In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 55-88.

According to a widespread view, Kant's claim that moral wrongness has its ground in a contradiction underlying every immoral action is a “bluff” rooted in “dogmatic moralism”. Ever since Benjamin Constant's exchange with Kant, counterexamples have played a crucial role in showing why Kant's “universalization procedure” fails to determine the moral validity of our judgments. Despite recent attempts to bring Kant's ethics closer to Aristotle's, these counterexamples have prevailed. Most recently, Jesse Prinz has launched another attack along the same lines. (...) Prinz insists that Kant's universalization procedure fundamentally begs the question and fails to generate plausible results. Even authors who are very sympathetic to Kant, such as Allen Wood, have tried to downplay universalization, focusing instead on other formulations of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I respond directly to four of the most prominent counterexamples. In each case, I aim to show how we can uphold Kant's fundamental claim that the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative articulates the form of our particular moral judgments. (shrink)

David Estlund holds that ultimate normative principles are insensitive to bad facts. This is a deliberately twisted appropriation of Jerry Cohen’s famous dictum that ultimate normative principles are fact-insensitive. In this paper, I will show why Estlund’s twist misses the point of Cohen’s argument. The fact-insensitivity claim is not a requirement to eliminate all facts from our normative theories because facts necessarily make these theories concessive. Instead, it may help us to locate the true origin of these concessions. In normative (...) theorizing, we have not explained why a fact supports a principle if we fail to articulate the higher-order principle in light of which that fact is normatively significant. (shrink)

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we (...) come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view, most eloquently advocated by Dieter Schönecker, that Kant is what I call a “sensualist intuitionist.” Kant’s text does not accommodate a sensualist intuitionist reading; the fact of reason is cognized by reason, not intuition. I agree with Schönecker that the feeling of respect for the moral law makes us feel its obligatory character, but I disagree that this feeling constitutes cognition of the normative content of the moral law. We do not cognize (...) the validity of the moral law through feeling. I argue instead for what I take to be the standard view: We feel through respect for the moral law the limiting and humiliating effect that rational cognition of the moral law has on our sensibility. (shrink)

Kant and Sartre are two of the most significant figures in modern philosophy, and yet there has, until very recently, been little comparative research undertaken on them. Despite dealing with many shared philosophical issues, they have traditionally been taken to be too opposed to each other to render any search for possible parallels between their works a useful enterprise. Indeed, Sartre is often taken to be one of Kant’s most vocal critics in the literature, and as rather indebted to other (...) major figures, such as Husserl and Heidegger. As a consequence, often, where comparative analysis has been done upon Kant and Sartre, the emphasis has been on their differences, rather than on their similarities. However, as recent research has begun to show, the story is not that straightforward and there is much to be explored with regard to parallels between Kant and Sartre. Baiasu has characterised Sartre’s relation to Kant as one of an “anxiety of influence” – Sartre desires to explicitly distance himself from Kant, but this obscures some deeper underlying parallels between them1. Such parallels can form a foundation for productive dialogue, more widely, between the schools of Kantian “Critical philosophy” and existentialism2. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 1 Seiten: 78-87.

Kant famously claims that the table of the categories of freedom does not require explanation. Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be. In this article I want to show that a coherent interpretation of the table depends essentially on a clarification of what have been taken to be three fundamental ambiguities in Kants (...) text is, I argue, rooted in a hybrid conception of practical rationality assumed by his interpreters. I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. But it will require spelling out Kant’s moral cognitivism in such a way that he emerges as holding what I will call a unitary account of practical rationality. (shrink)

Geschwisterlichkeit wird in der Tradition des politischen Liberalismus häufig als moralischer Wert verstanden, der über das Ideal der Gerechtigkeit hinausgeht. Im Unterschied dazu argumentiert Jochen Bojanowski für ein neues Verständnis: Demnach sind wir im politischen Kontext zueinander geschwisterlich eingestellt, wenn wir einen gesellschaftlichen Kooperationsrahmen befürworten, in dem bloße Glücksunterschiede nicht in distributive Vorteile umgemünzt werden können. Ausgehend von dieser Idee entwickelt Bojanowski eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, der zufolge Geschwisterlichkeit einen konstitutiven Teil von Gerechtigkeit darstellt.

Mit seiner Unterscheidung zwischen idealer und nicht-idealer Theorie hat John Rawls eine der zentralen Methodendiskussionen der gegenwärtigen politischen Philosophie angestoßen (vgl. Simmons 2010; Valentini 2012). An dieser Alternative entzündete sich später auch grundlegende Kritik an Rawls’ Werk. Die Unterscheidung wird in Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit eingeführt (Rawls 1971, 9), um die Zielsetzung und die Grenzen von Rawls’ Theorieansatz zu bestimmen.

Nach einer verbreiteten Auffassung kann Kant die Zurechenbarkeit menschlicher Handlungen nicht erklären, weil seine Freiheitstheorie impliziere, dass ausschließlich die moralisch guten Handlungen freie Handlungen sind. Folgt man Kants Kritikern, hätte er Freiheit als ein Wahlvermögen für oder gegen das moralisch Gebotene bestimmen müssen. In diesem Aufsatz wird dafür argumentiert, dass diese empirische Definition für Kant aus erkenntniskritischen Gründen ausscheidet und er mit der nicht-empirischen Vernunfteinsicht moralischer Verpflichtung zum ersten Mal einen Definitionsgrund gefunden hat, mit dem er über die analytische Definition (...) einer Kausalität aus Freiheit aus der ersten Kritik hinausgehen kann. Dass diese Definition die Möglichkeit der moralisch bösen Handlung nicht ausschließt, wird durch eine genaue Analyse von Kants Argument für seine sogenannte „Analytizitätsthese“ bewiesen. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of autonomy has been criticised for identifying acting freely with acting morally. As a result, many Kantians have moved away from Kant’s moral conception of autonomy, instead proposing what I will call an “end-set- ting” or “two-way capacity” account of autonomy. I believe that we should resist these revisions and that doing so makes clear why it is only the capacity for moral autonomy that is of unlimited value. What fundamentally distinguishes our free capacity of volition is the (...) fact that we are autonomous. This capacity en- ables us to have a conception of unlimited goodness that gives us the dignity, i. e. the unlimited value, that non-autonomous beings lack. (shrink)