While cognitive scientists increase their tentative incursions in the social domains traditionally reserved for social scientists, most sociologists and anthropologists keep decrying those attempts as reductionist or, at least, irrelevant. In this paper, we argue that collaboration between social and cognitive sciences is necessary to understand the impact of the social environment on the shaping of our mind. More specifically, we dwell on the cognitive strategies and early-developing deontic expectations, termed naïve sociology, which enable well-adapted individuals to constitute, maintain and (...) understand basic social relationships. In order to specify the way in which the demanding character of typical social relationships can be recognized in situ, we introduce the concept of “deontic affordances”. Finally, we shed light on the continuum that might relate a primitive naïve sociology, dedicated to the processing of invariant properties of the social life and a mature naïve sociology, necessary for dealing with the variable properties of cultural forms of life. (shrink)

Somewhat questioning Elizabeth Spelke's attempt to account for infants’ social knowledge, our commentary argues that social cognition might be divided into several specialized systems. In addition to the core system dedicated to the intersubjective dimension of close relationships, infants could be prewired to process social relationships, such as dominance, characterized by their impersonal, normative dimension.

John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of "gaps" that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...) but a first-person plural, Weontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility. Key Words: free will • agency • reasons for acting • ontology. (shrink)

En tant que concept social, principe politique et objet de savoir, la société est une création socio-historique, esquissée au XVIIe siècle et couronnée au XVIIIe siècle par l'esprit des Lumières. L'idée s'impose qu'elle est l'instrument collectif de l'épanouissement de la liberté individuelle.

A l'âge où les sciences du cerveau et de la cognition apportent de fascinantes révélations sur les fondements matériels de la nature humaine, est-il possible pour la sociologie de continuer à réfléchir en vase clos, hors de l'effervescence scientifique qu’entraînent ces découvertes? Les auteurs qui s’expriment dans cet ouvrage exposent leurs points de vue argumentés sur le lien entre sciences de la cognition et sciences du social et sur les conditions d’élaboration d’une véritable sociologie cognitive. La diversité des perspectives offre (...) un état des lieux passionnant sur une "querelle des disciplines" qui n’a jamais vraiment cessé de hanter la sociologie. (shrink)

John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of “gaps” that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...) but a first-person plural, Weontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility. (shrink)

This classic is the benchmark against which all modern books about Nietzsche are measured. When Walter Kaufmann wrote it in the immediate aftermath of World War II, most scholars outside Germany viewed Nietzsche as part madman, part proto-Nazi, and almost wholly unphilosophical. Kaufmann rehabilitated Nietzsche nearly single-handedly, presenting his works as one of the great achievements of Western philosophy. Responding to the powerful myths and countermyths that had sprung up around Nietzsche, Kaufmann offered a patient, evenhanded account (...) of his life and works, and of the uses and abuses to which subsequent generations had put his ideas. Without ignoring or downplaying the ugliness of many of Nietzsche's proclamations, he set them in the context of his work as a whole and of the counterexamples yielded by a responsible reading of his books. More positively, he presented Nietzsche's ideas about power as one of the great accomplishments of modern philosophy, arguing that his conception of the "will to power" was not a crude apology for ruthless self-assertion but must be linked to Nietzsche's equally profound ideas about sublimation. He also presented Nietzsche as a pioneer of modern psychology and argued that a key to understanding his overall philosophy is to see it as a reaction against Christianity. Many scholars in the past half century have taken issue with some of Kaufmann's interpretations, but the book ranks as one of the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. Featuring a new foreword by Alexander Nehamas, this Princeton Classics edition of Nietzsche introduces a new generation of readers to one the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. (shrink)

I argue for the use of the adjunction operator (adding a single new element to an existing set) as a basis for building a finitary set theory. It allows a simplified axiomatization for the first-order theory of hereditarily finite sets based on an induction schema and a rigorous characterization of the primitive recursive set functions. The latter leads to a primitive recursive presentation of arithmetical operations on finite sets.

