The Machiavellian Moment is a classic study of the consequences for modern historical and social consciousness of the ideal of the classical republic revived by Machiavelli and other thinkers of Renaissance Italy. J.G.A. Pocock suggests that Machiavelli's prime emphasis was on the moment in which the republic confronts the problem of its own instability in time, and which he calls the "Machiavellian moment." After examining this problem in the thought of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Giannotti, Pocock turns to the (...) revival of republican thought in Puritan England and in Revolutionary and Federalist America. He argues that the American Revolution can be considered the last great act of civic humanism of the Renaissance. He relates the origins of modern historicism to the clash between civic, Christian, and commercial values in the thought of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Pocock, J. G. A. The myth of John Locke and the obsession with liberalism.--Ashcraft, R. The two treatises and the exclusion crisis: the problem of Lockean political theory as bourgeois ideology.

Pocock, J. G. A. (John Greville Agard) 1924- "Quentin Skinner: The History of Politics and the Politics of History" Common Knowledge - Volume 10, Issue 3, Fall 2004, pp. 532-550.

Barbarism and Religion - Edward Gibbon's own phrase - is the title of an acclaimed sequence of works by John Pocock designed to situate Gibbon, and his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, in a series of contexts in the history of eighteenth-century Europe. This is a major intervention from one of the world's leading historians of ideas, challenging the idea of 'The Enlightenment' and positing instead a plurality of enlightenments, of which the English was one. Professor (...) Pocock argues that the English Enlightenment of which Gibbon was part was an ecclesiastical as well as a secular phenomenon, one of several Protestant Enlightenments distinct from that of the Parisian philosophes, and part of the reconstitution of Europe after the wars against Louis XIV. The whole sequence is concerned less with the specific historiography of the Roman Empire than with the cultural history of Europe in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

John Pocock's edition of Burke's _Reflections_ is two classics in one: Burke's Reflections and Pocock's reflections on Burke and the eighteenth century.

SUMMARYIn this essay, inspired by J.G.A. Pocock's appropriation of Machiavelli's theory of political contingency, and building upon my previous engagements with Pocock's ‘republican existentialism’, I focus on the role played by ‘accidents’ in Machiavelli's analysis of war and foreign affairs within The Prince and the Discourses. In so doing, I consider the following issues: the ways through which a potential imperial hegemon might consolidate control over nearby lesser powers—and, conversely, how such less powerful polities might resist imperial encroachments (...) on their autonomy; the contrasting military modes and orders characteristic of ancient and modern republics; and the extent to which Machiavelli actually thought that accidents in foreign affairs were ever truly ‘accidental’ in light of his determinations concerning well- versus badly ordered domestic institutions. (shrink)

Scholars loosely affiliated with the "Cambridge School" (e.g., Pocock, Skinner, Viroli, and Pettit) accentuate rule of law, common good, class equilibrium, and non-domination in Machiavelli's political thought and republicanism generally but underestimate the Florentine's preference for class conflict and ignore his insistence on elite accountability. The author argues that they obscure the extent to which Machiavelli is an anti-elitist critic of the republican tradition, which they fail to disclose was predominantly oligarchic. The prescriptive lessons these scholars draw from republicanism (...) for contemporary politics reinforce rather than reform the "senatorial," electorally based, and socioeconomically agnostic republican model (devised by Machiavelli's aristocratic interlocutor, Guicciardini, and refined by Montesquieu and Madison) that permits common citizens to acclaim but not determine government policies. Cambridge School textual interpretations and practical proposals have little connection with Machiavelli's "tribunate," class-specific model of popular government elaborated in The Discourses, one that relies on extra-electoral accountability techniques and embraces deliberative popular assemblies. (shrink)

The last thirty years has witnessed an explosion of scholarly books and articles on Locke which, claims Harpham, has "recast our most basic understanding of Locke as a historical actor and political theorist, the Two Treatises as a document, and liberalism as a coherent tradition of political discourse". The seven articles in this volume attempt to assess this "new scholarship," which is described as revisionist and historicist. This volume is now probably the best introduction to the "new scholarship." The introduction (...) by Edward Harpham, "Locke's Two Treatises in Perspective," and the bibliography provide a nice summary of key ideas, books, and articles. The essence of the new perspective is best stated by Richard Ascraft [[sic]] in "The Politics of Locke's Two Treatises of Government": "Locke's thought is thus both philosophically more conservative and politically more radical than we have hitherto supposed. In short, Locke is at once closer to Aristotle and Hooker and to the levelers and Sidney than the prevailing interpretations of his political thought maintain". Ashcraft attempts to separate Locke from the philosophy of Hobbes on such issues as resistance, toleration, justice and natural law, obligation; he directs his argument against Macpherson and Strauss, whose presences haunt the borders of the new scholarship. Eldon Eisenach, in his "Religion and Locke's Two Treatises of Government," interprets Locke's philosophy as marked by a deep skepticism regarding the reach of natural reason and informed by a "deep faith in the efficacy of biblical revelation" as the source of our moral and political duties. Eisenach comes close to dissenting from the new scholarship by wondering whether "Dunn and Ashcraft" are whistling in the dark concerning the coherence of Locke's "worldview"; but he closes ranks with the assertion that the Essay lays out a path to salvation. Eisenach concludes that Locke is not antireligious and secular, but a defender of biblical Christianity. The new scholarship must emphasize all the more a "spiritualist and assertively evangelical Locke". David Resnick, in "Rationality and the Two Treatises," attempts to recover the portrait of Locke as an antitraditionalist, committed to a critical rationalism. Resnick uses Weber's theory of rationality to render a consistent account of Locke's social analysis. Yet Resnick also insists that Locke's political philosophy is not self-interested and atomistic but is rooted in a fully Christian worldview: "Locke's deeply held theological convictions about the existence, benevolence and rationality of God ground his reasoning in a metaphysically stable framework". This religious assumption provides a basis for Locke's "rationality." But a new inconsistency is opened up by this resolution--a rationalism rooted in religious faith, by a philosopher who continually urged their distinction. Karen Iversen Vaughn, in "The Economic Background to Locke's Two Treatises of Government," attempts to correct the new scholarship's neglect of the economic premises of Locke's political philosophy; this neglect is part of an overreaction to Macpherson, but Vaughn offers a moderate economic interpretation of Locke. Vaughn shows the importance of rational self-interest in economic behavior, the necessity of political society to set conditions for economic pursuit: limit on sovereign power is an example of self-interest and evidence that "economic aspects of man's behavior permeated all aspects of life". Further, "civil society requires enforceable rules to contain the self-seeking actions of all men, so that life, liberty and property can be protected". Vaughn's essay opens the back door to the "self-interested" Locke of the "old scholarship." Ronald Hamowy, in "Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm," also seeks to redress the imbalance of the new scholarship, arguing that Locke's philosophy was not displaced by the civic humanist tradition and republican virtue. He offers a detailed analysis of Cato's Letters by John Tenchard and Thomas Gordon. Like Locke, "Cato" defines political authority in terms of inalienable rights. His analysis of liberty is strikingly Lockean, and not republican. Pocock's assessment of Locke's irrelevance to Whiggism and the American founding must be rejected. In the final essay, "Locke's Two Treatises and Contemporary Thought: Freedom, Community and the Liberal Tradition," Stephen L. Newman compares contemporary American libertarian and communitarian alternatives to the liberal welfare state. Newman offers a very trenchant criticism of libertarianism as decidedly non-Lockean by dint of its utter depoliticization of all behavior and its tendency to restore the execution of natural law to the private citizen and private groups. On the other hand, communitarianism fails to provide a sufficiently specific and robust notion of the common good, and more consistent writers like Walzer and Barber fall back not upon a teleological community, but autonomy mixed with participation. Locke's distinction of politics from economics, family, and social groups still provides the most workable and realistic account of politics available in the modern world; hence Newman concludes that libertarianism and communitarianism offer "impoverished" political theories. (shrink)

