Tännsjö’s book Setting Health-Care Priorities defends the view that there are three main normative theories in the domain of distributive justice, and that these theories are both highly plausible in themselves, and practically convergent in their normative conclusions. All three theories point to a somewhat radical departure from the present distribution of medical resources: in particular, they suggest redirecting resources from marginal life extension to the care of mentally ill patients. In this paper I wish to argue, firstly, that prioritarianism (...) should not be considered as an amendment to utilitarianism, as it is in Tännsjö’s view, but as a distinctive fourth option. This can best be appreciated if we focus on a reading of the theory that emphasizes its derivation from egalitarianism and its attempt to develop an intermediate approach between utilitarian and egalitarian intuitions. Secondly, in response to Tännsjö’s central objection to prioritarianism, I will argue that the theory does not apply in intrapersonal cases but is only relevant for decisions regarding the interpersonal distribution of benefits. Finally, I will suggest that a practical convergence of the four theories on specific issues such as artificial reproduction or mood enhancement is far less likely than Tännsjö seems to believe. (shrink)

L’argumentation morale implique de donner des raisons de soutenir des conclusions normatives, et quand le fondement de ces raisons est mis en question, un effort de justification systématique est alors exigé. L’article discute trois modèles de justification philosophique : le modèle des « décisions de principe » proposé par Richard Hare ; deux versions de l’intuitionnisme philosophique ; le modèle de l’équilibre réflexif de John Rawls. Il défend la thèse qu’une version modifiée de « l’équilibre réflexif large », en dépit (...) des critiques qui lui ont été adressées sur la base d’études empiriques portant sur les jugements moraux, reste la stratégie la plus sûre pour fournir des justifications aux propositions morales. (shrink)

I submit that philosophy makes progress, but it does so in a way that is distinct from the sense in which the word applies to science, and is more akin to what happens in allied fields such as mathematics and logic. I develop a model of philosophy as “evoking” (to use L. Smolin's term) a series of peaks in conceptually defined but empirically constrained, landscapes, or what N. Rescher calls “aporetic clusters.” I also discuss empirical evidence for the existence of (...) such clusters, following a statistical survey of philosophers’ views about their own field, carried out by D. Bourget and D.J. Chalmers. (shrink)

In questo testo viene discussa la tesi secondo cui sarebbe possibile una comprensione esaustiva del fenomeno amoroso sulla base dei meccanismi della chimica cerebrale. Si distinguono diversi aspetti dell'amore e si portano ragioni per le quali le chimica cerebrale può svolgere un ruolo più o meno ampio in ciascuno di essi nel fornire una spiegazione del fenomeno amoroso.

The article briefly analyzes the concept of a person, arguing that personhood does not coincide with the actual enjoyment of certain intellectual capacities, but is coextensive with the embodiment of a human individual. Since in PVS patients we can observe a human individual functioning as a whole, we must conclude that these patients are still human persons, even if in a condition of extreme impairment. It is then argued that some forms of minimal treatment may not be futile for these (...) patients; they may constitute a form of respect for their human dignity and benefit these patients, even if they are not aware of that. Moreover, it is important to consider the symbolic significance of care: while many believe that PVS is a kind of imprisonment, for others providing food and fluids is the only way to testify our proximity to these persons. The best policy would be to provide, as a general rule, artificial nutrition and hydration to PVS patients: this treatment could be withdrawn, after a period of observation and reflection by the family and proxies, on the basis of the proxies' objection to the continuation or of the patient's advance directives specifically referring to this situation. (shrink)

