_Published by Taylor & Francis Group for the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education_ This _Handbook_ addresses the concept and implementation of technological pedagogical content knowledge -- the knowledge and skills that teachers need in order to integrate technology meaningfully into instruction in specific content areas. Recognizing, for example, that effective uses of technology in mathematics are quite different from effective uses of technology in social studies, teachers need specific preparation in using technology in each content area they will (...) be teaching. Offering a series of chapters by scholars in different content areas who apply the technological pedagogical content knowledge framework to their individual content areas, the volume is structured around three themes: What is Technological Pedagogical Content Knowledge? Integrating Technological Pedagogical Content Knowledge into Specific Subject Areas Integrating Technological Pedagogical Content Knowledge into Teacher Education and Professional Development The _Handbook of Technological Pedagogical Content Knowledge for Educators_ is simultaneously a mandate and a manifesto on the engagement of technology in classrooms based on consensus standards and rubrics for effectiveness. As the title of the concluding chapter declares, "It’s about time!" The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education is a national, voluntary association of higher education institutions and related organizations. Our mission is to promote the learning of all PK-12 students through high-quality, evidence-based preparation and continuing education for all school personnel. For more information on our publications, visit our website at: www.aacte.org. (shrink)

Mill’s feminism has been the object of many discussions, from the publication of The Subjection of women onward, especially among feminist theory. In this article, my aim is to join the critical assessment of Mill’s feminism by considering it in regard of Harriet Taylor’s own feminist creeds. To do so, I’ll first highlight the importance of women’s emancipation in Mill’s work, as well as the boldness of his defense of women’s equality. Then, I’ll endeavor to show that despite his genuine (...) commitment to women’s social, moral, and political emancipation, his feminism is still shaped by sexist biases, especially regarding women’s part in the family and maternity. I’ll then by able to argue that reading Mill and Taylor together allows to contend that Mill’s feminism limits cannot be ascribed to the prejudices of his era. (shrink)

Entre l’œuvre de Hobbes et celle de Bentham, la proximité conceptuelle est grande : l’un et l’autre semblent réfléchir depuis un vocabulaire partagé. Suivre cette proximité conduit notamment à révéler l’importance, dans leurs théories politiques respectives, de la règle de majorité, déterminante dans le processus qui permet de constituer le peuple. Hobbes transforme l’accord majoritaire à l’entrée en société en unanimité proclamée, tandis que Bentham fait de la règle de majorité l’outil permettant de donner une consistance immanente à l’unité du (...) peuple. L’usage qu’ils font de la règle de majorité permet ainsi de préciser les rapports que chacun conçoit entre peuple et multitude et, de là, de concevoir une voie anglo-saxonne de penser positivement la multitude. (shrink)

Que les seuls régimes politiques légitimes soient les démocraties représentatives contemporaines a acquis la force d’une évidence. Pourtant, à leurs origines, ces régimes représentatifs n’avaient pas vocation à être démocratiques : leurs fondateurs les avaient même imaginés pour prévenir l’émergence de formes de gouvernement démocratique. Partant de cet oubli, l’article propose de revenir sur l’histoire de l’association de la démocratie et de la représentation, des révolutions américaine et française à la première moitié du xix e siècle. S’attachant plus particulièrement aux (...) usages de la notion de démocratie et de ses dérivés (« démocrate », « démocratique »), il s’attache à mettre en évidence la manière dont celle-ci, d’abord figure repoussoir dans l’ordre politique, est finalement devenue « maître-mot ». (shrink)

Faisant de la démocratie représentative la forme idéalement la meilleure de gouvernement, la pensée politique de Mill se distingue d’abord en tant qu’elle dépasse l’alternative généralement posée entre régime représentatif et démocratie directe. Néanmoins, la forme de gouvernement qu’il élabore pose un certain nombre de problèmes, puisque les principes sur lesquels elle repose, principe de compétence d’une part, principe de participation d’autre part, sont, au moins a priori, difficilement conciliables. Cet article entend montrer que le système politique pensé par Mill, (...) loin d’être contradictoire, nous donne des outils solides pour penser les démocraties représentatives. (shrink)

We have been oversold on the base rate fallacy in probabilistic judgment from an empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint. At the empirical level, a thorough examination of the base rate literature (including the famous lawyer–engineer problem) does not support the conventional wisdom that people routinely ignore base rates. Quite the contrary, the literature shows that base rates are almost always used and that their degree of use depends on task structure and representation. Specifically, base rates play a relatively larger role (...) in tasks where base rates are implicitly learned or can be represented in frequentist terms. Base rates are also used more when they are reliable and relatively more diagnostic than available individuating information. At the normative level, the base rate fallacy should be rejected because few tasks map unambiguously into the narrow framework that is held up as the standard of good decision making. Mechanical applications of Bayes's theorem to identify performance errors are inappropriate when (1) key assumptions of the model are either unchecked or grossly violated, and (2) no attempt is made to identify the decision maker's goals, values, and task assumptions. Methodologically, the current approach is criticized for its failure to consider how the ambiguous, unreliable, and unstable base rates of the real world are and should be used. Where decision makers' assumptions and goals vary, and where performance criteria are complex, the traditional Bayesian standard is insufficient. Even where predictive accuracy is the goal in commonly defined problems, there may be situations (e.g., informationally redundant environments) in which base rates can be ignored with impunity. A more ecologically valid research program is called for. This program should emphasize the development of prescriptive theory in rich, realistic decision environments. (shrink)

The analysis presented in this article shows that overarching conceptual systems, such as the metaphor “NATIONS ARE A FAMILY,” often bring together expressions with dissimilar intentions, ideologic...

