Current debates about the integration of traditional and academic ecological knowledge struggle with a dilemma of division and assimilation. On the one hand, the emphasis on differences between traditional and academic perspectives has been criticized as creating an artificial divide that brands TEK as “non-scientific” and contributes to its marginalization. On the other hand, there has been increased concern about inadequate assimilation of Indigenous and other traditional perspectives into scientific practices that disregards the holistic nature and values of TEK. The (...) aim of this article is to develop a practice-based account of the epistemic relations between TEK and AEK that avoids both horns of the dilemma. While relations between TEK and AEK are often described in terms of the “holistic” nature of the former and the “mechanistic” character of the latter, we argue that a simple holism–mechanism divide misrepresents the epistemic resources of both TEK and AEK. Based on the literature on mechanistic explanations in philosophy of science, we argue that holders of TEK are perfectly capable of identifying mechanisms that underlie ecological phenomena while AEK often relies on non-mechanistic strategies of dealing with ecological complexity. Instead of generic characterizations of knowledge systems as either mechanistic or holistic, we propose to approach epistemic relations between knowledge systems by analyzing their heuristics in practice. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of (...) these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice. (shrink)

We propose a philosophical theory of scientific models. Our main claim is that they should be understood as fictions. We illustrate the relevance of the claim by illustrations drawn from the history of science, and we propose a typology.

Modern scientific theories of emotional behavior, almost without exception, trace their origin to Charles Darwin, and his publications On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). The most famous evolutionary dilemma Darwin acknowledged as a challenge to his theory of natural selection was the incomplete sub Cambrian fossil record. However, Darwin struggled with two other rarely referenced theoretical and scientific dilemmas that confounded his theories about emotional behavior. These included (1) the (...) origin of social instincts (e.g., altruism, empathy, reciprocity and cooperation) and the reasons for their conservation in evolution and (2) the peripheral control of heart rate vis-a-vis emotional behavior outside of consciousness. Darwin acknowledged that social instincts are critical to the survival of some species, but had difficulty aligning them with his theory of natural selection in humans. Darwin eventually proposed that heart rate and emotions are controlled via one’s intellect and cortical mechanisms, and that instinctive behavior is genetically-programmed and inherited. Despite ongoing efforts, these two theoretical dilemmas are debated to this day. Simple testable hypotheses have yet to emerge for the biological mechanisms underlying instinctive behavior or the way heart rate is controlled in infants. In this paper, we review attempts to resolve ¬these issues over the past 160 years. We posit that research and theories that supported Darwin’s individualistic brain-centric and genetic model have become an “orthodox” Western view of emotional behavior, one that produced the prevailing behavioral construct of attachment as developed by John Bowlby. We trace research and theories that challenged this orthodoxy at various times, and show how these challenges were repeatedly overlooked, rejected, or misinterpreted. We review two new testable theories, emotional connection theory and calming cycle theory, which we argue resolve the two dilemmas We show emerging scientific evidence from physiology and a wide variety of other fields, as well from clinical trials among prematurely born infants, that supports the two theories. Clinical implications of the new theories and possible new ways to assess risk and intervene in emotional, behavioral and developmental disorders are discussed. (shrink)

This article addresses ontological negotiations in the Global South through three case studies of community-based research in Brazil and Ghana. We argue that ontological perspectives of Indigenous people and local communities require an ontological pluralism that recognizes both the plurality of representational tools and of ways of being in the world. Locating these two readings of ontological pluralism in the politics of the Global South, the article highlights a wider dynamic from ontological paternalism to ontological diversity to ontological decolonization. We (...) conclude by arguing that this dynamic provides important lessons for the state for social ontology in academic philosophy and for the design of politically reflexive development interventions. (shrink)

There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of the amygdala in (...) visual processing to show that the influence of biased assumptions on visual perception gives us a unique path to rich evaluative content that does not require an appeal to controversial mechanisms like top-down modulation. (shrink)

Probabilistic reasoning is heavily investigated in decision research. Violations of probability theory have been demonstrated numerously, for instance, the tendency to overestimate the joint probab...

