Category mistakes are sentences such as 'Green ideas sleep furiously' or 'Saturday is in bed'. They strike us as highly infelicitous but it is hard to explain precisely why this is so. Ofra Magidor explores four approaches to category mistakes in philosophy of language and linguistics, and develops and defends an original, presuppositional account.

Two fundamental rules of reasoning are Universal Generalisation and Existential Instantiation. Applications of these rules involve stipulations such as ‘Let n be an arbitrary number’ or ‘Let John be an arbitrary Frenchman’. Yet the semantics underlying such stipulations are far from clear. What, for example, does ‘n’ refer to following the stipulation that n be an arbitrary number? In this paper, we argue that ‘n’ refers to a number—an ordinary, particular number such as 58 or 2,345,043. Which one? We do (...) not and cannot know, because the reference of ‘n’ is fixed arbitrarily. Underlying this proposal is a more general thesis: Arbitrary Reference : It is possible to fix the reference of an expression arbitrarily. When we do so, the expression receives its ordinary kind of semantic-value, though we do not and cannot know which value in particular it receives. Our aim in this paper is defend AR. In particular, we argue that AR can be used to provide an account of instantial reasoning, and we suggest that AR can also figure in offering new solutions to a range of difficult philosophical puzzles. (shrink)

Since the work of Gödel and Cohen, which showed that Hilbert's First Problem was independent of the usual assumptions of mathematics, there have been a myriad of independence results in many areas of mathematics. These results have led to the systematic study of several combinatorial principles that have proven effective at settling many of the important independent statements. Among the most prominent of these are the principles diamond and square discovered by Jensen. Simultaneously, attempts have been made to find suitable (...) natural strengthenings of ZFC, primarily by Large Cardinal or Reflection Axioms. These two directions have tension between them in that Jensen's principles, which tend to suggest a rather rigid mathematical universe, are at odds with reflection properties. A third development was the discovery by Shelah of "PCF Theory", a generalization of cardinal arithmetic that is largely determined inside ZFC. In this paper we consider interactions between these three theories in the context of singular cardinals, focusing on the various implications between square and scales, and on consistency results between relatively strong forms of square and stationary set reflection. (shrink)

In his seminal paper 'Assertion', Robert Stalnaker distinguishes between the semantic content of a sentence on an occasion of use and the content asserted by an utterance of that sentence on that occasion. While in general the assertoric content of an utterance is simply its semantic content, the mechanisms of conversation sometimes force the two apart. Of special interest in this connection is one of the principles governing assertoric content in the framework, one according to which the asserted content ought (...) to be identical at each world in the context set. In this paper, we present a problem for Stalnaker's meta-semantic framework, by challenging the plausibility of the Uniformity principle. We argue that the interaction of the framework with facts about epistemic accessibility - in particular, failures of epistemic transparency - cause problems for the Uniformity principle and thus for Stalnaker's framework more generally. (shrink)

One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists allegedly have some trouble addressing, and to which (...) perdurantism apparently has a straightforward response. I argue, however, that in each case, there are versions of endurantism that can offer precisely the same response to the challenge, and thus the ability to provide this particular solution does not directly tell in favour of one the two views. In §1, I elaborate two views which will be particularly prominent in the discussion: liberal endurantism and restrictive perdurantism. In §2–6 I discuss in turn the central pro-perdurantism arguments: the argument from anthropocentricism, the argument from vagueness, the argument from recombination, the argument from temporary intrinsics, and the argument from coincidence. In §7–8, I discuss the main pro-endurantism arguments: the arguments from motion, and the argument from permanent coincidence. Finally, in §9, I discuss what conclusion can be drawn from this discussion. (shrink)

Since the work of Gödel and Cohen, which showed that Hilbert's First Problem was independent of the usual assumptions of mathematics, there have been a myriad of independence results in many areas of mathematics. These results have led to the systematic study of several combinatorial principles that have proven effective at settling many of the important independent statements. Among the most prominent of these are the principles diamond and square discovered by Jensen. Simultaneously, attempts have been made to find suitable (...) natural strengthenings of ZFC, primarily by Large Cardinal or Reflection Axioms. These two directions have tension between them in that Jensen's principles, which tend to suggest a rather rigid mathematical universe, are at odds with reflection properties. A third development was the discovery by Shelah of "PCF Theory", a generalization of cardinal arithmetic that is largely determined inside ZFC. In this paper we consider interactions between these three theories in the context of singular cardinals, focusing on the various implications between square and scales, and on consistency results between relatively strong forms of square and stationary set reflection. (shrink)

In this paper we consider whether L(R) has “enough information” to contain a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis. We believe this question provides deep insight into the difficulties surrounding the continuum hypothesis. We show sufficient conditions for L(R) not to contain such a counterexample. Along the way we establish many results about nonstationary towers, non-reflecting stationary sets, generalizations of proper and semiproper forcing and Chang's conjecture.

