Within modern scholarship on Indian philosophy, religious studies, and Indology Purva-Mimamsa unfortunately features as a rather under-represented area. The present edition and translation of the Mimamsanyayasamgraha by James Benson is a most welcome exception in two respects: On the one hand it makes accessible the major premises and topics of Purva-Mimamsa to students and scholars in a rather simple and brief manner. On the other hand it represents the first translation of a work from the late 17th century, i.e. from (...) the "new school" of Purva-Mimamsa. So far no major texts from this period are available and little is known about the school's developments and changes in those times. Thus, besides providing a solid and understandable introduction to the system, this book will also be valuable to advanced students of Purva-Mimamsa interested in its newer branches. It will therefore be of use not only for Indologists, but also to students and scholars dealing with South Asian religions, ritual and intellectual history. (shrink)

The Purpose of the Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṅgraha and Its TranslationSome of the criticism frequently seen in book reviews is due to the reviewer's desire to have read something else. Indeed, I do not wish to judge James Benson's Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṅgraha: A Compendium on the Principles of Mīmāṃsā from the standpoint of what I would have written if I had been in his place. And thus, I will start by outlining his work and the goals he had in mind.The central part of this extensive (...) book consists in a critical edition of a previously unpublished Mīmāṃsā work together with its first English translation. All the other sections, including the introduction, summary of topics, and indexes, must be understood as subsidiary.The... (shrink)

Part of a 18th century treatise of the neo-Nyaya school in Indic philosophy, deals with verbal testimony (śabda).

To understand the history of Advaita Vedānta and its rise to prominence, we need to devote more attention to what might be termed “Greater Advaita Vedānta,” or Advaita Vedānta as expressed outside the standard canon of Sanskrit philosophical works. Elsewhere I have examined the works of Niścaldās (ca. 1791–1863), whose Hindi-language Vicār-sāgar (“The Ocean of Inquiry”) was once referred to by Swami Vivekananda as the most influential book of its day. In this paper, I look back to one of Niścaldās’s (...) major influences: Sundardās (1596–1689), a well-known Hindi poet and a direct disciple of Dādū Dayāl (d. 1604). Sundardās is typically classified as a bhakti poet rather than an Advaita Vedāntin; certainly he is not included in existing surveys or histories of Vedānta. In his youth, however, he studied Sanskrit and Vedānta in Banaras, and his poems present us with a mind that found no contradiction in claiming Dādū as his master and at the same time embracing the teachings of Advaita Vedānta. I argue that not only should Sundardās be included in histories of Advaita Vedānta, he should be credited for his originality: not only did he “Vedānticize” the Dādū Panth, he “Dādūized” Vedānta. I conclude by comparing Sundardās to two Sanskrit intellectuals from roughly the same period: Mahādeva Sarasvatī Vedāntin and Annambhaṭṭa, both of whom, like Sundardās, had commitments to Advaita Vedānta as well as to other intellectual traditions. (shrink)

To understand the history of Advaita Vedānta and its rise to prominence, we need to devote more attention to what might be termed “Greater Advaita Vedānta,” or Advaita Vedānta as expressed outside the standard canon of Sanskrit philosophical works. Elsewhere I have examined the works of Niścaldās, whose Hindi-language Vicār-sāgar was once referred to by Swami Vivekananda as the most influential book of its day. In this paper, I look back to one of Niścaldās’s major influences: Sundardās, a well-known Hindi (...) poet and a direct disciple of Dādū Dayāl. Sundardās is typically classified as a bhakti poet rather than an Advaita Vedāntin; certainly he is not included in existing surveys or histories of Vedānta. In his youth, however, he studied Sanskrit and Vedānta in Banaras, and his poems present us with a mind that found no contradiction in claiming Dādū as his master and at the same time embracing the teachings of Advaita Vedānta. I argue that not only should Sundardās be included in histories of Advaita Vedānta, he should be credited for his originality: not only did he “Vedānticize” the Dādū Panth, he “Dādūized” Vedānta. I conclude by comparing Sundardās to two Sanskrit intellectuals from roughly the same period: Mahādeva Sarasvatī Vedāntin and Annambhaṭṭa, both of whom, like Sundardās, had commitments to Advaita Vedānta as well as to other intellectual traditions. (shrink)

To understand the history of Advaita Vedānta and its rise to prominence, we need to devote more attention to what might be termed “Greater Advaita Vedānta,” or Advaita Vedānta as expressed outside the standard canon of Sanskrit philosophical works. Elsewhere I have examined the works of Niścaldās, whose Hindi-language Vicār-sāgar was once referred to by Swami Vivekananda as the most influential book of its day. In this paper, I look back to one of Niścaldās’s major influences: Sundardās, a well-known Hindi (...) poet and a direct disciple of Dādū Dayāl. Sundardās is typically classified as a bhakti poet rather than an Advaita Vedāntin; certainly he is not included in existing surveys or histories of Vedānta. In his youth, however, he studied Sanskrit and Vedānta in Banaras, and his poems present us with a mind that found no contradiction in claiming Dādū as his master and at the same time embracing the teachings of Advaita Vedānta. I argue that not only should Sundardās be included in histories of Advaita Vedānta, he should be credited for his originality: not only did he “Vedānticize” the Dādū Panth, he “Dādūized” Vedānta. I conclude by comparing Sundardās to two Sanskrit intellectuals from roughly the same period: Mahādeva Sarasvatī Vedāntin and Annambhaṭṭa, both of whom, like Sundardās, had commitments to Advaita Vedānta as well as to other intellectual traditions. (shrink)

