Unamuno’nun Sis adlı romanı gerçekliğin doğasına ilişkin felsefi bir sorgulama edimini bir aşk hikâyesi etrafında sembolize ederek dolaylı bir biçimde okuyucuya sunmaktadır. Eserin kahramanı Augusto Pérez’in varoluşsal krizinin kurgu ve gerçeklik arasındaki ilişkiyle birlikte farklı bir boyuta taşındığı bu roman, hayatın anlamı, ölümsüzlük arzusu ve bireyin tanrıyla olan ilişkisi gibi temaları varoluş ve kimlik arayışı ekseni etrafında şekillendirerek tartışmaya açmaktadır. Nesnel gerçeklik ve öznel hakikat arasında gidip gelen bu tartışma, Unamuno’nun varoluşçuluğu hakkında önemli ipuçları taşımakta ve kavramsal kişilikler (...) aracılığıyla ustaca ortaya koyduğu diyalog yöntemini dâhiyane edebi üslubuyla birleştirmektedir. Hayatın muğlaklıklarla dolu belirsiz bir yapısı olduğunu ifade eden Unamuno için yaşamın kendisi bir sistir. Dahası, yaşamın tüm canlılığının ve dinamikliğinin taşıyıcısı olan bu sisi aklın ve mantığın ışığında dağıtmaya ve berraklaştırmaya çalışmanın kendisinin komik olduğunu belirten Unamuno, yaşamın anlamının tam da bu trajik anlamı içinde ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Aklın bildikleri ile kalbin inandıkları arasında insan absürt ve paradoksal olana adeta Kierkegaardcı bir iman sıçramasıyla bağlanmalıdır. Unamuno’nun varoluşçuluğunu gerçeklik problemi bağlamında değerlendirmeye çalışan bu makalenin amacı, varoluşun kurgu ve gerçeklik arasındaki özel yerini öznel bir iç hesaplaşmaya dönüştürme gerekliliğine dikkat çekmektir. (shrink)
Moreau sketches here with enthusiasm the large features of Aquinas’s epistemology. He is not, as he makes clear, a Thomist either by training or by avowal. The book is not, then, a specialist’s monograph or dogmatic treatise. It is Moreau’s attempt to hear what Aquinas will say to the great questions. The attempt is largely successful in attending to Aquinas’s remarks, though it does not catch their ambiguities.
Is it a mistake to use "true" or "false" in certain contexts? White sets the stage for dealing with this issue by laying out a field of usages. He develops his position by characterizing and criticizing contemporary treatments of these data, moving rapidly from case to case. His numerous summaries and conclusions, obviously based on a wider view of the material than is presented in the text, may leave the uninitiated alternately puzzled, bristling, or suspicious. While White's data are expressed (...) clearly, the goal of his arguments and his organizational principles are frequently less apparent. White's discussions of fiction and modality are of particular historic interest. Here we find Frege and Russell arguing about whether they can argue about the King of France. We meet with Aristotle's ancient problem of the future naval battle, witness latter-day skirmishes over the nature of moral language, and find Leibniz, Hume, and Kant debating the logic of necessity and contingency. Are there really different types of truth which correspond with different modalities and existence presuppositions, as White seems to assume? This question, harking back to books 5 and 6 of Plato's Republic, is passed over by White in his usage-oriented quest for the sense of "truth." Truth will suit both student and researcher alike and is to be recommended for its breadth of concern and for its 18 pages of bibliography.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)
Lucas plays off his understandings of the problem of freedom and Gödel's Theorem, concluding that, "... a human being cannot be represented by a logistic calculus and therefore cannot be described completely in terms of physical variables, all of whose values are completely determined by the conjunction of their values at some earlier time". Lucas approaches the problem of freedom from the perspective of a computer programmer. His argument is as follows. Men can construct a logistic calculus, L, of which (...) Gödel's theorem is a theorem. Gödel's theorem is known-by-men-to-be-true, which is a fact. Facts have ontological status. Any attempt to represent this fact by a definite description must result in an infinite regress of meta-L's, for a Gödel theorem can be constructed in any meta-L powerful enough to show that Gödel's theorem is a theorem of L. Accordingly, men can do something which cannot be represented within L; men are therefore undeterminable. Lucas's position amounts to a rethinking of Fichte's position, set in the metaphor of meta-mathematical logic. However, whereas Fichte concluded that a man can choose to posit that he is free, and thereby make himself free, Lucas concludes that all men are free since some men know that Gödel's theorem is true. One question suggested by Lucas's argument is ontological, and another is epistemological. First, what is the ontological status of facts? Secondly, what is the distinction between knowing-that-p and showing-that-p? Ultimately, Lucas's demonstration pivots on equating the-completeness-of-L with knowing-the-completeness-of-L. It remains to be shown that that which is capable of knowing-that-p is governed in the act of knowing-that-p by the conditions which determine p.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)