Assuming some large cardinals, a model of ZFC is obtained in which $\aleph_{\omega+1}$ carries no Aronszajn trees. It is also shown that if $\lambda$ is a singular limit of strongly compact cardinals, then $\lambda^+$ carries no Aronszajn trees.

We prove that the statement "For every pair A, B, stationary subsets of ω 2 , composed of points of cofinality ω, there exists an ordinal α such that both A ∩ α and $B \bigcap \alpha$ are stationary subsets of α" is equiconsistent with the existence of weakly compact cardinal. (This completes results of Baumgartner and Harrington and Shelah.) We also prove, assuming the existence of infinitely many supercompact cardinals, the statement "Every stationary subset of ω ω + 1 (...) has a stationary initial segment.". (shrink)

Category mistakes are sentences such as ‘Colourless green ideas sleep furiously’ or ‘The theory of relativity is eating breakfast’. Such sentences are highly anomalous, and this has led a large number of linguists and philosophers to conclude that they are meaningless (call this ‘the meaninglessness view’). In this paper I argue that the meaninglessness view is incorrect and category mistakes are meaningful. I provide four arguments against the meaninglessness view: in Sect. 2, an argument concerning compositionality with respect to category (...) mistakes; in Sect. 3 an argument concerning synonymy facts of category mistakes; in Sect. 4 concerning embeddings of category mistakes in propositional attitude ascriptions; and in Sect. 5 concerning the uses of category mistakes in metaphors. Having presented these arguments, in Sect. 6 I briefly discuss some of the positive motivations for accepting the meaninglessness view and argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude that the meaninglessness view ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This is a survey paper giving a self-contained account of Shelah's theory of the pcf function pcf={cf:D is an ultrafilter on a}, where a is a set of regular cardinals such that a

Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Model Theory in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

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A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates (...) describe properties of iterated revisions. (shrink)

A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomenon is disunified and its accompanying term is ambiguous. The tests have been used to evaluate disunification proposals about causation, pain, and knowledge, among others. -/- These ambiguity tests, however, have come under fire. It has been alleged that the tests fail for polysemy, a common type of ambiguity, and one that (...) is at issue in philosophically interesting cases. Furthermore, the objection that the tests fail for polysemy is often taken to be an undeniable bit of linguistic data. -/- We argue that this is mistaken. The objection implicitly relies on controversial assumptions about how to account for copredicational sentences, in which a single argument is ascribed prima facie incompatible properties. Furthermore, on several viable theories of copredication, the objection fails. However, our discussion also reveals that even if ambiguity tests are preserved, they may be significantly harder to execute than previously thought. (shrink)

If we replace first-order logic by second-order logic in the original definition of Gödel’s inner model L, we obtain the inner model of hereditarily ordinal definable sets [33]. In this paper...

Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...) discusses the applications of Leibniz’s Law to arguments in metaphysics. It begins by presenting a variety of central arguments in metaphysics which appeal to the law. The article then proceeds to discuss a range of strategies that can be drawn upon in resisting an argument by Leibniz’s Law. These strategies divide into three categories: (i) denying Leibniz’s Law; (ii) denying that the argument in question involves a genuine application of the law; and (iii) denying that the argument’s premises are true. Strategies falling under each of these three categories are discussed in turn. (shrink)

Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, (...) I argue that there is in fact no such asymmetry: assuming epistemic externalism, both the actual world agent and their biv counterpart are in a position to know whether or not they are envatted. After an introduction, I present the main argument. I examine to what extent the argument survives when one accepts additional externalist-friendly commitments: semantic externalism, a sensitivity condition on knowledge, and epistemic contextualism. Finally, I discuss the implications of my conclusion to a variety of debates in epistemology. (shrink)

