The return of individual research results and incidental findings from biobanking research is a much debated ethical issue globally but has extensive relevance in India where the burden of out of pocket health care expenses is high for the majority. The views of 21 ethics committee (EC) members and 22 researchers from Bengaluru, India, concerning the ethics of biobanking research were sought through in‐depth interviews using an unfolding case vignette with probes. A shared view among most was that individual research (...) results which are ‘actionable’ or have ‘clinical significance’ should be returned to the sample contributors through their treating physicians. This was seen as an ethical obligation and a moral duty on the side of the researcher to “give back” to the person who contributed to the research. The challenges foreseen were that of resources, both financial and personnel, for the time and counseling needed to accompany the disclosure of results. Perceptions of ‘ownership’ appear to influence the concept of benefit sharing. While benefit sharing in financial terms was considered ethically challenging, certain researchers and ethics committee members made a case for “two way altruism” where the researcher in return for the altruistic ‘valuable contribution’, shares with the contributor/ community, benefits of the research which could include research findings, improved patient care, and more affordable access to the new diagnostic tests or products arising from the research. This defines the emerging ethic of “giving back” which goes beyond individual rights and ensures reciprocity and distributive justice. (shrink)

Recent data indicate that under a specific posthypnotic suggestion to circumvent reading, highly suggestible subjects successfully eliminated the Stroop interference effect. The present study examined whether an optical explanation could account for this finding. Using cyclopentolate hydrochloride eye drops to pharmacologically prevent visual accommodation in all subjects, behavioral Stroop data were collected from six highly hypnotizables and six less suggestibles using an optical setup that guaranteed either sharply focused or blurred vision. The highly suggestibles performed the Stroop task when naturally (...) vigilant, under posthypnotic suggestion not to read, and while visually blurred; the less suggestibles ran naturally vigilant, while looking away, and while visually blurred. Although visual accommodation was precluded for all subjects, posthypnotic suggestion effectively eliminated Stroop interference and was comparable to looking away in controls. These data strengthen the view that Stroop interference is neither robust nor inevitable and support the hypothesis that posthypnotic suggestion may exert a top-down influence on neural processing. (shrink)

This opinion revolves around the discussion of matters that are beyond the realm of space-time. For instance, it discusses parallel universes, wormholes, and extrasensory perception or psi. Rationality is operationally defined. The opinion throws light on the manner in which the lines of rationality become unclear when it takes into consideration extrasensory phenomena. In addition, it contends that psychiatric disorders such as Schizophrenia are the result of contact from different parallel universes. Hence, Schizophrenia according to this paper is not a (...) disorder by itself but rather just a communication of messages from an alternate reality. Also, another psychological disorder called Dissociative Identity Disorder is also the result of different souls in one person or communication from different souls from parallel universes. Whether atoms are conscious or not is debatable but can be a possibility due to their eerie and unpredictable nature. The concept of parallel universes introduces a paradoxical manner of thinking, which is dealt with in the paper. The paper concerns itself with issues in quantum physics, clubbed with extrasensory perception in parapsychology. It subtly emphasizes rational thinking in the debate about space-time and beyond. Rationality as a concept is dealt with from different angles. Finally, quantum cognition is used to explain an all too familiar, pervasive yet inexplicable domain of knowledge, which is human behaviour. (shrink)

Back in Ancient India, Shankaracharya postulated a philosophy which is now known as Advaita. According to Advaita philosophy, the ‘jivãtma’ (individual soul) and ‘Brahmãtma’ (universal soul) are one and the same and these are the only ‘real’ things that exist. Everything else is an illusion. To challenge this almost unshakeable viewpoint, I bring to the fore a book authored by a Nobel Laureate. In 1935, Alexis Carrel’s revolutionary book entitled “Man the Unknown” was published. Though controversial in terms of its (...) content, it delineates the unexplored aspects of the human being – the understanding of mental processes and consciousness, which he claims humans have not mastered. Throughout the book, Carrel suggests that there is something that is unknown in the homo sapiens and hence he titles his work “Man the Unknown.” Based on this, I argue that both the esoteric East and the pragmatic West have not uncovered something “hidden” –the unknown factor/element. Substantial evidence exists for this contention in the scientific community. For example, questions such as among identical twins diagnosed with depression, why does one medication cure depression for one twin and have no effect on the other twin? Ceteris paribus, why does therapy work for one client but not for another client with the same disorder? These questions do not have clear, crystallized answers. Perhaps, if such a thing like an unknown element exists, it would pave the way for the postulation of the Grand Theory of the behavioural sciences. (shrink)

In the summer of 1997 one could scarcely enter a bookstore in Beijing without encountering Wang Xiaobo's pensive and defiant look on the cover of dozens of books displayed at the entrance. Wang had suddenly died in the spring of that year at the age of forty-five. Born in Beijing in 1952 to a family of intellectuals, he remained attached to China's capital despite periods of separation, such as during the Cultural Revolution, when he was sent to Yunnan to "learn (...) from the peasants" and taught in a "people-run-school" in Shandong, and also during the 1980s, when he studied in the United States . Wang always returned to Beijing, in the late 1970s to study economy and business at the People's University and in the late 1980s to teach there. After retiring in 1993, he devoted his time to writing: poetry, novels, essays, non-fiction, and a movie script. (shrink)

A volume in the International Library of the Philosophy of Education under the general editorship of R. S. Peters, which will both interest and repay close study by epistemologists and philosophers of language, as well as philosophers of education. The book concerns concept formation and the growth of knowledge, i.e., as the general editor of the series writes, "the genesis of knowledge and not just the logical properties of its outcome." The book is divided into two parts: in the first, (...) Hamlyn, employing a Piagetian framework and terminology, examines first the classical empiricist account of the genesis of knowledge, which, after Piaget, he strictures as "genesis without structure." This account fails to explain the existence of intersubjective agreement. Then Hamlyn goes on to examine the rival rationalist account, which he strictures as "structure without genesis." Here, the failure is that there is no good account of how knowledge even gets started. Finally, Hamlyn examines an account of the growth of knowledge to which he is more sympathetic; that of the French psychologist, Piaget: "structure with genesis." Hamlyn finds striking similarities between the Piagetian theory and that of Kant, but, in the end, this account has a fatal flaw as well. Indeed, according to Hamlyn, all three accounts really fail for the same basic cause, viz., their account of knowledge is too egocentric, and "they all start from the same starting point, the individual set against his environment." In the second part of the book, Hamlyn sets out his own view, the object of which is to correct the egocentric view of knowledge which undermines the traditional theories and even their more modern versions, in Chomsky as the representative of Rationalism, and Piaget, as the Kantian representative. Here Hamlyn argues that knowledge would be impossible without what Wittgenstein called "agreement in judgments" and then argues that this implies common reactions, attitudes, wants, and interests, in relation to the world. Finally, Hamlyn proceeds to apply this "social view" of knowledge and understanding to the acquisition of both in the case of the child. In the course of doing so, he relates the acquisition of knowledge and understanding in the child to the child’s acquisition of language. In the course of his discussion, Hamlyn has interesting things to say about a wide variety of topics such as "non-epistemic seeing" and the relations between knowledge and understanding. In addition he provides illuminatingly critical discussions of the main ideas of Piaget and Chomsky; and although most philosophers are persuaded that they should become familiar with the ideas of the latter, Hamlyn makes out a good case that philosophers ought to start to think about the work of the former as well. All of this is done in a pleasingly straightforward way, devoid of any tiresome literary conceits. (shrink)