Abstract:Subject As Freedom (1930) is correctly regarded as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's magnum opus. But this text relies on a set of ideas and develops from a set of concerns that KCB develops more explicitly in essays written both before and after that text, which might be regarded as its intellectual bookends. These ideas are important and fascinating in their own right. They also illuminate KCB's engagement with Kant and with the Vedānta tradition as well as his understanding of freedom itself, including (...) its soteriological dimension. These two essays are "Sankara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1930) and "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance" (1936). We explore KCB's conception of philosophy and its relation to spiritual practice through a close reading of these two essays. (shrink)

The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, (...) particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. (shrink)

The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, (...) particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. (shrink)

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa combines Vedāntin philosophy, dramatic and aesthetic elements, and personal expressions in a unique manner. Moreover, it seems to be conveying a notion of selfhood or personhood which is unique and innovative for the Hindu tradition. This paper aims at uncovering this unique notion. It deconstructs the BhP by arguing for the amalgamation of the Rasa-aesthetic school with Vedānta. It then turns to the topic of personhood in the Hindu tradition; it raises the complexity of discussing personhood (...) in the Indian context and discusses three notions of personhood which are ‘the Worldly Self of Mīmāṁsā’, the ‘Solitary Self of Sāṅkhya’, and the ‘Transcendental Self of Vedānta’. Having articulated these three notions, it highlights the notion of aesthetic personhood underlying the BhP. The paper goes further to differentiate notions of Vivarta from those of Pariṇāma, pointing out at the Pariṇāma worldview to be underlying the notion of aesthetic personhood of the BhP. At last and as an outcome of its main argument, it offers a sketch of ascending notions of aesthetic notions of personhood in the BhP. (shrink)

The great Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara puts forth a mystic parallelism thesis that is identified and examined here: mystical and sensory experiences are epistemically parallel. Among the conclusions drawn are that the Advaita metaphysics precludes successful defense of a Brahman-centered philosophy on the basis of such a thesis because Advaita precludes a story about how the experience of its Brahman could arise. Thus Śaṅkara needs "scripture" (śruti) to secure important parts of his view. A truly mystical Vedānta, in contrast, would (...) not. (shrink)

This paper was written for a workshop, Chance and Contingency in Indian Philosophy, that was held at Yale University in May 2017. It examines the role that chance plays by focusing on the popular maxim of the crow and the palm tree. It argues that while representatives of different schools of thought were aware of the possibility of purely random occurrences, they dealt with it very differently. For some like the Vedāntins chance provided proof of their positions, while for others, (...) Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, chance was a challenge, particularly to their theories of inference. (shrink)

Samkara has been regarded by many as the most authoritative Hindu thinker of all time. A great Indian Vedantin brahmin, Samkara was primarily a commentator on the sacred texts of the Vedas and a teacher in the Advaitin teaching line. This book serves as an introduction to Samkara's thought which takes this as a central theme. The author develops an innovative approach based on Samkara's ways of interpreting sacred texts and creatively examines the profound interrelationship between sacred text, content and (...) method in Samkara's thought. The main focus of the book is on Samkara's teaching method. This method is, for Samkara, based on the Upanishads' own; it is to be employed by Advaitin teachers to draw pupils skilfully towards that realisation which is beyond all words. Consequently, this book will be of interest not only to students and scholars of Indian philosophy, but to all those interested in the relation between language and that which is held to transcend it. (shrink)

The meanings in which the word "word" can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the "word-equals-world" thesis, and the extent to which Bhartṛhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartṛhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language (...) plays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartṛhari's thinking from that of the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and pariṇāma as philosophical terms is offered. (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa and anumāna, (...) and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

This paper announces the first critical edition of Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the Bhagavadgītā in its Kashmirian recension, based on one Kashmirian Devanāgarī and seven Śāradā manuscripts in addition to two existing non-critical editions. The volume will also include a new edition of the Kashmirian recension of the Bhagavadgītā and a full French translation. After a short presentation of Abhinavagupta’s commentary and a discussion of previous work on the subject, the manuscripts used are listed and briefly described. The question and importance (...) of the Kashmirian recension of the Bhagavadgītā and problems of its edition are discussed in detail, with several textual examples. In order to give a sample of the Gītārthasaṃgraha’s contents, some of Abhinavagupta’s remarkable interpretations are also highlighted, in particular tantric or esoteric ones. An Appendix deals with the closely related question of Bhāskara the Vedāntin, his date, his provenance and the Gītā recension he probably used for his commentary. (shrink)