The classics appear conspicuously in the pamphlet wars of the American Revolution, though in the opinion of Bernard Bailyn , their presence is “window-dressing” and their influence “superficial.” They are “ everywhere illustrative, not determinative, of thought” . Up the scale in influence comes Enlightenment rationalism, also “superficial” but only “at times”—that removes the foreigners, ancient and modern. Then, further up the scale are English common-law writers, “powerfully influential” though still insufficiently “determinative”; above them, a “major source,” New England Puritan (...) thought and culture; and finally, at the top, seventeenth-century British “heroes of liberty” and the “early eighteenth-century transmitters of this tradition,” e.g. Commonwealth men, Bishop Hoadly. Who would have thought that the bishop of Winchester weighed in the balance more heavily than Plato and Aristotle? Only once in passing does Bailyn even mention Machiavelli, to whom J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and Harvey C. Mansfield would grant large prominence in the development of Revolutionary thought. (shrink)

The influence of historiography on aspects of political thought in France, Italy and Germany. In recent years the overlap between political thought and historiography has changed the boundaries of intellectual history. Donald Kelley, the longtime editor of The Journal of the History of Ideas has played a leading part in this process. These essays by his friends and former students follow in his footsteps. The collection is divided into three parts: France, England [six essays], and Italy and Germany [four essays]. (...) Anthony Grafton and John Salmon provide an introduction, and the volume concludes with a bibliography of Donald Kelley's many works. Historians and Ideologues is designed for those with an interest in the contribution of historiography to political thought, and will be a timely addition to the growing reaction against the postmodern scepticism in historiographical research in this field. Contributors include Ann Blair, Julian Franklin, Kathleen Parrow, David Harris Sacks, Sarah Hanley, Daniel Woolf, Gordon Schochet, Joseph Levine, John Pocock, Perez Zagorin, William Connell, Donald Phillip Verene, and Michael Carhart. Anthony Grafton is a Professor in the Department of History at Princeton University. John Salmon is the Marjorie Walter Goodheart Emeritus Professor of History at Bryn Mawr College. (shrink)

A proposta, neste artigo, é de investigar a leitura que John Pocock faz do republicanismo de Nicolau Maquiavel. Neste sentido, dois são os argumentos principais deste trabalho. Em primeiro lugar, trata-se de evidenciar que se, de um lado, Maquiavel recupera o ideal aristotélico do humano como animal político, de outro lado, tal se passaria de modo a transformá-lo numa versão enfraquecida, à medida em que radicalmente impactada pela natureza contingente das coisas humanas. É o que, em segundo lugar, (...) abriria caminho não apenas a uma ética fundada na política (antes do que na filosofia contemplativa, conforme pretendia Aristóteles), senão também a um republicanismo de acento plebeísta. (shrink)

Ao longo da história da filosofia, John Locke tem sido frequentemente associado à tradição do liberalismo político, o que decorre, invariavelmente, de um modo peculiar de interpretação da noção de liberdade para o filósofo, que estaria estruturada em torno da ideia de não-interferência. Derivada frequentemente de propostas analíticas realizadas em um “vácuo histórico”, em que as ideias de Locke são tomadas como uma estática coleção, tal conclusão expressa uma perspectiva que não considera o caráter essencialmente discursivo da filosofia política (...) e o “campo problemático” em que os conceitos foram pensados pelo filósofo. Diante dessa perspectiva, o propósito deste artigo é o de realçar, na linguagem política utilizada pelo filósofo, os elementos contextuais que permitem a compreensão dos argumentos desenvolvidos pelo autor como parte de uma _performance_ – na acepção proposta por John Pocock –, a fim de destacar os aspectos que indicam a possibilidade de aproximação do conceito de liberdade de Locke da ideia de liberdade republicana, descrita por Philip Pettit a partir da ideia de não-dominação, sem descuidar da análise das evidências textuais que indicam a presença de argumentos na obra do autor que compõem o cerne da concepção republicana de liberdade. (shrink)

