into question the limits of obedience to authority figures. The perverse consequences of concerns over the Milgram experiments are that researchers must now submit to the authority of ethics review boards and that researchers are considered prima facie to be threats to participants. These assumptions are questioned widely by social science researchers, but this article argues that these assumptions seem to have blinded analysts to the possibility that there may be a (...) group of participants that might also be threatened by the power of authority figures in a research situation—researchers. Regarding the second point, social science researchers “interviewing up” may themselves be threatened, whether overtly or covertly, by their participants’ relative authority and power. In cases where researchers work with extraordinarily powerful respondents, what might IRBS and the researchers they work for learn from the Milgram experiments? (shrink)

After more than a decade of reflection on obedience experiments based on a laboratory model of his own design, the social psychologist Stanley Milgram is clearly confident that the experimental results make a substantial and striking contribution towards understanding human nature:Something … dangerous is revealed: the capacity for man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the inevitability that he does so, as he merges his unique personality into larger institutional structures.

After more than a decade of reflection on obedience experiments based on a laboratory model of his own design, the social psychologist Stanley Milgram is clearly confident that the experimental results make a substantial and striking contribution towards understanding human nature:Something … dangerous is revealed: the capacity for man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the inevitability that he does so, as he merges his unique personality into larger institutional structures.

Milgram’s experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many of us can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say-so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico-moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not (...) be used in research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram’s conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue a) that the subjects were indeed taken in b) that there are good historical reasons for regarding the experiments as ecologically valid, c) that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, d) that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects and e) that even if he was wrong to conduct the experiments this does not mean that he failed to establish immoral obedience. So far from ‘disrespecting’ his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might (now) be right to prohibit what it was (then) right to do. (shrink)

Drawing on archival materials, interviews, as well as published sources, this article traces the roots of one of the most important and controversial studies in the social sciences, the experiments on obedience to authority conducted by the social psychologist, Stanley Milgram. Milgram’s research had two determinants: First, his attempt to account for the Holocaust and, second, his intention to apply Solomon Asch’s technique for studying conformity to behavior of greater human consequence than judging lengths of lines-the task (...) which was the original focus in Asch’s studies. After a detailed presentation of these antecedents of Milgram’s work, the article concludes with a brief discussion of the applicability of the obedience experiments to the behavior of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. (shrink)

When the public outcry concerning the ‘Facebook experiment’ began, many commentators drew parallels to controversial social science experiments from a prior era. The infamous Milgram and Zimbardo experiments concerning the social psychology of obedience and aggression seemed in some ways obvious analogs to the Facebook experiment, at least inasmuch as all three violated norms about the treatment of human subjects in research. But besides that, what do they really have in common? In fact, a close reading of (...) Milgram, Zimbardo, and the Facebook experiment reveals something about the way power—both as a subject of scholarly inquiry and as an element wielded by researchers—is conceptualized today. Although all three experiments were, in essence, measuring the researchers’ ability to induce an emotional or behavioral change in subjects, the Facebook experiment did much more than the others to hide such considerations and naturalize the exercise of power at work in that study. This paper thus argues that the invisibility of power in the discourse of the Facebook experiment demonstrates, in miniature, the more insidious elements of big data as a whole. (shrink)

Milgram’s series of obedience experiments and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment are probably the two best-known psychological studies. As such, they can be understood as central to the broad process of psychologization in the postwar era. This article will consider the extent to which this process of psychologization can be understood as a simple overflow from the discipline of psychology to wider society or whether, in fact, this process is actually inextricably connected to the science of psychology as such. (...) In so doing, the article will argue that Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s studies are best usefully understood as twin experiments. Milgram’s paradigm of a psychology which explicitly draws its subject into the frame of its own discourse can be said to be the precondition of Zimbardo’s claim that his experiment offers a window onto the crucible of human behaviour. This will be analysed by drawing on the Lacanian concepts of acting out and passage à l’acte. The question then posed is: if both Milgram and Zimbardo claim that their work has emancipatory dimensions — a claim maintained within mainstream psychology — does a close reading of the studies not then reveal that psychology is, rather, the royal road to occurrences such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib? The drama of a psychology which is fundamentally based on a process of psychologization is that it turns its subjects into homo sacer of psychological discourse. (shrink)

This paper discusses the use of the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study in the bioethical literature. The two studies are presented and a variety of uses of them identified and discussed. It is argued that the use of these studies as paradigms of problematic research relies on a reduction of their complexity. What is discussed is thus often constructions of these studies that are closer to hypothetical examples than to the real studies.