In Hawthorne and Magidor 2009, we presented an argument against Stalnaker’s meta-semantic framework. In this paper we address two critical responses to our paper: Stalnaker 2009, and Almotahari and Glick 2010. Sections 1–4 are devoted to addressing Stalnaker’s response and sections 5–8 to addressing Almotahari and Glick’s. We pay special attention (Sect. 2) to an interesting argument that Stalnaker offers to bolster the transparency of presupposition (an argument that, if successful, could also form the basis of a defence of the (...) KK principle). (shrink)

We start by studying the relationship between two invariants isolated by Shelah, the sets of good and approachable points. As part of our study of these invariants, we prove a form of “singular cardinal compactness” for Jensen's square principle. We then study the relationship between internally approachable and tight structures, which parallels to a certain extent the relationship between good and approachable points. In particular we characterise the tight structures in terms of PCF theory and use our characterisation to prove (...) some covering results for tight structures, along with some results on tightness and stationary reflection. Finally, we prove some absoluteness theorems in PCF theory, deduce a covering theorem, and apply that theorem to the study of precipitous ideals. (shrink)

The paper challenges Williamson’s safety based explanation for why we cannot know the cut-off point of vague expressions. We assume throughout (most of) the paper that Williamson is correct in saying that vague expressions have sharp cut-off points, but we argue that Williamson’s explanation for why we do not and cannot know these cut-off points is unsatisfactory. -/- In sect 2 we present Williamson's position in some detail. In particular, we note that Williamson's explanation relies on taking a particular safety (...) principle ('Meta-linguistic belief safety' or 'MBS') as a necessary condition on knowledge. In section 3, we show that even if MBS were a necessary condition on knowledge, that would not be sufficient to show that we cannot know the cut-off points of vague expressions. In section 4, we present our main case against Williamson's explanation: we argue that MBS is not a necessary condition on knowledge, by presenting a series of cases where one's belief violates MBS but nevertheless constitutes knowledge. In section 5, we present and respond to an objection to our view. And in section 6, we briefly discuss the possible directions a theory of vagueness can take, if our objection to Williamson's theory is taken on board. (shrink)

We prove a number of consistency results complementary to the ZFC results from our paper [J. Cummings, M. Foreman, M. Magidor, Canonical structure in the universe of set theory: part one, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 129 211–243]. We produce examples of non-tightly stationary mutually stationary sequences, sequences of cardinals on which every sequence of sets is mutually stationary, and mutually stationary sequences not concentrating on a fixed cofinality. We also give an alternative proof for the consistency of the (...) existence of stationarily many non-good points, show that diagonal Prikry forcing preserves certain stationary reflection properties, and study the relationship between some simultaneous reflection principles. Finally we show that the least cardinal where square fails can be the least inaccessible, and show that weak square is incompatible in a strong sense with generic supercompactness. (shrink)

A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula $\alpha$ as the theory defined by the set of all those models of $\alpha$ that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates (...) describe properties of iterated revisions. (shrink)

There have been numerous results showing that a measurable cardinal κ can carry exactly α normal measures in a model of GCH, where a is a cardinal at most κ⁺⁺. Starting with just one measurable cardinal, we have [9] (for α = 1), [10] (for α = κ⁺⁺, the maximum possible) and [1] (for α = κ⁺, after collapsing κ⁺⁺) . In addition, under stronger large cardinal hypotheses, one can handle the remaining cases: [12] (starting with a measurable cardinal of (...) Mitchell order α ) , [2] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal and α is less than κ, starting with a measurable of high Mitchell order) and [11] (as in [12], but where κ is the least measurable cardinal, starting with an assumption weaker than a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order 2). In this article we treat all cases by a uniform argument, starting with only one measurable cardinal and applying a cofinality-preserving forcing. The proof uses κ-Sacks forcing and the "tuning fork" technique of [8]. In addition, we explore the possibilities for the number of normal measures on a cardinal at which the GCH fails. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it takes for (...) a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non-obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument from vagueness. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a certain kind of 'type confusion' which involves use of expressions of the wrong grammatical category, as in the string 'runs eats'. It is (nearly) universally accepted that such strings are meaningless. My purpose in this paper is to question this widespread assumption (or as I call it, 'the last dogma'). I discuss a range of putative reasons for accepting the last dogma: in §II, semantic and metaphysical reasons; in §III, logical reasons; and in §IV, (...) syntactic reasons. I argue that none of these reasons is conclusive, and that consequently we should be willing to question this last dogma of type confusions. (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of [The SCH revisited]. In § 1 we define a forcing with countably many nice systems. It is used, for example, to construct a model "GCH below κ, c f κ = ℵ0, and $2^\kappa > \kappa^{+\omega}$" from 0(κ) = κ+ω. In § 2 we define a triangle iteration and use it to construct a model satisfying "{μ ≤ λ∣ c f μ = ℵ0 and $pp(\mu) > \lambda\}$ is countable for some λ". The question (...) of whether this is possible was asked by S. Shelah. In § 3 a forcing for blowing the power of a singular cardinal without collapsing cardinals or adding new bounded subsets is presented. Answering a question of H. Woodin, we show that it is consistent to have "c f κ = ℵ0, GCH below $\kappa, 2^\kappa > \kappa^+$, and ¬□* κ". In § 4 a variation of the forcing of [The SCH revisited, § 1] is defined. It behaves nicely in iteration processes. As an application, we sketch a construction of a model satisfying: "κ is a measurable and 2κ ≥ κ+α for some $\alpha, \kappa < c f \alpha < \alpha$" starting with 0(κ) = κ+α. This answers the question from Gitik's On measurable cardinals violating the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