The study of historiography is undergoing a revolution akin to that which took place in the history of political thought in the 1960s, and the work of J.G.A. Pocock is central to both. Pocock's continuing exploration, in Barbarism and Religion (1999-), of the intellectual contexts of Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, is central to this enterprise, and this essay situates the origins of his own work within a pre-‘Cambridge School’ Cambridge and its (...) experience of what might be called the Butterfieldian moment. That was marked by a desire to treat religion seriously as a driving force in history; and the same concern is applied here to further understanding an eighteenth-century controversy in which history and religion were dramatically involved, and which profoundly affected Gibbon's own historical and religious views. The work of Conyers Middleton and John Jortin is critically examined from this perspective. These preludes to Gibbon lead to a series of postludes examining the particular contexts in which Victorian and twentieth-century historians and writers, from Henry Hart Milman to Evelyn Waugh, variously appreciated and interpreted Gibbon. The whole is to be seen as a reflexive engagement with Pocock's vitally illuminating studies in eighteenth-century historiography. ☆ A slightly revised version of a lecture given at the University of Sussex on 22nd May 2008, on the occasion of a colloquium devoted to J.G.A. Pocock's Barbarism and Religion. It had originally acted as a prelude to a lecture by Pocock on the same occasion, subsequently published as ‘Gibbon and the invention of Gibbon: chapters 15 and 16 reconsidered’, History of European Ideas 35 (2009), 209–16. In this sense, therefore, the present essay has become a postlude. I am deeply grateful to Noël Sugimura for generously reading and commenting on the rescoring of a lecture into an essay. (shrink)

John Pocock's The First Decline and Fall (2003) presents a novel argument for drawing a clear distinction between medieval and early modern varieties of political thinking and writing that implicitly challenges the current historiographical trend that "softens" the dividing line between the two. The present paper critically examines Pocock's claim, which is based on the appearance of the theme of the historicity of the Roman Empire (imperial decline and fall) in early modern (and especially Florentine) political theory. (...) In particular, the works of Marsiglio of Padua and Nicholas of Cusa are surveyed to demonstrate that Pocock's thesis, while useful, fails to capture fully the historical complexity of the medieval / modern divide in European thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 141-160 [Access article in PDF] The Politics of Character in John Milton's Divorce Tracts David Hawkes nunquam privatum esse sapientum --Cicero I. There has recently been a great deal of debate over the relative influence on Milton's politics of two discordant revolutionary ideologies: classical republicanism and radical Protestant theology. 1 In the mid-seventeenth century the search for intellectual precedents and (...) rationalizations of the English revolution brought these two traditions into an uneasy alliance, and Milton, like many other revolutionary apologists, drew on both of them. Of course the two schools of thought are not necessarily incompatible. J. G. A. Pocock notes one point of connection between them: The context in which men attain their final end--or recover their prima forma, though this concept might not have been antinomian enough for the radical saints of the New Model--is that of apocalypse; the "end" of Aristotelian teleology is still united with the eschatological "end" of prophetic time. 2The Aristotelian "end" of man is the good, defined as "an activity of soul in accordance with virtue," and the belief that one can or has fulfilled that end is [End Page 141] certainly amenable to Protestant antinomianism. 3 Furthermore, as Sharon Achinstein points out, Milton's "conception of virtue... melds the religious notion of conscience with a classical sense of civic duty." 4 On the other hand there are significant differences between the classical and the Christian notions of "virtue" and the "good," which dictate that, as Nigel Smith puts it, "[c]lassical republicanism, properly conceived, would in many ways be in conflict with the millenarian, chiliastic and perfectionist Protestantism of the sects." 5 The problem faced by Milton as a Protestant Republican is that the definition of the "good" offered by millennial sanctification and that attainable through Aristotelian virtue are in many ways mutually exclusive and contradictory. They have been characterized as such ever since Augustine's City of God asserted that pagan ethics are incompatible with true, Christian virtue. 6 Millennialism relies on faith; civic humanist virtue relies on works. Antinomianism abolishes the law; republicanism institutes the rule of law. The saints are sanctified by grace; the virtuous are distinguished by their own strength of character. Radical Protestant freedom is negative and private--it is the ability to speak and worship according to the dictates of conscience; civic humanist liberty is positive and public, the ability to participate fully in the government of the res publica. While daunting, however, these contradictions are not quite insuperable. I believe that Milton finds a common denominator in the accounts given by these two traditions of psychological objectification and that the agreement of Roman and Christian morality on this point leads him to make the tendency to objectification (or rather the ability to resist that tendency) the central issue of his mature political theory.The political ideas of the classical republicans and their descendants, the Renaissance civic humanists, were based upon Aristotle's Politics and Nico-machean Ethics, while the intellectual sources of radical Protestantism can be traced to Luther's commentaries on Paul's epistles. During the English revolution the Pauline exegesis of the relationship between the old and the new covenants provided intellectual ammunition against custom and tradition, as well as inspiring the antinomianism of the radical fringe to which Milton was falsely accused of adhering during the divorce controversy. In the divorce tracts Milton points out that Aristotle and Paul share one fundamental tenet: they argue that interior and exterior slavery are of the same nature and therefore concomitant [End Page 142] and inseparable. Furthermore, Milton notes, Aristotle and Paul both claim that exterior and interior slavery consist in "carnality," the subjection of the spirit to the flesh. This identification of carnality with servility becomes a constant strain which runs throughout Milton's career and provides the consistent element in his apparently vacillating theories of politics and religion.II. Although this argument recurs throughout Milton's career, it is first hammered into shape during the divorce controversy... (shrink)

The first step in planning a lexicon of European political and legal concepts is to decide upon how it is to be organised. Among the principal alternatives are the formats of three German reference works on the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) and the methods associated with John Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Although these German and Anglophone styles are often regarded as incompatible, on closer inspection, they turn out to be in many respects complementary, as Skinner has recently acknowledged. (...) What would such a format look like? Is it possible to overcome the difficulties inherent in attempting a lexicon combining continental and Anglophone political and legal concepts? (shrink)

