Logic has a function in the social act of persuading. It defines the rules of relevance, coherence, and consistency which persuading should exemplify. These rules are not themselves objects of persuasion, but a priori reference-points persuading must take for granted. In the theories of logic currently in vogue, logical rules are found, not made. As we find them, we are ‘logical spectators’. Using them, we are ‘logical agents’.

My quarrel is with Ehman's third and concluding section. There he undertakes a confrontation of the two conceptions of the self developed in his preceding argument. "We must decide," he says, "whether the self is reducible to a determinate object in the world or is a transcending subject for which both the world and the self's own determinate nature are mere objects". But the self can never be reduced to a mere object, for the self "can detach itself in thought (...) and will from every objective determination" --a power one would hardly wish to ascribe to a mere object. Thus. (shrink)

Romantic love is subject to the same philosophical analysis, this book shows, as any other human experience such as selfhood, good and evil, or justice—even though most philosophers have neglected it. An appropriate method of inquiry here, the author holds, "must be an ontological theory; it must evaluate the reality of love in comparison to the other things we think are real." Part I examines the layman's conception of romantic love as a "mysterious, unanalyzable feeling." It also examines the psychologist's (...) conception of romantic love as "an unmysterious natural phenomenon"—a drive. Part II turns to the sociologist's conception of romantic love as a social institution—"an interpersonal transaction with a social function." Part III concludes that romantic love is an objective social process which society makes possible "by granting the individual a private inner being which escapes typification by being literally unspeakable." Written with clarity, wit, and charm, _Romantic Love _will appeal to all intellectually curious readers including philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

Sulla base di una dimenticata intuizione di Alberto Grilli, l’articolo si propone di rivendicare, con nuovi argomenti e precisazioni, l’attribuzione a un frammento del Telamo di Ennio delle parole superstitiosi vates inpudentesque harioli (Enn. sc. 319 V.2) che nelle edizioni più recenti delle tragedie enniane vengono invece attribuite a Cicerone, fonte del frammento.

The theoretical foundations of the social structure of the society and the historical forms of ownership were discussed in the article. The presence of many types of property is a necessary condition for its normal functioning in society. As a result of these types of property, the needs and activities of every person in society are fully satisfied. From ancient times to the present day, attitudes towards property issues have developed in different ways in different regimes. Even before the creation (...) of society, people generally, used and took advantage of collective property. Over time, as a result of a number of events occurring in the world and in nature, collective property began to lose its relevance. After property inequality began to emerge, stratification among people began to form, which acted as a driving force for the creation of other forms of property. The collective form of property gradually changed and began to be replaced by individual and other forms of property. Modern production is conditioned by the transformation of economic, social and other spheres, which, in turn, creates the basis for the formation of new types of social systems and requires the reconsideration of property as the main category of private-legal relations. Since property is multi-subject, it not only expands and complicates the internal structure of property subjects, but also means the formation of new social classes according to the place they occupy (the functions they perform) in property relations.The modern structure of property relations is formed as a complex multi-level system: the close contact of individual and common beginnings, levels of ownership, the specificity of various sociаl fields creates the opportunity and demand for the formation of various forms of property, determines their dynamics and transformation in advance. Different classes and groups of owners, territorial associations, state, national groups and monopolies become the subjects of property relations. (shrink)

The relevance of leader ethicality has moti- vated ethical leadership theory. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of moral identity for the concept of ethical leadership. We relate ethical leadership incorporating an internalized moral identity to productive deviant workplace behavior. Using qualitative empirical data we illustrate the relevance of critical situations, i.e., situations in which hypernorms and organizational norms diverge, for the distinction of ethical leaders with or without internalized moral identities. Our paper takes a multidisciplinary approach integrating insight (...) from management as well as humanities and social sciences toward a comprehensive sense of ethical leadership. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Perhaps the most influential proposal in the recent literature on the epis- temology of religious belief has been Alvin Plantinga’s anti-evidentialist contention that we should treat certain religious beliefs as properly basic. In order to support this anti-skeptical maneuver, Plantinga (along with other “reformed” epistemologists such as William Alston) has looked to the kind of anti-evidentialist model that is standardly offered as regards the epistemology of perceptual belief and has claimed that there are sufficient analogies between perceptual experience and (...) religious experience to moti- vate the use of such a model in religious epistemology. It is argued here, however, that while Plantinga et al. are right to draw our attention to these analogies, in doing so they have failed to pay due attention to important disanalogies that exist between religious and perceptual experience. Moreover, I contend that these disanalogies have epistemo- logical ramifications that require subtle modifications to the reformed epistemology thesis. In particular, following a suggestion made by Keith DeRose, I argue that re- formed epistemology would be better modelled along explicitly virtue-theoretic lines. (shrink)