Schlick’s relationship with the Tractatus has been mainly investigated in what concerns the conception both of language and world, the insight of logic, the criteria of verifiability, the proper role of philosophy as mental activity. However, some other features of Schlick’s reading of the Tractatus require a closer consideration. In the 1920s, Schlick was dealing with the questions of ethics (and, to some extent, of religion), that represent from the early days the core issue of his philosophy of culture. Schlick’s (...) intellectual relationship with Wittgenstein ought to be explored also in this broader context, namely after his first encounter with the Tractatus. As it emerges from their private conversations in 1929, Schlick did not agree with Wittgenstein’s account of ethics as a domain going beyond the limits of language. Whereas Wittgenstein maintains that “that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same [Tractatus 6.421]”, Schlick considers ethics as a factual science. As he says in the Problems of ethics (1930), “if there are ethical questions that have meaning, and are therefore able to be answered, then ethics is a science”. Wittgenstein’s position is patently in contrast with Schlick’s. According to Wittgenstein, ethics, no differently from religion, cannot be tested as is usual for meaningful propositions, namely by recurring to hypotheses, high probability or knowing. My paper aims at highlighting this contrast, that is rooted both in the Tractatus and in Schlick’s conception of ethics as science already endorsed in his work before the arriving in Vienna. How Schlick would have appreciated Wittgenstein’s late thoughts on ethics remains, at any rate, an open question. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen, der Begründer der Marburger Schule des Neukantianismus, hat einen bis dato unterirdischen Einfluss auf den Logischen Empirismus ausgeübt. Seine Konzeption der transzendentalen Methode sowie seine scharfe Polemik gegen den Psychologismus wurden insbesondere von Rudolf Carnap und Hans Reichenbach zum Teil angenommen, aber zugleich auch umgewandelt. Reichenbach’s Analyse der Wissenschaft und Carnaps logische Analyse wissenschaftlicher Sätze sind mit Cohens Ansatz in dem Sinne noch verbunden, dass die Kritik der Vernunft Kantischer Prägung durch die Eruierung der begrifflichen Struktur wissenschaftlicher Theorien (...) ersetzt wird. Trotz offensichtlicher Differenzen handelt es sich doch um einen Zusammenhang, auf den die Forschung weiter einzugehen hat. (shrink)

This paper aims at focusing on Cassirer's relationship with Hegel during the crucial period when Cassirer is outlining and completing the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in the early 1920s. The main thesis is that Cassirer has never abandoned his original Neo-Kantian approach, despite the fact that it has been enriched within the perspective of a philosophy of culture indebted to some extent also to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. However, Cassirer maintains that Kant's critical idealism must be contrasted with Hegel's absolute (...) idealism, keeping thereby open the process of the spirit that cannot close itself in a definitive logical structure. This critical stance is shared by some contemporaries of Cassirer such as Dilthey, Windelband, and above all Natorp. We have thus to read Cassirer's project against the historical backdrop of the ‘Hegel-Renaissance’ in Germany, a circumstance that, according to the author, can contribute to a more adequate understanding of Cassirer's opus magnum. (shrink)

The article focusses on the catalogue of love-affairs from Book 3 of Hermesianax's Leontion (fr. 7 Powell = 3 Lightfoot). Contrary to two basic assumptions of previous scholarship, this article underscores that fr. 3 Lightfoot is neither representative of the Leontion as a whole nor an instance of unsophisticated poetic production. The evidence indicates that Hermesianax's catalogue might have played a crucial role in shaping the later reception of some of the figures he portrays (Mimnermus, Antimachus and perhaps even Hesiod). (...) Finally, several points of contact with Clearchus of Soli show that Hermesianax may be engaging with relevant aspects of contemporary culture, most of all the Peripatetic investigation of biography and the phenomenology of love. (shrink)

It is no secret that we inhabit an increasingly irrational world, plagued by rampant pseudoscience, science denialism, post-truths and fake news. Or perhaps, human nature being what it is, we have always lived in such a world and we are now simply more keenly aware of it because of easy and widespread access to social media. Moreover, the stakes are higher, as pseudoscience in the form of the anti-vax movement imperils the lives of many, while climate change denialism literally risks (...) a collapse of the human ecosystem. So how do we deal with the problem? How do we talk to otherwise perfectly reasonable and functional people who nevertheless espouse all sorts of nonsense — and vote accordingly? In this paper I will explore a couple of real life conversations among many that I have had with believers in pseudoscience, and then present and discuss virtue epistemology as one approach to ameliorate the problem. No silver bullets are available, unfortunately, but it is our intellectual and moral duty to keep, as Carl Sagan famously put it, the candle of reason lit even when surrounded by the darkness of unreason. (shrink)

Can ethics be approached scientifically? What's the relationship between science and the study of morality?

I hope I'll be forgiven for including this piece about the infamous Priory of Sion, which, as, anyone who has read The Da Vinci Code can tell you, is a secret organization dedicated to keeping the secret of the Holy Grail — an organization led down the centuries by eminent scientists, thinkers and artists including Da Vinci himself. While not strictly philosophical, this article is an excellent exercise in the kind of scrupulous detective work rarely done by those who spread (...) such myths. It also nicely illustrates how such myths are often started. (shrink)