The relationship between the history of political thought and modern political philosophy since the late 1960s has been marked by an apparent paradox. On the one hand, a number of leading historians of political theory, such as Quentin Skinner, John Pocock and John Dunn, have at various times expressly asserted that their subject should have very little relevance for modern theory; on the other hand, many of the same historians have also been distinguished contributors to discussions among (...) political philosophers about issues such as republicanism, democracy or justice. Moreover, these assertions have failed to discourage the philosophers, many of whom have continued the ancient practice of pillaging the classics in search of ideas and styles to be revived for their own time. (Obvious examples would be Nozick's use of Locke, Kavka's use of Hobbes and maybe even Rawls' use of Kant.) Some philosophers – notably Macintyre and Taylor – have gone so far as to argue that we cannot disentangle ourselves from the complex histories of our own culture, and that unhistorical political theory is both conceptually barren and morally hazardous. It would not have been surprising if the practitioners of positivist political science, of the kind which was widely accepted earlier in this century, had disclaimed any interest in the history of political thought; but what is disconcerting is that the positivist generation seems to have been more enthusiastic in principle about the modern relevance of studying the history of theories than the anti‐positivist generation of the period since 1960. So I will begin this paper by trying to explain the character of the methodological debate on the history of political thought which began in the 1960s, and how far the historians were really opposed to any modern exploitation of the classic texts of political theory. (shrink)

When Istvan Hont died in 2013, the world lost a giant of intellectual history. A leader of the Cambridge School of Political Thought, Hont argued passionately for a global-historical approach to political ideas. To better understand the development of liberalism, he looked not only to the works of great thinkers but also to their reception and use amid revolution and interstate competition. His innovative program of study culminated in the landmark 2005 book Jealousy of Trade, which explores the birth of (...) economic nationalism and other social effects of expanding eighteenth-century markets. Markets, Morals, and Politics brings together a celebrated cast of Hont's contemporaries to assess his influence, ideas and methods. Richard Tuck, John Pocock, John Dunn, Raymond Geuss, Gareth Stedman Jones, Michael Sonenscher, John Robertson, Keith Tribe, Pasquale Pasquino, and Peter N. Miller contribute original essays on themes Hont treated with penetrating insight. (shrink)

In the current debate on republicanism the relationship between republicanism and democracy is an aspect whose historical dimension has thus far hardly been investigated. It offers instead also the chance to clear up ambiguities on the opposition between republicanism and liberalism. In this sense, recent research on the radical Enlightenment, on the link between economics and politics, by a new reading of physiocracy as political discourse, and on the foundations of political representation represent some of the most important advances made (...) by historical research over the last few years. This essay wishes to trace these results back to a long line of research on a modern republicanism that had already been investigated many decades ago by a historian of the Enlightenment interested in republican tradition, Franco Venturi, the author of Settecento riformatore and of Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment, to which John Pocock dedicated the first volume of his recent Barbarism and Religion. By means of a successful integration of three recent essays by John Israel on the uniqueness of Dutch republican discourse, by Richard Whatmore on the economic roots of French republicanism and by Nadia Urbinati on the foundations of representative democracy in Condorcet, it is possible to isolate the characteristics of a democratic republicanism. Among the various threads that have been followed up, the theme of equality has surfaced in various ways in the search for the characteristics of modern republicanism. These highlight the idea of the emergence in the early modern age of an European political culture and of a democratic and egalitarian republicanism that was encouraged by the contribution from various national situations within which it forged its identity, against the model of an Atlantic republicanism. (shrink)

ExcerptThe field of supranational democracy, which this paper addresses, is usually characterized by grand institutional designs and utopian projects. My aim here is, however, admittedly modest. I would like to examine one specific strategy deployed by a number of political theorists writing in this field. These authors come from very different backgrounds—they range from Pierre Manent and John Pocock to Larry Siedentop and Jean Cohen—yet they all share one important idea: in response to models for global governance that (...) seek to relocate sovereignty to a supranational level or to disperse sovereignty vertically over different levels (e.g., global federalism, deliberative supranationalism,…. (shrink)

I should say a preliminary word about the method I am adopting in this article, mainly to point out that there is nothing whatever remarkable about it. I take myself to be approaching the Politics in accordance with the interpretative canons standard in mainstream historical and Aristotelian scholarship. Compare the study of Aristotle's metaphysics. Everyone would grant that before we start considering whether hule or indeed any other Aristotelian concept anticipates or maps onto some modern notion of matter in any (...) interesting or important way, it is imperative to acquire a full understanding of the way the idea functions within the whole matrix of concepts, analyses, and theses which make up Aristotle's physics and metaphysics. I am simply pursuing the same method with respect to that matrix of concepts in Aristotle's political philosophy within which Miller hopes to locate an anticipation of the idea of rights. My references to the work of John Pocock in section V have suggested to some readers that I am espousing a form of historical or cultural or Kuhnian relativism which rules Miller's project out of court ab initio. The only form of relativism to which I think this essay commits me is the methodological relativism that I have just described. (shrink)

