When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: what seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This paper will present the idea that there are in fact two sets of virtues an arguer has to master—and with them four sometimes very different roles.

Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate—a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation's goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be "essentially" adversarial.

If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would probably always be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, and even mandatory (...) – and also when it is not. (shrink)

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...) which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play. (shrink)

This paper investigates the process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether a precedent-case gives her a binding reason to follow in her present-case. I review the objections that have been raised against the two main accounts of reasoning by precedent: the rule-account and the analogy-account. I argue that both accounts can be made viable by amending them to meet the objections. Nonetheless, I believe that there is an argument for preferring accounts that integrate analogical reasoning: any account of (...) reasoning by precedent that is descriptively minimally adequate will leave some room for judicial discretion. Discretion should be used under consideration of the best legally relevant arguments for and against a decision. Integrating analogical reasoning helps the judge to bring to her own attention the strongest case for following. Analogical reasoning also eases the recognition of possible reasons for distinguishing. Thereby, it facilitates a more balanced decision-making process. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the debate about the strawman fallacy. It is the received view that strawmen are employed to fool not the arguer whose argument they distort, but instead a third party, an audience. I argue that strawmen that fool their victims exist and are an important variation of the strawman fallacy because of their special perniciousness. I show that those who are subject to hermeneutical lacunae or who have since forgotten parts of justifications they have provided earlier (...) are especially vulnerable to falling for strawmen aimed at their own positions or arguments. Adversarial argumentation provides especially fertile ground for strawmen that fool their own victims, but cooperative argumentation is no fail-safe protection from them either. (shrink)

Arguers sometimes cite a decision made in an earlier situation as a reason for making the equivalent decision in a later situation. I argue that there are two kinds of “case-to-case arguments”. First, there are arguments by precedent, which cite the mere existence of the past decision as a reason to decide in the same way again now, independent of the past decision’s merits. Second, there are case-to-case arguments from parralel reasoning which presuppose that the past decision was justified and (...) are used to show that an equivalent present decision would also be justified. Both arguments are a type of argument by analogy. They differ in their structures and conditions of cogency, even though they often look the same in presentation. Their similar appearance poses a risk of miss-evaluation and fallacious use. Therefore a clearly theorized distinction is important. (shrink)

_A thoroughly revised edition of the classic resource for understanding gender differences in the classroom_ In this profoundly significant book, author Michael Gurian has revised and updated his groundbreaking book that clearly demonstrated how the distinction in hard-wiring and socialized gender differences affects how boys and girls learn. Gurian presents a proven method to educate our children based on brain science, neurological development, and chemical and hormonal disparities. The innovations presented in this book were applied in the classroom and proven (...) successful, with dramatic improvements in test scores, during a two-year study that Gurian and his colleagues conducted in six Missouri school districts. Explores the inherent differences between the developmental neuroscience of boys and girls Reveals how the brain learns Explains when same sex classrooms are appropriate, and when they’re not This edition includes new information on a wealth of topics including how to design the ultimate classroom for kids in elementary, secondary, middle, and high school. (shrink)

Gender inequity is a persistent problem in the United States. While the high school social studies classroom should be an important space for addressing gender inequity, there is significant underrepresentation of women in the curriculum. Thus, it is crucial that we understand how self-described feminist social studies teachers present women and gender-equity in their classrooms. In this mixed-methods study, the researchers examined the beliefs and practices of six feminist-identifying teachers. The results reveal commonalities across teachers related to classroom discourses, curricular (...) modifications, and professional practice, yet there were compelling differences based on whether or not the teacher subscribed to a critical feminist perspective or a liberal feminist perspective. While all the teachers in the study saw themselves as change agents, teachers who operated from a critical feminist lens focused more on structural gender inequity as a means to eliminate sexism, whereas teachers who operated from a liberal lens focused more on individual acts of sexism and greater inclusion of women—often individual women—in the curriculum. This study contributes to the scarce research on feminism in social studies and provides tools for practitioners who want practices that are more inclusive. (shrink)

When a new theory of argumentation becomes available on the English-speaking market, such as it is happening now through the translation of Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument, it is always interesting to work out how the new input will interact with the work that has otherwise been done in the field. This comment aims to determine whether rhetoric has a place in Wohlrapp’s account of argumentation.