Le culte grandiose de Kali, la Mère, son incomparable symbolisme, ses litanies et ses chants, embrasse l'âme de l'univers qu'il glorifie comme aucune conception religieuse ne le fit jamais. La terrifiante déesse sème la peste et les pires ravages sur ses pas, tout en accordant sa grâce et sa clémence à ses enfants assez hardis pour soulever l'horrible masque derrière lequel elle se cache la figure. Ceux-là retrouveront les traits radieux qui ont enchanté leur enfance. La sublime conception de Kali, (...) la Mère, découle d'une philosophie moniste qui s'écarte pourtant sensiblement de la philosophie Védanta de Shankara. Tous deux partent, il est vrai, de la même idée. Ils admettent l'un et l'autre une substance une, indivisible et éternelle, que les Védantins appellent Brahma et les adorateurs de Kali, la Mère, Siva. Mais il y a divergence quant aux manifestations. Pour Shankara il n'y a qu'illusion. Il tranche le lien qui rattache le phénomène à l'absolu. Il se demande qui a pu susciter l'apparence. Mais, l'absolu étant la vérité même, il n'a pu engendrer l'apparence pas plus que la lumière n'aurait pu engendrer l'obscurité. Qu'y avait-il donc de commun entre les Brahmas et Maya? A première vue il semble qu'il n'y a aucun rapport. Pour Shankara il n'était besoin d'aucune relation, puisque Maya n'existe pas en réalité et que le monde n'est que mirage. Le monde n'existe que pour l'esprit qui est lui-même sujet aux hallucinations. Adorer la Mère, c'est accepter l'univers dans ses aspects les plus terrifiants. Cette philosophie est diamétralement opposée au christianisme dans son culte du Dieu d'amour, du Père plein de miséricorde. Le christianisme enseigne que tout se fait pour notre bien, tandis que pour les adorateurs de Kali, l'univers est féroce et hostile à l'homme, qui avant tout doit se montrer supérieur aux événements. Mais Kali n'est pas seulement la destructrice. Si elle démolit inexorablement toutes les formes vitales qui ont fait leur temps et qui se détériorent, elle en crée au fur et à mesure des nouvelles. C'est dans cette conception de la Mère qu'il faut chercher tout d'abord le mystère de l'esprit indien. Dans son essence la plus intime la mère du monde est l'absolu, est Siva même. Comme telle elle représente la connaissance, l'entité et la joie absolues. Pour les adorateurs de Kali les mots Mantram Saham (je suis elle) renferment la clef de la vie et dissipent crainte et tristesse. (shrink)

This paper is historical and is devoted to an old controversy in the Indian philosophical tradition with the Vedantins (and others) holding that cognitive states are self-revealing and the Nyaya taking the opposite position. I have summarized the major Vedantin arguments for their viewpoint and offered a critique from the Nyaya perspective. This throws light on a major philosophical controversy in the Indian tradition, a controversy that has not been studied in-depth in the Western tradition. Notably the problem of induction, (...) a major problem in contemporary epistemology, has been studied in-depth in the Western tradition since its introduction by David Hume in the 18th century but the said problem has been studied deeply in Indian tradition for centuries earlier. I have argued in my Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction (2010) that the older Indian contribution on this problem is fully relevant for the very best that contemporary philosophers have offered on this. I hope that this paper will draw the attention of contemporary Western epistemologists who would get involved in this critically important epistemological debate and address a lacuna in the Western tradition. (shrink)

The paper addresses three main issues drawing on Husserl’s writings on logic. First, what gives the logical objects their objective status, given the fact that these are intimately connected with human mental processes? Second, if logical objects are objective then how is logical knowledge at all possible? The answer to this question leads to a transcendental foundation of formal logic. Third, how do the principles of logic apply to the real world? This question can be addressed by positing a formal (...) ontology. Against Russell and Whitehead, it has been pointed out that even if logical implication does not in any way depend on human mind, inference is definitely mind-dependent. But this thesis does not necessarily lead to psychologism, as has been pointed out by contemporary Indian logicians. Indian theories of inference deal with the question of truth and falsity but lack a formal ontology. Both pure logic and modern physics claim to be independent of human existence. This claim becomes evident in the conversation between Heisenberg and Tagore. Husserl had distinguished between logical grammar and logic of consequences. The notions of truth and falsity are relevant only in the context of logic of consequences. However, none of the well-known theories of truth, correspondence, coherence or pragmatic theory is free from defects. Following in the footprints of the Advaita Vedantins, it has been maintained that falsity is more fundamental than truth. In the process of cognitive history, a proposition is taken to be true, unless its falsity is proven. Hence the conclusion: since Philosophy is search for the truth, all Philosophy—infinitely—is a gradual rejection of all claims to truth and finally, destroys itself. (shrink)