On associe habituellement Rousseau à la tradition républicaine, opposée schématiquement à la tradition libérale. Sans remettre en cause globalement cette thèse, il peut être intéressant de déplacer les termes de la problématique, en présentant la critique rousseauiste du libéralisme comme une critique menée de l’intérieur, plutôt que de l’extérieur. On peut en effet, à l’exemple de John Pocock, identifier un tronc commun aux pensées républicaine et libérale ou, à l’exemple de Charles Larmore, voir dans le républicanisme « une (...) formulation plus lucide de la théorie libérale ». Cela se traduit chez Rousseau par une stratégie consistant à se réapproprier les promesses contenues dans les prémisses du libéralisme, pour mieux en dénoncer les conséquences dogmatiques. De fait, on trouve chez Rousseau une défense des droits individuels, un souci de l’indépendance individuelle dans les relations économiques et plus généralement dans les rapports sociaux, une justification jusnaturaliste de la propriété privée, et même des emprunts à l’idée selon laquelle la mise en concurrence permettrait de définir les conditions d’un choix optimal. Cependant l’analyse de certains textes de l’Émile montre que Rousseau vise en définitive à dissiper l’illusion d’une autorégulation optimale des rapports sociaux et économiques : l’opacité et les distorsions des rapports économiques ainsi que l’usage spontanément irrationnel de la liberté individuelle impliquent la nécessité de gouverner la liberté, par l’éducation et par la législation. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on republicanism often looks back to Aristotle as the Greco-Roman epitome of the history of republican theory. This article contends that Aristotle offers a poor model in compari...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 101-103 [Access article in PDF] Cees Leijenhorst. The Mechanization of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes' Natural Philosophy. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Pp. xv + 242. Cloth, $97.00. Cees Leijenhorst, the young Dutch scholar and student of the late Karl Schuhmann, has written the most important book on Thomas Hobbes's natural science since Frithiof Brandt's Thomas Hobbes's Mechanical Conception of (...) Nature of 1928. This is true despite the undoubted brilliance and success of Leviathan and the Air Pump, published in 1985 by Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin. Why this is so, it will be the burden of this review to clarify.Writing in the modern historiographical tradition known as contextualism, long associated with John Pocock, Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck, Leijenhorst seeks to locate Hobbes within the horizon of that current of natural thought that began with Aristotle, led through antiquity and then flourished and came to predominate with the West's recovery of the Stagirite in the late Middle Ages. The course of so long a filiation of ideas cannot be the subject of a book whose length is under 250 pages, though a companion collection of essays on Aristotle and his long progeny, edited by Leijenhorst and others, has also appeared [End Page 101] (to be reviewed in the Journal). Instead, Leijenhorst focuses on the last, self-avowed inheritors and developers of that tradition, known as late Aristotelianism, though precisely how to define that tradition is itself problematized.Classically trained, Hobbes was well equipped to study Aristotle directly in Greek, without intermediaries; he early on published a translation of Thucydides. Still, Leijenhorst's concern is less to draw Hobbes closer to Aristotle than to relate him both to his immediate intellectual predecessors and to his own contemporaries, though, in each case, for different reasons. In the former, Leijenhorst convincingly argues that, as Gilson showed for Descartes, Hobbes assumed, drew upon, adopted and modified prevailing Aristotelian doctrines, even as he famously condemned their ancient author. And, Hobbes's sources, as they themselves interpreted, rejected and modified the views of their forebear, were rather various, including such writers of manuals as Bartholomaeus Anglicus and John Case, as well as others whose interests and directions were more varied and less conservative, including Scaliger, Rudolph Goclenius and Otto Casmann.A common source for both these strains of late Aristotelianism was the great stream of commentaries produced largely by members of the Jesuit Order from the middle of the sixteenth century onward, including Franciscus Toletus, Antonio Rubio, Petrus Fonseca, as well as Franciscus Suarez and members of other orders.This stream of thought also fed into the confessional strife of post-Reformation Europe, so that both Lutherans and Calvinists developed their own Aristotelianisms. One of the most striking conclusions of Leijenhorst's work is that, in characterizing both Aristotle's and his own metaphysics (or philosophia prima) as a universal science rather than as a particular theological science, Hobbes is an heir of this "Protestant ontology."Finally, Hobbes looked to the great names of natural-scientific thinking in sixteenth-century Italy, Zabarella, Pomponazzi, Fracastoro, Telesio and Campanella. Like Hobbes, these latter authors, "though vehemently anti-Aristotelian," nonetheless "exploited kinematic, empiricist and materialist tendencies found within the Aristotelian tradition itself, particularly in the School of Padua" (11).Such investigations into sources and lines of argument illuminate relations with predecessors and contemporaries in ways that social-constructivist accounts, like those of Schaeffer and Shapin and of the Edinburgh sociologist of knowledge David Bloor, may not accomplish. The author gives one instance of direct conflict between the results of that school and his own contextualism which illustrates this larger point.In his fight with Boyle, Hobbes is at pains to deny the existence of the void. Though he came to reject it rather late in his scientific thinking, the void, Schaffer and Shapin suggest, served to give space to the "incorporeal substances," similar to the scholastics' "abstract essences," upon which the latter erected the "kingdom of darkness" that... (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 76 - 97 This article presents an account of those works, related to conceptual history and historiographical issues, written by the American historian of political thought Melvin Richter. The attention is primarily directed toward the reception of the German historiographical style called “_Begriffsgeschichte_”, and especially on its reception among Anglophone scholars. Therefore, the main objective of the article is to throw light on Richter’s understanding of _Begriffsgeschichte_, and to sum up his efforts to (...) put in contact Koselleck’s “history of concepts” with the works of authors such as Quentin Skinner and John G. A. Pocock, who are associated with the so-called “_Cambridge school contextualists_”. Thus, the aim is to point out their direct thought about _Begriffsgeschichte_, and consequently, to see how they’ve reacted to Richter’s proposals concerning the possibility of adopting that “history of concepts” as the frame for future historical researches. By doing so, and relying mainly on the extensive contributions appeared on the pages of the specialized periodicals, this article highlights some of the principal reactions to the theoretical and practical implications of “conceptual history”; in particular as they are emerging in the midst of what is indeed a recent and still ongoing international debate. Furthermore, the article tries to compare Koselleck’s _Begriffsgeschichte_ with some works of “analytical bibliography”. It is also interesting to note that these bibliographical studies are associated with Cambridge University as well as the historical researches of Skinner and Pocock. (shrink)