Some authors argue that the rule-of-law ideal gives judges a prima facie duty to provide a determinate formulation of the precedent’s general norm in all their precedent-opinions. I question that claim. I agree that judges have a duty to decide their cases based on reasons and that they should formulate these reasons in their opinions. I also agree that formulations of general norms should be the goal of common-law development and that judges have a duty to contribute to the realization (...) of this goal. However, I argue that judges may sometimes do so better if they do not provide a determinate formulation of a general norm in their opinion. Often, judges may not feel confident that they are able to formulate a good general norm for their precedent decision, even if they believe that their decision is both correct and justifiable through argument. In this case, various reasons speak against providing a determinate formulation of a general norm, including rule-of-law reasons. (shrink)

Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an addressee’s beliefs in ways that are in some significant sense outside of their direct voluntary control. Since such changes may impact the well-being, life projects, or sense of self of the addressee, they risk infringing upon their autonomy. We call this the “autonomy worry” of argumentation. In light of this worry, this paper asks whether one ought to seek (...) an addressee’s consent before arguing with them. We first consider the view that arguing of any sort and on any topic requires consent. However, such a view is extreme, and we reject the general requirement of consent because argument contains its own internal permission structure. We find, however, that this permission structure is not always operative, and that consent may nonetheless be morally required in certain kinds of cases. (shrink)

The need to maintain the public trust in the integrity of the accounting profession has led to increased interest in research that examines the moral reasoning abilities (MRA) of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). This study examines the MRA of CPAs practicing in small firms or as sole practitioners and the factors that affect MRA throughout their working careers.The results indicate that small-firm accounting practitioners exhibit lower MRA than expected for professionals and that age, gender and socio-political beliefs affect the moral (...) reasoning abilities of small-firm practitioners. We also find that completion of an ethics course in college has a positive impact on MRA. Also, the survey respondents indicate overwhelming support for including ethics courses within the business curriculum. Finally, the fact that those accountants with the lowest MRA are the least supportive of ethical training may indicate the need for mandatory, rather than optional, training in ethics both in university and Continuing Professional Education courses. (shrink)

Humility holds a modest but important place among the judicial virtues. But in spite of its growing popularity, it does not yet have a place on the ‘central judicial virtues’ lists. This paper provides an argument that judicial humility, especially institutional judicial humility, should be considered a necessary judicial virtue at least in common-law jurisdictions. This is because it is a necessary ingredient in precedent-based decisions that are fully justified from the point of view of the law and of political (...) morality. Further, while it is sufficient that individual judges make decisions that a humble judge would have made, the judicial community must in fact be humble in order to produce fully justified common-law decisions – humility is therefore necessary as a community-virtue. (shrink)

Accountants confronted with ethical dilemmas are expected to comply with their ethical guide or seek advice from their professional body. This study of Chartered Accountants in Ireland records their views on the usefulness of a Code of Ethics, the efficacy of their professional Institute and the need for ethics courses in Continuing Professional Development. Peter Clarke is a lecturer in the Department of Accountancy, University College Dublin, Dublin 4; Nancy Hill and Kevin Stevens are members of the School of Accountancy, (...) DePaul University, Chicago. (shrink)

The FASB in its Conceptual Framework has set high principles in the ethics of standard-setting in accounting. This paper concentrates on what the FASB calls the cost/benefit constraint, i.e., the commitment to setting an accounting standard only when the benefits of the standard exceeds the costs of that standard toall stakeholders. This constraint is supposed to take precedence over other concerns, such as neutrality (freedom from bias) of account information.The major conclusion of this paper is that a conflict exists between (...) the FASB's commitment and its practice. There is no evidence that the FASB has always made a costs and benefits judgement with respect to proposed standards. In the cases when such a judgement is made, the FASB discounts social costs; therefore, it is not considering costs to all stakeholders. At the same time the FASB discounts social costs, it seems to have an undue concern for standards that do not increase the volatility of net income. The Conceptual Framework explicitly defines costs as the costs to society as a whole. (shrink)