In this paper, perhaps the first of its kind, an attempt is made to elucidate and examine the Vedantic theory of soul constructed on the basis of the experience of dreamless sleep which, being radically and qualitatively different from waking and dreaming states, is considered by the Vedantins as a state of temporarily purified individual soul (atman), a state of pure substantial consciousness. They take the experience of dreamless sleep as a model experience of the soul's final liberation from the (...) body and its internal as well as external faculties. The ultimate liberation, according to the Vedantins, is a state of total identification of the individual soul with the Universal Soul (Brahman), the summum bonum of every Vedantin. The paper also includes a critique of the Vedantic soul theory by the Buddhists who vehemently deny any autonomous and substantial soul whose essence is unchangingly permanent, pure consciousness and self-illuminating knowledge. The soul is instead interpreted by the Buddhists as a product of the functioning of a person's psycho-physical organism and a mere subject of knowing, thinking, desiring, etc. The analysis further shows that the Vedanta, especially the Advaita Vedanta, metaphysics of soul is inadequate in many respects and mainly based on a priori and scriptural arguments and emotive appeals, whereas the Buddhists deny any kind of autonomous and permanent agent of knowing, thinking and desiring by successfully reducing substantial consciousness to mere acts of knowing. (shrink)

The scope and audacity of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s contributions to Sanskrit grammar has made him one of early-modern India’s most influential, if not controversial, intellectuals. Yet for as consequential as Bhaṭṭoji’s has been for histories of early-modern scholasticism, his extensive corpus of non-grammatical writings has attracted relatively little scholarly attention. This paper examines Bhaṭṭoji’s work on Vedānta, the Tattvakaustubha, in order to gage how issues of language became an increasingly important site of inter-religious critique among early-modern Vedāntins. In the Tattvakaustubha, Bhaṭṭoji (...) reproaches Madhvācārya, the founder of the eponymous Mādhva or Dvaita Vedānta system, for his use of ungrammatical words. In extending his accusations of grammatical negligence to include Madhva’s early commentator Jayatīrtha, Bhaṭṭoji sought to undermine Mādhva claims to authoritative scriptural exegesis. Bhaṭṭoji’s provocation impelled later Mādhva scholars like Rāghavendratīrtha to bring a sharper set of grammatical tools to core commentarial works. Where others have pointed to Vyāsatīrtha as a turning point for Mādhva scholastic discourse in the areas of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Navya Nyāya, this paper suggests that it was the post-Bhaṭṭoji scholar Rāghavendratīrtha who brought a hitherto unrivaled grammatical expertise to Mādhva writings. That both Mādhva and Advaita Vedāntins wielded grammatical legitimacy as a cudgel against the other raises important socio-historical questions about the relationship between text-criticism, conceptions of scholastic legitimacy, and inter-religious contestation in early-modern South Asia. (shrink)

Le culte grandiose de Kali, la Mère, son incomparable symbolisme, ses litanies et ses chants, embrasse l'âme de l'univers qu'il glorifie comme aucune conception religieuse ne le fit jamais. La terrifiante déesse sème la peste et les pires ravages sur ses pas, tout en accordant sa grâce et sa clémence à ses enfants assez hardis pour soulever l'horrible masque derrière lequel elle se cache la figure. Ceux-là retrouveront les traits radieux qui ont enchanté leur enfance. La sublime conception de Kali, (...) la Mère, découle d'une philosophie moniste qui s'écarte pourtant sensiblement de la philosophie Védanta de Shankara. Tous deux partent, il est vrai, de la même idée. Ils admettent l'un et l'autre une substance une, indivisible et éternelle, que les Védantins appellent Brahma et les adorateurs de Kali, la Mère, Siva. Mais il y a divergence quant aux manifestations. Pour Shankara il n'y a qu'illusion. Il tranche le lien qui rattache le phénomène à l'absolu. Il se demande qui a pu susciter l'apparence. Mais, l'absolu étant la vérité même, il n'a pu engendrer l'apparence pas plus que la lumière n'aurait pu engendrer l'obscurité. Qu'y avait-il donc de commun entre les Brahmas et Maya? A première vue il semble qu'il n'y a aucun rapport. Pour Shankara il n'était besoin d'aucune relation, puisque Maya n'existe pas en réalité et que le monde n'est que mirage. Le monde n'existe que pour l'esprit qui est lui-même sujet aux hallucinations. Adorer la Mère, c'est accepter l'univers dans ses aspects les plus terrifiants. Cette philosophie est diamétralement opposée au christianisme dans son culte du Dieu d'amour, du Père plein de miséricorde. Le christianisme enseigne que tout se fait pour notre bien, tandis que pour les adorateurs de Kali, l'univers est féroce et hostile à l'homme, qui avant tout doit se montrer supérieur aux événements. Mais Kali n'est pas seulement la destructrice. Si elle démolit inexorablement toutes les formes vitales qui ont fait leur temps et qui se détériorent, elle en crée au fur et à mesure des nouvelles. C'est dans cette conception de la Mère qu'il faut chercher tout d'abord le mystère de l'esprit indien. Dans son essence la plus intime la mère du monde est l'absolu, est Siva même. Comme telle elle représente la connaissance, l'entité et la joie absolues. Pour les adorateurs de Kali les mots Mantram Saham (je suis elle) renferment la clef de la vie et dissipent crainte et tristesse. (shrink)

