ニューロン発火がなぜ「心」になるのか? 私が私であることの不思議、意識の謎に正面から挑んだ、茂木健一郎の核心!

_In what computational aspect is the brain different from the_ _computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be_ _“creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the_ _neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several_ _important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human_ _mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the_ _brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of_ _"externality" that adds new ingredients to the (...) system and its output. We_ _argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to_ _consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality"._ _We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities_ _ is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia _ _under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,_. (shrink)

The explicit system for action selection integrates emotional information with the higher-order cognitive processes which culminate in the language system. Even the basic feels of emotion are what they are because they are integrated into the higher cognitive processes. The relation between emotion and intelligence would become increasingly important as the focus of brain science shifts to the integrative function of the prefrontal lobe.

_The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._.

manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to.

The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuroscience might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neuroscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the supervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural activity.

We analyzed the variability of response in records obtained from MT (V5) of awake, behaving monkeys and kindly provided to us by Newsome and Bair (see Newsome et al 1990 for Methods). Some sets of random dot kinematograms had been generated with a constant randomization seed (novar stimuli), while others had been generated with varying randomization seeds (var stimuli). The neural responses to novar stimuli exhibited a remarkable degree of consistent temporal modulation, while the responses to var stimuli were homogeneous (...) over the presentation time. We suspected that correspondence noise might be a major source of variability and to test this we compared the variability of response to novar and var stimuli, making the assumption that the variability observed in responses to novar stimuli reflected the internal noise only, whereas variability in the case of var stimuli reflected internal noise and external noise. From this assumption, we could estimate the relative importance of external noise and internal noise in this system. The main conclusions are:- (1) Efficiency values (up to about 35%) calculated from neural responses in MT are of the same order as those of human observers, (Barlow and Tripathy 1997) (2) External correspondence noise is a significant factor in limiting the detectability of coherent motion in these random dot stimuli. (shrink)

At key moments in the Phaedrus and the Republic, Socrates qualifies our capacity to “see” the highest realities (the “place of being,” the “Good beyond being”) with the adverb “mogis” (mogis kathorosa, Phdr. 248a; mogis horisthai, Rep. 517b). Mogis can be used to indicate either the toilsome difficulty of some undertaking or the subject’s proximity to failing to accomplish the undertaking. Socrates uses mogis to qualify the nature of the human soul’s capacity to make the intellectual ascent and see the (...) divine, but it is not prima facie clear whether the qualification is meant to express (1) the difficulty we have in undertaking the intellectual ascent (a comment on the effort required) or (2) the fact that the human soul’s capacity to make the intellectual ascent will, on account of its limitations, only “just barely” be achieved, if at all. After discussing the uses of mogis in classical literature and surveying Plato’s uses of mogis across the corpus, I interpret Plato’s use of mogis at Phaedrus 248a, arguing that mogis kathorosa should be translated as “only gets a good look at the things that are with much toil” rather than the more common “scarcely able to gaze upon the things that are.” I then turn to the parallel passage at Republic 517b and argue against a prominent account, put forward by John Sallis, among others, of Plato’s understanding of divine inaccessibility. Whereas Sallis et al. argue that Plato’s use of mogis indicates that which is to be seen at the acme of the ascent is only “barely glimpsed” on account of the fact that it “withdraws” from our view, I argue instead that Plato’s use of mogis indicates that though we can “get a good look” at the highest realities, that good look is qualified by their inexhaustible excess. The human capacity to see the highest realities is qualified because there is “always more to see,” not because that which is there to be seen “withdraws” from view, and still less because there is some intrinsic limitation to human intellectual vision that prevents us from apprehending the highest realities. Accordingly, the divine is accessible but never exhaustible. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstomas teorinis judesys, kuriuo Emmanuelis Levinas grindë savàjà asmens tapatumosampratà, prieðingà Vakarø filosofijos klasikiniame racionalizme ir fenomenologijoje susiklosèiusiossavimonës kaip sàmonës tapatumo sau prielaidai. Kanto asmens tapatumo koncepcija taip pat liekaðioje „antileviniðkoje“ paradigmoje, taèiau Levinas pasitelkia ketvirtàjà Kanto antinomijà kaip iðlaisvinanèià subjektyvumà ið laiko spàstø. Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kaip Levinas perðoka nuo dinamiðko laiko sekmens problemos prie subjekto tapatumo kaip jo socialumo klausimo. Koká vaidmenáðioje naujoje asmens tapatumo sampratoje vaidina Fiodoro Dostojevskio romanø kai kuriø veikëjøvertybinëms prielaidoms labai artima Levino subjekto (...) pasyvumo, paþeidþiamumo ir apsëstumo samprata? Kaip ji iðplaukia ið ketvirtosios Kanto antinomijos pamokø? Vieniðas filosofinis subjektas negalikito momento kitybës aptikti pats savyje. Levino filosofinis subjektas kito momento kitybæ randa kitame asmenyje. Taip laikas sukuriamas. Levinas, susiedamas asmens tapatumà su nauja laiko samprata,suteikia jam socialumo matmená. Autorë straipsnyje árodinëja tezæ, kad Levino subjekto tapatumosteigèiai didþiausià átakà turëjo Dostojevskio romanuose suformuluota þmogiðkosios brolybës samprata. Jos paveiktas Levinas formuluoja naujà asmens tapatumo savimonæ, todël jo filosofijoje pasyvusapsëstasis kitu subjektas yra amþinas Odisëjas, niekada nebegráþtantis pats á save ir nebesutampantissu savimi. Toks teorinis judesys, autorës manymu, tampa galimas, kai Levinas, sekdamas Kanto ketvirtàja antinomija, savo subjektà iðlaisvina ið dinaminës laiko tëkmës panèiø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: ketvirtoji Kanto antinomija, Levinas, Dostojevskis, subjekto tapatumas. (shrink)

O dukhe voinstvennosti -- Fenomen prazdnichnoĭ draki -- Infernalʹnai︠a︡ tema v filosofii -- Mogi i ikh mogushchestva -- Chzhuan-t︠s︡y i daos Emeli︠a︡ -- Inʺekt︠s︡ii︠a︡ khaosa v struktury pori︠a︡dka.