The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Suzanne Langer's earlier works on the philosophy of art, particularly her Feeling and Form, are the points of departure for this general study of the phenomena of life and mind which she clearly intends to be her magnum opus. This is the first of two volumes, the second volume as yet unpublished. Her main thesis is that the "departure [of man] from the normal pattern of animal mentality is a vast and special evolution of feeling in the hominoid stock". She (...) opposes all attempts to bifurcate nature into matter and mind, and in this regard aligns herself with the main currents of contemporary thought. But the centrality she gives to the notion of feeling is uniquely her own, separating her views from those of most other contemporary thinkers and providing the most controversial part of her book. In different places throughout the work, the term "feeling" includes within its scope "sensation," "inward tension," "pain," "emotion," "intent," and a number of other phenomena. Critics of the work will no doubt argue that the theory cannot overcome the vagueness engendered by giving this central concept such a wide scope. But before making a final judgment on this point they will have to pay special attention to the second and third parts of this book where her concept of feeling slowly takes shape through reflection on the arts and on the nature of living things. In a second volume she promises to move beyond living things in general to the distinctive features of human consciousness. A second respect in which this work differs from much other writing in the philosophy of mind is the wealth of references and examples from the biological and psychological sciences which display the encyclopedic interests and openness which have always characterized Suzanne Langer's writings.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Reichenbach wrote this book just after taking the first course Einstein ever taught on the theory of relativity. His important and influential work The Philosophy of Space and Time was written several years later and relied in part on the axiomatization of the special and general theories of relativity already worked out in this book. For special relativity Reichenbach divides his axioms into two sets, the light axioms which relate light signals to the topology and metric of time and space, (...) and the matter axioms which do the same for rigid rods and clocks. Thus the axioms focus on the conventions uniting theory and observation and give more insight into the physical foundations of the theory than do most axiomatizations. Reichenbach's approach has been criticized by Weyl and others, but at least some of the criticism seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what Reichenbach was attempting to do. Now that this early work has been translated into English, there is hope that it will be more widely read. There is no doubt that students of the theory or of recent philosophical discussion of space and time will profit from a careful reading of this book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author urges that psychology take a more liberal approach "without sacrificing its gains." Psychology, in trying to be too "scientific," has imposed upon itself artificial limits, which have become barriers to an adequate study of individual personality, especially in its moral and religious aspects. Given originally as the Yale University Terry Lectures for 1954.--R. H.

Presents, with interpretative comments, the concurring and dissenting opinions in 71 recent crucial court decisions. All but seven are supreme court cases, relating to constitutional provisions for civil and political liberties.--R. H.

The much neglected "fifth sense" provides the subject matter for this analytical study. The author distinguishes two kinds of perception associated with this sense, perception by touch and perception of bodily state, and gives an account of the nature of the sensations proper to each. The latter are divided into intransitive bodily sensations and transitive bodily sensations. The greater part of the book is devoted to developing the thesis that bodily sensations can be interpreted as sense impressions of occurrences in (...) our own body.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Arguments from conflicting appearances are almost as ancient as philosophy itself, and in a sense the whole thrust of Burnyeat's essay is to emphasize the curious fact of the continual appearance of such arguments throughout the history of philosophy. The premise of conflicting appearances has led on the one hand to relativistic views of knowledge and sometimes beyond these to skepticism. On the other hand, however, the same premise drove Plato to the conclusion that knowledge could never be perceptual, and (...) Bradley to the affirmation of a necessary Absolute. (shrink)

One of the aims of this book is to bring contemporary research in the neurological and physiological sciences into relationship with discussions in the philosophy of mind. The author does not deny the significance of ordinary talk about the mind, including talk about actions, intentions, beliefs and the like, but he wants to see how this language is compatible with evolutionary and neurophysiological accounts of man. He frequently refers to and accepts Charles Taylor's arguments that "peripheralist" or S-R behavioral theories (...) fail to account for the intentionality of mental states and the teleology of behavior. In fact, one way of reading this book is to see it as an attempt to answer a question raised by Taylor's book: If "peripheralist" theories of behavior cannot account for intentionality and teleology, can a "centralist" or neurophysiological theory of man account for these characteristics? The key chapters of the book attempt to answer this question in the affirmative. The author thinks of the intentionalist characterization of the physical structures of behavior as a "heuristic overlay" on the extensional account of functioning. But the two descriptions, intentional and extensional, are linked together by a series of hypotheses describing the evolutionary source of the functioning. The important problem is to explain how conceptual content or information gets into the neurophysiological picture. The author attempts to deal with this as well as with other problems about the nature of mind including introspection, consciousness, imagery, reasoning, intention, action and language. His discussion of the neurophysiological background for his speculations is purposely general in order to free his conclusions from specific empirical hypotheses about the nervous system which may turn out to be false. This purposeful limitation makes his argument less convincing in some places than it might have been. But he is asking important questions and offering answers to them which deserve careful consideration.--R. H. K. (shrink)