This paper offers a literary and ideological deconstruction of the Bhāgavata Purāa; it traces the Purāa's formation through the convergence of the Vedāntin, the Aesthetic and the Vaiava traditions, and argues that it is the doctrine of Pariāma which underlies the treatise. I first examine the Bhāgavata Purāa's literary components; the roots of these are traced back historically to the Vedānta and Ālvār traditions, and the Bhāgavata Purāa's nature as an opus universale, representing an all Indian cultural 'melting pot', (...) is highlighted. The paper then looks at the relations of Vaiavism and dramaturgy, both historically as well as theologically, and argues that the Bhāgavata Purāa was traditionally read as a drama. It proceeds to decipher the aesthetic theory underlying the Bhāgavata Purāa, and argues that it is Bharata's dramaturgical rasa theory. Within the rasa tradition, Abhinavagupta 's and Bhoja's positions are highlighted and compared through three seminal points and it becomes apparent that the Bhāgavata Purāa's underlying aesthetic theory is close to the Pariāma doctrine of Bhoja where gāra is considered to be the supreme rasa. As Bhoja's date is no doubt later than the Bhāgavata Purāa's it is assumed that the Bhāgavata Purāa was influenced by one of Bhoja's predecessors. The paper ends by reinforcing this analysis by highlighting a later tradition which had actually accepted this point of view and that is the Gauiya Vaiava tradition. (shrink)

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were not solely textists; nor were they merely existential metaphysicians; nor were they a combination of both. Rather, their epistemologies involve a sixfold use of vitally important sacred and secular pramāṇa-s as instruments in orchestrated fashion where symphonies of their respective ontologies are given to their listeners. With the two Vedāntins, no pramāṇa is in every case the lead instrument. Rather, they employ any of the six as lead instrument at various times, depending on the pedagogic and/or (...) apologetic context, while the others support the melody played by the lead. The result for both teachers is a melodic epistemological opposed-to-the-other composition characterized by careful thought and use of the six pramāṇa-s, all with the goal of defending their respective traditions of Vedānta as the truth of the matter at hand—knowledge of Brahman. (shrink)

RésuméL'absolu, tel que nous le décrivent les grands textes taoïstes ou védantins, correspond à un modèle théorique d'une importance exceptionnelle: le Divin pluridimensionnel par opposition au Dieu unidimensionnel de notre monothéisme traditionnel. L'affirmation du Divin s'avère ici solidaire d'une intégration de toutes les formes de la finitude et d'un dépassement des coupures ontologiques analogues à celles qui séparent Dieu et les créatures dans le monothéisme créationniste.SummaryThe Absolute, as described in the principal Taoist or Vedantist works corresponds to an exceptionally important (...) theoretical model: the multidimensional Divine being as opposed to the unidimensional God of our traditional monotheism. This asseveration of the “Divine” implies an integrating of all forms of the finite and a transcending of all ontological divisions similar to those which separate God and his creatures in the monotheistic theory of creation.ZusammenfassungDas Absolute, wie es in den grossen taoistischen und wedischen Texten beschrieben wird, entspricht einem theoretischen Modell von ausserordentlicher Bedeutung, namlich der mehrdimensionalen Gottheit im Gegensatz zum eindimensionalen Gott unseres traditionellen Monotheismus. Die Gottheit zeigt sich hier verantwortlich für eine Integration aller Formen der Endlichkeit und für eine Ueberwindung der ontologischen Zäsuren, die mit denjenigen zu vergleichen sind, welche Gott und Geschöpfe beim Monotheismus mit einem Schöpfergott trennen. (shrink)

This paper aims at examining the issue of the role of supreme being theology in non-Abrahamic traditions. According to the dominant view in contemporary philosophy of religion, the philo-sophical project of inferring divine properties from the concept of God as a maximally perfect being, usually called supreme being theology, is an exclusivity of the Abrahamic traditions. In attempting to question this view, I investigate the developments of two key-concepts of Vedāntatradition –the concepts of Brahman (literally, the greatest) and Bhagavān (literally, (...) the possessor of all excellences) –in thethought of three famous vedantins: Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Jīva. (shrink)

Many schools of Indian philosophy stress the importance of knowledge on the path to liberation, but what kind of knowledge is meant? Is it the kind of knowledge that can be had through philosophical thinking, through a path of intellectual inquiry? In this presentation I will sketch the position of Niścaldās, a late Advaita Vedāntin whose magnum opus, The Ocean of Inquiry, though not well known today, was once referred to by Vivekananda as having “more influence in India than (...) any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries.” For Niścaldās, the central practice on the path to liberation is inquiry, an intellectual process of raising and removing doubts which, I argue, is closely related to the dialectical method employed throughout Indian philos­ophy. The practice of inquiry presupposes a high level of moral and spiritual qualifications, but once these qualifications are met, philosophical thinking itself becomes, for Niścaldās, a spiritual practice. This practice is the chief means for bridging the gap between purely theoretical awareness and a deeper, liberating knowledge. (shrink)