John Searle est l'un des plus grands philosophes contemporains. Tout au long d'une trajectoire intellectuelle originale, il a forgé des concepts analytiques ingénieux dont la portée dépasse le cadre de la philosophie puisqu'il vise à inscrire dans une même armature naturaliste le langage, l'esprit et la société. Il manquait au lecteur curieux un guide susceptible de l'orienter dans cette oeuvre, plus complexe qu'il n'y paraît. Un des objectifs du Monde selon Searle est précisément d'introduire et d'illustrer, dans un langage accessible (...) aux non-spécialistes, l'architecture conceptuelle et les enjeux de ses réflexions. Mais il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un ouvrage introductif ; Fabrice Clément et Laurence Kaufmann adoptent une posture critique par rapport à un système de pensée fondamentalement individualiste qui fait du monde social et du rapport à autrui une option facultative. (shrink)

For Kant right and ethics are two formally distinct departments of a single morality of reason and freedom. Unlike ethics, right involves an authorization to coerce, and this coercion serves as a pathological incentive. I argue that for Kant the distinctive character of right flows from the fact that juridical obligation has a different relational structure than ethical obligation. I argue that this relational structure explains the connection of right to coercion, and also explains how a categorical imperative can be (...) known a priori to issue in both a pathological and non-pathological incentive. Thus the justification of coercion and its special role as incentive are rooted in the relational character of juridical obligations, and so ultimately in categorical imperatives of reason. Since this pathological incentive has a moral basis in the structure of juridical obligations, and so ultimately in a representation of moral laws, I argue that Kant’s discussion of the juridical incentive of coercion is more continuous with his main discussion of moral incentives in the Critique of Practical Reason than it might at first appear. I illustrate the consequences of this reading by discussing the propensity to injustice, as Kant understands it, and the unique way in which the juridical incentive undermines it. (shrink)

Despite the growing public awareness of social sustainability issues, little is known about what drives firms to emphasize social criteria in their supplier management practices and what the precise benefits of such efforts are. This is especially true for relationships with international suppliers from the world's emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Building on stakeholder theory, we address the issue by examining how pressures from customers, the government, and employees as primary constituencies of the firm determine the (...) extent to which firms consider social aspects in the selection of emerging economy suppliers. Further, we analyze how such socially sustainable supplier selection relates to the capabilities of the firm's suppliers, its market reputation, and the learning in its supply management organization. We test the developed research framework empirically using data from 244 U. S. and German corporations. Our findings, consistent with our hypothesized model, suggest that middle-level supply managers as internal stakeholders play a major driving role for firms' socially sustainable supplier selection, and that strong positive links exist between that selection and the investigated outcomes. (shrink)

John Rawls divides this theory into two parts that he calls ideal and nonideal theory. In this essay I argue that Rawls runs together two quite different conceptions of this dyad corresponding to the idea of strict compliance and realistic utopia respectively. These conceptions employ different criteria of classification, are motivated by different concerns, and have different practical upshots. I present a view that combines the two coherently on Rawls’ behalf while remaining true to his intentions. But I argue that (...) even this amended view is unsatisfactory. Although the realistic utopia conception is well motivated, strict compliance is problematic. The upshot is that we can embrace the division of the theory of justice into ideal and nonideal theory, while rejecting the strict compliance understanding of ideal theory. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.

Over the past thirty-five years, there has been an explosive increase in scientists' ability to explain the structure and functioning of the human brain. While psychology has advanced our understanding of human behavior, various other sciences, such as anatomy, physiology, and biology, have determined the critical importance of synapses and, through the use of advanced technology, made it possible actually to see brain cells at work within the skull's walls. Here Jean-Pierre Changeux elucidates our current knowledge of the human brain, (...) taking an interdisciplinary approach and explaining in layman's terms the complex theories and scientific breakthroughs that have significantly improved our understanding in the twentieth century. (shrink)