An analysis of two-person communication, in terms of symbolic logic. The author presents methods for evaluating message-sequences in terms of their informativeness with respect to questions representing the interests of the receiver. Philosophers will find in this book theoretical counterparts to a number of familiar notions: e.g., meaning, controversy, and dialectic. This study is an important first step in the logical explication of a large class of difficult problems.--R. H. T.

The author offers some interesting suggestions for the rewriting of the history of logic which modern developments in symbolic logic demand. He divides the history into two parts, the first dealing with what is called the Aristotelian core of logic and the improvements made on that core within a basically classical tradition, and the second, with the tradition of improvements inspired by Leibniz' idea of mathematical logic. The book is brief and much less of a comprehensive history than a prolegomena.--R. (...) H. K. (shrink)

The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first of a number of volumes designed to review the philosophical work which has been done in various areas of philosophy between the years 1956 and 1966. It succeeds an earlier three volume publication entitled Philosophy in the Mid-Century which covered the period from 1949 to 1955. This first volume in the series covers the fields of logic, philosophical logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. For anyone interested in these fields, the book is an indispensable guide. The (...) procedure is that an expert in a given area writes a summary of the work done in the area in the last ten years and adds a bibliography covering the same period. In all there are thirty-two such essays, most written in English, but a few in French and German. Some representative essays and their authors are the following: On the logical side, Modal Logic, Many Valued Logics, Logic of Practical Discourse, Semantics, Model Theory, Pragmatics, Chronological or Tense Logic, The Logic of Questions, Combinatory Logic and others. There are two general essays on recent developments in philosophical logic and a number of essays on the development of logic in various Eastern and Western European countries and Japan. On the mathematical side are three essays on foundations of set theory and mathematics, essays on Intuitionism in mathematics, and general essays by A. Church, H. Freudenthal and others. The essays are generally of high caliber and the bibliographies in most cases very comprehensive. Occasionally the essays contain not only summary of work done but original suggestions and development of ideas. It would be hard to find a more useful guide for the philosopher overwhelmed by the many developments in these fields in recent years.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Perhaps the greatest difficulty confronting any interpreter of Peirce is the seeming chaos of doctrines, investigations, points of view, and original ideas found in Peirce's writings. There are in general two possible treatments of Peirce's philosophical work: the eclectic, in which Peirce is presented as a "fox," or a brilliant dabbler; the thematic, in which Peirce is seen as a "hedgehog," or a resolute, synoptic thinker whom circumstances prevented from achieving a final unification. Apel's Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to (...) Pragmaticism takes the latter tack, seeing Peirce as engaged in a life-long investigation into the foundations and consequences of pragmatism and semiotics. All other inquiries are made ancillary to these, including Peirce's logical work. For Apel, the unifying thread is Peirce's encounter and dialogue with Kant's transcendental philosophy. Consequently, Peirce is seen as the founder of what Apel calls "transcendental semiotic or transcendental pragmatics". This view of Peirce has the interesting effect of making it seem that Peirce's work has perhaps more in common with Ernst Cassirer's, than it does with William James's. (shrink)