Abstract“Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response” (ASMR) refers to a sensory‐emotional experience that was first explicitly identified and named within the past two decades in online discussion boards. Since then, there has been mounting psychological and neural evidence of a clustering of properties common to the phenomenon of ASMR, including convergence on the set of stimuli that trigger the experience, the properties of the experience itself, and its downstream effects. Moreover, psychological instruments have begun to be developed and employed in an attempt (...) to measure it. Based on this empirical work, we make the case that despite its nonscientific origins, ASMR is a good candidate for being a real kind in the cognitive sciences. The phenomenon appears to have a robust causal profile and may also have an adaptive evolutionary history. We also argue that a more thorough understanding of the distinctive type of phenomenal experience involved in an ASMR episode can shed light on the functions of consciousness, and ultimately undermine certain “cognitive” theories of consciousness. We conclude that ASMR should be the subject of more extensive scientific investigation, particularly since it may also have the potential for therapeutic applications. (shrink)

Selon la théorie de la connaissance phénoménale comme accointance, notre connaissance des propriétés phénoménales de nos états conscients repose sur une relation épistémologiquement directe et métaphysiquement simple. Dans cet article, je soutiens que le meilleur argument en faveur de cette approche est une inférence à la meilleure explication. Je décris l’ explanandum et l’ explanans de cette inférence, ce qui me conduit à distinguer un sens faible et un sens fort de l’accointance. Je montre ensuite que l’inférence est fragile pour (...) deux raisons. En premier lieu, il n’est pas clair que l’ explanandum puisse être établi indépendamment de la thèse même qu’il motive, ce qui fait apparaître un risque de circularité explicative au sens de Hempel. En second lieu, les défenseurs de l’accointance devraient montrer comment une relation métaphysiquement simple, donc irréductible à des mécanismes, peut expliquer l’acquisition des croyances phénoménales. Je conclus que nous n’avons pas actuellement de raisons d’accepter la thèse forte de l’accointance, mais que le concept d’accointance faible pourrait certainement jouer un rôle important dans une théorie de la connaissance phénoménale. (shrink)

Das Philosophieren folgt dem Bedürfnis von Menschen, sich die Welt erschließen und erklären zu wollen. Dabei geht es oft um Dinge, auf die es keine eindeutigen Antworten gibt. Das Philosophieren mit Kindern - als Unterrichtsprinzip - greift Fragen von Kindern auf und eröffnet (methodische) Möglichkeiten für das Betrachten, Staunen und Nachdenken als Welterschließung. Gerade die Bereiche Kunst und Sprache, auf die in diesem Band fokussiert wird, bieten vielfältige Anknüpfungspunkte für das Philosophieren mit Kindern. (Verlagstext).

Selon une opinion largement répandue, Husserl n’aurait fait de l’histoire le thème de ses réflexions que dans la dernière période de sa vie. Et de fait il y a bien quelque chose de nouveau dans la fondation historico-philosophique de la phénoménologie menée à bien dans la Krisis. Cependant la maxime à laquelle sera consacrée la présente méditation provient d’un manuscrit rédigé en 1921. Il s’agit d’un...

As Kant shows in A 71–76 of the First Critique, his table of the twelve “logical functions of understanding” (in A 70) is an indispensable extension of a table of four well-known logical functions that we find in a section of the Logic that was “already finished” in Aristotle’s times: The Square of Oppositions. The undisputed completeness of this special table thus warrants the completeness of Kant’s general table as well. Any further philosophical proof of completeness for Kant’s table of (...) judgements as a whole is therefore not necessary at all. And due to the contingency of “kind and number” of human forms of intuition and functions of judgment, such a ‘proof’ would not even be possible according to Kant – and thus it is not a subject (or even a part) of his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. A concluding evaluation of Kant’s own statements about the proof-structure of the B-Deduction as a whole supports this claim. (shrink)

A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork. (...) When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom. (shrink)

This chapter reviews Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of language, and especially to the theory of meaning.