Three central combinatorial properties in set theory are the tree property, the approachability property and stationary reflection. We prove the mutual independence of these properties by showing that any of their eight Boolean combinations can be forced to hold at${\kappa ^{ + + }}$, assuming that$\kappa = {\kappa ^{ < \kappa }}$and there is a weakly compact cardinal aboveκ.If in additionκis supercompact then we can forceκto be${\aleph _\omega }$in the extension. The proofs combine the techniques of adding and then destroying (...) a nonreflecting stationary set or a${\kappa ^{ + + }}$-Souslin tree, variants of Mitchell’s forcing to obtain the tree property, together with the Prikry-collapse poset for turning a large cardinal into${\aleph _\omega }$. (shrink)

Call an argument a ‘happy sorites’ if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at (...) least some happy sorites arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments. (shrink)

We introduce the large-cardinal notions of ξ-greatly-Mahlo and ξ-reflection cardinals and prove (1) in the constructible universe, L, the first ξ-reflection cardinal, for ξ a successor ordinal, is strictly between the first ξ-greatly-Mahlo and the first Π1ξ-indescribable cardinals, (2) assuming the existence of a ξ-reflection cardinal κ in L, ξ a successor ordinal, there exists a forcing notion in L that preserves cardinals and forces that κ is (ξ+1)-stationary, which implies that the consistency strength of the existence of a (ξ+1)-stationary (...) cardinal is strictly below a Π1ξ-indescribable cardinal. These results generalize to all successor ordinals ξ the original same result of Mekler–Shelah [A. Mekler and S. Shelah, The consistency strength of every stationary set reflects, Israel J. Math.67(3) (1989) 353–365] about a 2-stationary cardinal, i.e. a cardinal that reflects all its stationary sets. (shrink)

This paper is about omitting types in logic of metric structures introduced by Ben Yaacov, Berenstein, Henson and Usvyatsov. While a complete type is omissible in some model of a countable complete...

Category mistakes are sentences such as ”The number two is blue’ or ”Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent (...) with many central and otherwise plausible theories of figurative language. Thus if the meaninglessness view is correct, the theories in question must each be rejected, and conversely, if any of the theories in question is correct, the meaninglessness view must be wrong. The debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected. (shrink)

One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument from Vagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood. The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On the other hand, (...) if diachronic universalism is formulated as Sider proposes, the argument fails to establish his principle, and thus perdurantism. (shrink)

We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L, a logic introduced in [5] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at (...) κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Wang’s Paradox’, Michael Dummett provides an argument for why strict finitism in mathematics is internally inconsistent and therefore an untenable position. Dummett’s argument proceeds by making two claims: (1) Strict finitism is committed to the claim that there are sets of natural numbers which are closed under the successor operation but nonetheless have an upper bound; (2) Such a commitment is inconsistent, even by finitistic standards. -/- In this paper I claim that Dummett’s argument fails. I question (...) both parts of Dummett’s argument, but most importantly I claim that Dummett’s argument in favour of the second claim crucially relies on an implicit assumption that Dummett does not acknowledge and that the strict finitist need not accept. (shrink)