The expressed aim of Alf Ross' study is to lay the philosophical foundations for deontic logic by explicating the concepts of directive and norm. But there is a wider significance to his task, for he makes clear throughout that the concepts of directive and norm are central to a wide variety of disciplines, including moral, legal, and social philosophy, linguistics and the other social sciences. Moreover, the test of adequacy of his explications include an appeal to the usefulness the concepts (...) have, not only to the logician, but for the moral and legal philosopher and especially in the case of his account of norms, for the social scientist. He begins with a discussion of speech acts, developing a distinction between indicative and directive speech. A "directive" is defined in terms of directive speech as an action-idea conceived as a pattern of behavior in directive speech and a variety of different sorts of directives are distinguished. A "norm" is then defined as a directive which stands in a certain kind of relation to social facts and the elements of norms are discussed. Finally, Ross offers an interpretation of deontic logic as a set of postulates defining directive speech. He discusses some of the problems of interpretation although he does not make contact with some of the more recent discussion of deontic paradoxes, e.g., the paradoxes engendered by contrary-to-duty imperatives. This is an informative and thought provoking study. The writing is very clear and the reader is guided throughout by a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In an introductory sketch of history of scholastic interest in aesthetics, the author notes the reawakening of Thomistic interest in this subject since the last century. He adds, with evidence drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century works, that this interest has been accompanied by methodological confusions and a misunderstanding of the theory of beauty of St. Thomas himself. He seeks to remedy this situation with a scholarly treatment of Aquinas' theory of beauty, divided into two parts; the first a genetic (...) investigation of the development of Thomas's ideas on beauty, the second a systematic account of the mature theory. A notable attempt to develop Aquinas' ideas on this subject from the entire corpus of his writings and not merely from the Summas and one or two other major works.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This publication of the proceedings of the first of a new series of colloquia to be held at the University of Western Ontario contains an opening address on existence and quantification by W. V. Quine and three symposia. The paper discussed in the first of these symposia, "Descartes' Ontological Argument" by Anthony Kenny, follows closely one chapter of Kenny's recent book on Descartes. Kenny's paper contains both an interesting account of Descartes' views and some challenging remarks about ontological arguments in (...) general. His paper is discussed in separate commentaries by Norman Malcolm and Terence Penelhum. An interesting feature of this volume is that some comments from the floor are recorded and included along with the regular commentaries. Ernest Sosa and Bernard Williams comment on Kenny's paper along with Malcolm and Penelhum. Kenny responds to all four commentators. The other two symposia follow a similar format. The second, "On Events and Event-descriptions," features a paper by R. M. Martin which focuses on the logic of event descriptions and their role in scientific explanation. Events for Martin are extensional entities, unlike facts, but like facts they are "fictitious in the sense of being handled on virtually." His views are discussed by Donald Davidson, R. J. Butler and Wesley Salmon. In the third symposium on "Existence Assumptions in Practical Thinking," Stephan Körner elaborates on his view of effective choice, relating his account to those of Hume, Kant, and Peirce on the specific topic of the relationship of choice and natural necessity. The commentaries of J. J. Thomson and Bernard Williams are helpful here in getting Körner to clarify his interesting views. In sum, this first colloquium at the University of Western Ontario features genuine philosophical communication on some important issues.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to certain problems in the philosophy of science through the study of four case histories in the history of science. It is designed for undergraduate science majors whom, the author feels, often have difficulties connecting the usual discussions in the philosophy of science with the science they have studied and are studying. Each case history is followed by a commentary which considers its philosophical implications. The first case, Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, (...) is treated briefly and from it some implications are drawn about the relation of simple theories and the facts supporting them. The next three cases are considerably more complicated and receive more extended treatment. The first of these concerns scientific work on the motions and spacing of the planets from early Babylonian and Greek observations and theories to Kepler and Newton. The second concerns the development of the periodic table of the elements from Dalton to Mendeleev and the third discusses gene theories of inheritance from Mendel onward. In connection with these studies the author considers questions about the nature of theories and theoretical entities, methods of testing theories, the dependence of observation on theory and the issues of reduction among other topics. Although he limits his discussion to a few selected topics in the philosophy of science he has written an informative and interesting study which should fulfill its stated aims.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Foundations research in physics, according to Bunge, has lagged behind its sister discipline, the foundations of mathematics. His book is an attempt to partially remedy this situation by analyzing the form and content of some basic ideas in physics and presenting some of the fundamental theories of physics in an axiomatic fashion. The heart of the book consists of axiomatizations of Classical Mechanics, Classical Field Theories, and Quantum Mechanics. Bunge does not claim to be working without predecessors. While the idea (...) of a separate discipline in the foundations of physics is rather new, the existence of material that clearly belongs to foundations research is not. This is attested to by the substantial bibliography at the end of the book. But he is ideally suited to the task of bringing this difficult material together and welding it in his own fashion into a coherent whole. His grasp of physical theory is wide-ranging and he writes with clarity and wit. In the first chapter he states his views on a number of issues in the philosophy of science: explanation, prediction, operationalism, laws, and other topics. The arguments are usually summarized very briefly, or reference is made to other books. Thus those who disagree with his philosophical presuppositions will not be convinced; but friends or foes will miss a great deal of informative material if they do not push on to the axiomatizations which follow and which are the main concern of the book. This book will undoubtedly be a source-book for future foundations research in the physical sciences.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Peter Geach brings the same careful attention to logical detail to these studies in the philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind as he has brought to other philosophical works. Some of the topics discussed here, however, will surprise some readers of Geach's earlier works, e.g., reincarnation, immortality, creation, praying for things to happen, and worshipping the right God. There are separate chapters on these topics as well as chapters on thought, form and existence, and the moral law. It should (...) be noted for readers who may not share Geach's interest in some of these topics that each of the chapters makes important points about issues which go beyond the topics of immediate interest. For example, Geach's two chapters on reincarnation and immortality are very interesting commentaries on the problem of personal identity, and the chapter on praying for things to happen is an interesting essay on time. The chapters on existence and thought pick up themes from Geach's earlier writing on Aquinas and Frege and mental acts. The Aristotelian roots of Geach's thought are clear in these essays from his account of existence and thought to his denial of clear sense to the idea of an immortality of a separate soul or its reincarnation. There is a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself is (...) sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a translation of Jacob Klein's study "Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra" which appeared in 1934-1936. His principal thesis is that the Renaissance mathematicians of the sixteenth century did not simply continue the work of the Greek and Arab mathematicians but in the process of developing ancient mathematics introduced a radically new conception of number which has since guided modern mathematical thought. The central figure in this revolution is Vieta. Klein traces the influence of Vieta's ideas (...) upon Stevin, Descartes, Wallis, and other figures of the scientific revolution, after discussing the conception of number and arithmetic in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek sources. Persons reading this book with a primary interest in the philosophical ideas involved will be frustrated by the mass of historical detail which often obscures rather than illuminates the philosophical issues. But the book deserves its reputation as an important historical study.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first of these two volumes is a second edition of the first part of Jonas' comprehensive scholarly study of Gnosticism, first published in 1934. Except for minor corrections the first edition has been left unrevised. The second volume carries the study up to the third century A.D. A final volume completing the second part is promised for the near future.--R. H.

