The book is a critical analysis of the work of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx. It focuses on their separate analyses of the role of law in society, pointing out their faults and errors, and the resultant impact on modern social science. The author takes issue with Weber's work on rationality, with Durkheim's work on repressive and restitutive law, and with Marx's work on social justice and law as part of the super-structure. In each section of the book (...) he shows the implications that flow from a re-assessment and re-interpretation of their work for an understanding of society. The book is multi-disciplinary, making ample reference to law, sociology, anthropology, history, religion, ecology, criminology, philosophy and economics. Its various chapters discuss a wide range of themes, including rationality, tradition, science, political authority, conflict resolution, community, justice and altruism. (shrink)

Wilson and Kass talked about their book, The ethics of human cloning, which is about the ethical debate over human cloning.

The logician Kurt Godel in 1951 established a disjunctive thesis about the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge: either the mathematical mind is equivalent to a Turing machine (i.e., a computer), or there are absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. In the second half of the twentieth century, attempts have been made to arrive at a stronger conclusion. In particular, arguments have been produced by the philosopher J.R. Lucas and by the physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose that intend to show that the (...) mathematical mind is more powerful than any computer. These arguments, and counterarguments to them, have not convinced the logical and philosophical community. The reason for this is an insufficiency if rigour in the debate. The contributions in this volume move the debate forward by formulating rigorous frameworks and formally spelling out and evaluating arguments that bear on Godel's disjunction in these frameworks. The contributions in this volume have been written by world leading experts in the field. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that defenders of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities do not need to construct a metaphysically possible scenario in which an agent is morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. Rather, there is a weaker (but equally legitimate) sense in which Frankfurt-style counterexamples can succeed. All that's needed is the claim that the ability to do otherwise is no part of what grounds moral responsibility, when the agent is indeed morally responsible.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

Growing powers to manipulate human bodies and minds, not merely to heal disease but to satisfy desires, control deviant behavior, and to change human nature, make urgent questions of whether and how to regulate their use, not merely to assure safety and efficacy but also to safeguard our humanity. Oversight in democratic societies rightly belongs to the polity, not merely to self-appointed experts, scientific or ethical. Yet the task of governing the uses of dangerous knowledge is daunting, and there is (...) little evidence that we have the will or the wisdom to do it well. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper three concepts of system are introduced. The first is the following ordered set: S = , where S is a given system, C is the set of its parts, R1, ..., Rk are relations between these parts, Rk+1, ..., Rk+m are relations between parts of S and its environment U. This concept does not take into account the fact that real things change. Thus it is the concept of abstract system. The second concept (...) takes changes of systems for granted. At every period i the system is slightly different. At the periods i Si is a set of sections of a real system: Si = , where {C}i is the set of sets of parts of S, {R1, ..., Rk}i and {Rk+1, ..., Rk+m}i are sets of relations. Different sections of a system are similar; the same holds for the relations and the subsequent environments. To describe the evolution of systems these similarity-relations have to be considered. Let the relations between the C's, the parts of the system, be symbolized as X, the similarity relations between the {R1, ..., Rk} pointed to by T, and the relations between the other sets of relations marked by Z. Let W be asigned to the relations between the succesive environments. SI is a system which lasts during the period I and changes in this time. The period I is in fact identical with i. The symbol SI was introduced to point to the relations S, T, Z, W, which were absent in the definition of Si. Now we have the following third concept of system: SI = . In the second part of the paper the relation X is analysed, when C consists of statements and S is a theory. The relation is to the effect that statements of later stages of a theory refer to n-tuples which exhibit more arguments that the relation spoken of at earlier stages of the theory. (shrink)

t.1 • Nominalizm Poincare'go i jego konsekwencje • Paradoksy logistyki • Pojęcie rzeczywistości • Wielość rzeczywistości • Zastosowanie metody konstrukcyjnej do teorji poznania • Tragedja werbalnej metafizyki • Rola semantyki racjonalnej w filozofii • Rola zasady konsekwencji w zagadnieniu sprawiedliwości społecznej • Zagadnienia kultury duchowej w Polsce t.2 • Granice nauki. Zarys logiki i metodologji nauk ścisłych • Antynomje logiki formalnej • Zasady czystej teorji typów • Kilka uwag o podstawowych prawach rozchodzenia się światła • Liczby nieskończenie małe i ich (...) zastosowanie. (shrink)