J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn try to introduce historicity into the study of political thought. Believing that meaning is relational, they attempt to build cognitive contexts in which to fit events. Yet, their structural focus is often either ill-defined or overly simplified. They claim that if any statement is fixed into its proper context, the context will help to explain it. But the historical context is not always clearly understood itself; this is acting under (...) the "illusion of historical solidity and substance." They see language as the limitation of action, while actually it is a tool for inventiveness of thought. (shrink)

We still ask the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Every generation seems to offer new and contradictory answers to the question. In the last thirty or so years, the most interesting characterisations of Enlightenment have been by historians. They have told us that there is one Enlightenment, that there are two Enlightenments, that there are many Enlightenments. This has thrown up a second question, ‘How Many Enlightenments?’ In the spirit of collaboration and criticism, I answer both questions by arguing in this (...) article that there are in fact three Enlightenments: Radical, Sceptical and Liberal. These are abstracted from the rival theories of Enlightenment found in the writings of the historians Jonathan Israel, John Robertson and J.G.A. Pocock. Each form of Enlightenment is political; each involves an attitude to history; each takes a view of religion. They are arranged in a sequence of increasing sensitivity to history, as it is this which makes it possible to relate them to each other and indeed propose a composite definition of Enlightenment. The argument should be of interest to anyone concerned with ‘the Enlightenment’ as a historical phenomenon or with ‘Enlightenment’ as a philosophical abstraction. (shrink)

This article explores J.G.A. Pocock’s insight that “traces” of civic republican discourse survived within the dominant liberal paradigm of modern political thought. It does so by tracking classical republican themes in the works of American pragmatist John Dewey and English pluralist Harold Laski. The main contribution of the article is to show that the 1920s pluralist theory of the state can be interpreted as a reformulation of the classical republican critique of modern liberal conceptions of state sovereignty. In (...) particular, I suggest that Laski can be viewed as a kind of republican pluralist inspired by Aristotle and Harrington as well as by American pragmatism, itself a late outgrowth of the republican tradition in US history. (shrink)

Revisionists such as Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, and John Dunn argue that in order to understand an historical text, one must recover the particularity of intended meaning. According to this view, in the sphere of political/ social reality, thought has no universal truth, no independence of its context, no significance for the present, and no meaning beyond the author's intentions. Although this is a variant of classic historicism, it goes far beyond the latter. A study of (...) Gramsci's historicism shows that only the first of the above claims is entailed by historicism or justifiable in its own terms. The revisionist program would prevent us from understanding our own political ideas as they are founded upon our philosophical traditions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Logic of Probabilities in Hume's Argument against Miracles Fred Wilson The position is often stated that Hume's discussion of miracles is inconsistent with his views on the logical or ontological status oflaws ofnature and with his more general scepticism. Broad, for one, has so argued.1 Hume's views on induction are assumed to go somethinglike this. Any attempt to demonstrate knowledge ofmatters offact presupposes causal reasoning, but the latter (...) is based not on any perception of necessary connections, but on an unreasoned expectation that because events have been constantly conjoined in the past they will be constantly conjoined in the future. The fact that our past experience gives rise to certain expectations provides absolutely no reason to think that these expectations will be fulfilled. But this is forgotten as soon as he turns to the topic of miracles where the argument requires certain assumptions about laws of nature. Here he claims that the laws of nature arebased upon afirm andunalterable experience and dismisses what he apparently admits to be strong evidence for miracles on the basis of the claim that such events are absolutely impossible. The inconsistency between the discussion of miracles and the earlier discussions of induction and causality is clear. Nonetheless, there is a certain implausibility to this claim that makes it a difficult one to entertain seriously, since it is unlikely that a philosopher as careful as Hume would have failed to recognize the inconsistency if it existed. What I propose here to argue is that there is in fact no inconsistency, and that this becomes clear once one places the discussion ofmiracles in the broader context ofthe overall argument ofthe first Enquiry. In particular, the charge ofinconsistency disappears once one eliminates the caricature ofHume's views on causal reasoning upon which it rests. To come to grips with the discussion of miracles in Hume it is necessary to place that discussion in its historical context. In the generally empiricist atmosphere that developed in Britain following the mid-seventeenth century civil wars, the general defence of the reasonableness of Christianity consisted of two parts. First, it washeldthatrational argument, whether causal or teleological orboth, could yield a reasonable belief that a deity ofa more or less traditional sort existed. Then, second, in order to establish further that Jesus was the Son ofGod it was held that one could rely upon a chain oftestimony Volume XV Number 2 255 FRED WILSON leading back from the present to the past to infer the existence of miracles testifying to the divinity ofJesus. Hume attacks this second inference in the essay on miracles andthe first in the essay that follows in the Enquiries on God's particular providence (the themes of which are developed more fully in the Dialogues on Natural Religion). Given the central place that the appeal to miracles held in Christian apologetics in the 17th and 18th centuries, Hume's systematic attack on the argument from miracles constituted a clear attack on Christianity. To be sure, Hume's argument would never have persuaded JohnWesley, but that would hardly have surprised Hume himself, nor should it surprise us: those in the grips of religious enthusiasm, whether it be John Wesley or Jimmy Swaggart, will hardly be persuaded by rational argument, however much it is still true that they ought to be persuaded by it. The appeal to miracles tojustify specifically Christian beliefs had a long history. One can find it already in the late Roman period in Eusebius. Muslim thinkers were to challenge this traditional defence by arguing that chains oftestimony become more unreliable the longer they become. As for their own Islamic beliefs, these they admitted had also to be justified by an appeal to miracles, but there was, it was claimed, a unique self-justifying miracle in the Koran, the specially revealed Word of God. The critical theme of the Muslim apologists, that the longer a chain of testimony the less assurance it gives of the fact that a miracle had occurred, was developed in Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries.6 It seems to have been introduced by the Oxford orientalist Edward Pocock who had discovered this line of Muslim apologetics while... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 721-743 [Access article in PDF] Virtue, Commerce, and the Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the Atlantic Republican Debate Mark Jurdjevic Republicanism has dominated the historiographies of English and American political thought for the past two decades. 1 Its success derives principally from J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment, which presents a sweeping vision of an ancient Aristotelian (...) republican language that persisted for centuries in the mental landscape of the western world. Resurrected in Renaissance Florence, the language of republicanism continued to resonate powerfully in Stuart and Hanoverian Britain and colonial America. Pocock and those sympathetic to his work attributed the power and significance of republicanism to its internal discursive coherence over time; because of its deep roots in the European classical and Renaissance past, republicanism--not liberalism--provided the intellectual weapon with which the English and the Americans rebelled against the Stuart and Hanoverian monarchies. Pocock's provocative repudiation of the significance of John Locke and liberalism, as well as his suggestion that the revolutions of 1641, 1688, and 1776 were animated not by a utopian, forward-looking political ideology but by a backward-looking desire to restore a classical political order, generated a still-ongoing academic debate. 2 [End Page 721]This debate has not appreciated a crucial point: Pocock misunderstood Florentine political thought and mischaracterized its central tenets. 3 Unnecessary confusion has been generated by the lack of communication between specialists in Renaissance political thought and historians of English and early American political thought, as well as by the total dependence of English and American historians on Pocock for their understanding of "civic humanism." 4 Most historians of England and America skeptical of Pocock's argument have shown that republican language, where it did occur in England and America, differed in substantial and significant ways from the Florentine variety. 5 What they have actually shown, I hope to make clear, is that manifestations of republicanism in England and America differed only from Pocock's misunderstanding of the Florentine variety; Florentine republican language echoes strongly in the English and American republicanism that recent scholarship emphasizes.In this essay I seek to reintegrate Italy into the republican debate and, by doing so, to revitalize the argument that structural linguistic similarities pervaded the republicanism of Florence, England, and America. 6 I concentrate on the most important and contested point in English and American revisionism, the dialectical engine of TheMachiavellian Moment: the alleged incompatibility between virtue and commerce in "classical" republican theory. Pocock asserted that Florentine republicans mistrusted commerce and private wealth as corrupting forces in public life and he employed this perceived virtue-commerce antipathy as the link between his republican moments.The most leveling critiques of Pocock's republican tradition have rejected it on this point. Recent research on the relationship between commerce and virtue in the English and American republican contexts has reached a quite different conclusion: that republican theory was frequently elaborated in harmonious conjunction with a new ideology of commercial society. [End Page 722]Pocock, however, misunderstood civic humanism and the role of commerce in Renaissance republicanism. Florentine humanists believed that commerce and the private pursuit of wealth made possible the survival and integrity of the republic. Florentine republicanism of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was the ideology of an ascendant merchant elite; it provided a political language that integrated republican virtue with the habits, values, and mentality of the merchant. We should not therefore be surprised to see republicanism flourishing in later commercial societies. Although the virtue-commerce relationship in Renaissance republicanism was precisely the opposite of Pocock's claim, it directly anticipates the commercial element of republicanism that recent English and American scholarship emphasizes.I undertake three tasks; first, I survey and compare recent work on republicanism in America, England, and Italy; second, I show how Pocock selectively read the primary and secondary sources on Renaissance Florence; third and most importantly, I analyze the economic attitudes of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, Girolamo Savonarola, and Florentine... (shrink)

