In recent years, governments in a large number of countries have introduced so-called deployment policies to foster the diffusion of clean energy technologies. While there is little doubt that these demand-side measures have been very effective in raising the share of clean electricity generation, currently, much less is known about how deployment policies affect—and are affected by—technological innovation beyond the mere diffusion of existing technologies. Against this backdrop, this dissertation abstract and commentary presents the dissertation work of Dr. Joern Hoppmann. (...) Based on a discussion of deployment policies as a means for addressing pressing societal issues, the dissertation abstract describes four essays that provide a detailed account of the role that these policies play for technological learning in the solar photovoltaic industry. The theoretical background, methods, and main findings of each of the essays are briefly summarized. Building on this, this abstract discusses implications for managers and policy makers in terms of how to improve the design of deployment policies and navigate businesses in policy-induced markets. (shrink)

Many scholars in the past half century have taken issue with some of Kaufmann's interpretations, but the book ranks as one of the most influential accounts ever ...

In these studies of the relationships between poetry, religion, and philosophy, and of the background and development of existentialism, Walter Kaufmann has produced a book which is challenging and important on many different levels. --.

In these studies of the relationships between poetry, religion, and philosophy, and of the background and development of existentialism, Walter Kaufmann has produced a book which is challenging and important on many different levels. --.

The continuing discovery of important Hegel manuscripts and advances in the criticism of Hegel's works have set the stage for a major reevaluation of one of the greatest philosophers of all time. This volume constitutes the comprehensive reinterpretation of Hegel that has long been needed.The first chapters are devoted to the influences of other German philosophers on Hegel, his early publication as they are relevant to his later writings, and his Phenomenology--in itself and as a key to understanding his terminology (...) and dialectic. Examined next are the further elaboration of his thought in Logic; his famous system, as presented in various editions of the Encyclopedia; and his little-known views on history. A final chapter details in letters and contemporary reports Hegel's intellectual development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 523-541 [Access article in PDF] Antiquarianism, the History of Objects, and the History of Art before Winckelmann Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann [Figures] To the Memory of Franklin LeVan Baumer. In light of postmodernist and poststructuralist trends in the humanities which have contested notions of originality and of authorship, it might seem surprising that one outstanding myth of the eighteenth century has (...) not yet been thoroughly challenged. This is the claim made by Johann Joachim Winckelmann in the foreword to the Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, originally published in 1764, that he had created a new history of art which was distinct from a history of artists and also different from what had previously been written about antiquities (Altertümer): The history of the art of antiquity, which I have undertaken to write, is no mere account of the chronological order and change of art, but I take the word history in the wider sense, that it has in the Greek language, and my intention is to offer an attempt at a system.... But the essence of art is in every part the most eminent aim, in which the history of artists has little influence, and this [sort of history of artists], which has been compiled by others, is therefore not to be sought here... those who have treated antiquities, examine either only such where erudition was to be applied, or, if they speak of art, this happens in part with common eulogies, or their judgment is built on peculiar, false grounds. 1 [End Page 523]Wolf Lepenies once described this claim as one of the many foundational myths of the Enlightenment and presented instead some parallels between the writing of art history and natural history in the eighteenth century. 2 As interest in the historiography of art has revived, publications have continued to pour forth on Winckelmann. 3 Yet the critique suggested by Lepenies has largely not been followed. Winckelmann's claim to originality remains a starting or major turning point for most accounts of the history of the discipline of art history. 4 [End Page 524]It may be that Winckelmann's claim has remained largely unchallenged because his differentiation of his accomplishment from that of Gelehrsamkeit in particular coincides with and helps to support another distinction made at his time, that between "philosophy," or criticism, and erudition, the latter being at best necessary but inferior. 5 This distinction, which was fostered by the philosophes and their counterparts in other countries, has been frequently heard in scholarly debates, and it is echoed in current discussions where empirical scholarship is disparaged in favor of what is often now called Theory. 6 Thus while in the twentieth century the Enlightenment came in for heavy going starting with at least the critique of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 7 this is one Enlightenment opinion which, despite the rise of critical theory among other trends in recent scholarship, has gained in fashion, especially in the English-speaking world.But the contrast between philosophy, or critique, and erudition makes a distinction that is ultimately untenable, even if it is also one that has continued to dominate many views of the history of eighteenth-century scholarship. The case at hand suggests that supposed innovations of the eighteenth century in the historiography of art, as in many other fields of study, are much more bound up with late humanism and encyclopedism than their promulgators might have wished to admit. Scholars of a number of disciplines have begun to revise interpretations of the role of the so-called antiquarians of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries--those who dealt with Altertümer. 8 Some recent studies of the historiography of art have pointed to some connections between the antiquarian tradition and that of the historiography of art. 9 These approaches, however, have primarily dealt with Italian and French writers and, moreover, have left Winckelmann's position largely untouched. 10 Winckelmann's situation in the [End Page 525] broader European historical and geographical context also remains... (shrink)