This major work by Laurence Lampert provides a new interpretation of modern philosophy by developing Nietzsche's view that genuine philosophers set out to determine the direction of culture through their ideas and that they conceal the radical nature of their thought by their esoteric style. From this Nietzschean perspective, Francis Bacon and René Descartes can be considered the founders of modernity. Lampert argues that Bacon's positive claims for science aimed to destroy the dominance of Christianity. Descartes continued Bacon's radical (...) program while providing it with the mathematical physics required for its success. Far from being solely an epistemological and metaphysical thinker, says Lampert, Descartes was a master writer whose comic ridicule helped bring down the Church to which he paid lip service. Both Bacon and Descartes used the Platonic art of dissimulation to achieve their ends by making their revolutionary aims appear compatible with Christianity. Once we recognize Bacon and Descartes as legislators of modern times in a specifically Nietzschean sense, we can also see Nietzsche in a new way—as the first thinker to have understood modern times and transcended it in a postmodern worldview. According to Lampert, Nietzsche provides a new foundation for culture, a joyous science that reveals the grandeur and purposeless play of the cosmic whole and yet avoids enervating despair or destructive, dogmatic belief. (shrink)

Conditionals with conditional constituents pose challenges for _the Thesis_, the idea that the probability of a conditional is the corresponding conditional probability. This note is concerned with two proposals for overcoming those challenges, both inspired by early work of van Fraassen: the _Bernoulli Semantics_ associated with Stalnaker and Jeffrey, and augmented with a mechanism for obtaining “local probabilities” by Kaufmann; and a proposal by Bacon which I dub _Ordinal Semantics_. Despite differences in mathematical details and emphasis of presentation, both (...) proposals lend themselves for use as a basis for a modal-theoretic interpretation of embedded conditionals. The goal of this note is to compare the two frameworks by implementing a model for the interpretation of conditionals in each, based on the same underlying probability model for non-conditional sentences. I show that in the Ordinal model, certain sentences are assigned probabilities that do not accord with intuitions. This problem is familiar from the literature on Bernoulli models and can be addressed by introducing Kaufmann-style local probabilities into Ordinal models. I then show that Bernoulli Semantics has other limitations, in that it assigns probabilities in violation of the Thesis to certain very complex formulas. The upshot is that a fusion of the theories may be our best shot at getting the predictions right. (shrink)

We present a novel, perspicuous framework for building iterated ultrapowers. Furthermore, our framework naturally lends itself to the construction of a certain type of order indiscernibles, here dubbed tight indiscernibles, which are shown to provide smooth proofs of several results in general model theory.

This paper explores ethical issues raised by quadratic voting. We compare quadratic voting to majority voting from two ethical perspectives: the perspective of utilitarianism and that of democratic theory. From a utilitarian standpoint, the comparison is ambiguous: if voter preferences are independent of wealth, then quadratic voting out- performs majority voting, but if voter preferences are polarized by wealth, then majority voting may be superior. From the standpoint of democratic theory, we argue that assess- ments in terms of efficiency are (...) too narrow. Voting institutions and political institutions more generally face a legitimacy requirement. We argue that in the presence of inequalities of wealth, any vote buying mechanism, including quadratic voting, will have a difficult time meeting this requirement. (shrink)

Managed care employs two business tools of managed practice that raise important ethical issues: paying physicians in ways that impose conflicts of interest on them; and regulating physicians' clinical judgment, decision making, and behavior. The literature on the clinical ethics of managed care has begun to develop rapidly in the past several years. Professional organizations of physicians have made important contributions to this literature. The statements on ethical issues in managed care of four such organizations are considered here, the American (...) Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Three themes common to these statements are identified and critically assessed: the primacy of meeting the medical needs of each individual patient; disclosure of conflicts of interest in how physicians are paid; and opposition to gag orders. The paper concludes with an argument for a basic concept in the clinical ethics of managed care: physicians and institutions as economically disciplined moral co-fiduciaries of populations of patients. (shrink)

Nancy Jecker (2013) mounts a sustained and formidable critique of Norman Daniels's prudential lifespan account (PLA) as a reliable basis for justice between age groups in the responsible allocation...