One common interpretation of the orthodox Indian prohibition on desire is that it is a prohibition on phenomenologically salient desires. The Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi seem to support this view. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. The Vedāntins draw a distinction between counting some fact as a reason for acting (icchā) and counting one's desire (rāga) as a reason for acting, and prohibit the latter. The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between desiring to avoid some state of affairs (dveṣa) and believing (...) that some state of affairs is unimportant (vairāgya), and advocate the latter. Both deny that the state to which the English word 'desire' refers is a necessary condition of acting. (shrink)

One common interpretation of the orthodox Indian prohibition on desire is that it is a prohibition on phenomenologically salient desires. The Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi seem to support this view. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. The Vedāntins draw a distinction between counting some fact as a reason for acting and counting one's desire as a reason for acting, and prohibit the latter. The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between desiring to avoid some state of affairs and believing that some state (...) of affairs is unimportant , and advocate the latter. Both deny that the state to which the English word ‘desire’ refers is a necessary condition of acting. (shrink)

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason is normally an omnipresent property. Its Target is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an (...) inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators. (shrink)

This paper explains some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in Western as well as in Indian philosophy. Regarding the psychological concept of freedom or free will, this paper focuses on the distinction between fatalism, determinism, types of compatibilism, and libertarianism. Indian philosophers, by and large, are compatibilists, although some minor systems, such as Śākta Āgama, favor a type of libertarianism. From the Indian perspective the form of life of human beings has also been mentioned in the discussion of (...) free will. Regarding metaphysical freedom, I discuss the views of the Bhagavad Gītā and Swami Vivekananda in Sect. III. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, has discussed degrees of freedom of the subject at several levels. According to him, spiritual progress lies in the progressive realization of the freedom of the subject. I compare his view with the classical Advaita concept of freedom. I have also addressed the question of whether freedom from suffering can be realized at social and global levels. In this context I have mentioned some of the interpretations of the great saying ‘I am Brahman,’ and how freedom can be realized at the global level by using the Advaita concept of ‘oneness.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on YogaFujinaga SinReconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga. By Christopher Key Chapple, with a new translation of Haribhadra's Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya by Christopher Key Chapple and John Thomas Casey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. 170.Among the Jaina philosophers, Haribhadra (700-770) must be one of the most studied by both Indian and non-Indian scholars, with examinations of his work (...) going back to the early days of research on Indian thought in Europe. For example, Ṣaḍdar-śanasamuccaya, with introduction and notes by F. L. Pullé, was published in Florence in 1887. Traditionally, over one thousand books are attributed to Haribhadra. Besides commentaries on the āgamas, his writings also cover almost all other aspects of Jaina philosophy. The Yogadḍḍḍisamuccaya (hereafter YDS), as the title suggests, discusses aspects of yoga in Jainism with reference to other schools of Indian philosophy. The book under review here, Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga, by Christopher Key Chapple, consists of seven chapters of essays on the YDS and its author, a new English translation with Sanskrit text, and notes, a bibliography, and an index.In the first chapter, which deals with the writings of Haribhadra, especially the YDS, the author reviews opinions on his dates and agrees with the view that he lived [End Page 681] in the eighth century. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between Haribhadra and Patañjali as well as their thoughts concerning yoga. This chapter is probably the most important one in the book. Two "lost yogas," the Vedāntin Yoga of Bhagavaddasa and the Buddhist Yoga of Bhāskara, are explored in chapter 3. These are identified, as the chapter title indicates, as Vedānta yoga and Buddhist yoga.In chapter 4, on the philosophical background of the various yogas, the author points out that although Haribhadra was familiar with the thought of other schools, he proclaimed the Jaina tenet of realism and criticized Buddhist momentariness and Vedāntin monism. These criticisms may be related to the two yogas dealt with in the previous chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the notion of purity in Patañjali and Haribhadra, and chapter 6 deals with Haribhadra's criticisms of tantric yoga. In the last chapter Christopher Chapple examines Haribhadra's thoughts on yoga from a sociological standpoint; Chapple also assigns contemporary yoga movements to four groups in accordance with the types of yogins mentioned in the YDS.The author points out that in the Jaina tradition the word "yoga" fundamentally stands for any actions by living beings and the behavior required of pious Jainas (p. 28). In the YDS, however, Haribhadra uses this word to denote activities involved in reaching higher stages of spiritual awareness. This unique usage of the word shows Haribhadra's attitude toward "reconciling [the] Yoga" of Jainism and that of other schools, especially that of Patanñjali.Among the contributions made by this book to Jaina studies and Indology are (1) a clear explanation of the relationship between guḍasthāna in Jainism and Patañjali's Yoga system and (2) an attempt to recover the lost yogas, that is, the Buddhist yoga and Vedāntist yoga mentioned in the YDS. These two topics will be examined in more detail below.Guḍasthāna and YogaPatañjali's yoga system in essence is regarded as a course of spiritual purification. The Jainas also have a similar system, known as guḍasthāna, which consists of fourteen stages of spiritual development. This idea of guḍasthāna does not appear in the earlier canons, so it must be a comparatively new development in the history of Jainism. By the time of Haribhadra, guḍasthāna must have been popular among the Jainas as he explicitly uses the term in the YDS and tries to allot stages to each of eight limbs or aḍgas in Patañjali's system. Christopher Chapple explains their relationship and illustrates this with tables. A similar approach was attempted by K. K. Dixit in the introduction to his Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and Yogaviṃśikā (Ahmedabad, 1970). Chapple, however, has done this... (shrink)

Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda, whilst accepting much of the argumentation and style of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, aligns himself firmly with the ātman/ svabhāvatā tradition of Vedānta; his view of ātman is inspired by an absorption of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. For both Nāgārjuna and Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda, the basis of both the Madhyamaka and Advaitic perspectives is the impossibility of change (na anyathabhāva). For Nāgārjuna this entails ni $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ svabhāvatā, for Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda it means absolute svabhāvatā. Both accept that the belief in (...) an ‘own nature’ (which amounts to all views of reality) entails a non-active, unchanging absolute. Nāgārjuna takes this as grounds for a rejection of svabhāvatā, Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda accepts this as proof of its reality. The real dividing line between the two thinkers is on the question of the necessity (or not) of even positing a ‘nature’ to things. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of an underlying and unchanging substratum behind all manifestations, Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda argues that for there to be an appearance there must be a thing that appears. It is this point, the debate over ātman (svabhāva) or anātman (ni $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ svabhāva) at its most fundamental level, that is the real dividing line between the philosophies of the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntin. (shrink)

The scholar who translated The Edicts of Ashoka into English has now set out to present and critically analyze some of "The Great Ideas of Indian Culture." While apparently engaging in a search for the ever-elusive "Perennial Philosophy" by invoking Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, et al., the author's comparative statements come off as being little more than decorative paraphernalia. He submits too completely to the mystique of the Socratic dialogue in claiming that "the outstanding characteristic of Indian thought is dialogue". (...) We can agree that one does find a type of verbal exchange which might merit the designation of "conversation," but not dialogue. At no place in either the Upanisads or Gïta does the student ever feel the slightest compulsion to question or contradict the words of his guru. Nikam also commits the grave philosophical indiscretion of using Platonic language about "universals" to speak of the Vedäntin "Universal Absolute,". This sort of cross-cultural comparison is extremely misleading in cases where the ideas being compared are similar or identical in appearance but dissimilar in substance. Even so, the book is extremely informative, and, in places, inspiring, in its illumination of the subtler dimensions of Indian thought. Western philosophers and interested lay-students should find this small volume most helpful in gaining a succinct but comprehensive presentation of the "Great Ideas of Indian Culture."--J. B. L. (shrink)

