Mill's analysis and philosophy of religion, expressed principally in his posthumous and neglected Three Essays on Religion, surprised his admirers and critics and are essential for a complete understanding of his views of morality, human well‐being, and social reform. As a moral and social reformer, Mill thought deeply about the value and necessity of religion since it provided ideals to guide and inspire human conduct and helped cope with suffering; however, supernatural religions, like Christianity, needed to be reformed. Contrary to (...) many commentators, Mill did not want to rid the world of religion and establish a Religion of Humanity but preserve imaginative, supernatural hope and make it compatible with a rational morality and what is known about the world. Mill's philosophy of religion can be summed up so: improve yourself and society, and if you need the motivation to do so, it is legitimate to hope in supernatural realities that are consistent with reason and moral feelings. (shrink)

In ‘Utility of Religion’, Mill argues that a wholly naturalistic religion of humanity would promote individual and social welfare better than supernatural religions like Christianity; in ‘Theism’, however, Mill defends the salutary effects of hope in an afterlife. While commentators have acknowledged this discrepancy, they have not examined the utilitarian value of what Mill terms ‘illusions’. In this essay, I explain Mill's case against the utility of supernatural religious belief and then argue that Mill cannot dismiss the utility of hope (...) in an ultimate justice since it need not pervert the intellect or morality. There are thus utilitarian grounds to support some supernatural illusions, which undermines Mill's defence of an exclusively naturalistic religion. I conclude with the suggestion that while the utility of religious belief leads Mill toward William James's view, they disagree about whether supernatural religious sentiment has any unique, intrinsic force. (shrink)

Can a coach rightfully integrate a religious orientation in their coaching in a public institution? In its recent Kennedy v Bremerton School District (2022) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court defended the educational value of players’ exposure to diverse expressive activities as a part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society. I contend that religion-sport separation is the most philosophically defensible position, based primarily on the problems with supernatural theism in religions like Christianity. Nonetheless, there is a form of (...) religion-sport integration that is theoretically possible within my critique of theism which could strengthen the inner morality of sport. I describe the two necessary conditions of this potential religion-sport integration but conclude that the problems with defining the ‘religious’ might ultimately strengthen my defense of religion-sport separation. (shrink)

One promising form of philosophical practice is to conduct workshops on philosophical counseling for counselors. Since licensed professionals, such as Marriage and Family Counselors and Licensed Clinical Social Workers sometimes confront situations that raise philosophical issues and usually have a philosophical perspective that informs their practice, they could profit from a workshop on philosophical counseling; the workshop also qualifies for continuing education units (CEUs) that are typically required to renew their licenses. This paper describes the principal purposes of a workshop (...) for counselors, the structure of two such workshops, and suggestions for improvement of future workshops. (shrink)

Commentators on strategic fouling have not focused on what is most ethically relevant. I contend that strategic fouling in basketball is unethical in all of its forms because it violates the essence or true ethos of the sport: the display of the full realization of the skills of the game. I give an account of the essential skills, how they are determined, and how historical rule changes about fouling have principally been directed toward rewarding skill and increasing freedom of player (...) movement. I explain why the disciplined restraint from strategically fouling is a competitive virtue as well as a way to show full respect to opponents. Moreover, I contend that the physical contact involved in strategic fouling can elicit a desire to retaliate, an indication of an ethical aspect of strategic fouling that has been overlooked in the scholarly debate. (shrink)

Myles Brand offered a provocative defense of Intercollegiate Athletics (IA) by arguing that it is substantively similar to traditional performing arts, such as art or music, and so should be accepted by faculty as a legitimate part of university's educational mission. Randolph Feezell characterized Brand’s analogical argument as ‘sophistic’ and defended the reasonableness of what Brand termed the ‘Standard View’ of athletics whereby it is peripheral to a liberal arts education. I contend that Brand did not bring his persuasive analogical (...) argument to its logical conclusion: IA should contribute to a new, first-of-its kind academic major in Competitive Sport. Feezell’s criticisms of Brand’s analogical argument were unpersuasive, and his conception of a liberal arts education was outdated. As a result, I defend the legitimacy of a Competitive Sport major comparable to a Music Performance major and give a detailed description of its rigorous, liberal-arts based curriculum that integrates faculty and coaching instruction through shared learning objectives and outcomes. I conclude by identifying, and responding to, several practical issues if such a major were to be implemented in a US university. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Sports and politics don’t mix’. This platitude has been a pervasive part of U.S. professional sport culture, but it is vague and most of the versions are untrue since politics have been, and must be, a part of professional sports. Its only plausible meaning is that professional players should not make political statements while they are on-the-job. Players have a constitutional right to make political statements outside the workplace, but this right does not apply in privately owned sport associations. I (...) argue that player political protest has ultimately been moral, not political, in nature and that players’ on-the-job political expression can be justified based on the priority of the moral-legal concept of personhood. I propose player political expression policies that U.S. professional associations should adopt. (shrink)

Beyond the Fields is not the usual kind of book reviewed in JPS. Randolph Feezell is a highly regarded scholar in the philosophy of sport, having written significant books like Sport, Play and Ethi...