Milgram’s series of obedience experiments and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment are probably the two best-known psychological studies. As such, they can be understood as central to the broad process of psychologization in the postwar era. This article will consider the extent to which this process of psychologization can be understood as a simple overflow from the discipline of psychology to wider society or whether, in fact, this process is actually inextricably connected to the science of psychology as such. (...) In so doing, the article will argue that Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s studies are best usefully understood as twin experiments. Milgram’s paradigm of a psychology which explicitly draws its subject into the frame of its own discourse can be said to be the precondition of Zimbardo’s claim that his experiment offers a window onto the crucible of human behaviour. This will be analysed by drawing on the Lacanian concepts of acting out and passage à l’acte. The question then posed is: if both Milgram and Zimbardo claim that their work has emancipatory dimensions — a claim maintained within mainstream psychology — does a close reading of the studies not then reveal that psychology is, rather, the royal road to occurrences such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib? The drama of a psychology which is fundamentally based on a process of psychologization is that it turns its subjects into homo sacer of psychological discourse. (shrink)

Th is paper seeks an explanation for the overwhelming prevalence of anthropocentrism in the thinking of Western moral philosophers. It has been thought that such philosophers have been anthropocentric on the basis of reasons for which a rational defense may be given. When this view has been challenged, it has been challenged only by arguing that human interests stand in for rationally defensible reasons. Th is paper challenges the view that the only explanations of the prevalence of anthropocentrism are rationally (...) defensible reasons or human interests by advancing a competing explanation located in human psychology. The psychological experiments of Stanley Milgram and other empirical work by psychologists provide evidence of a psychological mechanism that supplies this competing explanation. (shrink)

Baumrind provides a fifty-year updating of her pioneering, extraordinarily influential ethical critique of the Milgram obedience experiments. She essentially reaffirms her earlier objections. These include the extensive use of deception, particularly in the informed consent phase, the destructive obedience exhibited by Milgram’s research personnel, violations of the experimenter’s fiduciary role of trust and empathy, the likelihood of lasting psychological harm experienced by at least some participants, and unwarranted generalizations made to the Nazi Holocaust in World War II. (...) I consider each of these concerns, among others, and find areas of agreement and disagreement with Baumrind. Her argument against the use of deception in the informed consent phase is convincing, as is her cautionary stance on generalizations made to the Nazi genocide. I take issue with her views on lasting harm, the epistemological value of deception, and the experimenter as fiduciary. Regardless of one’s agreement with Baumrind, her ethical arguments, considered in historical context, remain integral to an understanding of the impact of the obedience experiments. Her views have been seminal in changing the ethical monitoring of research with human participants. (shrink)

In two highly powered studies (total N = 1617), we showed that individuals estimated that they would stop earlier than others in a Milgram-like biomedical task leading to the death of an animal, confirming the relevance of the Better than Average Effect (BTAE) in a new research setting. However, this effect was not magnified among participants displaying high self-esteem. We also showed that participants who already knew obedience studies expected that others would be more obedient and would administer more (...) damaging treatment to the target. However, knowledge of Milgram’s studies was unrelated to a higher estimate of their own behavior (study 1), and was even linked to the prediction that they would stop earlier (study 2, preregistered). Despite the wide educational use of Milgram’s studies to increase people’s awareness of the risks inherent to blind obedience, it may be that this knowledge only serves to evaluate other’s behaviors, and not oneself. (shrink)

Avec l’ouverture des archives personnelles de Milgram, à partir du milieu des années 1990, une « seconde vague » de littérature sur les Études sur l’Obéissance s’est développée. Une partie de cette littérature suggère de manière convaincante que les expérimentations de Milgram sont si problématiques sur le plan éthique et méthodologique qu’elles ne mériteraient pas l’énorme attention qu’elles ont reçue et continuent de recevoir. À l’autre extrémité du spectre, certains chercheurs soutiennent qu’il y a encore beaucoup à apprendre (...) de ces expériences. Confronté à des opinions aussi divergentes, voire même contradictoires, qui doit-on croire? Après avoir examiné cette littérature, cet article aborde deux questions: les expérimentations sur l’obéissance sont-elles éthiquement contestables? Et restent-elles méthodologiquement valides? Cet article conclut que bien que les expérimentations sur l’obéissance soient, pour de nombreuses raisons, contraires à l’éthique, elles restent néanmoins méthodologiquement valides. L’article conclut également que c’est précisément en raison du caractère éthiquement scabreux de ces expérimentations qu’elles restent si pertinentes pour comprendre le monde réel, bien au-delà des murs des laboratoires. (shrink)