Because a thorough investigation of Machiavelli's thought and the thought of those who explicitly drew on it can be achieved only through the kind of Herculean labours displayed by Pocock in his Machiavellian Moment, I propose here to examine only two works by admirers of Machiavelli: Harrington's Oceana, which imports the Italian Renaissance to England's shores, and John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's Cato's Letters, which prepares its departure for America. I argue that a re-examination of these critical links (...) in the civic humanist chain does not bear out the civic humanist interpretation of Machiavelli's influence. Further, because Pocock, at times, asserts that what is crucial for establishing Machiavelli's participation in this tradition is not, in fact, what Machiavelli said, but how others read him, I believe that this examination begins to raise significant questions about the validity of Pocock's portrait of a Machiavellian civic humanist tradition. (shrink)

Fergus Kelly: Thinking in Threes: The Triad in Early Irish Literature Brian Pullan: Charity and Usury: Jewish and Christian Lending in Renaissance and Early Modern Italy Noel Malcolm: The Crescent and the City of the Sun: Islam and the Renaissance Utopia of Tommaso Campanella H. R. Woudhuysen: The Foundations of Shakespeare's Text J. G. A. Pocock: The Re-Description of Enlightenment Andrew Hadfield: Michael Drayton and the Burden of History Eric Foner: Abraham Lincoln: The Great Emancipator? Gillian Beer: Revenants and (...) Migrants: Hardy, Butler, Woolf and Sebald Stephen Banfield: Scholarship and the Musical: Reclaiming Jerome Kern Brian Simpson: The Rule of Law in International Affairs Christopher Bayly: 'The Nation Within': British India at War 1939-47 John Vickers: Economics for Consumer Policy Gillian Feeley-Harnik: The Geography of Descent Susan Gathercole: Working Memory and Learning During the School Years Lothar Ledderose: Carving Stone Sutras before the World Ends: The Inscription of 1118 CE at Cloud Dwelling Monastery near Beijing. (shrink)

Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited PHILIP VOGT TWO STATES OF NATURE, not one, figure in the political writings of John Locke. The more frequently discussed of the two, the "State of Nature" proper, is defined in the second of the Two Treatises of Government as the condition of perfect freedom abandoned by mankind upon the advent of political society.' Whether Locke viewed this "state" as a purely theoretical construct or as an actual moment (...) in human history is open to debate. 2 There is no basis, however, for doubting his belief in the literal reality of that other state of nature, the Garden of Eden. In Eden, mankind in the person of Adam-turned-rebel ob- tained its perfect, prepolitical freedom in exchange for the bliss of perfect obedience to a divinely ordained "Law of Nature." Without reference to man's tenancy of nature in both its prepolitical and prelapsarian states, Locke's discus- sion of the equilibrium struck in political society between obedience and free- dom is incomprehensible. Likewise, reference to both states is required for Valuable comments on the preliminary drafts of this article were given by Nancy Struever, Peter Vinten-Johansen, J. G. A. Pocock, Kirstie McClure, John Marshall, Carol Pech, Edward Schneider and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. 'John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett , II/ii/4. 9 While Locke.. (shrink)