This anthology of readings in the survey of Western philosophy--from the Ancient Greeks to the 20th Century--is designed to be accessible to today's readers. Striking a balance between major and minor figures, it features the best available translations of texts--complete works or complete selections of works-- which are both central to each philosopher's thought and are widely accepted as part of the canon. The selections are readable and accessible, while still being faithful to the original. Includes Introductions to each historical (...) period and to each philosopher, and an abundance of drawings, diagrams, photographs, and a timeline. This Combined Volume contains the most important works from Baird's Philosophic Classics, Volumes I-V. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Plato. Aristotle. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Epicurus. Epictetus. Plotinus. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. Augustine. Boethius. Anselm (and Guanilo). Moses Maimonides. Thomas Aquinas. William of Ockham. Pico Della Mirandola. MODERN PHILOSOPHY. Ren Descartes. Thomas Hobbes. Blaise Pascal. Baruch Spinoza. John Locke. Gottfried Leibniz. George Berkeley. David Hume. Immanuel Kant. NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. G.W.F. Hegel. John Stuart Mill. Soren Kierkegaard. Karl Marx. Friedrich Nietzsche. TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. Edmund Husserl. Bertrand Russell. Martin Heidegger. Ludwig Wittgenstein. A.J. Ayer. Jean-Paul Sartre. Willard Van Orman Quine. Jacques Derrida. For anyone interested in Philosophy, History of Philosophy, or History of Intellectual Thought. (shrink)

Plato’s dialogues show Socrates at different ages, beginning when he was about nineteen and already deeply immersed in philosophy and ending with his execution five decades later. By presenting his model philosopher across a fifty-year span of his life, Plato leads his readers to wonder: does that time period correspond to the development of Socrates’ thought? In this magisterial investigation of the evolution of Socrates’ philosophy, Laurence Lampert answers in the affirmative. The chronological route that Plato maps for us, (...) Lampert argues, reveals the enduring record of philosophy as it gradually took the form that came to dominate the life of the mind in the West. The reader accompanies Socrates as he breaks with the century-old tradition of philosophy, turns to his own path, gradually enters into a deeper understanding of nature and human nature, and discovers the successful way to transmit his wisdom to the wider world. Focusing on the final and most prominent step in that process and offering detailed textual analysis of Plato’s _Protagoras_, _Charmides_, and _Republic_, _How Philosophy Became Socratic_ charts Socrates’ gradual discovery of a proper politics to shelter and advance philosophy. (shrink)

Descartes a entrepris de détruire la pratique aristotélicienne de la philosophie : à son savoir seulement probable, les Regulae, puis les Essais opposent une science certaine d'objets clairs et distincts. Mais cette instauration concerne aussi, peut-être même d'abord, l'idéal pratique qu'Aristote ne cesse de viser dans les sciences théorétiques : le sage parvient à la félicité par l'exercice même d'une connaissance si parfaite qu'elle imite celle du dieu, qui pense sa pensée en acte et éternellement. Descartes met décidément en crise (...) la félicité par la contemplation, dont la pensée médiévale avait hérité d'Aristote. Pourtant, une autre figure de la félicité se dégage tout aussi indiscutablement de l'entreprise cartésienne : la méthode, la certitude scientifique qu'elle permet et les principes métaphysiques qui assurent l'une et l'autre restent, à chaque moment, solidaires d'une attitude et d'une ambition proprement morales - la volonté infinie aboutit à la générosité, où la considération du bon usage de notre libre-arbitre permet le - contentement de soi-même -. Ainsi la philosophie atteint-elle, pour Descartes aussi, à une félicité. Mais à une félicité volontaire et non plus contemplative. On tentera donc d'abord de mesurer, dans différents champs de la philosophie cartésienne, l'impact de la certitude jusque sur les questions d'éthique ; ensuite, de souligner la référence constante, quoique souvent implicite, de Descartes à la félicité telle qu'Aristote la visait ; enfin, de suivre leur dialogue au fil conducteur de leurs versions divergentes, mais complices, de l'admiratio et du thaumazein. (shrink)