Stanley Milgram’s work on obedience to authority is social psychology’s most influential contribution to theorizing about Holocaust perpetration. The gist of Milgram’s claims is that Holocaust perpetrators were just following orders out of a sense of obligation to their superiors. Milgram, however, never undertook a scholarly analysis of how his obedience experiments related to the Holocaust. The author first discusses the major theoretical limitations of Milgram’s position and then examines the implications of Milgram’s (oft-ignored) (...) experimental manipulations for Holocaust theorizing, contrasting a specific case of Holocaust perpetration by Reserve Police Battalion 101 of the German Order Police. It is concluded that Milgram’s empirical findings, in fact, do not support his position-one that essentially constitutes an obedience alibi. The article ends with a discussion of some of the social dangers of the obedience alibi. (shrink)

This article revisits a forgotten, late project by the social psychologist Stanley Milgram: the ‘cyranoid’ studies he conducted from 1977 to 1984. These investigations, inspired by the play Cyrano de Bergerac, explored how individuals often fail to notice when others do not speak their own thoughts, but instead relay messages from a hidden source. We situate these experiments amidst the intellectual, cultural, and political concerns of late Cold War America, and show how Milgram’s studies pulled together a (...) variety of ideas, anxieties, and interests that were prevalent at that time and have returned in new guises since. In discussing the cyranoid project’s background and afterlife, we argue that its strikingly equivocal quality has lent itself to multiple reinterpretations by historians, psychologists, performers, artists, and others. Our purpose is neither to champion Milgram’s work nor to amplify the critiques already made of his methods. Rather, it is to consider the uncertain, allusive, and elusive aspects of the cyranoid project, and to seek to place that project in context, whilst asking where ‘context’ might end. We show how the experiments’ range of meanings, in different temporal registers, far exceeded the explanatory rubric that Milgram and his intellectual critics provided at that time, and ponder the risk for the historian of making anachronistic or teleological assumptions. In short, we argue, cyranoids invite our open-ended exploration of ‘voices offstage’ in social and psychological relations, and offer a useful tool for thinking about historical context and the nature of historical interpretations. (shrink)

Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which (...) the Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers — including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)

Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which (...) the Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers – including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)

Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which (...) the Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers – including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)

In commerce, many moral failures are due to narrow mindsets that preclude taking into account the moral dimensions of a decision or action. In turn, sometimes these mindsets are caused by failing to question managerial decisions from a moral point of view, because of a perceived authority of management. In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram conducted controversial experiments to investigate just how far obedience to an authority figure could subvert his subjects' moral beliefs. In this thought-provoking work, the authors (...) examine the prevalence of narrow mental models and the phenomenon of obedience to an authority to analyse and understand the challenges which business professionals encounter in making ethical decisions. Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making proposes processes - including collaborative input and critique - by which individuals may reduce or overcome these challenges. It provides decision-makers at all levels in an organisation with the means to place ethical considerations at the heart of managerial decision-making. (shrink)

The value and significance of Stanley Milgram’s experiments on Obedience to Authority have been the subject of a controversy that we propose to analyze in the light of the role played by the reference to cybernetics Milgram introduced in his 1974 work. This reference is part of the series of theoretical analyses proposed by Milgram in the core of his book Obedience to Authority (1974). It constitutes the central basis for the formulation of the concept of (...) the “agentic state”. And yet, only a few direct analyses have been performed on this reference in the framework of studies of Milgram’s work. It nevertheless plays a central role in several ways. Firstly, it provides Milgram with a consistent and generalizing framework which allows him to integrate certain elements, which could otherwise have appeared to diverge from the general explanation proposed, into a unified and apparently consistent interpretation. Secondly, the specific use of this reference allows him to strengthen his obedience paradigm as a general social human behavioral trend. Indeed, the way Milgram presents this cybernetic paradigm is not neutral in that he opts for a paradigm promoting the vertical and hierarchical. Our work is twofold. Firstly, we analyze the way Milgram’s successive presentations of his experiment translates into a radicalization and a unification of the paradigm of obedience to authority by lateralizing explanatory elements, even though such elements were considered by Milgram. Secondly, we highlight why the reference to cybernetics allows for this radicalization and provides his work with a theoretical basis while at the same time discussing certain limits and problems with this reference. (shrink)