John Stuart Mill was one of the most important political and social thinkers of the nineteenth century, and his writings on human rights, feminism, the evils of slavery, and the environment are still widely read and influential today. Published after Mill’s death to avoid controversy, the three essays in this edition, _Nature_, _Utility of Religion_, and _Theism_, represent Mill’s considered position on religion. Mill argues that belief in a supernatural power holds us back, but that a conception of the meaning (...) and value of being human, or Religion of Humanity, could make the world a better place. Essential in understanding Mill’s views on religion and his practical philosophy, these essays are also significant contributions to the philosophy and psychology of religion. Appendices include Mill’s other writings on religion, his early influences, contemporary reviews, and other 19th century writings on religion and science. (shrink)

Voluntary stream segregation was investigated in cochlear implant users and normal-hearing listeners using a segregation-promoting objective approach which evaluated the role of spectral and amplitude-modulation rate separations on stream segregation and its build-up. Sequences of 9 or 3 pairs of A and B narrowband noise bursts were presented which differed in either center frequency of the noise band, the AM-rate, or both. In some sequences, the last B burst was delayed by 35 ms from their otherwise-steady temporal position. In the (...) other sequences, the last B bursts were temporally advanced from 0 to 10 ms. A single interval yes/no procedure was utilized to measure participants’ sensitivity in identifying delayed vs. no-delay sequences. A higher d′ value showed the higher ability to segregate the A and B subsequences. For NH listeners, performance improved with each spectral separation. However, for CI users, performance was only significantly better for the condition with the largest spectral separation. Additionally, performance was significantly poorer for the largest AM-rate separation than for the condition with no AM-rate separation for both groups. The significant effect of sequence duration in both groups indicated that listeners made more improvement with lengthening the duration of stimulus sequences, supporting the build-up effect. The results of this study suggest that CI users are less able than NH listeners to segregate NBN bursts into different auditory streams when they are moderately separated in the spectral domain. Contrary to our hypothesis, our results indicate that AM-rate separation may interfere with the segregation of streams of NBN. Additionally, our results add evidence to the literature that CI users build up stream segregation at a rate comparable to NH listeners, when the inter-stream spectral separations are adequately large. (shrink)

This study examines public health nurses’ perceptions and concerns about the implications of Japan’s new long-term care insurance law concerning care provision for elderly people and their families. Respondents voiced their primary concern about this law as access to services for all elderly people needing care, and defined their major responsibility as strengthening health promotion and illness prevention programmes. Although wanting to expand their roles to meet the health care, social and public policy advocacy needs of elderly persons and their (...) families, respondents also stated their concern for the possible lack of enough resources for this expansion to support family caregivers adequately. They viewed their first function as developing collaborative relationships with local government officials to help to assure sufficient resources to provide the necessary foundation for long-term care programmes to deliver services to all those in need. These concerns fall within the larger ethical issue of distributive justice in a society based on the obligations of the state to citizens and the family to its members, especially elderly relatives, who, according to traditional Japanese values, retain respect. (shrink)

A debate over whether God predestines some to reprobation broke out in the ninth century. No one actually taught this view, but both John Scotus Eriugena and Hincmar of Rheims, among other churchmen at the time, presumed it to be the view of those who referred to themselves as “double predestinarians.” In part, this was because the double predestinarians had made much of Augustine’s phrase “predestined to punishment,” a phrase that can in fact be found in several of his writings. (...) This article, which is the second of two parts, argues that Eriugena and Hincmar had difficulty avoiding the appearance of disagreeing entirely with Augustine’s use of that phrase. Eriugena said the phrase is to be understood a contrario to the divine nature; Hincmar said it is to be understood in a generic sense about God’s judgment on sin. Of the two, Hincmar came the closest to acknowledging that Augustine might have erred in using the phrase as he did. (shrink)