I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental (...) states with nonconceptual content, distal mental actions are caused by mental states with conceptual content. I argue that, when we are investigating animal cognition, we need a nonconceptual account for the content of intentions involved in mental actions such as action planning: non-immediate intentions. This in order to defend the claim that creatures that lack conceptual capacities are capable of entertaining plan-states, and thus of exercising mental agency in the form of action planning. (shrink)

Logics L F (M) are considered, in which M ("most") is a new first-order quantifier whose interpretation depends on a given filter F of subsets of ω. It is proved that countable compactness and axiomatizability are each equivalent to the assertion that F is not of the form $\{(\bigcap F) \cup X:|\omega - X| with $|\omega - \bigcap F| = \omega$ . Moreover the set of validities of L F (M) and even of L F ω 1 ω (M) depends (...) only on a few basic properties of F. Similar characterizations are given of the class of filters F for which L F (M) has the interpolation or Robinson properties. An omitting types theorem is also proved. These results sharpen the corresponding known theorems on weak models (U, q), where the collection q is allowed to vary. In addition they provide extensions of first-order logic which possess some nice properties, thus escaping from contradicting Lindstrom's Theorem [1969] only because satisfaction is not isomorphism-invariant (as it is tied to the filter F). However, Lindstrom's argument is applied to characterize the invariant sentences as just those of first-order logic. (shrink)

Logics $L^F(M)$ are considered, in which $M$ ("most") is a new first-order quantifier whose interpretation depends on a given filter $F$ of subsets of $\omega$. It is proved that countable compactness and axiomatizability are each equivalent to the assertion that $F$ is not of the form $\{(\bigcap F) \cup X: |\omega - X| < \omega\}$ with $|\omega - \bigcap F| = \omega$. Moreover the set of validities of $L^F(M)$ and even of $L^F_{\omega_1\omega}(M)$ depends only on a few basic properties of (...) F. Similar characterizations are given of the class of filters $F$ for which $L^F(M)$ has the interpolation or Robinson properties. An omitting types theorem is also proved. These results sharpen the corresponding known theorems on weak models $(\mathfrak{U}, q)$, where the collection $q$ is allowed to vary. In addition they provide extensions of first-order logic which possess some nice properties, thus escaping from contradicting Lindstrom's Theorem [1969] only because satisfaction is not isomorphism-invariant (as it is tied to the filter $F$). However, Lindstrom's argument is applied to characterize the invariant sentences as just those of first-order logic. (shrink)

