This book illustrates how Aristotle's ethical concepts such as justice, reciprocity and friendship offer a basis for his political philosophy. In particular, it points out the importance of Aristotle for articulating the concept of a civic relationship and developing a theory of integration, by exploring how he includes a wide variety of people within the deliberative and judicial processes. Comparisons between Aristotle's own thought and present-day 'Aristotelian' political theories, such as communitarianism, civic republicanism and the capabilities approach, are also among (...) the unique approaches offered by the book and are used to illustrate his original vision of politics. They can also, however, offer new insights into the problems of how to read his texts appropriately in their context and why we now need to read them, not only out of an antiquarian interest but also out of our concern for politics. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of how to make 'democratic' elements in Aristotle's political philosophy compatible with his aristocratic framework for distributing political authority. To this end, it is argued that in Aristotle's framework, the idea of aristocratic governance is justified, because it contributes most greatly to the achievement of the well-being of people in a city , or the common benefit of a wide range of free individuals , and that Aristotle's argument for the wisdom of the multitude is (...) actually not democratic, but rather aristocratic to the extent that he proposes integrating the multitude into the deliberative and judicial processes by identifying their 'virtuous character' as a group, not by offering an idea that human beings are created equal. The paper also offers a more constructive criticism of Nussbaum's capabilities approach by arguing that Aristotle's aristocratic idea of distributive justice provides more useful insights into the problem of popular participation than Nussbaum's emphasis on people's capacity for choosing their own way of life. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of how to make ‘democratic’ elements in Aristotle’s political philosophy compatible with his aristocratic framework for distributing political authority. To this end, it is argued that in Aristotle’s framework, the idea of aristocratic governance is justified, because it contributes most greatly to the achievement of the well-being of people in a city, or the common benefit of a wide range of free individuals, and that Aristotle’s argument for the wisdom of the multitude is actually not (...) democratic, but rather aristocratic to the extent that he proposes integrating the multitude into the deliberative and judicial processes by identifying their ‘virtuous character’ as a group, not by offering an idea that human beings are created equal. The paper also offers a more constructive criticism of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach by arguing that Aristotle’s aristocratic idea of distributive justice provides more useful insights into the problem of popular participation than Nussbaum’s emphasis on people’s capacity for choosing their own way of life. (shrink)

This article maintains that Aristotle develops his political theory as a craft and science in Politics 4–6. The literature, however, has argued that he views political knowledge as a form of practical wisdom or prudence. This article discusses the way that Aristotle proposes political theory as a skill to help deal with unfavorable circumstances. In Greek political thought, craft and science are characterized as skills of cooperating with nature, taking up opportunities, and coping with uncertainty. Aristotle uses this conception when (...) he develops his political theory in Politics 4–6. He understands that political theorists should advise prudent legislators on practical reforms of constitutions and help them address non-ideal situations. Serious efforts to gain causal knowledge are indispensable for statesmanship. This view of statesmanship better illustrates political theory as part of human efforts and cooperation to resolve uncertainty rather than the one that sharply distinguishes among theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. (shrink)

This paper argues that what Aristotle has in mind as the criterion for estimating the value of products in Nicomachean Ethics V.5 is neither the Marxian concept of 'human labour' nor Polanyi's concept of 'status', but the benefit of a recipient, and maintains that Aristotle here does not analyse the mechanism of a market economy, but addresses the problem of how to build reciprocal relationships among citizens through the exchange of goods. Furthermore, unlike Nussbaum's capability approach, which draws attention to (...) the concept of well-being, the paper argues that the concept of reciprocity plays the key role in Aristotle's distributive theory of property in the Politics and lays the foundation for his understanding of political governance as the exchange of governing and being governed in turn. (shrink)

_In what computational aspect is the brain different from the_ _computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be_ _“creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the_ _neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several_ _important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human_ _mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the_ _brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of_ _"externality" that adds new ingredients to the (...) system and its output. We_ _argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to_ _consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality"._ _We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities_ _ is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia _ _under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,_. (shrink)

The explicit system for action selection integrates emotional information with the higher-order cognitive processes which culminate in the language system. Even the basic feels of emotion are what they are because they are integrated into the higher cognitive processes. The relation between emotion and intelligence would become increasingly important as the focus of brain science shifts to the integrative function of the prefrontal lobe.

ニューロン発火がなぜ「心」になるのか? 私が私であることの不思議、意識の謎に正面から挑んだ、茂木健一郎の核心!

_The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._.

manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to.

The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuroscience might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neuroscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the supervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural activity.