The notion underlying Upanishadic and Vedäntin philosophy that Reality is unified, unique, and indivisible and that the world of plurality and multiplicity is unreal, has puzzled both Indian philosophers and students of Indian thought in the West. Many Western students of Vedänta have been misled by the idea that, in relation to the Ultimately Real, the phenomenal world is unreal or illusory. They have tended to read such terms as "unreal," "illusory," and "dreamlike" literally and thus have condemned Vedäntins to (...) the wholly untenable and unthinkable position of believing the empirical world to be absolutely non-existent. This most literate and erudite book explores the ontological status of the world of empirical and rational existence in the Upanishads and Shankara, the 9th century systematizer of Advaita Vedänta. Briefly, the argument of the author is that the phenomenal world is merely the tangible manifestation of primal nescience. Ignorance arises and persists because of man's tendency to superimpose the characteristics of one thing as it is recollected upon another thing as it is perceived. The traits of appearance are superimposed upon Reality, the non-Self upon the Self. The most common example used by Vedäntins is the act of mistakenly identifying the rope as a serpent. Only Brahman is real in an absolute and unqualified sense. Vyävahärika is the "world of names and forms based upon ignorance"; it is "the scene of our common endeavors which exhibits intelligible connections and is full of meaning and purpose" when viewed on its own terms and within its own limits. However, its indeterminable ontological status does not take away from its significance to the seeker after truth and Liberation. Perception, inference, intellection, and meditation all can serve as conductors along the path to salvation, provided they are not employed as ends in themselves. In the end, ratiocination must give way to intuitive insight, knowledge about must be superceded by knowledge of.--J. B. L. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Different Paths, Different Summits: A Model for Religious PluralismJason AlbertsonStephen Kaplan. Different Paths, Different Summits: A Model for Religious Pluralism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. Pp. xi + 187.In Different Paths, Different Summits, Stephen Kaplan provides us with a metaphysical system whereby we may view each religion as simultaneously existing, equally valid, and (perhaps) mutually exclusive, yet not contradictory. In this metaphysics there may exist multiple ontologies. (...) Each is to be viewed on its own terms and judged within its own soteriological providence. What, for Kaplan, constitutes a valid religion is the efficacy of its soteriological solution to the human condition. To this end, he utilizes the model, provided initially by David Bohm, of holography.Bohm's goal in the use of the holographic model is to explain the possibility of viewing both quantum mechanics and relativity theory as simultaneously existing and mutually exclusive, but not contradictory. Using Bohm's holographic model as a guide, Kaplan is able to explain the possibility of viewing multiple religions in the same fashion. Kaplan indicates that (1) both domains logically demand the other; (2) both are simultaneously existing, and neither is logically prior; and (3) both are interpenetrating.Kaplan chooses to use Bohm's holographic model in order to understand particular soteriological solutions as proffered by three specific religious traditions. The soteriologies with their representative religions are: theistic salvation according to Richard of St. Victor, monistic nondualistic liberation as represented by the Advaita Vedāntin, and the process nondualistic liberation of the Yogācāra Buddhist. With these, Kaplan achieves a variety of religious perspectives and places them, complete with their ontological perspectives, within his metaphysical system.Therefore, Kaplan's ontological and soteriological pluralism can be better understood in terms of each religion's soteriological solution to the human condition as being simultaneously existing with, equally ontologically valid as, and (perhaps) mutually exclusive of, but not contradicting the soteriological solution of, other religions. Put another way, each may be viewed as ultimately real, but not penultimately real.Kaplan has provided a basis for reconsidering the notion of religious pluralism in terms of both soteriology and ontology. This work, therefore, deserves the attention of philosophers and theologians currently interested in the concept of religious pluralism, as he enlists one of the great scientific minds of our time to provide a foundation for his novel ideas. [End Page 503]Copyright © 2005 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on YogaFujinaga SinReconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga. By Christopher Key Chapple, with a new translation of Haribhadra's Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya by Christopher Key Chapple and John Thomas Casey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. 170.Among the Jaina philosophers, Haribhadra (700-770) must be one of the most studied by both Indian and non-Indian scholars, with examinations of his work (...) going back to the early days of research on Indian thought in Europe. For example, Ṣaḍdar-śanasamuccaya, with introduction and notes by F. L. Pullé, was published in Florence in 1887. Traditionally, over one thousand books are attributed to Haribhadra. Besides commentaries on the āgamas, his writings also cover almost all other aspects of Jaina philosophy. The Yogadḍḍḍisamuccaya (hereafter YDS), as the title suggests, discusses aspects of yoga in Jainism with reference to other schools of Indian philosophy. The book under review here, Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga, by Christopher Key Chapple, consists of seven chapters of essays on the YDS and its author, a new English translation with Sanskrit text, and notes, a bibliography, and an index.In the first chapter, which deals with the writings of Haribhadra, especially the YDS, the author reviews opinions on his dates and agrees with the view that he lived [End Page 681] in the eighth century. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between Haribhadra and Patañjali as well as their thoughts concerning yoga. This chapter is probably the most important one in the book. Two "lost yogas," the Vedāntin Yoga of Bhagavaddasa and the Buddhist Yoga of Bhāskara, are explored in chapter 3. These are identified, as the chapter title indicates, as Vedānta yoga and Buddhist yoga.In chapter 4, on the philosophical background of the various yogas, the author points out that although Haribhadra was familiar with the thought of other schools, he proclaimed the Jaina tenet of realism and criticized Buddhist momentariness and Vedāntin monism. These criticisms may be related to the two yogas dealt with in the previous chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the notion of purity in Patañjali and Haribhadra, and chapter 6 deals with Haribhadra's criticisms of tantric yoga. In the last chapter Christopher Chapple examines Haribhadra's thoughts on yoga from a sociological standpoint; Chapple also assigns contemporary yoga movements to four groups in accordance with the types of yogins mentioned in the YDS.The author points out that in the Jaina tradition the word "yoga" fundamentally stands for any actions by living beings and the behavior required of pious Jainas (p. 28). In the YDS, however, Haribhadra uses this word to denote activities involved in reaching higher stages of spiritual awareness. This unique usage of the word shows Haribhadra's attitude toward "reconciling [the] Yoga" of Jainism and that of other schools, especially that of Patanñjali.Among the contributions made by this book to Jaina studies and Indology are (1) a clear explanation of the relationship between guḍasthāna in Jainism and Patañjali's Yoga system and (2) an attempt to recover the lost yogas, that is, the Buddhist yoga and Vedāntist yoga mentioned in the YDS. These two topics will be examined in more detail below.Guḍasthāna and YogaPatañjali's yoga system in essence is regarded as a course of spiritual purification. The Jainas also have a similar system, known as guḍasthāna, which consists of fourteen stages of spiritual development. This idea of guḍasthāna does not appear in the earlier canons, so it must be a comparatively new development in the history of Jainism. By the time of Haribhadra, guḍasthāna must have been popular among the Jainas as he explicitly uses the term in the YDS and tries to allot stages to each of eight limbs or aḍgas in Patañjali's system. Christopher Chapple explains their relationship and illustrates this with tables. A similar approach was attempted by K. K. Dixit in the introduction to his Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and Yogaviṃśikā (Ahmedabad, 1970). Chapple, however, has done this... (shrink)