In speaking of empirical science as a self-correcting process one implies that a proposition accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure may have to be eliminated later according to these very rules. Taking this for granted one realizes that a particular empirical science, say physics, should be defined in terms of rules of method rather than as a system of propositions representing our knowledge at a given time. Obviously both the science of Galileo and Newton and the science of (...) Einstein and Bohr are called ''physics'' and we do not regard this as a mere equivocation. It may, however, be objected that a definition of a science in terms of rules of method is incompatible with the view that a science consists of a set of propositions. To meet this objection I propose that we distinguish between the structure of a science as defined in terms of the rules of method and the corpus of this science at a given time, i.e., the set of propositions accepted at this time in accordance with the rules of method of this science. The relation between the structure of a science and the corpus of a science is similar to that obtaining between the structure of a legal order, e.g., American law, which is defined by the rules of the process of legislation in the broadest sense and the legal norms which are the corpus of law at a given time. It should then be noted that the assertion that a certain proposition belongs to a given science is incomplete without a time-index. The scientist changes the corpus of his science either by introducing new propositions to it or by eliminating propositions which were previously accepted and did not stand further control. The significance of whatever else he does in the course of his inquiry can be determined only in the light of this selection. There are two stages in this process of selection. The first is exclusively concerned with meanings as such. The scientist has to ascertain that a given aggregate of words represents a proposition, that this proposition contains only objective meanings, that it is not self-contradictory, that it belongs to the subject-matter of the particular science. The second phase of the selection, exhibited in scientific procedure in the strict sense, applies only to such propositions which have passed this preexamination. We shall call those rules of method in terms of which the first stage of selection is defined rules of the language of science and those rules in terms of which the second stage is defined rules of the procedure of science. In this paper I shall try to show how important it is to distinguish clearly between these two types of rules. I shall first deal with the rules of the language of science and confine myself to sciences dealing with the physical world. (shrink)

v. 1. Thales to Ockham.--v. 2. Bacon to Kant.

John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of “gaps” that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...) but a first-person plural, Weontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility. (shrink)

This paper addresses the significance of primitivism as a figure of thought during the emergence of Kulturwissenschaften—consisting of different fields of knowledge and disciplines—in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. Two interrelated problems in particular shaped the scholarly discourse on primitivism: first, the question of the existence and modes of operation of ‘other’ forms of thought and consciousness. Second, the epistemological question how these ‘other’ forms of thought could be recognized if the researcher him or herself belonged to (...) a particular historically determined European mode of thought and perception. In this context the art of non-European ‘primitives’ and of the insane became a central topic. Its cross-disciplinary investigation ultimately arrived at a redefinition of a nexus of problems: the challenge to the old concept of art as well as to the dominant concept of psychopathology, that is, the definition of normality and deviancy. Both the non-European ‘natives’ and the European ‘insane’ received new importance as scientific objects for a wider range of fields of knowledge. This process was connected with an articulated need to expand and strengthen the faculty of subjectivity and intuition on the part of the Kulturwissenschaftler for means of investigation and understanding. The discourse on primitivism in German Kulturwissenschaften reflected the crisis of knowledge and methology at the beginning of the twentieth century and was finally resolved by taking refuge in phenomenology and holism.Keywords: Kulturwissenschaften; ‘Other’ forms of thought; Art; Psychopathology; Subjectivity; Creativity; Emphatic notion of schizophrenia. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of whether poverty as such violates the dignity of persons. It is argued that it does. This is, it is argued, not due to a lack of basic goods, nor to the fact that poverty prevents persons from enjoying the rights they have, particularly the right to bodily integrity. Poverty does violate dignity, so it is argued, insofar as poor people are dependent on others in a degrading way.

This classic is the benchmark against which all modern books about Nietzsche are measured. When Walter Kaufmann wrote it in the immediate aftermath of World War II, most scholars outside Germany viewed Nietzsche as part madman, part proto-Nazi, and almost wholly unphilosophical. Kaufmann rehabilitated Nietzsche nearly single-handedly, presenting his works as one of the great achievements of Western philosophy. Responding to the powerful myths and countermyths that had sprung up around Nietzsche, Kaufmann offered a patient, evenhanded account (...) of his life and works, and of the uses and abuses to which subsequent generations had put his ideas. Without ignoring or downplaying the ugliness of many of Nietzsche's proclamations, he set them in the context of his work as a whole and of the counterexamples yielded by a responsible reading of his books. More positively, he presented Nietzsche's ideas about power as one of the great accomplishments of modern philosophy, arguing that his conception of the "will to power" was not a crude apology for ruthless self-assertion but must be linked to Nietzsche's equally profound ideas about sublimation. He also presented Nietzsche as a pioneer of modern psychology and argued that a key to understanding his overall philosophy is to see it as a reaction against Christianity. Many scholars in the past half century have taken issue with some of Kaufmann's interpretations, but the book ranks as one of the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. Featuring a new foreword by Alexander Nehamas, this Princeton Classics edition of Nietzsche introduces a new generation of readers to one the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. (shrink)