Accountants confronted with ethical dilemmas are expected to comply with their ethical guide or seek advice from their professional body. This study of Chartered Accountants in Ireland records their views on the usefulness of a Code of Ethics, the efficacy of their professional Institute and the need for ethics courses in Continuing Professional Development. Peter Clarke is a lecturer in the Department of Accountancy, University College Dublin, Dublin 4; Nancy Hill and Kevin Stevens are members of the School of Accountancy, (...) DePaul University, Chicago. (shrink)

This study identified a range of pedagogies developed to promote global citizenship within a university Latin American dance unit. It implemented changes to teaching and learning approaches in the...

This book argues for a new approach to the intellectual history of the Hellenistic world. Despite the intense cross-cultural interactions which characterised the period after Alexander, studies of 'Hellenistic' intellectual life have tended to focus on Greek scholars and institutions. Where cross-cultural connections have been drawn, it is through borrowing: the Greek adoption of Babylonian astrology; the Egyptian scholar Manetho deploying Greek historiographical models. In this book, however, Kathryn Stevens advances a 'Hellenistic intellectual history' which is cross-cultural in scope and (...) goes beyond borrowing and influence. Drawing on a wide range of Greek and Akkadian sources, she argues that intellectual life in the Greek world and Babylonia can be linked not just through occasional contact and influence, but also by deeper parallels in intellectual culture that reflect their integration into the same overarching imperial system. Tracing such parallels yields intellectual history which is diverse, multipolar and, therefore, truly 'Hellenistic'. (shrink)

The passage of time influences the content of the law and therefore also the validity of legal arguments. This is true even for charter-arguments, despite the widely held view that constitutional law is made to last. In this paper, I investigate the reason why the sanctity-of life argument against physician assisted suicide lost its validity between the Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez v. British Columbia in 1993 and Carter v. Canada in 2015. I suggest that a rhetorical approach to argument (...) evaluation is the best basis for a satisfying explanation. (shrink)

The proposition that feedback is never necessary in speech recognition is examined for utterances consisting of sequences of words. In running speech the features near word boundaries are often modified according to language-dependent rules. Application of these rules during word recognition requires top-down processing. Because isolated words are not usually modified by rules, their recognition could be achieved by bottom-up processing only.

Despite changes in the media landscape, film remains a vital force in contemporary culture, as do our ideas of what "a movie" or "the cinematic" are. Indeed, we might say that the category of film now only exists in theory. Whereas film-theoretical discussion at the turn of the 21st century was preoccupied, understandably, by digital technology's permeation of virtually all aspects of the film object, this volume moves the conversation away from a focus on film's materiality towards timely questions concerning (...) the ethics, politics, and even aesthetics of thinking about the medium of cinema. To put it another way, this collection narrows in on the subject of film, not with a nostalgic sensibility, but with the recognition that what constitutes a film is historically contingent, in dialogue with the vicissitudes of entertainment, art, and empire. The volume is divided into six sections: Meta-Theory; Film Theory's Project of Emancipation; Apparatus and Perception; Audiovisuality; How Close is Close Reading?; and The Turn to Experience. (shrink)