We analyzed the variability of response in records obtained from MT (V5) of awake, behaving monkeys and kindly provided to us by Newsome and Bair (see Newsome et al 1990 for Methods). Some sets of random dot kinematograms had been generated with a constant randomization seed (novar stimuli), while others had been generated with varying randomization seeds (var stimuli). The neural responses to novar stimuli exhibited a remarkable degree of consistent temporal modulation, while the responses to var stimuli were homogeneous (...) over the presentation time. We suspected that correspondence noise might be a major source of variability and to test this we compared the variability of response to novar and var stimuli, making the assumption that the variability observed in responses to novar stimuli reflected the internal noise only, whereas variability in the case of var stimuli reflected internal noise and external noise. From this assumption, we could estimate the relative importance of external noise and internal noise in this system. The main conclusions are:- (1) Efficiency values (up to about 35%) calculated from neural responses in MT are of the same order as those of human observers, (Barlow and Tripathy 1997) (2) External correspondence noise is a significant factor in limiting the detectability of coherent motion in these random dot stimuli. (shrink)

At key moments in the Phaedrus and the Republic, Socrates qualifies our capacity to “see” the highest realities (the “place of being,” the “Good beyond being”) with the adverb “mogis” (mogis kathorosa, Phdr. 248a; mogis horisthai, Rep. 517b). Mogis can be used to indicate either the toilsome difficulty of some undertaking or the subject’s proximity to failing to accomplish the undertaking. Socrates uses mogis to qualify the nature of the human soul’s capacity to make the intellectual ascent and see the (...) divine, but it is not prima facie clear whether the qualification is meant to express (1) the difficulty we have in undertaking the intellectual ascent (a comment on the effort required) or (2) the fact that the human soul’s capacity to make the intellectual ascent will, on account of its limitations, only “just barely” be achieved, if at all. After discussing the uses of mogis in classical literature and surveying Plato’s uses of mogis across the corpus, I interpret Plato’s use of mogis at Phaedrus 248a, arguing that mogis kathorosa should be translated as “only gets a good look at the things that are with much toil” rather than the more common “scarcely able to gaze upon the things that are.” I then turn to the parallel passage at Republic 517b and argue against a prominent account, put forward by John Sallis, among others, of Plato’s understanding of divine inaccessibility. Whereas Sallis et al. argue that Plato’s use of mogis indicates that which is to be seen at the acme of the ascent is only “barely glimpsed” on account of the fact that it “withdraws” from our view, I argue instead that Plato’s use of mogis indicates that though we can “get a good look” at the highest realities, that good look is qualified by their inexhaustible excess. The human capacity to see the highest realities is qualified because there is “always more to see,” not because that which is there to be seen “withdraws” from view, and still less because there is some intrinsic limitation to human intellectual vision that prevents us from apprehending the highest realities. Accordingly, the divine is accessible but never exhaustible. (shrink)

This is a review of Kazutaka Inamura's book "Justice and Reciprocity in Aristotle's Political Philosophy" (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 3 Seiten: 371-377.

Straipsnyje svarstomas teorinis judesys, kuriuo Emmanuelis Levinas grindë savàjà asmens tapatumosampratà, prieðingà Vakarø filosofijos klasikiniame racionalizme ir fenomenologijoje susiklosèiusiossavimonës kaip sàmonës tapatumo sau prielaidai. Kanto asmens tapatumo koncepcija taip pat liekaðioje „antileviniðkoje“ paradigmoje, taèiau Levinas pasitelkia ketvirtàjà Kanto antinomijà kaip iðlaisvinanèià subjektyvumà ið laiko spàstø. Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kaip Levinas perðoka nuo dinamiðko laiko sekmens problemos prie subjekto tapatumo kaip jo socialumo klausimo. Koká vaidmenáðioje naujoje asmens tapatumo sampratoje vaidina Fiodoro Dostojevskio romanø kai kuriø veikëjøvertybinëms prielaidoms labai artima Levino subjekto (...) pasyvumo, paþeidþiamumo ir apsëstumo samprata? Kaip ji iðplaukia ið ketvirtosios Kanto antinomijos pamokø? Vieniðas filosofinis subjektas negalikito momento kitybës aptikti pats savyje. Levino filosofinis subjektas kito momento kitybæ randa kitame asmenyje. Taip laikas sukuriamas. Levinas, susiedamas asmens tapatumà su nauja laiko samprata,suteikia jam socialumo matmená. Autorë straipsnyje árodinëja tezæ, kad Levino subjekto tapatumosteigèiai didþiausià átakà turëjo Dostojevskio romanuose suformuluota þmogiðkosios brolybës samprata. Jos paveiktas Levinas formuluoja naujà asmens tapatumo savimonæ, todël jo filosofijoje pasyvusapsëstasis kitu subjektas yra amþinas Odisëjas, niekada nebegráþtantis pats á save ir nebesutampantissu savimi. Toks teorinis judesys, autorës manymu, tampa galimas, kai Levinas, sekdamas Kanto ketvirtàja antinomija, savo subjektà iðlaisvina ið dinaminës laiko tëkmës panèiø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: ketvirtoji Kanto antinomija, Levinas, Dostojevskis, subjekto tapatumas. (shrink)

O dukhe voinstvennosti -- Fenomen prazdnichnoĭ draki -- Infernalʹnai︠a︡ tema v filosofii -- Mogi i ikh mogushchestva -- Chzhuan-t︠s︡y i daos Emeli︠a︡ -- Inʺekt︠s︡ii︠a︡ khaosa v struktury pori︠a︡dka.