Cet article propose une réflexion soulevée par le suivi psychanalytique de sujets expatriés dont les problématiques psychiques sont liées, entre autres facteurs, à la présence d’un secret tenu par leurs parents. J’émets ici l’hypothèse que l’expatriation, en tant que déplacement volontaire, peut permettre à certains sujets d’inscrire différemment, dans leur histoire, un événement traumatique tenu secret par leurs parents. Cette réflexion s’inscrit dans le prolongement d’une conception psychanalytique de l’expatriation (Drweski, 2015). Elle s’appuie sur les notions de clivage (Bayle, 2012), (...) du double transitionnel (Jung, 2015) et du secret (Tisseron, 2001). L’auteure présente le cas de Doris, expatriée française suivie dans le cadre d’un travail de recherche mené à l’étranger. Il apparaît que la distance physique instaurée par son expatriation lui permet de se dégager psychiquement du vécu lié au clivage parental et enclenche une évolution de la situation discursive au sein de la famille. (shrink)

Manipulations that draw attention to extensional or set-based considerations are neither sufficient nor necessary for enhanced use of base rates in intuitive judgments. Frequency formats are only one part of the puzzle of base-rate use and neglect. The conditions under which these and other manipulations promote base-rate use may be more parsimoniously organized under the broader notion of case-based judgment.

On trouve dans les écrits de Mill une légitimation circonstanciée de la révolution. Ce que doivent considérer celles et ceux que tente l’affrontement armé, c’est la nature des circonstances historiques, mais aussi leur propre force et leur degré de maturité politique, de manière à évaluer l’opportunité et la justice de la violence révolutionnaire. Il s’agira ici d’examiner les tensions et les évolutions de la pensée de Mill à l’égard de la « révolution », comme idée politique, comme événement historique, aussi (...) bien que comme processus long de transformation individuelle ou collective. (shrink)

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability (...) and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values. (shrink)

For Vajrayana Buddhism, the now is an interval, a boundary, a point of tension and suspension with an atmosphere of uncertainty. It is a bifurcation point of variable length; its name is “bardo.” The bardo is immersed in the conventional, or “seeming” reality. It emerges from what is called the “unstained” ultimate or primordial emptiness or “basal clear light.” Further, the ultimate is not the sphere of cognition. Cognition, including cognition of time, belongs to conventional reality. Buddhahood, in contrast, is (...) a condition of uncompounded knowledge where basic mind blossoms without temporal or other cognitive distinctions, unmade, unfabricated, luminous and pristine. Cyclical existence involves both the ultimate and the conventional as it moves through six bardos—all of which are the effulgent of the basal clear light—until Buddhahood. The six are: the bardo of this life ; the bardo of dream; the bardo of meditation; the bardo of dying; the bardo of dharmata ; and the bardo of existence. Each realm is both ultimate and conventional, and has specific initiation-based yogas to investigate these differences. The process of transition from one to the next involves at least three bodies, one mind, and aspects of speech. In each bardo, the character of the now as embodiment and temporal knowing varies yet a complete and consistent cross-bardo yogic wisdom leads to its total cessation in the basal clear light; the now is extinguished. The author presents, from the viewpoint of a knowledgeable practitioner of over 30 years, an essay on Vajrayana Buddhist time, drawing implications for Fraser’s time typology. The essay will draw from English translations of significant older, tantric texts on dream yoga, deity yoga, the Chod, tantric time, the bardo of death, and empowerment. Useful practices that can be applied by the audience to test the tradition and author’s assertions will be suggested. (shrink)

Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the ‘paradox of fiction’), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather “quasi-emotions”. Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists (...) have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then argue that, due to conceptual problems, these studies fail to be relevant to the philosophical debate and emphasize new directions for future empirical research on the topic. (shrink)

I agree with Gibbs that the message of the base rate literature reads differently depending on which null hypothesis is used to frame the issue. But I argue that the normative null hypothesis, H0: “People use base rates in a Bayesian manner,” is no longer appropriate. I also challenge Adler's distinction between unused and ignored base rates, and criticize Goodie's reluctance to shift research attention to the field. Macchi's arguments about textual ambiguities in traditional base rate problems suggest that empirical (...) testing is needed to tease apart the effects of problem clarification and problem framing. Macdonald's, Fletcher's and Snow's skepticism about the value of Bayesian methods in real world judgment tasks is treated as a challenge for the next generation of empirical base rate studies. (shrink)

We accept Sunstein's claim that people often use moral heuristics to make judgments and decisions. However, in situations that include a risk of betrayal, we disagree with Sunstein about when the relevant moral heuristic may be said to “misfire.” We suggest that the moral heuristic people apply to avoid the possibility of safety-product betrayal may be reasonable.