A debate over whether God predestines to make some people reprobate broke out in the ninth century. No one taught this view, but it was presumed by several churchmen at the time to be the position of those who called themselves double predestinarians. In part, this article explains why two double predestinarians, Gottschalk of Orbais and Ratramnus of Corbie, were mistaken for proponents of this view. They had been trying to explain Augustine’s phrase, “those predestined to punishment”, which they found (...) in no fewer than ten of Augustine’s texts. Gottschalk points out Augustine used the phrase interchangeably with the term reprobate. Thus, to Gottschalk, it is not a statement about what God predestines; rather, it is a statement about the effect of predestination on certain people. Likewise, to Ratramnus, the phrase referred to the effect of God’s ordering of both the good and evil acts of persons. That Gottschalk and Ratramnus identified Augustine’s use of the phrase with a belief in double predestination was due to their reading Augustine through the lens of Isidore of Seville’s Sententiae II.6. (shrink)

Despite the widespread agreement that the ontology of the marketing discipline is exchange, marketing ethics researchers have largely adopted a monadic viewpoint of ethical decision making. In this research, an interactionist approach is adopted in order to introduce a dyadic perspective of un/ethical decision making. The dyadic model includes each channel member's individual, situational and decision process factors linked by relationalism, an emerging paradigm in marketing channels. Relationalism is represented as a discriminating variable between perceived ethical dilemma and decision behaviour. (...) Finally, a number of theoretical propositions are presented and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

Related Works: Original Paper: Lou Van Den Dries. $T$-Convexity and Tame Extensions II. J. Symbolic Logic, Volume 62, Issue 1 , 14--34. Project Euclid: euclid.jsl/1183745182.

Van den Dries, L. and J. Holly, Quantifier elimination for modules with scalar variables, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 57 161–179. We consider modules as two-sorted structures with scalar variables ranging over the ring. We show that each formula in which all scalar variables are free is equivalent to a formula of a very simple form, uniformly and effectively for all torsion-free modules over gcd domains . For the case of Presburger arithmetic with scalar variables the result takes a (...) still simpler form, and we derive in this way the polynomial-time decidability of the sets defined by such formulas. (shrink)

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained (...) and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)

In their thought-provoking article, Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) defend the view that the status—both epistemic and ethical—of Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) used in psychotherapy is complicated. While therapeutic CAI seems to be more than a mere tool implementing particular therapeutic techniques, it falls short of being a “digital therapist.” One of the main arguments supporting the latter claim is that even though “the interaction with CAI happens in the course of conversation… the conversation is profoundly different from a conversation with (...) a human therapist” (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023, 8). In particular, unlike a human therapist, CAI cannot help its users gain new insight and self-understanding (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023). We agree that currently available therapeutic CAI cannot be considered a “digital therapist,” however, we think that the issue surrounding the acquisition of new self-understanding in the interaction with therapeutic CAI is more complicated than Sedlakova and Trachsel suggest. (shrink)

Growing demand for broadly accessible mental health care, together with the rapid development of new technologies, trigger discussions about the feasibility of psychotherapeutic interventions based on interactions with Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI). Many authors argue that while currently available CAI can be a useful supplement for human-delivered psychotherapy, it is not yet capable of delivering fully fledged psychotherapy on its own. The goal of this paper is to investigate what are the most important obstacles on our way to developing CAI (...) systems capable of delivering psychotherapy in the future. To this end, we formulate and discuss three challenges central to this quest. Firstly, we might not be able to develop effective AI-based psychotherapy unless we deepen our understanding of what makes human-delivered psychotherapy effective. Secondly, assuming that it requires building a therapeutic relationship, it is not clear whether psychotherapy can be delivered by non-human agents. Thirdly, conducting psychotherapy might be a problem too complicated for narrow AI, i.e., AI proficient in dealing with only relatively simple and well-delineated tasks. If this is the case, we should not expect CAI to be capable of delivering fully-fledged psychotherapy until the so-called “general” or “human-like” AI is developed. While we believe that all these challenges can ultimately be overcome, we think that being mindful of them is crucial to ensure well-balanced and steady progress on our path to AI-based psychotherapy. (shrink)

The majority of our linguistic exchanges, such as everyday conversations, are divided into turns; one party usually talks at a time, with only relatively rare occurrences of brief overlaps in which there are two simultaneous speakers. Moreover, conversational turn-taking tends to be very fast. We typically start producing our responses before the previous turn has finished, i.e., before we are confronted with the full content of our interlocutor’s utterance. This raises interesting questions about the nature of linguistic understanding. Philosophical theories (...) typically focus on linguistic understanding characterized either as an ability to grasp the contents of utterances in a given language or as outputs of this ability—mental states of one type or another. In this paper, I supplement these theories by developing an account of the process of understanding. I argue that it enables us to capture the dynamic and temporal aspect of understanding and reconcile philosophical investigations with empirical research on language comprehension. (shrink)