At a recent rally, Donald Trump resumed a habit he had developed during his election-rallies and read out the lyrics to a song. It tells the Aesopian fable of The Farmer and the Snake: A half frozen snake is taken in by a kind-hearted person but bites them the moment it is revived. Trump tells the fable to make a point about Islamic immigrants and undocumented immigrants from Southern and Central America: He claims the immigrants will cause problems and much (...) stricter immigration-policies are needed. I assume that Trump treats the fable as an argumentative device for supporting his stance on immigration. He uses it as a source-analogue both for the conclusion that immigrants will cause problems and for changing the frame in which immigrants and those willing to let them enter are seen. This gives me opportunity to examine the effect fables have as argumentative devices. Fables are a popular and effective choice for political argumentation. They are slimmed down, semi-abstract narratives, well suited for directing the audience's attention to a few properties of an otherwise complex situation. However, this also makes it easy to use them for manipulating an audience into oversimplifying complex contexts and stereotyping human beings. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, I show that certain parts of constitutional texts can plausibly be thought of as having a meaning that changes and evolves on its own. This idea is widely rejected, especially but not only by a group of legal theorists who subscribe to a theory of constitutional interpretation called originalism. In a recent paper, the originalist Lawrence Solum has defended the so-called “fixation thesis”, according to which the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when it was first (...) enacted and does not change later on. Solum rejects the idea that the meaning of the constitutional text might evolve because he cannot identify a plausible way in which any text could have an evolving meaning. I argue that there are such texts and offer folk-fairy-tales as an example. I then go on to present reasons why constitutions can plausibly be considered to be texts that, like fairy-tales, change their meanings independently. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Embracing the Other: The Transformative Spirit of Love by Grace Ji-Sun KimKrista StevensEmbracing the Other: The Transformative Spirit of Love Grace Ji-Sun Kim GRAND RAPIDS, MI: EERDMANS, 2015. 182 PP. $25.00In Embracing the Other: The Transformative Spirit of Love, Grace Ji-Sun Kim places herself in an important line of voices using theology as a platform to speak out against racism and sexism. Kim's identity as an Asian immigrant (...) to Canada and as a theologian provides her with a unique background from which to address the particular perils that Asian immigrant women face. As such, this book makes a distinctive contribution to the fields of theological ethics and contextual theologies.At the heart of Embracing the Other lies Kim's challenge to Christians to "critically engage the problem of Euro-American racism and sexism" (4). To build her argument, Kim moves from the historical to the constructive, insightfully presenting the biblical and theological roots of racism and sexism, the experience of Asian immigrant women in North America, and the trajectories of white and Asian feminist theology before moving to her proposal of a theological reconstruction of the Spirit as an approach to combating racism and sexism.Kim offers a compelling look at the parallels between treatment of foreign women in the Hebrew Bible and treatment of Asian American immigrant women in the West. She describes much of the Hebrew Bible as a world of patriarchy and fear of the other, a reality that forced many women to live disconnected from society. Their treatment reflects what Kim describes as "the gendering of language and ultimately of God" that gives rise to patriarchy and emphasizes God's "maleness" (16). While Kim's analysis of Hebrew Scripture may not be radically new, her point is foundational for her work—gendering language of God has helped shape the way many people continue to view women, and especially foreign women. Societies that perpetuate racism and sexism often have deep roots in centuries of theological patriarchy.Kim's most interesting work comes in her concluding chapters when she presents a reconstruction of the Spirit as God, as a way to reimagine God as not the white, dominant, male so stereotypical of Western theology and colonialism but as a God who is more closely identified with those on the margins—women and people of color. What distinguishes Kim from other feminist theologians is her connection between the Asian concept of Chi and biblical calls for justice as a way to reimagine Spirit God to overcome divisions. Chi, the "life-giving power of all created things," can also be understood by Christians as "the one Spirit God" (133). [End Page 211]Although Kim does not address potential complications of enculturation (a move that might help non-Asian audiences more easily make the jump from Spirit to Chi), her argument opens the door for a more robust understanding of Spirit as vibrant and justice oriented—a "transformative spirit of love." This Spirit of Love is transformative because it allows us to unlock our erotic power, which, for Kim, goes beyond sexual desire and is more rightly understood as a "life energy that gives us spiritual strength to love God, love our neighbor, and love all of creation" (140). The erotic encompasses raw, primal, human feelings of beauty, energy, and passion. By brilliantly freeing the erotic from its usual connection to lust, Kim reveals the profound, life-giving power of the Spirit that moves us to compassion and does not allow us to ignore feelings of hate or realities of suffering. This approach provides readers with a prophetic and unique understanding of Spirit as transformer of society.Krista StevensMarquette UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)