What does a Utilitarian mean by happiness when he says that it is the good? Specifically, pleasure. But how many different kinds of experiences are included under this term? It appears that as the word was used by Bentham, and indeed by almost all other hedonists, it had so wide an extension that it included all experiences not properly termed "unhappiness." Partly, however, because of the identification of happiness with pleasure and the absence of pain, and partly because of a (...) failure to emphasize by frequent explanation the difference between the meanings of terms as used by hedonists and the same terms in common usage, there has existed at all times a disposition to assume that hedonists intended a narrower meaning than they actually did. Even in hedonistic writings there has been a tendency to make a distinction between the usages accorded "pleasure" and "happiness," the former as used more frequently to refer to pleasures of the moment, and the latter to a long continued state of felicific feeling; or a distinction is made between "pleasure" as used when referring to happiness which has an immediately obvious physiological origin and "happiness" to felicific feeling of all types. Nevertheless, the terms are not used consistently in this way, and on the whole it would be better to think of "pleasure" and "happiness" as interchangeable in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and many others. (shrink)

Das allgemeine Prinzip der „Relativität der Begriffe” — vom Verfasser a. a. O. dargelegt — behauptet, dass ein und dieselbe Situation der Wirklichkeit auf verschiedene Weisen beschrieben werden kann, die sprachlich und begrifflich zwar verschieden sein mögen, doch grundsätzlich die gleichen bleiben. Die verbalen oder begrifflichen Unterschiede führen uns zu der falschen Annahme, dass den Elementen, welchen im Denken oder im sprachlichen Ausdruck weniger Bedeutung zugemessen wird, auch weniger Bedeuten in Wirklichkeit zukommen, oder dass sie weniger real sind.Die bedeutendste Anwendung (...) dieser Lehre auf die Biologie betrifft die Interpretation des „Individuellen”. Soll man das Individuum als eine Einheit verstehen, oder kommt der Begriff der Einheit einerseits den Teilen zu, wie z. B. Zellen, Molekülen und Atomen, oder andererseits höheren und synthetischen Einheiten wie z.B. Klassen, Arten, dem „élan vital”, u.s.w. ? Alle diese drei Ansichten haben etwas für sich, doch stehen auch jeder entscheidende Gegengründe gegenüber, so dass die einzig-mögliche Schlussfolgerung die Annahme der Begriffsrelativität ist. Jeder der drei Standpunkte ist nur in so weit wahr, als er etwas Positives beibringt, falsch jedoch solange er nur die beiden andern leugnet.Le principe de la relativité des concepts, ayant une application générale dans toutes: parties de la philosophie et de la science, est développé ailleurs par l'auteur. Ce principe propose qu'une situation quelconque peut être discutée dans plusieurs manières, se différant entre elles dans le choix des mots ou des concepts, tout en étant au fond indentiques. Les differences linguistiques ou conceptuelles nous mènent à l'assomption fausse que les éléments moins importants dans la pensée ou dans le langage sont moins importants dans la nature, ou même que ces éléments sont moins réels.En biologie, ce principe a une importance notable en ce qui concerne l'interprétation de l'individu. Doit-on entendre par l'individu les cellules, les molécules, les atomes, et les autres éléments qui le composent; ou bien l'individu même; ou encore doit-on oublier et l'individu et les éléments qui le composent, et baser sa philosophie sur les entités synthétiques telles que les espèces, les genres, et l'élan vital ? Chacune de ces trois opinions a des considérations en sa faveur; mais chacune d'elles se bute à des objections plus considérables encore qui l'empêchent d'être acceptée. La seule conclusion qui semble être possible est l'adoption du principe de la relativité des concepts, et l'assomption que chaque manière d'envisager l'individu est valide tant qu'elle a quelque chose de positif à dire; chaque manière est fausse quand elle nie Ja validité des autres points de vue. (shrink)