Traces the development of Croce as an historian, from his early essays on Neopolitan art history up to his last writings on postwar Italy and Europe. It is maintained that Croce's historical works can only be understood in the light of a philosophic conception of man and human existence, and that this conception is itself a human creation in time. The author is not primarily interested in criticism, although he does occasionally take exception to Croce's ideas, notably in regard to (...) his view of the counter-reformation as a spiritually "negative" event.--R. H. (shrink)

This volume claims to offer first a correct interpretation of Hume's theory of causation, and second, a philosophical defense of it against many recent criticisms. The first two chapters try to reconcile Hume's two definitions of "cause," and to prove that Hume was not a skeptic about induction. The authors contend that Hume's views on causation can be rationally reconstructed as a unified theory that is, they believe, faithful to his intentions, namely that causation involves regularities or constant conjunctions, and (...) some kind of necessity. (shrink)

Anyone interested in the highly active field of human communication will find this collection of essays by authors in different disciplines a very useful compendium of present results and problems. Communication theory is related in different essays to current work in Anthropology, Neurophysiology, Organization Theory, Philosophy of Language, Psychiatry, Psycholinguistics, Psychology, Sociology, and several other areas. The editor concludes with an essay "Toward a Theory of Human Communication." Each essay contains a very helpful bibliography of work in the appropriate area (...) and in addition the book contains a general bibliography prepared by Hugh Duncan which includes comments about the contents and nature of each book listed. The excellent essays of Searle and Fodor, Jenkins, and Saporta make the most direct connection with philosophical issues being widely discussed today, but most of the essays provide material which should be of interest to philosophers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers subjectivist, (...) empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this work R. M. Martin carries his semiotical studies into the fields of intensional semantics and pragmatics, dealing with such philosophically important concepts as meaning, preference, reasonableness and indifference. The crucial notion is that of the meaning or intension of an expression. Two major categories are distinguished, objective intensions and subjective intensions. To deal with objective intensions an intensional semantics is developed as an extension of denotational semantics in the tradition of Tarski, Carnap and Martin's earlier Truth and Denotation. (...) In the treatment of subjective intensions Martin makes an advance over his earlier study of pragmatics by utilizing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.—R. H. K. (shrink)