In his struggle to vindicate the religious enterprise from the charge that it is unfalsifiable and meaningless, McKinnon reduces both science and religion to distorted caricatures, ignores the centrality of the problems of evil, anguish, absurdity, and the egocentric predicament for religion, and asserts that religion and science are fundamentally one and the same. He builds his thesis on a distinction between "assertional," "self-instructional," and "ontological-linguistic" intentionality of utterances. By equivocating about whether these usages are logically independent, McKinnon holds that, (...) as "self-instructional," utterances are outside the positivist's arena. He presses the noteworthy point--that utterances sometimes are intended to report an existential stance--in such a way as to divert attention from the vast differences between religious and scientific methods and subject matter. Not content with leaving religious utterances restricted to mere reporting, McKinnon builds a case for bypassing positivistic attack under the other two usages by trading on a supposed incommensurability between particulars and universals. E.g., he holds that "God is love" must be indeterminate and unfalsifiable since both nouns are universals and since God is incomprehensible. And so it goes, a battle between straw men on a shifting field of honor for a prize of dubious worth. Notwithstanding, this is a thought provoking treatment of a difficult topic.--M. D. P. (shrink)
This collection of reprinted social philosophy broadly surveys and introduces problems and positions vis-à-vis the concept of right. Using the tools of ordinary language analysis, M. MacDonald evaluates the attempts of other writers to resolve the tensions between civil and moral responsibility. H. L. A. Hart argues that "... if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right." His laudatory deductive exercise and categorization of rights suggests no leads for answering the (...) hypothetical he poses. While MacDonald and Hart raise no gut issues, G. Vlastos gives a common sense analysis of the main stream of classical debate, couching his inquiry in terms of conflicts between collective and distributive justice. His article both includes the scope and surpasses the stopping points of the earlier selections. Through leading to a philosophical discussion of the workings of the denial of human rights within the segregationist position, R. Wasserstrom unmasks the practical stakes involved in what the others leave as an academic problem. H. Morris's witty analysis of a hypothetical "right to be punished" lays bare the fact that social institutions embody some concept of right, duty, and obligation. He leaves the reader with the unanswered but clearly indicated question of which concept of right does one want society to sanction. Also included are: J. Locke's The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapters two and five; J. Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies; The Virginia Declaration of Rights ; Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens ; Universal Declaration of Human Rights ; and a portion of the Declaration of Independence of the U.S.A.--M. D. P. (shrink)
The Greeks and Romans have been charged with destroying the ecosystems within which they lived. In this book, however, M. D. Usher argues rather that we can find in their lives and thought the origin of modern ideas about systems and sustainability, important topics for humans today and in the future. With chapters running the gamut of Greek and Roman experience – from the Presocratics and Plato to Roman agronomy and the Benedictine Rule – Plato's Pigs brings together unlikely bedfellows, (...) both ancient and modern, to reveal surprising connections. Lively prose and liberal use of anecdotal detail, including an afterword about the author's own experiments with sustainable living on his sheep farm in Vermont, add a strong authorial voice. In short, this is a unique, first-of-its-kind book that is sure to be of interest to anyone working in Classics, environmental studies, philosophy, ecology, or the history of ideas. (shrink)
To avoid misinterpretations one should substitute the ambiguous notion of 'new disease' with 'emerging disease'. A disease can be classified emergent in at least five dif férent historical situations; 1) it existed before it could be first identified but was overlooked from a médical point of view because it could not be conceptualized as a nosological entity; 2) it existed but was not noticed until a quantitative and/or qualitative change in its mani festations; 3) it did not exist in a (...) particular région of the world before its introduction from other régions; 4) it never existed in a human population but only in an animal population; 5) it is completely new - the triggering germ and/or necessary environmental conditions did not exist prior to the first clinical manifestations. A sériés of historical examples illustrate this classification. (shrink)