Virtue, the centerpiece of ancient ethics, has come under attack by virtue skeptics impressed by results of psychology experiments including Milgram’s obedience studies. The virtue skeptic argues that experimental findings suggest that character structures are so fragile vis-à-vis situational factors as to be explanatorily superfluous: virtues and robust character traits are a myth, and should be replaced by situation-specific “narrow dispositions” (Gilbert Harman) or “local traits” (John Doris). This paper argues that the virtue skeptics’ sweeping claims are ill-founded. (...) First, blending Aristotelian and contemporary insights about virtue, I reach adecision about a reasonable, nonstraw defmition of “virtue” and of “character trait.” Next, I argue that explanations give by Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett for the Milgram findings covertly invoke character traits. Reflection reveals that more robust, crosssituationally consistent traits are needed for explanation of subject behavior, and that it is reasonable to suppose that such traits were in place. (shrink)

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les études sur Stanley Milgram ont connu une véritable renaissance interdisciplinaire, qui a conduit à modifier profondément le débat sur ces expériences de psychologie sociale parmi les plus controversées du xxe siècle. L’intérêt considérable pour les conditions expérimentales de ses travaux constitue une nouvelle perspective, qui a des implications pour la philosophie de la psychologie sociale. L’ontologie sociale (ou ontologie historique), de différents styles, peut mettre en lumière les caractéristiques contingentes de l’« obéissance (...) à l’autorité» et d’autres expériences classiques de la psychologie sociale nord-américaine. Dans ce numéro de Philosophia Scientiæ consacré à Milgram, ma contribution consiste à montrer comment une approche empirique de l’interaction sociale peut aider à éclairer – « à partir de la base» -– les relations de pouvoir dans le laboratoire de Milgram, ainsi que les résistances à la poursuite de l’expérience. Tout d’abord, je présente le pouvoir comme une caractéristique multidimensionnelle de la sociabilité humaine, en soulignant son aspect performatif. Dans le laboratoire, les sujets jouant le rôle des Enseignants sont contraints à exercer leur pouvoir de différentes façons très contrastées, soit en exerçant ce pouvoir sur l’Apprenant (en se conformant à la volonté de l’expérimentateur), soit contre l’expérimentateur (c’est-à-dire en lui résistant). Deuxièmement, je propose que, comme la moralité, le pouvoir au sens performatif peut être compris à l’aide de la distinction entre premier-plan et arrière-plan (dans le vocabulaire Gestaltiste, la distinction figure/fond), les deux aspects du phénomène étant empiriquement fondés, et orientés vers les pratiques concrètes des agents en interaction. Troisièmement, je précise la notion de pouvoir performatif, en relation avec la pratique de ceux qui, parmi les sujets en position d’Enseignants, s’opposent à la continuation de l’expérience. En conclusion, l’article illustre la valeur de l’analyse éthnométhodologique conversationnelle, en tant que style d’ontologie sociale adapté tant à l’étude des relations de pouvoirs, à celle des prétentions à la connaissance en psychologie sociale, qu’à la reconstruction des présupposés de la psychologie sociale nord-américaine classique. (shrink)

Ayn Rand's career as a writer of fiction, accordingly, was preceded and accompanied by her work on the system of philosophic thought she ultimately called Objectivism. This chapter introduces her writing by showing how the chosen actions of a life consciously devoted to a conscious purpose were integrated with the texts she crafted, in both fiction and non‐fiction. Ayn Rand's major project was The Fountainhead. The money from the movie rights to The Fountainhead bought Ayn Rand time to begin her (...) next novel, Atlas Shrugged. Whereas the theme of The Fountainhead was individualism versus collectivism, not in politics but in man's soul, The Strike (as Atlas Shrugged was initially called) was designed to dramatize the conflict between individualism and collectivism within the political/economic realm. Rand was active in the American Writers Association and the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals. (shrink)

Artículo considerado un clásico en el ámbito de la psicología social, describe los resultados de la investigación realizada por su autor en los años sesenta del siglo pasado, los que muestran que una considerable mayoría de personas normales, en acatamiento a la autoridad, pueden realizar conductas éticamente reprobables que causan daño a otros. Estas conclusiones confirman, experimentalmente, la hipótesis de la Escuela de Frankfurt de que existe en todos nosotros una dimensión autoritaria de la personalidad, que en la mayoría de (...) las personas genera una obediencia incondicional a la autoridad. (shrink)

The Babylonian Talmud has reached us in multiple versions in medieval manu- scripts, early printed editions, and in citations in the works of medieval and early modern scholars. The field of Talmud criticism has developed criteria for working with these materials and the scholar E. S. Rosenthal famously theorized about the implications of textual variants for the history of the Talmud’s redaction. Tractate Temurah of the Babylonian Talmud received special attention due to the frequency and, at times, unique usage of (...) the term, lishana ’aḥarina, meaning “alternative textual reading,” found in it. In Temurah the term lishana ’aḥarina does not only signal a difference in formulation, as in other tractates of the Talmud, but some- times also seems to introduce a separately redacted text of the tractate that was integrated into a widespread and known base text. (shrink)