On se rappelle l’un des problèmes soulevés, en 1975, par John Greville Agard Pocock dans son ouvrage intitulé Le Moment machiavélien : dans l’Angleterre du XVIIe siècle, les idées républicaines et machiavéliennes devaient trouver à se développer dans un environnement intellectuel dominé par des concepts monarchiques, juridiques et théologiques, peu à même de conduire à une définition de l’Angleterre comme polis ou de l’Anglais comme citoyen. Dans ce même ouvrage, Pocock indiquait en outre, sans toutefois développer cette (...) indication, que Francis Bacon connaissait Machiavel à un degré qui aurait mérité d’être discuté plus en détail. Il s’agit de prendre cette dernière remarque au sérieux et, du coup, de tenter de mesurer, en confrontant notamment la pensée politique de Bacon à celle de Juste Lipse et à celle de Giovanni Botero, comment est déjà en germe, dans l’œuvre du Lord Chancelier, une reconceptualisation proprement civique des institutions politiques. Cette enquête nous conduira dès lors, nécessairement, à interroger le statut accordé par Bacon à l’économie et aux activités marchandes. (shrink)

In the last few years, there has been a notable surge of interest in the themes of civil religion and the battle against “priestcraft” among historians of political thought. Examples include Eric Nelson’s The Hebrew Republic; Paul Rahe’s Against Throne and Altar; Jeffrey Collins’s The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes; Jonathan Israel’s work on the legacy of Spinoza; Justin Champion’s work on John Toland; and my own book, Civil Religion. Within the intellectual space created by this recent scholarship, this article (...) focuses on relevant themes in the work of the one of the two thinkers who J.G.A. Pocock identified as most responsible for the “implantation of the values of civic humanism in English political thought” – namely, James Harrington (the other being the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury). (shrink)

Philip Pettit jest jednym z czołowych filozoficznych kodyfikatorów (neo-)republikańskiej koncepcji wolności i rządu, który kieruje się ideałem nie-dominacji (imperium i dominium). Jednocześnie jest autorem wielu ważnych prac z obszaru filozofii nauk społecznych (kwestia wyjaśniania i interpretacji), etyki (konsekwencjalizm), ontologii społecznej (jak istnieją grupy społeczne) oraz filozofii umysłu (jak funkcjonuje podmiot intencjonalny). W świetle krytyk i polemik, jakie pojawiły się ze strony nowej „fali republikańskiej”, by określić tym mianem zwolenników populistycznego republikanizmu (John P. McCormick i inni), którzy oskarżają przedstawicieli wcześniejszej (...) generacji tradycji republikańskiej, takich jak Johh G.A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, a zwłaszcza właśnie Philip Pettit, o arystokratyczne „odchylenie” (jedynie klasy wyższe i elity korzystają na projekcie depolityzacji republiki) istotne jest wskazanie na znaczenie dla odczytania projektu republikańskiego wypracowanych przez Pettita rozwiązań w ontologii społecznej. Autor stawia tezę, że dopiero uwzględnienie jego stanowiska w ontologii społecznej pozwala na pełne zrozumienie (co nie znaczy, że akceptację) jego propozycji w filozofii politycznej. Struktura artykułu jest następująca: (1) autor przedstawia trzy wymiary ontologii społecznej w ujęciu Pettita; (2) następnie pokazuje ich znaczenie w definiowaniu kategorii dobra wspólnego w kontekście republikańskiej wspólnoty politycznej (model condominium), (3) wskazuje na pewne paradoksy związane z realizacją republikańskiego ideału obywatelskiej kontestacji. Jednocześnie autor zwraca uwagę na ewolucję projektu republikańskiego (pewnych jego aspektów) w zależności od analogicznych ewolucji propozycji (rozwiązań) w ontologii społecznej. (shrink)

This article explores J.G.A. Pocock's insight that “traces” of civic republican discourse survived within the dominant liberal paradigm of modern political thought. It does so by tracking classical republican themes in the works of American pragmatist John Dewey and English pluralist Harold Laski. The main contribution of the article is to show that the 1920s pluralist theory of the state can be interpreted as a reformulation of the classical republican critique of modern liberal conceptions of state sovereignty. In (...) particular, I suggest that Laski can be viewed as a kind of republican pluralist inspired by Aristotle and Harrington as well as by American pragmatism, itself a late outgrowth of the republican tradition in US history. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...) example is normative practical reasoning of the form 'I ought to φ, so I'll φ', where 'I ought to φ' expresses a normative belief and 'I'll φ' an intention. This has at least some characteristics of reasoning, but there are also grounds for doubting that it is genuine reasoning. One objection is that it seems inappropriate to derive an intention to φ from a belief that you ought to φ, rather than a belief that you ought to intend to φ. Another is that you may not be able to go through this putative process of reasoning, and this inability might disqualify it from being reasoning. A third objection is that it violates the Humean doctrine that reason alone cannot motivate any action of the will. This paper investigates these objections. (shrink)

In this 2nd edition, John Gray adds an extensive postscript which defends the interpretation of Mill set out in the first edition, but develops radical criticisms of the substance of Millian and other liberalism.

En el contexto de la reciente explosión de interés investigador sobre la ilustración escocesa, en parte suscitado por los estudios de Duncan Forbes y John G. A. Pocock, la obra política de Hume ha recibido renovada atención. El presente ensayo explora la unidad estructural de la teoría política humeana, tal y como se esboza en principalmente en el libro III del Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana y los Ensayos, así como en su Historia de Inglaterra.