Abstract: Might knowledge normatively govern conversations and not just their discrete constituent thoughts and (assertoric) actions? I answer yes, at least for a restricted class of conversations I call aimed conversations. On the view defended here, aimed conversations are governed by participatory know-how - viz., knowledge how to do what each interlocutor to the conversation shares a participatory intention to do by means of that conversation. In the specific case of conversations that are in the service of joint inquiry, the (...) view defended is that interlocutors (A, B, ... n) must intentionally inquire together into whether p, by means of an aimed conversation X, only if A,B, ... n know how to use X to find out together whether p. The view is supported by considerations about instrumental rationality, shared intentionality, the epistemology of intentional action, as well as linguistic data. (shrink)

This volume provides discussions of both the concept of responsibility and of punishment, and of both individual and collective responsibility. It provides in-depth Socratic and Kantian bases for a new version of retributivism, and defends that version against the main criticisms that have been raised against retributivism in general. It includes chapters on criminal recidivism and capital punishment, as well as one on forgiveness, apology and punishment that is congruent with the basic precepts of the new retributivism defended therein. Finally, (...) chapters on corporate responsibility and punishment are included, with a closing chapter on holding the U.S. accountable for its most recent invasion and occupation of Iraq. The book is well-focused but also presents the widest ranging set of topics of any book of its kind as it demonstrates how the concepts of responsibility and punishment apply to some of the most important problems of our time. “This is one of the best books on punishment, and the Fourth Edition continues its tradition of excellence. The book connects punishment importantly to moral responsibility and desert, and it is comprehensive in its scope, both addressing abstract, theoretical issues and applied issues as well. The topics treated include collective responsibility, apology, forgiveness, capital punishment, and war crimes. Highly recommended.”—John Martin Fischer, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. (shrink)

It is often suggested that we are equipped with a set of cognitive tools that help us to filter out unreliable testimony. But are these tools effective? I answer this question in two steps. Firstly, I argue that they are not real-time effective. The process of filtering, which takes place simultaneously with or right after language comprehension, does not prevent a particular hearer on a particular occasion from forming beliefs based on false testimony. Secondly, I argue that they are long-term (...) effective. Some hearers sometimes detect false testimony, which increases speakers’ incentives for honesty and stabilizes the practice of human communication in which deception is risky and costly. In short, filtering prevents us from forming a large number of beliefs based on false testimony, not by turning each of us into a high-functioning polygraph but by turning the social environment of human communication into one in which such polygraphs are not required. Finally, I argue that these considerations support strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

According to the cognitive model of psychopathology, maladaptive beliefs about oneself, others, and the world are the main factors contributing to the development and persistence of various forms of mental suffering. Therefore, the key therapeutic process of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)—a therapeutic approach rooted in the cognitive model—is cognitive restructuring, i.e., a process of revision of such maladaptive beliefs. In this paper, I examine the philosophical assumptions underlying CBT and offer theoretical reasons to think that the effectiveness of belief revision (...) in psychotherapy is very limited. This is the case, I argue, because the cognitive model wrongly assumes that our body of beliefs is unified, while it is in fact fragmented. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...) health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

The language of “participant-driven research,” “crowdsourcing” and “citizen science” is increasingly being used to encourage the public to become involved in research ventures as both subjects and scientists. Originally, these labels were invoked by volunteer research efforts propelled by amateurs outside of traditional research institutions and aimed at appealing to those looking for more “democratic,” “patient-centric,” or “lay” alternatives to the professional science establishment. As mainstream translational biomedical research requires increasingly larger participant pools, however, corporate, academic and governmental research programs (...) are embracing this populist rhetoric to encourage wider public participation. We examine the ethical and social implications of this recruitment strategy. We begin by surveying examples of “citizen science” outside of biomedicine, as paradigmatic of the aspirations this democratizing rhetoric was originally meant to embody. Next, we discuss the ways these aspirations become articulated in the biomedical context, with a view to drawing out the multiple and potentially conflicting meanings of “public engagement” when citizens are also the subjects of the science. We then illustrate two uses of public engagement rhetoric to gain public support for national biomedical research efforts: its post-hoc use in the “care.data” project of the National Health Service in England, and its proactive uses in the “Precision Medicine Initiative” of the United States White House. These examples will serve as the basis for a normative analysis, discussing the potential ethical and social ramifications of this rhetoric. We pay particular attention to the implications of government strategies that cultivate the idea that members of the public have a civic duty to participate in government-sponsored research initiatives. We argue that such initiatives should draw from policy frameworks that support normative analysis of the role of citizenry. And, we conclude it is imperative to make visible and clear the full spectrum of meanings of “citizen science,” the contexts in which it is used, and its demands with respect to participation, engagement, and governance. (shrink)