There are important synergies for the next generation of ethical leaders based on the alignment of modified or adjusted mental models. This entails a synergistic application of moral imagination through collaborative input and critique, rather than "me too" obedience. In this article, we will analyze the Milgram results using frameworks relating to mental models (Werhane et al., Profitable partnerships for poverty alleviation, 2009), as well as work by Moberg on "ethics blind spots'' (Organizational Studies 27(3): 413-428, 2006), and by (...) Bazerman and Chugh on "bounded awareness" (Harvard Business Review, 2006; Mind & Society 6: 1-18, 2007) Using these constructs to examine the Milgram experiment, we will argue that the ways in which the experiments are framed, the presence of an authority figure, the appeal to the authority of science, and the situation in which the naïve participant finds herself or himself, all create a bounded awareness, a narrow blind spot that encourages a climate for obedience, brackets out the opportunity to ask the moral question: "Am I hurting another fellow human being?" and may preclude the subject from utilizing moral imagination to opt out of the experiment. We will conclude that these forms of almost blind obedience to authority are correctable, but with difficulty. We will argue that linking the modification of mental models to an unbinding of awareness represents an important synergistic relationship and one that can build effectively on the lessons learned from our experience with moral imagination. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate some important elements of the thought of George Bernard Shaw, more commonly known as one of the most famous playwrights of the twentieth century. Shaw’s philosophy dwells on the relationship between man and nature and especially the concept of freedom. Among all his works, it was decided here to analyse Saint Joan. In re-imagining the historical Joan as a heroine in a play of ideas, Shaw made use of the known facts about Joan of Arc (...) and Joan’s statements at her trial. Nonetheless, he made changes to emphasize her personal dignity and independence by contrast with the tyranny of institutions. Although he departed from the historical background, whitewashed her adversaries, and condensed episodes in Joan’s biography, he sought to be true to her confidence, courage, integrity, and common sense. His theatrical presentation is, in some respects, at odds with the Preface that accompanies the published play. (shrink)

Legal Fictions: Studies of Law and Narrative in the Discursive Worlds of Ancient Jewish Sectarians and Sages. By Steven D. Fraade. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism, vol. 147. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. xix + 627. $251.

De nombreux commentaires des expériences de Milgram soutiennent l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité, laquelle soutient que les participants de Milgram n’auraient en général pas cru qu’ils administraient des chocs électriques réels. Si l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité était juste, on devrait en conclure que les sujets obéissants ne croyaient pas mal agir, ce qui impliquerait que Milgram a échoué à mettre en évidence des niveaux alarmants d’obéissance destructrice. Dans cet article, nous démontrons que l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité n’est, en général, pas exacte : elle n’explique (...) que très difficilement le comportement des participants dans les expériences de Milgram et ses nombreuses réplications, et elle concorde mal avec les témoignages des participants concernant leur propre vécu. (shrink)

In debate over the ethics of deceptive experiments in American psy chology, commentators often provide an inaccurate history of these experiments. This happens especially where writers portray experi mental deception as a necessary accompaniment to human experiments, rather than a conscious choice based on values attached to persons and scientific inquiry. Compounding the error, commentators typically give a misleading portrayal of psychologists' attitudes and procedures. Commentators frequently cite Stanley Milgram's work in the 1960s as a harbinger (...) of changed attitudes towards deception, and suggest that today's psychologists abide by more enlightened ethical practices. It is difficult to find evidence to support this portrayal. (shrink)

This is the first scholarly study of Atlas Shrugged, covering in detail the historical, literary, and philosophical aspects of Ayn Rand's magnum opus. Topics explored in depth include the history behind the novel's creation, publication, and reception; its nature as a romantic novel; and its presentation of a radical new philosophy.

The essays in this collection treat historical, literary, and philosophical topics related to Ayn Rand's Anthem, an anti-utopia fantasy set in the future. The first book-length study on Anthem, this collection covers subjects such as free will, political freedom, and the connection between freedom and individual thought and privacy.

Ayn Rand's first novel, We the Living, offers an early form of the author's nascent philosophy—the philosophy Rand later called Objectivism. Robert Mayhew's collection of entirely new essays brings together pre-eminent scholars of Rand's writing. In part a history of We the Living, from its earliest drafts to the Italian film later based upon it, Mayhew's collection goes on to explore the enduring significance of Rand's first novel as a work both of philosophy and of literature.